

PLOTINUS

WITH AN ENGLISH TRANSLATION BY

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IN SEVEN VOLUMES

VII

ENNEADS
VI. 6-9



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PREFACE

TO LOEB PLOTINUS VI-VII

The text of these volumes corresponds to that of the third volume of the revised *editio minor* of Henry and Schwyzer (*Plotini Opera III*, Oxford Classical Texts, 1982), with correction of printers' errors and a few changes in punctuation, except in the following places, where the changes are indicated in the critical notes:

vol. VI	vol. VII
VI. 1. 12. 38	VI. 7. 1. 48-9
VI. 2. 5. 5	VI. 7. 7. 25
VI. 2. 9. 21	VI. 7. 7. 26-8
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VI. 4. 3. 15	VI. 8. 14. 19
VI. 5. 8. 29-31	VI. 8. 18. 29
VI. 5. 10. 44	VI. 8. 21. 23
VI. 5. 12. 6	

Indices have not been provided. The availability of the recently published *Lexicon Plotinianum* (by J. H. Sleeman and Gilbert Pollet: Leiden and Leuven 1980) makes the provision of a selective word-index unnecessary and likely to be misleading; and the *Index Fontium* in *Plotini Opera III* (see above), while not complete, is very extensive and must be referred to by anyone seriously interested in the sources of

PREFACE

Plotinus; work on its revision and expansion is continuing.

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A. H. ARMSTRONG.

SIGLA

A	= Laurentianus 87, 3.
A ¹	= codicis A primus corrector.
E	= Parisinus Gr. 1976.
B	= Laurentianus 85, 15.
R	= Vaticanus Reginensis Gr. 97.
J	= Parisinus Gr. 2082.
U	= Vaticanus Urbinas Gr. 62.
C	= Monacensis Gr. 449.
Q	= Marcianus Gr. 242.
w	= AE
x	= RJ
mg	= in margine
ac	= ante correctionem
pc	= post correctionem
H-S ¹	= Henry-Schwyzer, editio maior
H-S ²	= Henry-Schwyzer, editio minor (— OCT)

VI. 6. ON NUMBERS

Introductory Note

THIS treatise is number 34 in Porphyry's chronological order. It immediately follows the work now generally referred to as the "Gross-Schrift" or "Great Work", which Porphyry so strangely divided into four and placed in three different Enneads (see Introductory Note to III, 8), so that in his Ennead edition it appears as III. 8 (30), V. 8 (31), V. 5 (32) and II. 9 (33). V. 5 contains a brief account of what Plotinus thought about the One and numbers in chapters 4 and 5, and the present treatise is announced at the end of chapter 4: "If there are any difficulties about this, we will deal with them later." The status of numbers in the intelligible world and the generation of Numbers and Forms from ultimate principles, the One and the Indefinite Dyad, had been matters of interest and importance to Platonists since the lifetime of Plato himself, especially to those who were influenced by that side of their traditional inheritance which goes back to the Pythagoreans. Between the time of the revival of Platonism and Pythagoreanism in the first century B.C. and the time of Plotinus a considerable numerological literature had developed. But his treatise on Numbers is not at all closely related to it. His thought here is outstandingly original and independent and his interest in numbers is subordinate to his great primary concerns, to show how all reality proceeds in due order from its source, the One or Good, and how the human spirit may find its way back to that source, which is also its goal. He looks back to the discussions about the Ideal Numbers which took place in the Academy in the lifetime of Plato (about which he does not appear to know more than the scanty

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and baffling surviving evidence permits us to). And he takes account of Aristotle's discussions of the Ideal Numbers in Books A, M and N of the *Metaphysics* and of such limited light as the Aristotelian commentators read in his school, notably Alexander of Aphrodisias (see Porphyry *Life* chapter 14), could throw on these passages of Aristotle. But he does not seem to have been very much interested in or affected by the Pythagorean or Pythagoreanizing numerologists. The differences between their surviving works and the thought of Plotinus about the Ideal Numbers and the One are well described in the introduction to the recent Paris edition of VI. 6: "The two principal themes developed in this treatise, which are the problem of infinite number (chs. 1–3 and 17–18) and the status of number in the intelligible (chs. 4–16), do not derive from the current arithmological tradition. On the other hand, this tradition is distinguished by two very widespread characteristics: it includes a technical initiation into arithmetic and culminates in a theology and mysticism of numbers ... Now Plotinus shows himself very reserved about the number-mysticism which was so much in favour before, as after, his time. As for his arithmetical knowledge, it is indisputable, but it does not seem to have been encumbered by technical detail"¹ (cp. Porphyry *Life* ch. 14, 7–10).

There is however one passage from a Pythagorean numerological writer, Moderatus of Gades, who seems to have been of some philosophical importance and whose thought in some ways anticipated the Neoplatonism of Plotinus,² the beginning of which is worth quoting in conclusion as it has something in common with the approach of Plotinus and shows why he would have

¹ Plotin *Traité Sur les Nombres* (*Ennéade* VI 6 34), ed. with translation and commentary by Janine Bertier and others (Paris 1980), Introduction pp. 9–10.

² On Moderatus see J. Dillon *The Middle Platonists* (London 1977) 344–51.

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thought it necessary to take speculation about numbers seriously. It is to be found in Porphyry's *Life of Pythagoras* 48–53: "Moderatus says that the Pythagoreans, since they were not able to express clearly in words the first forms and the first principles because they were so hard to understand and hard to explain, turned to the numbers for the sake of intelligible instruction." For Plotinus not only the One but the realities of the intelligible world are strictly beyond the reach of discursive thought and language. But the traditional number-language, like other kinds of language, may instruct us and help us on our way to the direct apprehension of them which is our goal.

Synopsis

Is multiplicity, as a falling away from the One, and so infinity as innumerable multiplicity, evil? Yes, in so far as it is a self-dissipation of a thing's self, a going outwards instead of inwards. But it can be limited and made good and beautiful by unitary and unifying form (ch. 1). The "number of the infinite" is not in the sense-world. Number is not created by the numberer; it is limited in the intelligible world but we multiply it subjectively (ch. 2). How can the infinite really exist as infinite (or undetermined), when what exists is already determined by number? Multiplicity in the real intelligible world is not evil, though lower than the One, because it is determined and unified by the One; but it is the infinite (undetermined) which is limited. Infinity is not in motion or at rest; difficulty of focusing the mind on this slippery nature (ch. 3). Different ways of thinking about intelligible numbers: are they posterior to the Forms or co-ordinate with them or prior to them? Difficulties in the interpretation of Plato on number (ch. 4). Numbers cannot be simply incidental even if inevitable accompaniments of Forms; they must have some kind of prior independent existence (ch. 5). Refutation of a subjective-idealistic view of Forms and

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Numbers: thought does not make intelligible realities but they make our thought of them (ch. 6). The wonderful unity in diversity of Intellect, in which all realities are together, which Soul loves and aspires to; how to attain to contemplation of that reality (chs. 7–8). The order of the primary triad: Being before Intellect, Intellect before Life; the real numbers are in and prior to Being; quantitative number is an image of them (chs. 8–9). Continuing argument for the priority and independent existence of all number, not only the one (chs. 10–11). Refutation of the Stoic view that one and number have no real existence but are ways in which the soul is affected when it encounters things: the one and number are prior to thought and to substance (chs. 12–13). Number cannot be reduced to relation (ch. 14). Intellect is the true universal living being in which all living things exist together, and our universe imitates it; in both, numbers are prior to and generate beings (ch. 15). Quantitative number is secondary and depends for its existence on substantial number in Intellect and in the soul (ch. 16). The infinity or unlimitedness of intelligible number is not like the subjective unlimitedness of a line; line and figure are posterior to number, but have a real existence in the real living being and in Intellect (ch. 17). Number in the intelligible is unlimited only in the sense that it is absolute measure and cannot be measured by anything else. Concluding vision of the beauty and majesty of the intelligible world (ch. 18).

VI. 6 (34) ΠΕΡΙ ΑΡΙΘΜΩΝ

1. Ἡστὶ τὸ πλῆθος ἀπόστασις τοῦ ἐνὸς καὶ ἡ ἀπειρία ἀπόστασις παντελῆς τῷ πλήθισ αὐτάριθμον εἶναι, καὶ διὰ τὸ τὸ κακὸν εἶναι, ἢ ἀπειρία, καὶ οἵμεις κακοί, ὅταν πλῆθος; καὶ γὰρ πολὺ ἔκαστον, ὅταν 5 ἀδυνατοῦν εἰς αὐτὸν καύσιν χέηται καὶ ἐκτείνηται σκιδνάμενον· καὶ πάντη μὲν στερισκόμενον ἐν τῇ χόσι 10 τοῦ ἐνὸς πλῆθος γίνεσθαι, οὐκ ὄντος τοῦ ἄλλο πρὸς ἄλλο μέρος αὐτοῦ ἐναύντος· εἰ δέ τι γένοιτο ἀεὶ χεόμενον μένον, μέγεθος γίνεται, ἀλλὰ τί δεινὸν τῷ μεγέθει; ἢ εἰ 15 ἥσθανετο. Τὴν ἀντί οὐφέτη ἔαυτον γὰρ γινόμενον καὶ ἀφιστάμενον εἰς τὸ πόρρω ἥσθανετο. ἔκαστον γὰρ οὐκ ἄλλο, ἀλλ' αὐτὸ ζητεῖ, ἢ δ' ἔξω πορεία μάταιος ἢ 20 ἀναγκαία. μᾶλλον δέ ἔστιν ἔκαστον, οὐχ ὅτιν γένεται πολὺ ἢ μέγα, ἀλλ' ὅταν ἔαυτοῦ ἢ ἔαυτοῦ δ' ἔστι πρὸς αὐτὸ νεκευκός. η δέ ἔφεσις ἢ πρὸς τὸ οὖτως μέγα 25 ἀγνοοῦντός ἔστι τὸ ὄντως μέγα καὶ σπεύδοντος οὐχ οὐδεῖ, ἀλλὰ πρὸς τὸ ἔξω· τὸ δὲ πρὸς αὐτὸ τὸ ἔνδον θη. μαρτύριον δέ τὸ γενόμενον μεγέθει, εἰ μὲν ἀπηρτη-

¹ Plotinus begins here with a traditional Neo-

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1. Is multiplicity a falling away from the One, and infinity a total falling away because it is an innumerable multiplicity and for this reason is evil in so far as it is infinity, and are we evil when we are multiplicity? For a thing is multiple when, unable to tend to itself, it pours out and is extended in scattering; and when it is utterly deprived of the one in its outpouring it becomes multiplicity, since there is nothing to unite one part of it to another; but if something comes to be which abides in its outpouring, it becomes a magnitude. But what is there dreadful about magnitude? Now, if a thing perceived it, it would be dreadful; for it would perceive that it had come to be out of itself and had gone far away from itself. For everything seeks not another, but itself, and the journey to the exterior is foolish or compulsory. A thing exists more, not when it comes to be many or large, but when it belongs to itself; and it belongs to itself in tending to itself. But the desire to be great in this way is the property of something which does not know what true greatness is and is hastening not where it should but to the exterior; but the direction towards itself was inward. A sign of this is that when a thing comes to exist in magnitude, if it is by separation of parts, it exists as each

Pythagorean view of the evil of multiplicity and infinity (or indefiniteness), which, in his usual way, he modifies in the direction of a more positive valuation of multiplicity and number as the treatise continues. Cp. ch. 3, 7-9.

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μένον, ὡς ἔκαστον τῶν μερῶν αὐτοῦ εἶναι, ἔκεῖνα
εἶναι ἔκαστα, ἀλλ' οὐκ αὐτὸ τὸ ἔξ ἀρχῆς· εἰ δὲ ἔσται
αὐτό, δεῖ τὰ πάντα μέρη πρὸς ἓν ὥστε εἶναι αὐτό, διαν
ἀμηγέπη ἐν, μὴ μέγα, γ. γίνεται τούνν διὰ μὲν τὸ
μέγεθος, καὶ ὅσον ἐπὶ τῷ μεγέθει ἀπολλύμενον αὐτοῦ· ὁ
τι δὲ ἔχει ἐν, ἔχει ἔανισ. καὶ μὴν τὸ πᾶν μέγα καὶ καλόν.
ἢ ὅτι οὐδὲ ἀφείθη φυγέν εἰς τὴν ἀπειρίαν, ἀλλὰ
25 περιελήφθη ἐν· καὶ καλὸν οὐ τῷ μέγᾳ, ἀλλὰ τῷ καλῷ·
καὶ ἔστητο τοῦ καλοῦ, ὅτι ἔγένετο μέγα. ἐπεὶ ἔρημον ὁν
τοῦτο, διφερε μέγα, τόσῳ ἀν κατεφάνη αἰσχρόν· καὶ οὕτω
τὸ μέγα ὄλη τοῦ καλοῦ, ὅτι πολὺ τὸ δεόμενον κόσμου.
μᾶλλον οὖν ἕκαστον τὸ μέγα καὶ μᾶλλον αἰσχρόν.

2. Τί οὖν ἐπὶ τοῦ λεγομένου ἀριθμοῦ τῆς ἀπειρίας;
ἀλλὰ πρῶτον πῶς ἀριθμός, εἰ ἀπειρος; οὔτε γὰρ τὰ
αισθητὰ ἀπειρα. ὥστε οὐδὲ ὁ ἐπ' αὐτούς ἀριθμός, οὔτε ὁ
ἀριθμὸν τὴν ἀπειρίαν ἀριθμεῖ· ἀλλὰ καν διπλάσια ἢ
δ πολλαπλάσια ποιῇ, δρίζει ταῦτα, καν πρὸς τὸ μέλλον ἢ
τὸ παρελλιθὸς λαμβάνῃ ἢ καὶ ὅμοῦ, δρίζει ταῦτα. ἀρ'
οὖν οὐχ ἀπλῶς ἀπειρος, οὕτω δέ, ὥστε ἀεὶ ἔξειναι
λαμβάνειν; ἢ οὐκ ἐπὶ τῷ ἀριθμοῦ τὸ γεννᾶν, ἀλλ' ἡδη
ώρισται καὶ ἔστηκεν. ἢ ἐν μὲν τῷ νοητῷ ὥστερ τὰ οὗτα
10 οὕτω καὶ ὁ ἀριθμὸς ὠρισμένος ὅσος τὰ οὗτα. ἡμεῖς δὲ
ὡς τὸν ἀνθρωπὸν πολλὰ ποιοῦμεν ἐφαρμόζοντες
πολλάκις καὶ τὸ καλὸν καὶ τὰ ἄλλα, οὕτω μετὰ τοῦ

¹ The text of Plato referred to here seems to be the mention of ἀπειρος ἀριθμός at *Parmenides* 144A6, cp. Aristotle *Metaphysics* M 8. 1083b36-1084a1.

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and every one of its parts, and they each of them exist, but not the original thing itself; but if it is going to be itself, all its parts must tend to one: so that it is itself when it is one in some way, not large. So through magnitude and as far as depends on magnitude it loses itself; but as far as it possesses a one, it possesses itself. Yet, all the same, the universe is large and beautiful. This is because it has not been left to escape into infinity, but has been circumscribed by one; and it is beautiful not by largeness but by beauty; and it needed beauty because it became large. For if this universe was destitute [of beauty] it would have appeared as ugly as it was large; and so largeness is the matter of beauty, because what needed ordered beauty was many. Therefore the largeness [of the universe] is rather lacking in ordered beauty and rather ugly [than beautiful].

2. What, then, about what is called the number of the infinite?¹ But first, how is it a number, if it is infinite? For the objects of sense are not infinite, so their number is not infinite either, and the numberer does not number infinity; but, even if he makes them twice or many times as many, he limits them, and even if he takes into account the past or the future or both at once, he limits them. Is then the number not simply infinite, but so that we can always take more? No, the generation of number is not in the power of the numberer, but it is already limited and stands fast. Or, in the intelligible, just as the real beings are limited so is the number limited to as many as the real beings. But we, just as we make "man" many by many times applying beauty and the rest to him, so along with each image we generate an

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ειδώλον ἐκάστου καὶ εἴδωλον ἀριθμοῦ συναπογεννώμεν,
καὶ ὡς τὸ ἄστυ πολλαπλασιούμεν οὐχ ὑφεστὸς
15 οὔτε, τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον καὶ τυῆς ἀριθμούς πολυ-
πλασίους ποιούμεν· καὶ εἰ τοὺς χρόνους δὲ ἀριθμοῖμεν,
ἀφ' ἀντὸν ἔχομεν ἀριθμῶν ἐπάγομεν ἐπὶ τοὺς χρόνους
μενόντιν ἐν ἴριν ἐκείνων.

3. Ἀλλὰ τὸ ἀπειρον δὴ τούτο πῶς ὑφέστηκεν ὃν
ἀπειρον; ὁ γάρ ὑφέστηκε καὶ ἔστιν, ἀριθμῷ
κατεύληπται ἥδη, ἀλλὰ πρότερον, εἰ ἐν τοῖς οὖσιν ὅντες
πλήθης, πῶς κακὸν τὸ πλήθος; ἢ ὅτι ἥμωται τὸ πλήθος
5 καὶ κεκώλυται πάντη πλήθος εἰνπι ἐν τὸν πλήθος, καὶ διὰ
τούτο δὲ ἐλαττούτων τοῦ ἐνός, ὅτι πλήθος ἔχει, καὶ ὅσουν
πρὸς τὸ ἐν χειρού καὶ οὐκ ἔχον δὲ τὴν φύσιν ἐκείνουν,
ἀλλὰ ἐκβεβηκός, ἥλαττωται, τῷ δὲ ἐν παρ' ἐκάνψῃ τὸ
σεμνὸν ἔχει, καὶ ἀνέστρεψε δὲ τὸ πλήθος εἰς ἐν καὶ
10 ἔμεινεν. ἀλλ' ἡ ἀπειρία πῶς; ἡ γὰρ οὐδσα ἐν τοῖς οὖσιν
ἥθη ὥρισται, ἢ εἰ μὴ ὥρισται, οὐκ ἐν τοῖς οὖσιν, ἀλλ' ἐν
τοῖς γινομένοις ἵσως, ὡς κάν¹ τῷ χρόνῳ. ἢ κάν ορισθῇ,
τούτῳ γε ἀπειρος οὐ γάρ τὸ πέρας, ἀλλὰ τὸ ἀπειρον
δρᾶται· οὐ γὰρ δὴ ἀλλο τι μεταξὺ πέρατος καὶ ἀπειρον,
15 ὁ τὴν τοῦ ὄρου δέχεται φύσιν. τούτο δὴ τὸ ἀπειρον
φεύγει μὲν αὐτὸ τὴν τοῦ πέρατος ἰδέαν, ἀλίσκεται δὲ
περιληφθὲν ἔξωθεν. φεύγει δὲ οὐκ εἰς τόπον ἄλλον ἐξ

¹ Igal: *καὶ* Enn.

² The idea of subjective, imaginary multiplication here derives from Aristotle *Physics* Γ 8. 208a15–20.

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image of number, and, as we multiply the town though it does not really exist as multiple, in the same way we also multiply the numbers¹; and if we should be numbering times, we apply numbers to them from those which we have, and those numbers still remain within us.

3. But how can this infinite really exist as infinite? For what really exists and is, is already determined by number. But before we consider that, if there is really multiplicity in the real beings, how is multiplicity evil? Now [multiplicity there is not evil] because the multiplicity is unified and not allowed to be altogether multiplicity, being a one-multiple. And because of this it is less than the One, because it has multiplicity, and in so far as it is compared with the One, it is worse; and since it does not have the nature of that One; but has gone out from it, it has been diminished, but it keeps its majesty by the one in it, and it turned back its multiplicity to one and there it stayed. But how about infinity? For if it exists in the real beings it has already been limited, or if it has not been limited, it is not in the real beings, but perhaps in the things which come to be, as also in time.² Now even if it is limited, it is by this very fact infinite [or unlimited]; for it is not limit but the unlimited which is limited [or bounded]; for there is certainly nothing else between limit and unlimited which receives the nature of boundary. This infinity, certainly, in itself runs away from the idea of limit, but is caught by being surrounded externally. But it does not run away from one place to another: for it does not even

² Cp. Aristotle *Physics* Γ 7. 207b14–15.

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έπέρουν οὐ γάρ οὐδέ ἔχει τόπον· ἀλλ' ὅταν ἀλῷ, ὑπέση τόπος. διὸ οὐδὲ τὴν λεγομένην κίνησιν αὐτῆς τοπικὴν 20 θετέον οὐδέ τινα ἄλλην τῶν λεγομένων αὐτῇ παρ' αὐτῆς ὑπάρχειν· ὥστε οὐδέ ἀν κινοῖτο. ἀλλ' οὐδέ ἔστηκεν αὖτοῦ γάρ τοῦ ποὺς ὕστερον γενομένου; ἀλλ' ἔστιν η κίνησις αὐτῆς τῆς ἀπειράς οὕτω λέγευσθαι, ὅπερ μὴ μένει. ἀρ' οὖν οὕτως ἔχει, ὡς μετέωρος εἶναι ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ, η αἰωροῖσθαι ἐκεῖνος καὶ διέρος; αἰδηποῦτος ἄμφω 25 γάρ πρὸς τὸν αὐτὸν τόπον κρίνεται, τό τε μετέωρον οὐ παρεγκλῖνον [πρὸς τὸν αὐτὸν τόπον]¹ καὶ τὸ παρεγκλῖνον. τί ἀν οὖν τις ἐπινοήσειν αὐτήν; η χωρίσας τὸ εἴδος τῆς διανούας. τί οὖν νοήσει; η τὰ ἐναντία ἀμα καὶ οὐ τὰ ἐναντία· καὶ γάρ μέγα καὶ σμικρὸν 30 νοήσει—γίνεται γάρ ἄμφω—καὶ ἔστως καὶ κινούμενον—καὶ γάρ ταῦτα γίνεται. ἀλλὰ πρὸ τοῦ γίνεσθαι δῆλον, ὅπερ οὐδέτερον ὥρισμένως· εἰ δὲ μή, ἀριστας εἰ οὐν ἀπειρος καὶ ταῦτα ἀπείρως καὶ ἀωρίστως, φαντασθείη γ' ἀν ἐκάτερα. καὶ προσελθὼν ἐγγὺς μὴ ἐπιβάλλων τι πέρις ὥσπερ διετωρ 35 ὑπεκφεύγουσαν ἔξεις καὶ οὐδὲ ἐν εὑρήσεις· ηδη γάρ ἀριστας. ἀλλ' εἰ τῷ προσέλθοις ὡς ἐνί, πολλὰ φανεῖται· καν πολλὰ εἴπεις, πάλιν αὐτούς οὐκ ὄντος γάρ

¹ del. Kirchhoff.

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have any place; but when it is caught, place comes into existence. Therefore one cannot assume that what is called its movement is movement in place nor does any other one of what are called forms of movement belong to it of itself; so that it would not be in motion. But on the other hand it does not stand still either: for where could it, when "where" came to be afterwards? But the movement of infinity itself seems to mean that it does not stay still. Is it then in a state of being up above in the same place, or swinging to and fro? Certainly not: for both are judged in relation to the same place, what is up there and does not swing towards the same place and that which swings. In what way, then, could one conceive infinity? By separating its form in one's reasoning. What, then, will one conceive? One will conceive it as the opposites and at the same time not the opposites: for one will conceive it as great and small¹—for it becomes both—and at rest and moving—for it does really become these. But it is obvious that before becoming them it is neither definitely: otherwise, you have limited [or defined] it. If then it is infinite, and infinitely and indefinitely infinite, it could be imagined as either. And when you come up close to it and do not throw any limit over it like a net you will have it slipping away from you and will not find it any one thing: for [if you did] you would have defined it. But if you approach any of it as one, it will appear many; and if you say that it is many, you will be wrong again: for if each [part] of it is not

¹ Aristotle records that Plato spoke of the indefinite principle of multiplicity as a dyad "great and small": see *Physics* Γ 4. 203a15–16 and *Metaphysics* Α 6. 987b26.

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έκάστου ἐνὸς οὐδὲ πολλὰ τὰ πάντα καὶ αὕτη ἡ φύσις
αὐτῆς καθ' ἔτερον τῶν φαντασμάτων κινησις, καὶ, καθὸ
προσήλθεν ἡ φυσικός, σ. ἀστις. καὶ τὸ μὴ δύνασθαι δι'
αὐτῆς αυτὴν ἴδειν, κινησις ἀπὸ νοῦ καὶ ἀπολίσθησις τὸ
δὲ μὴ ἀποδρᾶντι ἔχειν, εἴργεσθαι. δὲ ἔξωθεν καὶ κύκλῳ
καὶ μὴ ἔξειναι προχωρεῖν, στάσις ἀν εἶη· ὥστε μὴ μόνον
ἔξειναι κινεῖσθαι λέγειν

4. Περὶ δὲ τῶν ἀριθμῶν ὅπως ἔχουσιν ἐν τῷ νοητῷ
σκεπτέον, πότερα ὡς ἐπιγνομένων τοις ἄλλοις εἰδεσιν
ἢ καὶ παρακολουθούντων ἀεὶ· οἷον ἐπειδὴ τὸ ὄν
τοιοῦτον οἴον πρῶτον αὐτὸν εἶναι, ἐνοήσαμεν μονάδα,
5 εἰτ' ἐπεὶ κίνησις ἔξ αὐτοῦ καὶ στάσις, τρία ἥδη, καὶ ἐφ'
έκάστου τῶν ἄλλων ἔκαστον. ἢ οὐχ οὕτως, ἄλλα
συνεγενῆθη ἔκάστω μονάς μ' α', ἢ ἐπὶ μὲν τοῦ πρώτου
ὄντος μονάς, ἐπὶ δὲ τοῦ μετ' ἔκεινο, εἰ τάξις ἔστι, δυάς ἢ
καὶ δυον τὸ πλῆθος ἔκάστου, οἷον εἱ δέκα, δεκάς. ἢ οὐχ
10 οὕτως, ἀλλ' αυτὸς ἐφ' ἑαυτοῦ ὁ ἀριθμὸς ἐνοηθῇ καὶ εἰ
οὕτως, πότερα πρότερος τῶν ἄλλων, ἢ ὑστερός. ὁ μὲν
οὖν Πλάτων εἰς ἔνοιαν ἀριθμοῖς τοὺς ἀνθρώπους
ἐληλιθέναι εἰπὼν ἡμερῶν προς νύκτας τῇ παραλλαγῇ,
τῇ τῶν πραγμάτων ἐτερότητι διδοντι τὴν νόησιν, τάχ'
15 ἀν τὰ ἀριθμῆτα πρότερον δι' ἐτερότητος ποιεῖν ἀριθμὸν
λέγοι, κοὶ εὖντι πίττα πιναπτάμενον ἐν μεταβολεῖ ψυχῆς
ἐπεξιούσης ἄλλο μετ' ἄλλο πρᾶγμα καὶ τότε γένεσθαι,
ὅπου ἀριθμῷ ψυχῇ τοῦτο δ' ἔστι, ὅταν αὐτὰ διεξίη καὶ

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one, all of them cannot be many. And this nature of it according to one and another of your imaginations is movement, and, according as imagination has arrived at it, rest. And the impossibility of seeing it by itself is movement from intellect and slipping away; but that it cannot run away but is held fast from outside and all round and is not able to go on, this would be its rest: so that one may not say that it is only in motion.

4. But we must consider how the numbers are in the intelligible, whether as coming into existence after the other Forms or always accompanying them; for instance, since being is of such a kind as to be itself the first, we conceived it as monad, then, since movement and rest came from it, we at that stage conceived three, and a number for each of the other Forms. No, not like this, but one monad was generated along with each, or a monad for the first existent and for that after it, if there is an order, a dyad or as much as the plurality of each is, for instance a decad if it is ten. Or not like this, but number was conceived itself by itself; and if so, was it prior to the others or posterior to them? Now Plato says that men came to the idea of number by the alternation of day and night, attributing the concept to the difference of the objects; perhaps he is saying that the things numbered are prior and make number by their difference, and that it is coming into existence in the transition of soul as it goes on from one thing to another, and comes into existence when the soul numbers : that is when it goes over things

¹ Plotinus is expounding here Plato *Timaeus* 39B-C and 47A on how we come to our knowledge of number and time.

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λέγητο παρ' αὐτῇ ἄλλο, τὸ δὲ ἄλλο, ὡς, ἔως γε¹ ταῦτάν τι
20 καὶ μὴ ἔτερον μετ' αὐτῷ νοεῖ, ἐν λεγούσιντο. ἀλλὰ μήν
ὅταν λέγῃ εἰν τῷ δληθμῷ ἀμιθμῷ² καὶ τὸ ἀριθμὸν ἐν
οὐδίᾳ, πάλιν ἀντιπόστασιν τινι ἀντί³ ἔαυτοῦ τοῦ
ἀριθμού λέγοι καὶ οὐκέ τῇ ἀριθμούσῃ ὑφίστασθαι
ψυχῇ, ἀλλὰ πάντα κινητά σώματα ἐν τῇ περὶ τὰ
αἰσθητὰ παραλλαγῆς τὴν ἔννοιαν τοῦ ἀριθμοῦ

5 Τίς οὖν ἡ φύσις αὐτῶν; ἄρα παρακολούθημα καὶ οἷον ἐπιθεωριύμενον ἔκαστη οὐσίᾳ, οἷον ἀνθρώπος καὶ εἰς ἀνθρώπος, καὶ ὃν καὶ ἐν δυν., καὶ τὸ πάντα ἔκαστα τὸ νοητὸν καὶ πᾶς ὁ ἀριθμός; ἀλλὰ πῶς διάς καὶ τριάς καὶ δ πῶς τὰ πάντα καθ' ἐν καὶ ὁ ποιοῦντος ἀριθμὸς εἰς ἐν ἀν συνάργοντο; οὕτων γάρ ἔσται πλήθης μὲν ἐνάδων, εἰς ἐν δε οὐδέτες παρὸ τὸ ἀπλοῦν ἐν· εἰ μή τις λέγοι, ὡς διάς μέν ἔστιν ἐκεῖνο τὸ πράγμα, μᾶλλον δὲ τὸ ἐπὶ τῷ πράγματι θεωρούμενον, ὁ διάσ ἔχει δυνάμεις συνειλημμένας οἷον 10 σύνθετος εἰς ἐν. ἡ οἵους ἐλέγον οἱ Πυθαγόρειοι, οἱ ἑδόκουν λέγειν ἀριθμὸν ἐκ τοῦ ἀναλογού, οἷον δικυπισθνῆτ τετράδα καὶ ἄλλον ἄλλως ἐκείνως δὲ μᾶλλον τῷ πλήθε τοῦ πράγματος ἐνὸς δυνος ὅμως καὶ τὸν ἀριθμὸν συζυγή, τοσοῦτον ἐν, οἰον δεκάδα. καίτοι

¹ Kirchhülf te Enn.

¹ The *Timaeus* passages might suggest that number only exists in the numbering soul and is posterior to the visible realities numbered. So Plotinus turns immediately to *Republic* VII 529C-D, where Socrates is insisting that true, philosophical astronomy is concerned not with the visible heavenly bodies but with "true" number and figure perceptible only to thought.

² Cf. Aristotle *Metaphysics* Γ 2. 1003b22–30.

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and says in itself "this is one thing and that is another", as, for instance, as long as it thinks something the same and does not think another thing after it, it says "one". But then when Plato says "in the true number", and speaks of the number in substance,¹ he will, on the other hand, be saying that number has an existence from itself and does not have its existence in the numbering soul but the soul arouses in itself from the difference in sensible things the idea of number.

5 What, then, is the nature of number? Is it an accompaniment of each substance and something observed in it man and one man,² for instance, and being and one being, and so with all the individual intelligibles and the whole of number? But how is there a dyad and a triad and how are all unined, and how could such and such a number be brought together into one? For in this way there will be a multiplicity of unities, but no number will be brought into unity except the simple one; unless someone were to say that the dyad is that thing itself, or rather what is observed in that thing, which has two powers brought together, as if conjoined into one. Or numbers might be as the Pythagoreans said they were: they seem to have spoken of numbers analogically,³ the tetrad as justice, for instance, and other numbers in other ways; but in that way the number would be coupled with the multiplicity of the thing, which all the same is one, a one which is so many, a decad for instance. We however do not

³ Plotinus clearly has no source for early Pythagorean thought which he regards as more dependable than Aristotle. He is using here *Metaphysics* A 5 985b23-51.

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ημεῖς οὐχ οὕτω τα δέκα, ἀλλὰ συνάγοντες καὶ τὰ
 15 διεστάτα δέκα λέγομεν. η οὕτω μὲν δέκα λέγομεν, ὅταν
 οἱ εἰκόνες γνηται ἐν, δεκάδα, ὡς κάκι οὕτως. ἀλλ'
 εἰ οὕτως, ἀρ' ἔτι ὑπόστασις ἀριθμοῦ ἔσται ἐπὶ τοὺς
 πράγματαν αὐτοῦ θεωρουμένου; ἀλλὰ τί καλύτερον, φαῖται
 αὐτὸς τις, καὶ τοῦ λευκοῦ ἐπὶ τοῖς πράγμασι θεωροῦμενοι
 20 ὑπόστασιν τοῦ λευκοῦ ἐν τοῖς πράγμασι εἶναι; ἐπειὶ καὶ
 κινήσεως ἐπὶ τῷ δύντι θεωρουμένης υπόστασις ἡν
 κινήσεως ἢ τῷ δύντι οὖσῃς [ἢ δὲ ἀριθμὸς οὐχ ὡς η
 κινήσις]¹ ἀλλ' ὅτι ἡ κινήσις τι, οὕτως ἐν ἐπὶ αὐτῇς
 ἐθεωρήθη. *(ἢ δὲ ἀριθμὸς οὐχ ὡς η κινήσις)*¹ λέγεται.
 25 εἴτε καὶ ἡ τοιαύτη ὑπόστασις ἀφίστησι τὸν ἀριθμὸν τοῦ
 οὐσίαν εἶναι, συμβεβηκός δὲ μᾶλλον τοιεῖ. καίτοι οὐδὲ
 συμβεβηκός οὐλας· τὸ γὰρ συμβεβηκός δεῖ τι εἶναι πρὸ²
 τοῦ συμβεβηκέναι, κανὸν ἀχώριστον γῆ, ὅμως εἶναι τι ἐφ'
 ἔαυτοῦ φύσιν τινά, ὡς τὸ λευκόν, καὶ κατηγορεῖσθαι
 κατ' ἄλλον ἥδη δὴ δὲ κατηγορηθήσεται ὥστε, εἰ περὶ
 30 ἕκαστον τὸ ἐν καὶ οὐ ταῦτὸν τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ τὸ "εἰς
 ἀνθρώπος", ἀλλὰ ἔτερον τὸ ἐν τοὺς ἀνθρώπους καὶ κοινὸν
 τὸ ἐν καὶ ἐφ' ἕκαστον τῷ ἄλλῳ, πρότερον ἀντὶ τὸ ἐν
 τοὺς ἀνθρώπους καὶ ἕκαστον τῷ ἄλλῳ, ἵνα καὶ ὁ
 ἀνθρώπος καὶ ἕκαστον τῶν ἄλλων τύχη ἕκαστον του ἐν
 35 εἶναι. καὶ πρὸ κινήσεως τοίνυν, εἴπερ καὶ ἡ κίνησις ἐν,

¹ transpos. Igai.

² I adopt this rendering of κάκι in agreement with Henry and Schwzyer; most translators take κάκι in the usual sense

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conceive ten like this, but we bring together things that are separate and say "ten". This indeed is how we say "ten", but when a unity comes to be from many, we say "decad", because this is how it is also in the Pythagorean way of thinking.¹ But if this is so, will there still be any real existence of number when it is only observed in things? But, someone might say, what is there to prevent there being a real existence of white in things, though white also is only observed in things? For movement also was observed in being and there was a real existence of movement which is in being. But because movement is a something, in this way a unity was observed in it; but number is not spoken of in the same way as movement. And then a real existence of this kind would deprive number of being substance, and make it rather something incidental. Yet not even altogether an incidental; for the incidental must be something before incidentally occurring, and, even if it is inseparable, all the same be something by itself, a particular nature, like white, and be predicated of something else when it is already what it will be predicated as. So that, if "one" applies to each individual thing and "one man" is not the same as "man", but the "one" is other than the "man" and the "one" is common and belongs to all the other individual things, the "one" would be prior to "man" and all the other individual things, so that man and each of the others might succeed in being one. And so it is prior to movement, since movement also is one thing, and prior to being, so that being

for Plotinus, "in the intelligible world", which does not seem appropriate here.

καὶ πρὸ τοῦ ὄντος, ἵνα καὶ αὐτὸ τοῦ ἐν εἶναι τύχῃ λέγω
δὲ τὸ τὸ ἐν ἔκεινο, ὃ δὴ ἐπέκεινα τοῦ ὄντος
φαμέν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῦτο τὸ ἐν ὃ κατηγορεῖται τῶν εἰδῶν
ἐκάστου, καὶ δεκάς τούτων πρὸ τοῦ καθ' οὐδὲ
κατηγορεῖται δεκάς καὶ τοῦτο ἔσται αὐτοδεκάς οὐ γάρ
40 δὴ φῶτο πράγματι ἐπιθεωρεῖται δεκάς αὐτοδεκάς ἔσται.
ἀλλ' ἀρά συνεγένετο καὶ συνέστη τοῖς οὖσιν; ἀλλ' εἰ
συνεγενήθη ὡς μὲν συμβεβηκός οίον τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ
ὑγίεια δεῖ καὶ καθ' αὐτὸ ὑγίειαν εἶναι. καὶ εἰ ὡς
στοιχείον δὲ συνθέτου τὸ ἐν, δεῖ πρότεροι εἶναι ἐν αὐτῷ
45 τὸ ἐν, ἵνα σὺν ἄλλῳ εἴτα [εἰ πρότερον εἶναι]¹ συμμιχθὲν
ἄλλῳ τῷ γενομένῳ δι' αὐτὸ ἐν ἔκεινο ποιῆσει φενδὼς
εἰ, δύο ποιῶν αὐτό. ἐπὶ δὲ τῆς δεκάδος πῶς τέ γὰρ δεῖ
ἔκείνω τῆς δεκάδος, δὲ ἔσται διὰ τὴν τοπαύτην δύναμιν
δεκάς; ἀλλ' εἰ εἰδοποιησει αὐτὸ ὥσπερ ὑλὴ καὶ ἔσται
50 παρουσίᾳ δεκάδος δέκα καὶ δεκάς, δεῖ πρότεροι ἐδὲ
ἔστηση τῇ δεκάδα οὐκ ἄλλο τι οὖσιν ἢ δεκάδα μόνον
εἶναι.

6. Ἀλλ' εἰ ἄκεν τῶν πραγμάτων τὸ ἐν αὐτὸ καὶ ἡ
δεκάς αὐτή, εἴτα τὰ πράγματα τὰ νοητὰ μετὰ τὸ εἶναι
ὅπερ ἔστι τὰ μὲν ἔναδες ἔσονται, τὰ δὲ καὶ δυάδες καὶ
τριάδες τίς ἀν εἴη ἡ φύσις αὐτῶν καὶ πῶς συστάσαι,
5 λόγω δὲ δεῖ νομίζειν τὴν γένεσιν αὐτῶν ποιεῖσθαι.
πρῶτην τοινιν δὲ λαβεῖν τὴν οὐσίαν καθόλου τῶν εἰδῶν,
ὅτι ἔστιν οὐχὶ νοήσαντος ἔκαστον τοῦ νενοηκότος, εἰτ'

del Kirchhoff

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itself may succeed in being one; but I mean not that One which we say is "beyond being"¹ but this other one which is predicated of each individual Form. So the decad also is prior to that of which decad is predicated, and this will be the absolute decad, for the thing in which decad is observed certainly will not be the absolute decad. And this other one, then, come into being and exist along with the real beings? But if it was generated along with them, it would be incidental, like health to man—but health also must be something in itself. And if the one is like an element of a compound, there must be beforehand a one which is one in itself, that it may be compounded with another; then, if it is compounded with another which has become one through it, it will make that other *properly* one by making it two. But how is it with the decad? For what need of the decad has the thing which is going to be a decad by the power of that amount? But if it is going to inform it like matter, and the thing is going to be ten and decad by the presence of decad, the decad must exist beforehand by itself and be nothing else but only decad.

6. But if the one itself and the decad itself exist without the things, and then the intelligible things after being what they are, are going to be, some of them henads and some of them dyads or triads, what would be their nature, and how would it come into existence? But we must understand that we make them come into being only in thought. First, then, we must comprehend the substantial nature of the Forms in general, that it does not exist because the

Plato *Republic* 509B9, the text which is one of the foundations of the doctrine of the One beyond Being

αὐτῇ τῇ νοήσει την ὑπόστασιν αὐτῶν παρασχομένου οὐ γάρ, ὅτ. ἐνόησε τί ποτ' ἔστι δικαιοσύνη, δικαιοσύνη 10 ἐγένετο, οὐδὲ ὅτι ἐνόησε τί ποτ' ἔστι κίνησις, κίνησις ὑπέστη. οὐτω γὰρ ἔμελλε τοῦτο τὸ νόημα καὶ ὑστερεν εἶναι τοῦ πράγματος αὐτοῦ τοῖς νοηθέντος— δικαιοσύνης αὐτῆς ἡ γόησις αὐτῆς—καὶ πάλιν αὖ ἡ νόησις προτέρα τοῦ ἐκ τῆς νοήσεως ὑποστάντος, εἰ τὸ νευρηκένα ὑπέστη. εἰ δὲ τῇ νοήσει τῇ τοιαύτῃ 15 τούτῳ ἡ δικαιοσύνη, πρώτον μὲν ἀποπον μηδὲν εἶναι δικαιοσύνην ἡ τὸν οἶον ὄρισμὸν αὐτῆς· τί γάρ ἔμει το νευρηκέναι δικαιοσύνην ἡ κίνησις ἡ τὸ τὶ εστιν αὐτῶν λαβόντα; τούτῳ δὲ ταῦτὸν τῷ μὴ ὄφεστῶτος πράγματος λόγων λαβεῖν, ὅπερ ἀδύνατον. εἰ δὲ τὶς λέγοι, ὡς ἐπὶ τὸν ἀντεν δλησ τὸ αὐτὸν ἐστιν 20 ἡ ἐπιστήμη τῷ πράγματι, ἐκείνως χρη νοεῖν το λεγόμενον, ὡς οἱ τὴν ἐπιστήμην τὸ πράγμα λέγει εἶναι οὐδὲ τὸν λόγον τὸν θεωροῦντα τὸ πράγμα αὐτὸ τὸ πράγμα, ἀλλὰ ἀνάπταν τὸ πράγμα αὐτὸ ἀνεν ὅλης ὁν νοητὸν τε καὶ νόησιν εἶναι, οὐχ οἷαν λόγοι εἶναι τοῦ 25 πράγματος οὐδὲ ἐπιβολὴν πρὸς αὐτό, ἀλλ' αὐτὸ τὸ πράγμα ἐν τῷ νοητῷ διν τὸ ἀλλοι ἡ νοῦν καὶ ἐπιστήμην εἶναι, οὐ γάρ ἡ ἐπιστήμη πρὸς αὐτήν, ἀλλὰ τὸ πράγμα ἐκεὶ τῇ ἐπιστήμην οὐ μένουσαν, οἰα ἔστω ἡ τοῦ ἐν ὅλῃ πράγματος, ἐτέραν ἐποίησεν εἶναι τοῦτο δὲ ἐστὶν 30 ἀληθινὴν ἐπιστήμην τούτο δὲ εστιν οὐκ εἰκόνα τοῦ πράγματος, ἀλλὰ τὸ πράγμα αὐτό. ἡ νόησις τούτη τῆς κινησιώς οὐ πετούηκεν αὐτοκίνησιν, ἀλλ' ἡ αὐτοκίνησις

¹ A clear statement that a Platonic Form is something very different from a hypostatised Aristotelian universa.

² Aristotle *De Anima* Γ 5. 430a2-3 and 7. 431a1 2.

thinker thinks each of them and so by that very thinking gives them their existence. For it is not because the thinker thought out what righteousness is that righteousness existed, or because he thought out what movement is that movement existed. For in this way this thought would be both posterior to the thing itself which was thought the thought of righteousness posterior to righteousness itself and on the other hand the thought would be prior to what existed as a result of thought, if it came into existence by thinking. But if righteousness is the same as the thought of righteousness, first of all it is absurd that righteousness should be nothing except something like its definition¹ for what is thinking righteousness or movement except grasping their essential nature? And this is the same as grasping the conception of a non-existent thing, which is impossible. But if someone were to say that "in immaterial things the knowledge and the thing are the same",² one must understand what is said in the sense that it does not mean that the knowledge is the thing nor the reason contemplating the thing the thing itself, but the other way round, that the thing itself when it is without matter is object of thought and thought, not thought in the sense of being a definition of the thing or an intuition of it, but the thing itself in the intelligible is nothing else but intellect and knowledge. For the knowledge is not directed to itself but the thing there makes the knowledge, which does not stay like the knowledge of a thing in matter, to be different: that is, makes it true knowledge that is, not an image of the thing but the thing itself. So the thought of movement has not made absolute movement, but absolute move-

πεποίηκε τὴν νόησων, ὡστε αὐτὴν ἔσιτην κάνησιν καὶ νόησιν ἡ γάρ κινησις ἡ ἐκεῖ κάκείνου νόησις, καὶ αὐτὸς δέ κίνησις ὅτι πρότη—οὐ νάρ πλλη ποδ αὐτῆς—καὶ ἡ 35 ὄντως, ὅτι μὴ συμβίβηκε ἀλλα, ἀλλα τοῦ κινουμένου ἐνέργεια ὄντος ἐνεργείᾳ. ὁστε αὖ καὶ οὐσία· ἐπίνοια δὲ τοῦ ὄντος ἑτέρα. καὶ δικαιοσύνη δε οὐ νόησις δικαιοσύνης, ἀλλα νοῦ οἰον διαθεσις, μᾶλλον δέ ἐνέργεια τοιάδε, ἵστις ὡς ἀληθῶς καλὸν τὸ πρόσωπον καὶ 40 οὐτε ἔσπερος *(οὕτε ἔώσις οἴτω καλὰ)*¹ αὐδός ὅλως τι τῶν αἰσθητῶν, ἀλλ' οἷον ὄγαλμά τι νοσρότι, οἷον ἐξ αὐτοῦ ἐστηκός καὶ προφανεῖ ἐν αὐτῷ, μᾶλλον δέ ὃν ἐν αὐτῷ.

7. Ὄλως γάρ δεῖ νοῆσαι τὰ πράγματα ἐν μιᾷ *φύσει*² καὶ μίαν φύσιν πάντα ἔχουσαν καὶ οἶον περιλαβούσαν, οὐκ ᾧς ἐν τοῖς αἰσθητοῖς ἔκαστον χωρίς, ἀλλαχοῦ ἥλιος καὶ ἄλλο ἄλλοθι, ἀλλ' ὁμοῦ ἐν ἐνὶ 5 πάντα· αὐτῇ γάρ νοῦ φύσις ἐπει καὶ φυση οὐτω μιμεῖται καὶ ἡ λεγομένη φύσις, καθ' ἣν καὶ ὑφή ἡς ἔκαστα γεννάται ἄλλο ἄλλοθι, αὐτῆς ὁμοῦ ἐαντῇ οὐσης. ὁμοῦ δε πάντων ὄντων ἔκπαττον οὐν χωρίς ἐστιν· ἐνορῇ δὲ αὐτὰ τὰ ἐν τῷ νῷ καὶ τῇ οὐσίᾳ ὁ [ἔχων]³ νοῦς οὐκ ἐπιβλέπων, ἀλλ' ἔχων, οὐδὲ χωρίζων ἔκαστον

¹ Kirchhoff

² Müller

³ del Theler.

¹ Euripides *Melanippe* fr. 486 Nauck², quoted by Aristotle *Nicomachean Ethics* E 3 1129b28-9 Plotinus quotes it also at I 6. 4. 11. 12 where it comes to his mind, as perhaps it does here, with the vision of the beauty of the moral Forms in Plato *Phaedrus* 250B

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ment has made the thought of it, so that it has made itself as movement and thought; for movement there is also the thought of that thing itself, and it itself is movement, because it is the first movement—for there is no other before it—and real movement, because it is not incidental to something else, but is the active actuality of what is moved, which exists in actuality. So, again, it is substance; but the [mere] notion of being is different. And righteousness is not the thought of righteousness, but a kind of disposition of intellect, or rather an active actuality, of such a kind that "its face" is truly beautiful and "neither the morning nor the evening star are so fair",¹ not at all any object of sense, but like an intellectual statue, as if standing out from itself and manifesting in itself, or rather existing in itself.

7 In general one must think of the intelligible things as in one nature, and one nature holding them all and in a way encompassing them, not each one separate as in the things of sense, the sun in one place and something else in another, but all things together in one²; for this is the nature of Intellect, since Soul imitates it in this way, and what we call Nature, according to which and by which the individual things are generated one in one place and one in another, while it is all together in itself. But though all things are together each one, on the other hand, is separate, but Intellect sees them, the things that are in Intellect and Being, not by looking at them but by having them, and does not separate each

¹ οὐοι πάντα is a phrase from the beginning of the book of Anaxagoras (fr. B 1 DK) which Plotinus finds particularly applicable to his intelligible world

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10 κεχάριστα, γάρ ηδη ἐν αὐτῷ ἀεί πιστούμεθα δὲ πρὸς τοὺς τεθαυμακότας ἐκ τῶν μετειληφότων τὸ δὲ μαγεθός αὐτοῦ καὶ τὸ κάλλος φυχῆς ἔρωτι πρὸς οὐτὸν¹ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων [τὸν]² εἰς φυχὴν ἔρωτι διὰ τὴν τουάντην φύσιν καὶ τῷ ἔχειν ἥκαται τι ὡμοίωται, καὶ γάρ δὴ καὶ 15 ἅποπον εἴναι τι ζῶν καλὸν αἰτοζών μὴ θαυμαστοῦ τὸ καλλος καὶ ἀφάντου ὄντος. τὸ δὴ παντελέσ ζῷον ἐκ πάντων ζῶν, μᾶλλον δὲ ἐν αὐτῷ τὰ πάντα ζῶa περιεχον καὶ ἐν ᾧ τοσούτον, σσα τά πάντα, μότερ καὶ τοδε το πᾶν ἐν ᾧ καὶ πᾶν τὸ ὄρατὸν περιέχον πάντα τὰ 20 ἐν τῷ ὄρατῳ.

8. Ἐπειδὴ τοίνυν καὶ ζῶon πρώτως ἔστι καὶ διὰ τούτο αὐτοζών καὶ νοῦς ἔστι καὶ οὐσία ἡ ὄντως καὶ φαμεν ἔχειν καὶ ζῷa τὰ πάντα καὶ ἀριθμὸν τὸν συμπαντα καὶ δίκαιον αὐτὸν καὶ καλὸν καὶ σσα ἄλλα 5 τοιάντα—ἄλλως γὰρ αὐτοάνθρωπόν φαμεν καὶ ἀριθμὸν αὐτὸν καὶ δίκαιον αὐτό—σκεπτέον πῶs τούτων ἔκασταν καὶ τί ὁ, εἰς δοσον ολὸν τέ τι εἰρεῖν περὶ τούτων. πρώτων τοίνυν ἀφετέον πάσαν αἰσθησαν καὶ νοῦν ιῶθεωρητέαν καὶ ἐνθυμητέον, ὡς καὶ ἐν ἡμῖν ζῷή καὶ νοῦς οὐκ ἐν 10 δύκεω, ἀλλ' ἐν δυνάμει ἀόργκω, καὶ τὴν ἀληθινὴν οὐσίαν

¹ Kirchhoff, ad Enn.

² deleimus ut correctionem ad autò falso hic insertam.
τῷ EBxUQ τῶν AC.

The "complete living being" is the intelligible paradigm of the material universe in Plato *Timaeus* 30C. It is clear from ch. 8 that Plotinus, like most Platonists, takes it to be the whole intelligible universe. Life in Plotinus is

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individual thing: for they are already separated in it for ever. We confirm this for those who are surprised at it from the participants. its greatness and beauty by the love of soul for it and by the love of other things for soul because it has a nature of this kind and by its having a nature by which it is in some respect made like Intellect. For it is certainly quite absurd for there to be any beautiful living being if the absolute living being is not of wonderful and inexplicable beauty. It is truly the "complete living being" composed of all living beings, or rather encompassing in itself all living beings, being one as large as all things¹; just as this All is one and is all that is visible, encompassing all things that are in the visible

8. Since, then, it is the primary living being, and for this reason the absolute living being, and is Intellect and substance, real substance, and we claim that it contains all living things and the whole of number, and the absolutely righteous and beautiful and all other such things—we speak in a different way of absolute man and absolute number and absolute righteousness—we must enquire how each of these exists as an individual and what it is, as far as it is possible to discover anything about these things. First, then, we must put away all sense-perception and contemplate Intellect by intellect and consider that in us also there is life and intellect, not in bulk but in bulkless power, and that

often thought of as prior to intellect; but the intelligible living being as the formed, structured whole must be considered posterior to the intellect which eternally forms and structures its life

ἔκδεδυκέναι ταῦτα καὶ δύναμιν εἶναι ἐφ' ἔαυτῆς
βεβώσαν, οὐκ ἀμενηγόν τι χρῆμα, ἀλλὰ πάντων
ζωτικωτάτην καὶ νοερωτάτην, ἃς οὕτε ζωτικώτερον
οὔτε νοερώτερον οὔτε οὐσιωδέστερον, οὐ τὸ
ἔφαινάμενον ἔχει ταῖτα κατὰ λόγου τῆς ἐπαφῆς, τὸ μὲν
15 ἐγγὺς ἐγγυτέρῳ, τὸ δὲ πόρρω πορρωτέρῳ. εἰπερ οὖν
ἔφετὸν τὸ εἶναι, τὸ μάλιστα διν μάλλον δὲ τε μάλιστα
νοῦς, εἰπερ τὸ νοεῖν ὅλως· καὶ τὸ τῆς ζωῆς ὥσταις· εἰ
δη τὸ διν πρώτον δει λαβεῖν πρώτον διν, εἴτα νοῦν, εἴτα
τὸ ζωον—οὗτο γάρ ηδη πάντα δοκεῖ περιέχειν—δὲ
20 νοῦς δεύτερον—ἐνέργεια γάρ τῆς οὐσίας—οὗτ' αἱ κατὶ²
τὸ ζῶον διάριθμὸς εἴη—ηδη γάρ καὶ πρὸ αὐτοῦ καὶ ἐν
καὶ δύν ἡμ—οὕτε κατὰ τὸν νοῦν—πρὸ γάρ αὐτοῦ ἡ
οὐσία δι οὐσία καὶ πολλὰ ἡμ.

9. Λείπεται τοίνυν θεωρεῖν, πότερα η οὐσία τὸν
ἀριθμὸν ἐγένητο τῷ αὐτῆς μερισμῷ, η δὲ ὁρίθμὸς
ἐμέρισε τὴν οὐσίαν καὶ δή καὶ η οὐσία καὶ κίνησις καὶ
στάσις καὶ ταῦτὸν καὶ ἔτερον αὐτὰ τὸν ἀριθμὸν η δι
5 ἀριθμὸς ταῦτα ἀρχὴ δὲ τῆς σκάμψεως· δρ' οὖν τε
ἀριθμὸν εἶναι ἐφ' ἔαυτοῦ η δεῖ καὶ τὰ δύο ἐπὶ δυοῖς
πράγμασι θεωρεῖσθαι καὶ τρίᾳ διαπούτως; καὶ δὴ καὶ τὸ
ἐν τῷ τοῦς ἀριθμοῖς; εἰ γαρ ἐφ' ἔαυτοῦ ἀνεν τῶν
ἀριθμητῶν δύνατο εἶναι, πρὸ τῶν δύντων δύνατο ἀ
10 εἶναι δρ' οὖν καὶ πρὸ τοῦ ὄντος, η τοῦτο ἔστεον καὶ πρὸ³
ἀριθμού ἐν τῷ παρόντι καὶ δο-έον ἀριθμον ἐξ ὄντος
γνεσθαι. ἀλλ' εἰ τὸ διν ἐν δύο ἔστι καὶ τὸ δύο δύτα δύο
δύτα ἔστι, προηγήσεται τού τε δύτα τὸ ἐν καὶ δι ἀριθμὸς

These are the "very important kinds" of Plato *Sophist* 254-255A which Plotinus understands as the categories of the intelligible world

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the true substance has stripped off these things and is a power standing on itself, no feeble shadowy thing but the most living and intelligent of all, than which nothing is livelier or more intelligent or more substantial, that which touches it has all this in proportion to [the closeness of] its touch, that which is near more nearly and that which is far from farther. If then being is an object of desire, that which is most of all being is still more desirable, and that which is most of all intellect, if intelligence in general is desirable, and the same with life. If then one should take being first, since it exists first, then intellect, and then the living being (for it is already established that this contains all things)—but intellect comes second, for it is the active actuality of substance, then number would not be on the level of the living being—for even before it both one and two existed—not on the level of intellect—for substance was before it, which was already one and many

9 It remains then to consider whether substance generated number by its own division, or number divided substance, for certainly either substance and movement and rest and same and other generated number or number generated them.¹ The starting point of our investigation is: can number exist by itself, or must the two be observed in two things, and the three likewise? And, indeed, also the one which is among the numbers?² For if it could exist by itself without the things numbered, it could exist before beings. Then also before being?³ Well, let us leave this and assume for the present that the one is before number and grant that number comes to exist from being. But if being is one being, and two beings are two beings, the one will precede being

τῶν δυτικῶν. ἀρ' οὖν τῇ ἐπιβολῇ ἡ καὶ τῇ
 15 ὑποστάσει; σκεπτέον δὲ ὅδε· δταν τις ἄνθρωπον ἔνα νοῆ
 καὶ καλὸν ἔν, ὑστερὸν δήπου τὸ ἔν νοεῖ ἐφ' ἐκατέρῳ· καὶ
 δὴ καὶ δταν ἵππον καὶ κύνα, καὶ δη σαφῶς τα δυο
 ἐνταῦθα ὑστερον. ἀλλ' εἰ γεννών ἄνθρωπον καὶ γεννών
 ἵππον καὶ κύνα ἡ ἐν αὐτῷ δύτας προφέροι καὶ μὴ κατὰ
 20 τὸ ἐπελθόν μήτε γεννών μήτε προφέροι. ἀρ' οὐκ ἔρει
 "εἰς ἐν ἴτειν καὶ μετιτέων εἴς ἄλλο ἐν καὶ δύν ποιητέον
 καὶ μετ' ἔρουν καὶ ἄλλο ποιητέον"; καὶ μὴν οὐδὲ τὰ
 δύτα, ὅτε ἐγένετο, ἥριθμῆθη· ἀλλ' ὅσα ἔδει¹ γενέσθαι
 δήλον την [δυα ἔδει]² πᾶς ἄρα ὁ ἥριθμος ἦν πρὸ πολὺ ἀπό την
 τῶν δυτικῶν. ἀλλ' εἰ πρὸ τῶν δυτικῶν, οὐκ ἦν δύτα. ἡ ἦν ἐν
 25 τῷ δυτικῷ ὁ ἥριθμος ἦν τοῦ δυτικοῦ—ἐν γάρ ἦν ἔτι τὸ
 δύ—ἀλλ' ἡ τοῦ ἥριθμοῦ διναμις ὑποστάσα ἐμέρισε τὸ
 δύ καὶ οἱοι ἀδίνεω ἐποίησεν αὐτὸν τὸ πλῆθος. ἡ γάρ ἡ
 οὐσία αὐτοῦ ἡ ἡ ἐνέργεια ὁ ἥριθμὸς ἔσται, καὶ τὸ ζῆτον
 αὐτὸ καὶ ὁ νοῦς ἥριθμός. ἀρ' οὖν τὸ μὲν ὁ ἥριθμὸς
 30 ἥριθμός, τὸ δὲ δυτικὸς ἔξειλη γμένος ἥριθμός, νοῦς δὲ
 ἥριθμός ἐν ἐαυτῷ κινούμενος, τὸ δὲ ζῶον ἥριθμὸς
 περιέχων; ἐπει καὶ ἀπὸ τοῦ ἐνὸς γενόμενον τὸ δύ, ὡς τη
 ἐν ἐκείνῳ, δεῖ αὐτὶ οὕτως ἥριθμὸν εἶναι διὸ καὶ τὰ εἰδη
 ἐλεγον καὶ ἐνάδας καὶ ἥριθμούς. καὶ οὐτός εστιν ὁ
 35 οὐσιώδης ἥριθμός· ἄλλος δὲ ὁ μοναδικὸς λεγόμενος
 εἶδωλον τούτου. ὁ δὲ οὐσιώδης ὁ μὲν ἐπιθεωρούμενος

Harder δει Enr.

² del. Harder, ut correcti nem ad 22 δυα δει

Plotinus is working here with the speculation about Ideal Numbers in the Old Academy discussed by Aristotle in *Metaphysics* M and N. For "monadic" (arithmetica) number see M 8. 1083b16-17

and number will precede beings. Is this, then, in our idea and intuitive conception of it, or in its reality? But we should proceed with the investigation in this way: when someone thinks one man and one beauty, he presumably thinks the one later in each case; and also when he thinks a horse and a dog, it is perfectly obvious here that he thinks the two afterwards. But suppose he was generating man and generating horse and dog or, when they existed in himself, bringing them out, and not just generating them or bringing them out as they casually occurred to him, will he not say 'We must go to one, and pass to another one, and make two, and make another one along with me'? And certainly the beings were not numbered at the time when they came to be; but it was [already clear] how many there had to be. The whole number, therefore, existed before the beings themselves. But, if numbers were before beings they were not beings. Now number was in being, not as the number of being for being was still one—but the power of number which had come to exist divided being and made it, so to speak, in labour to give birth to multiplicity. For number will be either the substance or the actual activity of being, and the absolute living being is number, and Intellect is number. Is not Being, then, unified number, and the beings number unfolded, and Intellect number moving in itself, and the Living Being inclusive number? Since, because Being came into existence from the One, as that One was one, Being must also in this way be number: this is why they called the Forms henads and numbers. And this is substantial number; but the other, which is called monadic, is its image.¹ But the substantial number is that con-

τοῖς εἶδεσι καὶ συγγενῶν αὐτά, πρώτων, δὲ ὁ ἐν τῷ ὄντι
καὶ μετὰ τοῦ ὄντος καὶ πρὸ τῶν ὄντων βάσιν δὲ ἔχει τὰ
ὄντα ἐν αὐτῷ καὶ πηγὴν καὶ ρίζαν καὶ ἀρχήν. καὶ γάρ
40 τῷ ὄντι τὸ ἐν ἀρχῇ καὶ ἐπὶ τούτου ἐστὶν ὅν σκεδασθεῖη
γαρ ἂν ἀλλ' οὐκ ἐπὶ τῷ ὄντι τὸ ἐν ἡδη γάρ ἀν εἴη ἐν
πρώτῳ τυχεῖν του ἐν, καὶ ἡδη τὸ τυγχάνων· ἡς δεκάδος
δεκάς πρὸ τυχεῖν τῆς δεκάδος.

10 Ἐστὼς οὖν τὸ ὅν ἐν πλήθε, ἀριθμός, δτε πολὺ⁵
μεν ἡγείρετο, παρασκευῇ δὲ οἷον ἦν πρὸς τὰ ὄντα καὶ
προτύπωσις καὶ οἷον ἐνάδες τόπον ἔχουσαι τοῖς ἐστά¹⁰
αὐτάς ιδρυθησομένοις καὶ γάρ καὶ νῦν "τοσούτον
δ βιούλοματ" φησι. "πλῆθις χρυσοῦ η οἰκιῶν". καὶ ἐν μὲν
δ χρυσός, βούλεται δὲ οὐ τὸν ἀριθμὸν χρυσὸν πιστήσαι,
ἀλλὰ τὸν χρυσὸν ἀριθμόν, καὶ τὸν ἀριθμὸν ἡδη ἔχων
ἐπιθεῖναι ζητεῖ: οὐδινον τῷ χρυσῷ, ὥστε σιμβήναι τῷ
χρυσῷ τοσούτῳ γενέσθαι εἰ δὲ τὰ ὄντα μὲν ἐγένετο πρὸ¹⁵
10 ἀριθμοῦ, δ δ' ἀριθμὸς ἐπ' αὐτοῖς ἐπεθεωρέτο τοσαῦτα
κινητεῖται τῆς ἀριθμούσης φύσεως, δσα το ἀριθμητά.
κατὰ συντυχίαν ἢν ἀν τοπαῦτα καὶ οὐ κατὰ πρόθεσιν
τοσαῦτα, δσα ἐστίν. εἰ οὖν μὴ εἰκῇ τοπαῦτα, δ ἀριθμὸς
αὐτῶν προώτη τοῦ τοσαῦτα τοῦτο δέ ἐστιν ἡδη ὄντος,²⁰
μὲν τοι ἐν μετέσχει, ἵνα δὲ ἔστι δὲ ἐν παρὰ τοῦ ὄντος,
ἐπεὶ καὶ τὸ ὅν παρ' αὐτοῖς ἐν, ἐν δὲ παρὰ τοῦ¹ ἐν
ἔκαστον τε ἐν, εἰ δόμοῦ πολλα ἢν τὸ ἐν τὸ ἐπ' αὐτοῖς, ὡς

¹ Theiler παρ' αὐτοῖς (vel αὐτοῖς) Enn

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templated in the Forms and sharing in their generation, and, primarily, the number in Being and with Being and before the beings. The beings have their foundation in it and their source and root and principle. For indeed the One is the principle of Being, and the being of Being rests upon this, for otherwise it would be scattered; but the One does not rest upon Being; for then Being would be one before attaining the One, and what attains the decad would be a decad before attaining the decad

10. Being, therefore, standing firm in multiplicity was number, when it was as many, and was a kind of preparation for the beings and a preliminary sketch, and like unities keeping a place for the beings which are going to be founded on them. For even here and now one says 'I want such and such an amount of gold or house-property.' And gold is one, but he wants not to make number gold but gold number; and since he already possesses the number he tries to apply it to the gold, so that it will happen to the gold to become so much. But if the beings came into existence before number and the number was observed in them as the numbering nature was moved to a total corresponding to the things numbered, they would be so many by chance, and not as many as they are by deliberate predisposition. If then they are not as many as they are just casually, number is a cause which pre-exists their being so many: that is, it was when number already existed that the things which came to be participated in the "so many" and each one of them participated in the "one", so that it might be one. It is a being from Being, as Being is being from itself, and one from the one. And each is one, if the one in them is many all

PLUTINUS ENNEAD VI. 6.

τριὺς ἐν, καὶ τὰ πάντα ὅντα οὐτως ἐν, οὐχ ὡς τὸ ἐν τὸ
κατὰ τὴν μονάδα, ἀλλ’ ὡς ἐν ἡ μονάδας ἡ ἄλλος τις
ἀριθμός. επει ταὶ καὶ ὁ λεγων ἥδη πράγματα μύρια
γενόμενα, εἰ εἴπε μύρια ὁ ἀριθμῶν, οἱ παρ’ αὐτῶν
φησι τὰ μύρια προσφωνέσθαι δεκανύντων ὥσπερ τὰ
χρώματα πάτων, ἀλλὰ τῆς διανοίας λεγούσης τοσαυτα·
ει γάρ μὴ λέγοι, οὐκ ἀν εἰδείη, δισον τὸ πλήθος πῶς οὖν
25 ἔρει; ἡ ἐπιστάμενος ἀριθμεῖν τοῦτο δέ, εἰ ἀριθμὸν
ειδεῖη εἰδείη δ’ ἄν, εἰ εἴη ἀριθμός. ἀγνοεῖν δὲ τὴν φύσιν
ἐκείνην, δσα ἔστι τὸ πλήθος, ἀτοπον, μάλλον δὲ
ἀδύνατον. ὥσπερ τοίνυν εἰ λέγοι τις ἀγαθά, ἡ τὰ παὸ
πάτων τοιαῦτα λέγει, ἡ κατηγορεῖ τὸ ἀγαθὸν ως
30 συμβεβηκος αὐτῶν. καὶ εἰ τὰ πρᾶτα λέγει, ὑπόστασαι
λέγει τὴν πρώτην εἰ δὲ οἷς συμβεβηκε τὸ ἀγαθόν, δεῖ
εἶναι φύσιι ἀγαθοῦ, ἵνα καὶ ἄλλοι συμβεβήκη, ἢ¹ τὸ
αἴτιον τὸ πεποιηκός καὶ ἐν ἄλλῳ δε, εἶναι ἡ αὔτοαγαθὸν
ἡ γεγενητήκας τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἐν φύσει οἰκείᾳ. οὐτως καὶ ἐπι
τῶν ὅντων ὁ λέγων ἀριθμον, οἷον δεκάδα, ἡ αὐτὴν
35 ὑφεστάσαι δεκαδα ἀν λεγο., ἡ οἷς συμβεβηκε δεκάς
λέγων αὐτὴν δεκάδα πιπηκάλιτο ἀν τίθεσθοι ἐφ’ πιτῆς
οὐκ ἄλλο τι ἡ δεκάδα σύναν. ἀνάγκη τοίνυν, εἰ τὰ ὅντα
δεκάδα λέγοι, ἡ αὐτὰ δεκάδα εἶναι ἡ πρὸ αὐτῶν ἄλλην
δεκάδα εἶναι οὐκ ἄλλο τι ἡ αὐτὸ τοῦτο δεκάδα οἵσσον²

¹ Igal. ἡ Enn.

² Kirchhoff. εἶναι Enn., H. S¹

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together, as the triad is one, and all the beings are one, not like the one of the number one, but as the ten thousand or any other number is one. Since someone who says that things have now come to ten thousand, if he says "ten thousand" as he counts, he is not asserting that the things are called "ten thousand" of and from themselves, as if they were showing their colours, but it is the reason which says there are so many of them; for if it did not say so, he would not know how many there were. How, then, can he say how many? Because he knows how to number, but this is so if he knows number, but he could only know number if there was number. But it would be absurd, or rather impossible, to be ignorant of the nature of number, of how much the amount is. It is, then, as when someone speaks of good things, he either speaks of them as good of themselves, or predicates the good incidentally of them. And if he is speaking of primary goods he is speaking of the first real existence, but if of things to which the good is incidental, there must be a nature of good in order for it to be incidental to other things, in that the cause which produces good also in another must be either the Good Itself or something which has generated the good in its own nature. In this way also one who speaks of a number in the real beings, a decad for instance, would be speaking either of the decad which exists as itself, or if he was speaking of the things to which decad is incidental he would be compelled to postulate the decad itself existing by itself and being nothing but decad. It is necessary then, if one says that the real beings are decad, that they themselves must be the decad or there must be another decad prior to them which is nothing else

PLOTINUS: ENNEAD VI 6.

40 καθόλοι τούνν δεκτέον,¹ ὅτι πᾶν, ὅτιπερ ἀν καὶ ἄλλου κατηγορῆται, παρ' ἄλλου ἐλήλυθεν εἰς ἔκεινο η ἐνέργειαν ἔστιν ἔκεινον καὶ εἰ τοιούτον, οἷον μὴ ποτὲ μὲν παρεῖναι, τοτὲ δὲ μὴ παρεῖναι, ἀλλ' αὐτὸς μετ' ἔκεινον εἶναι, εἰ οὐσία ἔκεινο, οὐσία καὶ αὐτό, καὶ οὐ μᾶλλον ἔκεινο η αὐτὸς οὐσία εἰ δὲ μὴ οὐσίαν διδοίη, ἀλλ' οὐ 45 τῶν ὄντων καὶ ὄν. καὶ εἰ μὲν δύνατο τὸ πρᾶγμα ἔκεινο νοεῖσθαι ἄνευ τῆς ἐνέργειάς αὐτοῦ, ἀμα μὲν εἶναι οὐδὲν ἥττον ἔκεινω, ὑστερὸν δὲ τῇ ἐπινοίᾳ τάπτεσθαι παρ' ἡμῶν. εἰ δὲ μὴ παρεπινοεῖσθα, οἷόν τε ἄνεις ἔκεινον, οἷον ἀνθρωπον ἄνευ τοῦ ἔν, η οὐχ ὑστερὸν αὐτοῖ, ἀλλὰ 50 συνυπάρχον, η πρότερον αὐτοῦ, ὥν αὐτὸ δι' ἔκεινο ὑπάρχη ημεῖς δή φαμεν πρότερον τὸ ἔν καὶ τὸν ἀριθμὸν

11. Ἀλλ' εἰ τὴν δεκάδα μηδὲν εἶναι τις λέγοι η ἐνάδας τοσαύτας, εἰ μὲν τὴν ἐνάδα συγχωροι εἶναι, διὰ τί μίαν μὲν συγχωρησει ἐνάδα εἶναι, τὰς δὲ δεκα οὐκέτι; αἱ γάρ η μία τὴν ὑπόστασιν ἔχει, διὰ τι οὐ καὶ αἱ ἄλλαι; 5 οἱ γάρ δὴ συνεζεύχουσι δεῖ ἐνι τινι τῶν ὄντων τὴν μίαν ἐνάδα οὗτοι γάρ οὐκέτι ἔκαστον τῶν ἄλλων ἐν εἴη. ἀλλ' εἰ δεῖ καὶ ἔκαστον τῶν ἄλλων ἐν εἶναι, κονὸν τὸ ἔν τούτῳ δὲ φύσις μία κατὰ πολλῶν κατηγορουμένη, η ἐλέγουμεν καὶ πρὸ τοῦ ἐν πολλοῖς θεωρεῖσθαι δεῖν καθ' 10 αἵτην ὑπάρχει. οὕσης δὲ ἐνάδος ἐν τούτῳ καὶ πάλιν ἐν ἄλλῳ θεωρουμένης, εἰ μὲν κάκενη ὑπάρχει, οὐ μία μηνον ἐνὶ τὴν ὑπόστασιν ἔξει καὶ οὕτως πλήθος ἔσται ἐνάδιων εἰ δὲ ἔκεινην μονην τὴν πρώτην, ητοι τῷ

¹ Sleeman δεκτέοι Enn

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but that very thing, decad. In general, then, it must be accepted that everything, whatever it is, which is predicated of something else came to it from something else or is the active actuality of the thing of which it is predicated. And if it is of such a kind as not to be sometimes present and sometimes not, but to be always with that thing, if that thing is substance, it also is substance, and what it is predicated of is no more substance than it is, but if one does not grant it substance, at least it belongs to the real beings and exists. And if that thing could be thought of without its actual activity, that activity could none the less be simultaneous to it, but ranked later by us in our thought. But if it cannot be thought except along with what is predicated of it, as "man" cannot be thought without the "one", it is either not posterior to but co-existent with it, or prior to it, so that the thing may exist through the activity; but we maintain that the one and number are prior.

11. But if someone says that the decad is nothing but so many henads [or units], if he agrees that the unit exists, why will he agree that one unit exists and not agree that the ten do? For why do not the other units have existence as the one does? For the one unit must not be yoked to any one being for if it was, each of the others could no longer be one. But if each individual one of the others must also be one, the one is common: this means that there is one nature predicated of many, which we said must exist in itself before being observed in many. If then a unit exists in this thing and is again observed in another, if that other unit also really exists, it will not be only one unit which has existence, and so there will be a multiplicity of units, but if it is said that only that

PLOTINUS: ENNEAD VI 6

μάλιστα δύντι συνοῦσαν ή τῷ μάλιστα ἐν πάντῃ. ἀλλ' εἰ
 15 μὲν τῷ μάλιστα δύντι, ὅμωνύμως ἀν αἱ ἄλλαι ἐνάδες καὶ
 οἱ συνταχθήσονται τῇ πράγῃ, η ο αριθμός εξ ἀνοροίων
 μονάδων καὶ διπλοῖς τῶν μονάδων καὶ καβόσαι
 μονάδης εἰ δὲ τῷ μάλιστα ἐνί. τί ἂ δέοντο τὸ μάλιστα
 ἔν, ἵνα ἔν ή, τῆς μονάδος ταύτης, εἰ δὴ ταῦτα ἀδύνατα,
 ἀνάγκη ἐν εἶναι οὐκ ἄλλο τι ὃν η ἐν φιλόν,
 20 ἀπτηρημάτων τῇ οὐσίᾳ αὐτοῦ πρὸ τοῦ ἔκαστον ἐν
 λεχθῆναι καὶ νοηθῆναι. εἰ οὖν τὸ ἐν ἀνευ τοῦ πράγματος
 τοῦ λεγυμενου θν πόλεις ἔσται, διὰ τί οὐκ ἄλλο ἐν
 ὑποστήσεται; καὶ χωρὶς μὲν ἔκαστον πολλαὶ μονάδες, ἡ
 25 καὶ πολλὰ ἄν. εἰ δὲ ἐφεξῆς οἷον γεννών η φύσις, μᾶλλον
 δὲ γεννήσασα η οὐ στάσα καθ' ἐν ὀν ἐγέννα, οἷον συνεχῆ
 ἔνα ποιοῦσα, περιγράφασα μὲν καὶ στάσα θάττον ἐν τῇ
 προδδῷ τούς ἐλάττους αριθμοὺς ἀπογεννήσαι, εἰς πλέον
 δὲ κινηθεῖσα, οὐκ ἐπ ἄλλοις, ἀλλ' ἐν αὐτοῖς ταῖς
 κινήσει, τοὺς μείζους ἀριθμοὺς ὑποστήσαι καὶ οὕτω
 30 δη ἔκάστοις ἀριθμοῖς ἐφαρμόσαι τὰ πλήθη ἔκαστα καὶ
 ἔκαστον τῶν ὅγτων εἰδūναι, ὡς, εἰ μὴ ἐφαρμοσθεῖ
 ἔκαστον ἀριθμῷ ἔκάστῳ, η οὐδὲ ἀν εἴη η ἄλλο τι ἀν
 παρεκβάν εἴη ἀνάριθμον καὶ ἄλογον γεγενημένον.

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first unit exists, it will do so as coupled either to that which in the highest degree exists or to that which is in the highest degree one in every way. But if to that which exists in the highest degree, then the other units will have merely their name in common with the first, and will not be ranked on the same level with it, or number will consist of unlike unities and there will be intrinsic differences between unities even in so far as they are unities; but if it is coupled to that which is one in the highest degree, why would what is one in the highest degree need this unity in order to be one? If these suggestions are impossible, there must be a one which is nothing else but bare one, isolated in its essential nature, before each individual one is spoken and thought. If, then, the one without the thing which is called one is going to exist also there in the intelligible, why should not another one as well come into existence? And each individual taken separately will be many unities, that is many "ones". But if that nature generates in a kind of succession, or rather has generated, or does not stand still at one thing of those which it has generated, but makes a kind of continuous one, when it draws a line and stops more quickly in its outgoing it generates the lesser numbers, but when it moves further, not in other things but in its very own movements, it brings the greater numbers into existence, and so it would fit the particular multiplicities and each particular being to the particular numbers, knowing that, if each particular thing was not fitted to each particular number, it could not exist at all or would get away and be something else by becoming innumerate and irrational).

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12 Ἀλλ οὐκ εἰ καὶ τὸ ἐν καὶ τὴν μονάδα μὴ ὑπόστασιν λέγοι ἔχειν—οὐδεν γάρ ἔτι, δι μὴ τὶς πάθημα δέ τι τῆς ψυχῆς πρὸς ἐκείνην εἰναι ὅν, πάθημα λέγειν εἶναι τῆς 5 φυχῆς καὶ μηδὲν εἶναι ὅν; εἰ δὲ ὅπις μόντει τοῦτο καὶ πλήρτει καὶ φαντασίαν περὶ ὄντος πιεῖ, μυττομένην καὶ φαντασίαν λαμβάνουσαν τὴν φυχὴν καὶ περὶ τὸ ἐν ὄρῳμεν ἔπειτα πότερα καὶ τὸ πάθημα καὶ τὸ νόημα τῆς φυχῆς ἐν τῇ πλήθει ὄρῳμεν, ἀλλ ὅταν λεγαμεν "μηδὲν", 10 ἐκ μὲν τοῦ πράγματος αὐτοῦ οὐκ ἔχομεν τὸ ἐν—φαμὲν γάρ οὐκ εἶναι ἐν αὐτῷ τὸ ἐν—ἔχομεν ἀρά ἐν, καὶ ἔστι 15 ἐν φυχῇ ἀνεν τοῦ "τὸ ἐν". ἀλλ ἔχομεν τὸ ἐν ἐκ τῶν ἔξωθεν λαβόντες τινὰ νόησιν καὶ τινα τύπον, οὐρανόημα ἐκ τοῦ πράγματος. οἱ μὲν γάρ τῶν λεγομένων παρ' αὐτοῖς ἐννοημάτων ἐν εἴδος τὸ τῶν ἀριθμῶν καὶ 20 τοῦ ἐνὸς τιθέντες ὑποστάσεις ἡν τοιαύτας τιθείεν, εἴπερ τι τῶν τοιούτων ἐν ὑποστάσει, πρὸς οὓς περὶ αὐτῶν καιρίως ἀν λέγοιτο. ἀλλ οὖν εἰ τοιούτον οἶλον ὑστερού ἀπὸ τῶν πραγμάτων λέγοιεν γεγονέναι ἐν ἡμῖν πάθημα τῇ νόημα, οἶλον καὶ τὸ τοῦτο καὶ τὸ τὶ καὶ δὴ καὶ ὅχλον 25 καὶ ἕορτὴν καὶ στρατὸν καὶ πλήθεις—καὶ γάρ ὥσπερ τὸ πλήθος παρὰ τὰ πράγματα τὰ πολλὰ λεγόμενα οὐδέν

Plotinus is arguing here against the Stoics. cp. SVF II 864 and 866

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12. But if someone says that the one and the unit have no real existence—for there is nothing that is one which is not some one thing—but the one is a way the soul is affected in regard to each of the real beings, first of all, what is the obstacle to saying that whenever one says "being" one is speaking of a way in which the soul is affected and there is no such thing as being? But if it is because this stabs and strikes and takes a mental image of being, we see that the soul is also stabbed by and takes a mental image of the one.¹ Then, do we see this way of being affected and this thinking of the soul as one or many? But when we say "not one", we do not have the one from the thing itself—for we say that the one is not in it—but we do have the one, and it is in the soul without the "some one thing". But we have the one by taking some kind of thought and impression from the things outside us, a sort of idea derived from the thing. For those who posit the idea of number and the idea of the one as one species of what are called in their philosophy ideas,² should posit existences of this kind, if any of such things are in existence; and there is much that could appropriately be said about them. But if they were to say that this way of being affected or thought arises in us as a kind of after-consequence of the things, like the "this" and the "something" and, for that matter, "crowd" and "feast" and "army" and "multitude"—for just as the multitude is nothing over and above the things which are said to be

¹ ἐννόημα is a Stoic term, for the Stoics ἐνόημα had no extra-mental existence: cp. SVF I 65 and Diogenes Laertius VII 61

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έστιν οὐδὲ ἡ ἑορτὴ παρὰ τοὺς συναχθέντας καὶ εἰθυμουμένους ἐπὶ νεροῖς, οὗτως οὐδὲ τὸ ἐν μόνον τι καὶ ἀπηργματικὸν τῶν ἄλλων υποῖντες, ὅτι λέρωμιν ἐν πολλὰ δὲ καὶ ἄλλα τοιαῦτα εἴναι, οἷον καὶ δεξιὸν καὶ τὸ 25 ἄνω καὶ τα ἀντικείμενα τούτοις τὸ γάρ ἄρ εἴη πρὸς ὑπόστασιν ἐπὶ δεξιοῦ ἡ ὅτι ὁ μὲν ὥδι, ὁ δὲ ὥδι ἔστηκεν ἡ καθηταῖ; καὶ δὴ καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ ἄνω ἀσαύτως, τὸ μὲν τοιαύτην θέσω *(ἔχειν)*¹ καὶ ἐν τούτῳ τῷ παντὸς μᾶλλον, ὁ λέγομεν ἄνω, τὸ δὲ εἰς τὸ λεγόμενον κάτω—30 πρὸς δὴ τα τοιαυτα πρωτον μὲν ἐκείνῳ λεκτέον, ὡς ὑπόστασί τις τῶν εἰρημένων ἐν ἕκαστῳ τούτων, οὐ μεντοὶ ἡ αὐτὴ ἐπὶ πάντων οὔτε αὐτῶν πρὸς ἄλληλα οὔτε πρὸς τὸ ἐν ἀπάρτων. χωρὶς μέντοι πρὸς ἔκαστον τῶν λεχθέντων ἐπιστατέοι.

13. Τὸ δὴ ἀπὸ τοῦ ὑποκειμένου γενέσθαι τὴν νόησα τοῦ ἐνός, τοῦ ὑποκειμένου [καὶ]² τοῦ ἐν αἰσθήσει ἀνθρώπου ὄντος ἡ ἄλλου ὅτουσῦν ζώου ἡ καὶ λίθου, πῶς ἀλ εἴη εὖλυγον, ἄλλου μὲν ὄντος τοῦ φαέντος—τοῦ 5 ἀνθρώπου—ἄλλου δὲ καὶ οὐ ταῦτον ὄντος τοῦ ἐν: οὐ γαρ ἄγ καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ μὴ ἀνθρώπου τὸ ἐν ἡ διάνοια κατηγοροῦ. ἔπειτα, ὥσπερ ἐπὶ τοῦ δεξιοῦ καὶ τῶν τοιούτων οὐ μάτην κινουμένη, ἄλλ' ὁρώσα θέσω διάφορον ἔλεγε τὸ ὥδι, οὐτωσὶ τὸ ἀγανθα ὁρώσα λέγει ἐν οὐ γάρ δὴ κενὸν πάθημα καὶ ἐπὶ μηδενὶ τὸ ἐν λέγει. 10 οἱ γάρ δὴ ὅτι μόνον καὶ οὐκ ἄλλο καὶ γάρ ἐν τῷ ‘καὶ οὐκ ἄλλο’ ἄλλο ἐν λέγει. ἔπειτα τὸ ἄλλο καὶ τὸ ἔτερον

¹ Theatet.

² del Bechtler.

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many, nor the feast anything over and above those assembled and enjoying themselves at the ceremonies, so, when we say "one", we do not think of the one as something alone and quite apart from the other things; and there are many others like this, like "right" and "up" and their opposites; for what would there be of real existence about "right" other than that one stands or sits here and the other there? And it would be just the same with "up", that a thing has this kind of position and is more in that part of the universe which we call "up", and another more in that called "down"; in answer to this sort of argument we must first say this, that there is some kind of real existence in each of these things mentioned, but not the same in all, either of themselves in relation to each other or in the relation of all to the one. So we must consider each of the arguments separately

13. How could it be reasonable to suppose that the thought of the one originated from what underlies it, which is a man or some other living thing, or even a stone, in the realm of sense, since what appears is one thing—the man—and the one is another and not the same? Otherwise reason would not predicate "one" in the case of a thing which is not man. And then, just as in the case of "right" and the like reason was not moved without any cause, but because it saw a different position it said "here", so in this case it is because it sees something that it says "one"; for it is not reporting an empty way of being affected and saying "one" about nothing. For it is certainly not saying that the thing is alone and there is no other thing; for in the "no other thing" it is saying another "one". And then the "other" and

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νοτερον¹ μὴ γάρ ἐρείσασα πρὸς ἓν οὐτε ἄλλο ἔρει ἡ διάνοια οὕτε ἔτερον, τό τε "μόνον" ὅταν λέγῃ, ἐν μόνω λέγειν αὐτεῖ τὸ ἐν λέγειν πρὸ τοῦ "μόνον". Ἐπειτα τὸ 15 λέγον, πρὶν εἰπεῖν περὶ ὄλλουν ἔνν², ἔστιν ἐν, καὶ περὶ οὐ λέγει, πρὶν εἰπεῖν η̄ νοῆσαι τινα περὶ αὐτοῦ, ἔστιν ἐν η̄ γάρ ἐν η̄ πλείω ἐνὸς καὶ πολλά· καὶ εἰ πολλά, ἀνάγκη προυπάρχειν ἔν. ἐπεὶ καὶ δται πλῆθος λέγη πλείων ἐνὸς λέγει καὶ στρατὸν πολλοὺς ὠπλισμένους καὶ εἰς ἐν 20 συντεταγμένους νοεῖ, καὶ πλῆθος οὐκ ἐὰ̄ πλῆθος εἶναι η̄ διάνοια δηλόν πον καὶ ἐνταῦθα ποιεῖ η̄ διδοῦσα τὸ ἐν, οὐ μὴ ἔχει τὸ πλῆθος, η̄ δέξεις τὸ ἐν τὸ ἐκ τῆς τάξεως ἰδύσσων τὴν τοῦ πολλοῦ φύσιν συνήγαγεν εἰς ἐν συνὲ γάρ οὐδὲ ἐνταῦθα τὸ ἐν φεύδεται, ὥσπερ καὶ ἐπὶ 25 οἰκίας τὸ ἐκ πολλῶν λίθων ἐν μᾶλλον μέντοι τὸ ἐν ἐπὶ οἰκίας. εἰ οὖν μᾶλλον ἐπὶ τοῦ συνεχοῦς καὶ μᾶλλον ἐπὶ τοῦ μὴ μεριστοῦ, δῆλον δτ. ὅντος τινὸς φύσεως τοῦ ἐνὸς καὶ ὑφεστώσης. οὐ γάρ οἶδον τε ἐν τοῖς μὴ οὖν τὸ μᾶλλον εἶναι, ἀλλ' ὥσπερ τὴν οὐσίαν κατηγοροῦντες καθ' ἑκάστου τῶν αἰσθητῶν, κατηγοροῦντες δὲ καὶ 30 κατὰ τὸν νοητὸν κυριώτερον κατὰ τὸν νοητὸν τὴν κατηγορίαν ποιούμεθα ἐν τοῖς οὖσι τὸ μᾶλλον καὶ κυριώτεροι τίθεντες, καὶ τὸ οὖν μᾶλλον ἐν οὐσίᾳ καὶ αισθητῇ η̄ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις γενεσιν, οὕτω καὶ τὸ ἐν μᾶλλον καὶ κυριώτερον ἐν τε τοῖς αἰσθητοῖς αὐτοῖς διάφορον 35 κατὰ τὸ μᾶλλον καὶ ἐν τοῖς νοητοῖς ὄρώντες εἶναι κατὰ πάντας τοὺς τρόπους εἰς ἀναφορὰν μέντοι ἐνις

¹ η̄ (vel) U, Creutzer η̄ wBCQ εἰς η̄ H S²

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the "different" come later; for if the reason does not rest on the one it will not say "other" or "different", and when it says "alone" it says "one alone", so that οὐ says the "one" before the "alone". And then what speaks is one before it says "one" of something else, and that about which it speaks, before anyone speaks or thinks about it is one, for it is either one or more than one and many, and if many, one must exist before it. For also when it says "multitude" it says "more than one" and it thinks an army as many men armed and brought together into one order and does not allow what is a multitude to be a multitude, the reason which gives the "one" which the multitude does not have makes it clear [that it is not only a multitude], or, by seeing the "one" which results from its order, gathers the nature of the many into one; for the one is not falsely predicated here any more than it is of a house which is one from many stones; though the "one" of the house is more one. If then it is more one in the continuous and [still] more one in the indivisible, it is clearly because the one is a particular nature which has existence. For it is not possible for there to be a "more" in non-existents, but just as when we predicate substance of each individual sense-object, and also predicate it of the intelligibles, we predicate it more appropriately of the intelligibles, putting the "more" and the "more appropriately" in the realm of real beings, and say that there is more being in the category of substance, even sensible substance, than in the other genera, in the same way also we see that the one, which differs in respect of more [and less] also in the sense-objects, is also more and more appropriately in the intelligibles—and in all these ways it must be

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εἶναι φατέον. ὥσπερ δὲ ἡ οὐσία καὶ τὸ εἶναι νοητόν καὶ
οὐκ αἰσθητόν ἔστι, καν̄ μετέχῃ τὸ αἰσθητὸν αὐτῶν,
οὕτω καὶ τὸ ἐν περὶ αἰσθητον μὲν ἀν̄ κατὰ μετοχὴν
θεωροῦτο, νοητὸν μέντοι καὶ νοητώς ἡ διάνοια αὐτὸν
40 λαμβάνει· ὥστε απ' ἄλλον ἄλλο νοεῖ, δούχῳ δρᾷ προήδει
ἄστα· εἰ δὲ προήδει ὃν τόδε τι, ταῦτὸν τῷ δν̄. καὶ ὅταν πι,
Ἐν αὖ λέγει· ὥσπερ ὅταν τινέ, δύο· καὶ ὅταν τινάς,
πολλοὺς εἰ τινιν ρῆθε¹ τι νοῆσαι ἔστιν ἄνευ τοῦ ἐν ἡ
τοῦ δύο ἡ τινος ἀριθμοῦ, πᾶς οἶλον τε ἀνευ οὐδούχῳ οἶνον τέ
45 τι νοῆσαι ἡ εἰπεῖν μὴ εἴναι; οὐ γάρ μὴ ὄντος μηδὲ ὅτιον
δύνασαι² νοῆσαι ἡ εἰπεῖν, λέγειν μὴ εἴναι ἀδύνατον
ἄλλ' οὐ χρεία πανταχοῦ πρὸς παντος νοήματος ἡ λόγου
γένεσιν, προιπτάρχειν δεῖ καὶ λόγου καὶ νοήσεως οὕτω
γάρ ἂν προς τὴν τούτων γένεσιν παραλαμβάνοιτο. εἰ δὲ
50 καὶ εἰς οὐπίσιας ἑκάστης ὑπόστασιν—οὐδὲν γάρ δν̄, δ μὴ
ἐν—καὶ πρὸ οὐσίας ἀν̄ εἴη καὶ γεννων τὴν οὐσίαν. δεδ
καὶ ἐν δν̄, ἀλλ' οὐκ δν̄, εἴτα ἐν ἐν μεν γάρ τῷ “οἱ” καὶ ἐν
πολλὰ ἀν̄ εἴη, ἐν δὲ τῷ “ἐν” οὐκ ἔν τὸ “οἱ”, εἰ μὴ καὶ
ποιήσιεν αὐτὸν προσιεῦσαν αὐτοῦ τῇ γενέσει καὶ τὸ
55 ‘τούτο’ δὲ οὐ κενόν ὑπόστασιν γάρ δεικνυμένην λέγει

¹ H. S. μῆτε Εἰπ.

² Igal· δυνασθαι wBUCQ δύναται Kirchhoff: δύνατον H. S.¹
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affirmed that there is a reference to one. But just as substance and being is intelligible and not perceptible, even if the perceptible participates in it, in this way also the one might be perceived in the perceptible by participation, but the reason grasps it as intelligible and does so intellectually; so that it thinks one thing, which it does not see, from another, so it knew it before. But if it knew it before as being this particular thing, it is the same as being. And when it says it is something, it says as well that there is one; just as when it says "some" in the dual, it says that there are two, and when in the plural, that there are many.¹ If, then, it is not possible to think anything without the one or the two or some number, how is it possible for that not to exist without which it is not possible to think or speak? For it is impossible to say that something does not exist of which, since it does not exist, you cannot think or say anything at all. But that which is needed everywhere for the coming into existence of every thought and statement must be there before statement and thinking for this is how it can be brought to contribute to their coming into existence. But if it is needed for the existence of each and every substance—for there is nothing which is which is not one—it would also exist before substance and as generating substance. For this reason also it is one-being, but not first being and then one; for in that which was being and also one there would be many; but being is not present in the one except in the sense that it might make it by inclining to its generation. And the "this" is not an empty word for

¹ Cp. Plato *Sophist* 237D6 10.

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ἀντὶ τοῦ ὄντος αὐτοῦ καὶ παρουσίαν τινά, οὐσίας ή
ἄλλο τι τῶν ὅντων ὡστε τὸ “τοῦτο” σημαίνοι ἀν οὐ
κενόν τι ούδε ἔστι παθήμα τῆς διανοίας επὶ μηδενὶ δυντι,
ἀλλ’ ἔστι πρᾶγμα ὑποκείμενον, ὡσπερ εἰ καὶ τὸ ἴδιον
60 αὐτοῦ τινας ὄντα λέγοι.

14. Πρὸς δὲ τὰ κατὰ τὸ πρός τι λεχθέντα ἀν τις
εὐλόγως λέγοι, ὡς οὐκ ἔστι τὸ ἐν τοιοῦτοι οἷον ἄλλου
παθόντος αὐτὸ μηδὲν παθὸν ἀπολαλεκέναι τὴν αὐτοῦ
φύσιν, ἀλλὰ δεῖ, εἰ μέλλοι, ἐκ τοῦ ἐν ἐκβῆναι, πεπονθέναι
5 τὴν τοῦ ἐνὸς στέρησιν εἰς δύο ή πλείω διαιρεθέν. εἰ οὖν δ
αὐτὸς ὅγκος διαιρεθεὶς δύο γίνεται οὐκ ἀπολόμενος ὡς
ὅγκος, δῆλον ὅτι παρὰ τὸ ὑποκείμενον ἦν ἐν αὐτῷ
προσὸν τὸ ἐν, δ ἀπέβαλε τῆς διαιρέσεως αὐτὸ
φθειρασῆς. δ δὴ ὅτε μὲν τῷ αὐτῷ παρεστιν, οτὲ δὲ
10 ἀπογίνεται, πῶς οὐκ ἐν τοῖς οὖσι τάξομεν, ὅπου ἀν γ;
καὶ συμβεβηκέναι μὲν τούτοις, καθ’ αὐτὸ δὲ εἴναι, ἐν τε
τοῖς αἰσθητοῖς δταν φαινομενοῖς τε τοῖς νοητοῖς, τοῖς
μὲν ἵστεροις συμβεβηκόσ, ἐφ’ αὐτοῦ δὲ ἐν [τοῖς
νοητοῖς]¹ τῷ πρώτῳ ὅταν ἐν, εἴτα δν. εἰ δέ τις λέγοι,
ως καὶ τὸ ἐν μηδεν παθὸν προσελθοντος ἄλλου αὐτῷ
15 οὐκέτι ἐν, ἀλλὰ δύο ἔσται, οὐκ ὁρθῶς ἐρεῖ. οὐ γάρ το ἐν
ἐγένετο δύο, οὔτε φ’ προσετέθη οὔτε τὸ προστεθέν, ἀλλ’
ἐκάτερον μέναι ἐν, ὡσπερ ἦν· τὰ δὲ δύο κατηγορεῖται

¹ delevimus, ut glossam ad τῷ πρώτῳ

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it is used to speak of a real existence which is pointed out instead of its name, and of a presence, a substance or some other of the things which really are, so that the ‘this’ would indicate something which is not empty, and it is not a way in which the reason is affected about nothing existent, but a thing underlying the thought, just as if it said the proper name of a thing itself.

14. One might reasonably reply to what has been said under the head of relation, that the one is not the kind of thing to lose its own nature when something else is affected and it is affected in no way, but if it is going to escape from the one it must experience the deprivation of the one by being divided into two or more. If therefore the same bulk becomes two by being divided without being destroyed as bulk, it is clear that besides the underlying bulk the one was in it as something added, which it lost when the division destroyed it. Now, how can we avoid ranking among things which exist, wherever it may be, what is sometimes present to and sometimes absent from one and the same thing? And we shall affirm that it is present to these things incidentally, but exists by itself, when it appears both in perceptible and intelligible things, incidentally to the later order, but on its own in the first [order of being], when it is first one and then being. But if someone were to say that the one also, without being affected in any way, when something else comes to it will no longer be one but two, he will not be speaking correctly. For it was not the one which became two, neither the one which was added nor the one it was added to, but each of them remains one, as it was, but the “two” is predicated of both, but the

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κατ' ἀμφοῖν, χωρὶς δὲ τὸ ἐν καθ' ἐκατέροι μένοντος.
οἰκουν τὰ δύο φύσει, εἰ σχέσει καὶ η δυάς. ἀλλ' εἰ μεν
20 κατὰ τὴν σύνοδον καὶ τὸ συνόδῳ εἶναι ταῦτὸν τῷ δίο
ποιεῖν, τάχ' ἀν̄ η τοιαύτη σχέσις τα δύο καὶ η δυάς
τὴν δὲ καὶ ἐν τῷ ἐισιτήρι πάθει αἰτηρεῖται πάλιν αὖ δυάς
συγσθέντος γὰρ ἐνός των γινεται δύο· οὐ τοίνυν οὔτε
συνόδος οὔτε σχέσις τὰ δύο, ὥν ἀν̄ τὴν σχέσις ὁ αὐτὸς δὲ
25 λογος καὶ ἐπὶ παντος ἀρθμοῦ. ὅταν γὰρ σχέσις γίνη
γεννώσα τι, ἀδύνατον τὴν ἐναντίαν τὸ αὐτὸ γεννᾶν, ὡς
τοῦτο εἴηται τὸ πρᾶγμα τὴν σχέσιν τί οὖν τὸ κύριον
αἴτιον; ἐν μὲν εἶναι τοῦ ἐν παρουσίᾳ δύο δὲ δυάδος,
ῶστερ καὶ λευκὸν λευκοῦ καὶ καλον καλοῦ καὶ δικαίου
30 δίκαιον. η οὐδὲ ταῦτα θετέον εἶναι, ἀλλὰ σχέσεις καὶ ἐν
τούτοις αἴτιατέον, ὡς δίκαιον μὲν διὸ τὴν πρὸς τάδε
τριπλῆν πρήξειν, καλον δέ, ὅτι οὕτω διατιθέμεθα οὐδενὸς
δίτος ἐν αἵτῳ τῷ ὑποκειμένῳ οἷον διαθείναι ημάς οὐδὲ
35 τι ἐν ὁ λέγεις, πάντως δηπον ἔστι καὶ μεγα καὶ καλον
καὶ λιπρά ἐν εἴη εἰπεῖν περὶ αὐτοῦ. ὡς οὖν τὸ μέγα καὶ
μάγεθδς ἔστιν ἐν αὐτῷ καὶ γλυκὺ καὶ πικρὸν καὶ ἄλλαι

¹ Cp. Plato *Phaedo* 96E8-97E1. Plotinus here is following the *Phaedo* very closely i.e. he is treating numbers simply

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"one" separately of each, which remains what it is. The two and the dyad is not therefore naturally relative. But if two was by coming together, and coming together was the same thing as making two, perhaps the two and the dyad would be a relation of this kind. But as it is the dyad is also observed on the other hand in the opposite way of being affected; for when some one thing is cut, it becomes two; so that the two is neither a coming together nor a cutting, so as to be a relation. And the same argument applies to every number For, when it is a relation which produces something, it is impossible for the opposite relation to produce the same thing so that this thing can be the relation What then is the proper cause of number? A thing is one by the presence of the one and two by the presence of the dyad, just as it is white by the presence of the white and beautiful by that of the beautiful and just by that of the just¹ Otherwise, one would not be able to maintain that these exist either, but would have to make relations responsible for these two, as if the just was so because of this particular relation to these particular things, and the beautiful because we are so disposed, with nothing existing in the underlying reality of a kind to dispose us, and nothing coming from outside to what appears beautiful. Whenever, then, you see something which you call one, it is of course also in every way great and beautiful and there would be a vast number of other things to say about it Therefore, as the great and greatness are in it, and sweet and bitter and other

as a particular kind of Forms, with the same objective reality and causative power as other Forms.

ποιότητες, διὰ τί οὐχὶ καὶ τὸ ἔν; οὐ γάρ δὴ ποιότης μὲν
ἔσται πάσα ἡτισσύν, ποσότης δὲ ἐν τοῖς οὖσιν οὐκ ἔσται,
οὐδὲ ποσότης μὲν τὸ συνεχές, τὸ δὲ διωρισμένον οὐκ
40 ἔσται, καίτιο μέτρῳ τὸ συνεχὲς χρήγει τῷ διωρισμένῳ
ώς οὖν μέγι μεγέθυντος ταρουσιᾳ, οὕτω καὶ ἐν ἑνὸς καὶ
διός διπλοῖς καὶ τὸ ἄλλα ωσαύτως τὸ δὲ ζητεῖν πῶς
μεταλαμβάνει κοινὸν πρὸς πάντων τῶν εἰδῶν τὴν
ζητοιμένην μετάληψιν. φατέον δὲ ἐν μὲν τοῖς
15 διηρημένοις ἄλλως θεωρεῖσθαι τὴν [δεκάδα]¹ ἀνρήπτη
δεκάδα ἐν δὲ τοῖς συνεχέσιν ἄλλως, ἐν δὲ ταῖς πολλαῖς
εἰς ἐν τοσανταις δυνάμεσιν ἄλλως· καὶ ἐν τοῖς ιοητοῖς
ηδη ἀναβιθηκάνται τοις δὲ ἐκεῖ μηκέτι ἐν ἄλλοις
θεωρουμένονς, ἀλλ' αὐτοὺς ἐφ' αὐτῶν ὅντας τοὺς
ἀληθεστάτους ἀριθμοὺς εἶναι, αὐτοδεκάδα, οὐ δεκάδα
50 ,ινῶν νογιῶν.

15. Πάλιν γάρ ἔξ ἀρχῆς τούτων ἡδη λεχθέντων
λέγωμεν τὸ μὲν ξύμπαν ὃν τὸ ἀληθινὸν ἐκείνο καὶ ὃ
εἶναι καὶ ποὺν καὶ ζῷων τέλειων τέλοις, ἥμιν δὴ πάντα ζῷα
εἶναι, οὐδὲ δὴ τὸ ἔν ἐνι, ὡς ἦν αὐτῷ δυνατόν, μερίμητα
5 καὶ τόδε τὸ ζῷον τὸ πάντα ἔφυγε γάρ ἵ τοις αἰσθητοῦν φύσις
τὸ ἐκεῖ ἐν, εἴπερ καὶ ἔμελλεν αἰσθητὸν εἶναι.. ἀριθμὸν δη
δεῖ αὐτὸν εἶναι συμπαντα εἴ γάρ μη τέλεος εῖη, ἐλλείπο
ἄν ἀριθμῷ των· καὶ εἰ μὴ πᾶς ἀριθμὸς ζῷων ἐν
αὐτῷ εἴη, παντελέσ ζῷον οὐκ ἀν εἴη· ἔστιν

del. Igal

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qualities, why not also the one? For there will certainly not be every possible kind of quality, but not quantity, in the real things, nor will the continuous be quantity and the discrete not, although the continuous uses the discrete as a measure. As therefore a thing is great by the presence of greatness, so it is one by the presence of one and two by the presence of dyad, and the rest in the same way. But the problem of how the thing participates [in number] is common to the enquiry about participation in all the Forms. But we must affirm that the decad is observed in one way in things that are discrete and in another in things that are continuous, and in other ways in the many unified powers of this particular number; and that we have already accended among the intelligibles, and that there are the true numbers, no longer observed in other things but existing themselves on their own, the absolute decad, not the decad of some intelligibles.

16. Now that this has been said, let us say again, starting at the beginning, that total being, that true being, is both being and intellect and perfect living thing, and in all living things together, this universal living thing here below has imitated its one, as far as it could by [its own] one; for the nature of the perceptible escaped the one there, since it was going to be perceptible by the senses. It must certainly be total number; for if it was not perfect, it might be deficient in some number; and if the whole number of living things was not in it, it would not be the "complete Living Thing". Number therefore exists

¹ Again Plato Timaeus 31B1

PLUTINUS ENNRAD VI 6

10 οὖν δὲ ἀριθμὸς πρὸ τῶν παντῶν καὶ τοῦ παντελούσ
ζώοι. ὁ μὲν δὴ ἀνθρωπός ἐν τῷ νοητῷ καὶ τα ἄλλα ζῶα
καθό ἐστι, καὶ ἡ ζῷα παντελές ἔστιν ἔκεινο. καὶ γάρ
καὶ ὁ ἐνταῦθα ἀνθρωπός, ἡ ζῷα τὸ πᾶν, μέρος αὐτοῦ
καὶ ἔκαστον, ἡ ζῷα, ἔκει ἐν ζῷῳ ἔστιν. ἐν δὲ τῷ νῷ,
καθόσον νοῦς, ὡς μὲν μέρη οἱ¹ τοι πουτες καθ'
15 ἔκαστοι· ἀριθμος δε καὶ τούτων. οὐ τοίνυν οὐδὲ ἐν νῷ
ἀριθμὸς πρώτως· ὡς δὲ ἐν νῷ ὅσα νοῦ ἐνέργειαι καὶ ὡς
νοῦ, δικαιοσύνη καὶ σωφρασίνη καὶ αἱ ἄλλαι ἀρσταὶ καὶ
ἔπιστημη καὶ ὅσα νοῦς ἔχων νοῦς ἔστιν ὄντας. πῶς οὖν
οὐκ ἐν ἄλλῳ ἡ ἐπιστήμη; ἢ ὅτι ἐπι ταῦταν καὶ ὅμοιον δὲ
20 ἐπιστημων, το επιστητον, η ἐπιστήμη, καὶ τὰ ἄλλα
ώσαστας· διό καὶ πρώτως ἔκαστον καὶ οὐ συμβεβηκος
ἡ δικαιοσύνη, φυχὴ δέ, καθόσον φυχή, σιμβεβηκός·
δινάμει γάρ μάλλον ταῦτα, ἐνέργειᾳ δέ, ὅταν πρὸς νοῦν
καὶ σὺν νῷ.² μετὰ δὲ τούτῳ ἥδη τὸ δι, καὶ ἐν πούτῳ δὲ
25 ἀριθμός, μεθ' οὐδ τὰ ὄντα γεννᾷ κινούμενον κατ' ἀριθμόν,
προστησάμενον τοὺς ἀριθμοὺς τῆς ὑποστάσεως αὐτῶν,
ῶσπερ καὶ αὐτοῦ τὸ ἐν συνάπτον αὐτο τὸ δὲ πρὸς τὸ
πρώτον, οἱ δὲ ἀριθμοὶ οὐκέτι τὰ ἄλλα πρὸς τὸ πρώτον
ἀρκεῖ γάρ τὸ δὲ συνημμένον, τὸ δὲ δὲ συνημμένον ἀριθμὸς
30 συνάπτει τὸ ὄντα πρὸς αὐτό τοι σχιζόμενον δε κατὰ τὴν αὐτοῦ
ἄλλο μένει τὸ ἐν αὐτοι· σχιζόμενον δε κατὰ τὴν αὐτοῦ

¹ Creuzer ὡς Enn.

² Eīng συνῇ Enn.

ON NUMBERS

prior to every living thing and to the "complete living thing". Man is certainly in the intelligible, and the other living things in that they exist, and that intelligible exists in that it is the "complete living thing". For in fact the man here below also, in that the All is a living thing, is part of it; and each individual thing, in that it is a living thing, is there in the intelligible living thing. And in Intellect, in so far as it is Intellect, all the intellects exist individually as parts; but then there is a number of these also. Not even in Intellect then does number exist primarily; but it is in Intellect as the sum of the active actualities of Intellect, and, as it is the number of Intellect, it is righteousness and self-control and the other virtues and knowledge and all the things by the possession of which Intellect is really Intellect. How then is knowledge not in something else? It is because the knower, the known and the knowledge are the same and all together, and it is just the same with the rest, for this reason each exists primarily and righteousness is not incidental but is incidental to soul in so far as it is soul; for in soul these things are rather potential, but are actual when it is directed to Intellect and with Intellect. But immediately after Intellect comes being, and number is in this, and with its help it produces the real beings when moving according to number, setting the numbers before their existence as the One stands before its own, joining being itself to the first (but the numbers no longer join the other beings to the first; for it suffices that being is joined to it). But being, when it has become number, joins the beings to itself, for it splits (not in so far as it is one, but its one abides); and when it has split according to its

φύσιν εἰς δος ἡθέλησεν, εἴδεν εἰς δος κατὰ¹ τὸν ἀριθμὸν ἔγεννησεν ἐν αὐτῷ ἄρα δύτα· ταῖς γάρ δυνάμεσι τῷ ἀριθμῷ ξεχίσθη καὶ τοποῦται ἔγεννησεν, δος δὲν ὁ ἀριθμός. ἀρχὴ οὖν καὶ πηγὴ ὑποστάσεως τοῖς οὖσιν
35 ὁ ἀριθμὸς ὁ πρώτος καὶ ἀληθής διὸ καὶ ἐνταῦθα μετὰ ἀριθμῶν ἡ γένεις ἐκάστους, κανὸν ἄλλον ἀριθμὸν λάβῃ τι, η̄ ἀλλο γεννᾷ η̄ γίνεται οὐδέν, καὶ οὐτις μὲν πρώτοις ἀριθμοῖς ὡς ἀριθμητοί οἱ δ' ἐν τοῖς ἀλλοις ηδη ἀμφότερα ἔχουσιν· γ̄ μεν ταρὰ τούτων, ἀριθμητοί, γ̄ δὲ
40 κατὰ τούτους τὰ ἄλλα μετρουσι, καὶ ἀριθμουστες τοὺς ἀριθμοὺς καὶ τὰ ἀριθμητά· τίνι γάρ δέκα ἀν λέγοιεν η̄ τοῖς παρ' αὐτοῖς ἀριθμοῖς;

16. Τούτους δὴ, οὓς φαμεν πρώτους ἀριθμοὺς καὶ ἀληθεῖς ποῦ ἀν τις φάγη θέρτε καὶ εἰς τί γένος τῶν δύτων, ἐν μὲν γάρ τῷ ποσῷ δοκοῖσιν εἶναι παρὰ πᾶσι καὶ δὴ καὶ ποσοῦ μνήμην ἐν τῷ πρόσθει ἐποιεῖσθε
5 ἀξιούντες ὅμοιας [ἐν]² τῷ συνεχεῖ καὶ τῷ διωρισμένῳ ἐν τοῖς οὖσι τιθεναι. πάλιν τε αὐτὸν λέγετε, ὡς πρώτων δύτων οὐδεὶς εἰσὶν οἱ ἀριθμοί, ἀλλοις τε αὐτὸν ἀριθμοὺς παρ' ἐκείνους εἶναι λέγετε ἀριθμοῦντας. πῶς οὖν ταῦτα διατάττεσθε, λέγετε ἡμῖν ἔχει γάρ πολλὴν ἀπορίαν
10 ἐπεὶ οὐ τοῦτο ἐν τοῖς αἰσθητοῖς πότερα ποσόν τι η̄

¹ conieciimus: καὶ Enn.

² expunctum in A. del Kirchhoff

¹ In this chapter Plotinus has moved from the simple Platonism of the *Phaedo* to a position more in accord with the later discussions in the Academy, alluded to by

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nature into as many as it wished, it looked to see how many it had generated according to number, which were therefore in it; for it was split by the powers of number and generated as many as the number was. Therefore the first and true number is the principle and spring of existence for the real beings.¹ And so here below too the coming into being of every individual thing takes place with the help of numbers, and when something takes another number it generates something else or nothing comes to be at all. And these are the first numbers, as numbered; but those in the other things already have both; in that they come from these first, they are numbered numbers, but in that they are according to these, they measure the other things, numbering both the numbers and the things numbered, for by what could they say "ten" except by the numbers in themselves?

16. Now, these which we affirm are the first and true numbers—someone might ask "Where do you put them, and in which of the genera of beings?" For everybody puts them in the quantitative, and you did mention the quantitative in what you said before, when you claimed that one must put the discrete like the continuous among beings.² But again on the other side you say that these are the numbers of the first real beings, and again you say that there are other numbering numbers beside these. So tell us how you arrange all this. For there is a great deal of difficulty here; since the one also which is in per-

Aristotle, in which the Ideal Numbers are prior to the Forms

² In ch. 14, 38–40.

PLOTINUS ENNEAD VI. 6.

πολλάκις μὲν τὸ ἐν ποσόν, πιὸ δὲ μόνον ἀρχὴ ποσοῦ
καὶ οὐ ποσόν; καὶ πότερα ἀρχὴ οὐδα συγγενὲς ἢ ἄλλο
τι, ταῦτα ἡμὲν πάντα δίκαιοι διαυμφέντες. λειτέον
οὖν ἀρξαμένοις ἐντεύθεν περὶ τούτων ὡς σταύ μὲν—
πρῶτον δ' ἐπὶ τῶν αἰσθητῶν ποιητέον τὸν λόγον—ὅταν
15 τοίνυν ἄλλο μετ' ἄλλου λαβάν εἴπεις δύο, οἷον κόνι καὶ
ἄνθρωπον ἢ καὶ ἄνθρωπους δύο ἢ πλέοντας, δέκα εἰπών
καὶ ἄνθρωπων δεκάδα, ὁ ἀριθμὸς οὗτος οὐκ οὐσία οὐδὲ
ώς ἐν αἰσθητοῖς, ἀλλὰ καθαρῶς ποσον. καὶ μερίζων¹
καθ' ἓν καὶ τῆς δεκάδος ταῦτης μέρη ποιῶν τὰ ἕνα
20 ἀρχὴν ποιεῖς καὶ τίθεσαι ποσοῦ· εἰς γὰρ τῶν δέκα οὐχ ἐν
καθ' αὐτό. δταν δὲ τὸν ἄνθρωπον αὐτὸν ἐφ' ἑαυτοῦ
λέγεις ἀριθμὸν τινα, οἷον δυάδα, ζῷον καὶ λογικόν, οὐχ
εἰς ἔτι ὁ τρόπος ἐνταίθα ἀλλ' ἢ μὲν διεξόδευεις καὶ
ἀριθμεῖς, τυσόν τι ποιεῖς, οὐδὲ τὰ ὑποκείμενά ἔστι δύο
25 καὶ ἔκατερον ἔν, εἰ τὸ ἐν ἔκατερον συμπληροῦν τὴν
οὐσίαν καὶ ἡ ἔνοτης ἐν ἔκατερῳ, ἀριθμὸν ἄλλον καὶ
οὐσιώδη λέγεις. καὶ ἡ δυας αὐτῇ οὐχ ὕστερον οὐδὲ ὅσον
λέγει μόνον ἔξωθεν τοῦ πράγματος, ἀλλὰ τὸ ἐν τῇ οὐσίᾳ
καὶ συμέχον τὴν τοῦ πράγματος φύσιν. οὐ γὰρ ποιεῖς
30 ἀριθμὸν συνταῦθα ἐν διεξόδῳ ἐπιών πράγματα καθ'
αὐτὰ δύτα οὐδὲ συνιστάμενα ἐν τῷ ἀριθμεῖσθαι τί γάρ
ἄν γνωιτο εἰς οὐσίαν ἄλλοι σύνθροντι μετ' ἄλλους
ἀριθμουμένω; οὐδὲ γάρ τις ἐνάς, ὥσπερ ἐν χορᾷ, ἀλλ' ἢ

· Creuzer. μερίζον Enn

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ceptible things—is it something quantitative, or is a number of times one quantitative, but it itself the principle of the quantitative and not quantitative? And, being the principle, is it of the same genus, or something else? You owe us an explanation of all this." So, starting from this point, we must say about all this that when—we must base our discussion first on perceptible things—when, therefore, you take one thing after another and say "two", a dog and a man for instance, or two men, or more when you say "ten" and "a decad of men", this number is not a substance, not even the kind of substance which occurs among perceptible things, but purely quantitative. And when you divide into ones and make them part of this decad you make and posit the ones as principle of the quantitative, for a one of the ten is not one in itself. But when you say that man in himself is a particular number, a dyad for instance, animal and rational, your way of proceeding here is not one single way, but in so far as you are counting and numbering you are making something quantitative, but in so far as the underlying realities are two and each of them is one, if each one is an essential complete unit of the substance and unity is in each, you are speaking of a different and substantial number. And this dyad is not posterior, nor just as much as it says merely, outside the thing, but that which is in the substance and holds the nature of the thing together. For you certainly do not make number here below when you go through one after another things which have their own existence and do not come together in the numbering for what difference does it make in substance to one man if he is counted along with another? For there is no unity either, as

δεκάς αὕτη τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἐί σοὶ τῷ ἀριθμοῦντι τὴν
ὑπόστασιν ἀν ἔχοι, ἐν δὲ ταῖς δέκα οὐσίαις μή
85 συντεταγμένοις εἰς Ἀν οὐδὲ δεκάς ἀν λόγοισι, ἀλλὰ δέκα
σι ποιεῖς ἀριθμον, καὶ ποσὸν τουτο τὸ δέκα ἐν δε τῷ
χορῷ καὶ ἔστι τι ἔξω καὶ ἐν τῷ σ-ρατῷ πῶς δ' ἐν σοί, ἢ
ο μει πρὸ τού ἀριθμειν ἔγκειμενος ἄλλως· ο δ' ἐκ του
φανῆναι ἔξωθεν πρὸς τὸν ἐν σοὶ ἐνέργεια ἡ ἔκεινων ἢ
40 κατ' ἔκεινους, ἀριθμοῦντος ἀμα καὶ ἀριθμὸν γεννῶντος
καὶ ἐν τῇ ἐνέργειᾳ ὑπόστασιν ποιοῦντος τοσοῦ, ὥσπερ
καὶ ἐν τῷ βαδίζειν ὑπόστασιν τινος κινήσεως. πῶς οὖν
ἄλλως δ' ἐν ἡμῖν ἡ ὁ τῆς οὐσίας ἡμῖν μετέχοντα
φησιν ἀνιθμοῦν καὶ ἀρμονίας καὶ ἀριθμὸς αὐτὸν καὶ
ἀρμονία οὔτε γάρ σωμά φησί τις οὔτε μέγεθος· ἀριθμὸς
45 ἄμφι ἡ φυχὴ, εἴπερ υδύνα. ὁ μὲν δηι οὐσίας ἀριθμὸς
οὐσία, ὡς σῶμα, δ' δε τῆς φυχῆς οὐσίαι ὡς ψυχαί, καὶ
δὴ ὅλως ἐπὶ τῶν νοητῶν, εἰ ἔστι τὸ ἔκεινοι φωναί αὐτὸ^ν
πλείων, οἷον τριάς, αὐτη ἡ τριάς οὐσιώδης ἡ ἐν τῷ ζῷῳ
ἢ δὲ τριάς ἡ μήτηρ ζῷου, ἀλλ' ὅλως τριάς ἐν τῷ ὄντι,
50 ἀρχὴ οὐσίας εἰ δ' ἀριθμεῖς ζῷον καὶ καλόν, ἐκάτερον

¹ Plato *Timaeus* 36E6 37A1. In considering Pythagorean and Platonic thought about numbers it is most important always to remember that, from Pythagoras onwards, the numbers are musical numbers, the numbers of melody and rhythm.

² A Pythagorean doctrine accepted by Plato's pupil

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there is in a chorus, but this decad of men would have its existence in you, the numberer, but in the ten which you number, which are not ordered together into one, one could not even speak of a decad, but you make ten by numbering, and this ten is quantitative; but in the chorus there is also something outside you and also in the army. But in what way is the number in you? Now, that which is latent in you before the numbering is there in a different way; but that which comes from the outward appearance to the number in you is the actualisation either of those numbers in you or according to them, when you number and at the same time generate number and in this actualisation produce a real existence of the quantitative, just as in walking you produce a real existence of a kind of movement. What, then, about the number which is in us in a different way? It is the number of our substance; for, Plato says, since it participates in number and melody¹ it is again number and melody, for one says, it is not body or magnitude; the soul therefore is a number,² if it is a substance. The number of body is certainly substance in a bodily way, but the number of soul is substance in the way souls are. And indeed generally among the intelligibles, if the living being there is itself more than one, a triad for instance, this triad in the living being is substantial. But the triad which does not yet belong to the living being, but is in a general way a triad in real being, is a principle of substance. But if you number "living being" and "beautiful", each of them is one, but you Xenocrates, see Aristotle *Metaphysics* A 5. 985b30 and Xenocrates fr 66 Heinze, for Xenocrates the soul was a self-moving number

μὲν ἔν, σὺ δὲ γεννᾶς ἀρθμὸν ἐν σοὶ καὶ ἐνεργεῖς ποσὸν καὶ διάδα. εἰ μέντοι ἀρετὴν τέτταρα λεγοις—καὶ τετράς ἔστι τις οἷον τὰ μέρη αὐτῆς εἰς ἔν—καὶ ἐνάδα τετράδα οἷον τὸ ὑποκείμενον, καὶ σὺ τετράδη ἐφαρμόσσεις τὴν ἔν σοι.

17 Οὐ δὲ λεγόμενος ἄπειρος ἀριθμὸς πῶς; πέρα, γέροντοι αὐτῷ διδοασιν οἱ λόγοι. η καὶ ὄρθως, εἴπερ ἔσται ἀριθμός· τὸ γάρ ἄπειρον μάχεται τῷ ἀριθμῷ διὰ τὸ οὖν λέγομεν “ἄπειρος δὲ ὄρθιμός”· διὸ τὸν δισπερ
5 ἄπειρον λέγομεν γραμμήν—λέγομεν δὲ γραμμὴν ἄπειρον, οὐχ ὅτι ἔστι τις τοιαύτη, ἀλλ' ὅτι ἔξεστι ἐπὶ τῇ μεγάστῃ, οἷον τοῦ παντός, ἐπινοῆσαι μετ' αὐτῷ—οὕτῳ καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ ἀριθμοῦ, γνωσθέντος γάρ οὗτος ἔσται αὐτὸν διπλασίου ποτῆσαι τῇ διανοίᾳ οὐκ ἔκεινα
10 συνάθαντα. το γάρ ἐν σοὶ μονῷ νόημα καὶ φάντασμα πῶς ἀν τοῖς οὖσι προσάφαις; η φήσομεν ἄπειρον ἐν τοῖς νοητοῖς εἶναι γραμμήν, ποσὴ γάρ ἀν εἴη η ἔκει γραμμή· ἀλλ' εἰ μή πιστή τις ἐν ἀριθμῷ, ἄπειρος ἀτ εἴη. η τὸ
15 ἄπειρον ἀλλον τρόπον, οὐχ ὡς ἀδιεξίτητον ἀλλὰ πῶς
η ἐν τῷ λόγῳ τῆς αὐτογραμμῆς οὐκ ἔπι πρωτοτούρημενοι πέρας. τί οὖν ἔκει γραμμὴ καὶ πού;
ὑπερον μὲν γάρ ἀριθμοῦ ἐνοράτα, γάρ ἐν αὐτῇ τὸ ἔπι καὶ γάρ ἀφ' ἔνδος καὶ πρὸς μίαν διάστασῶν ποσὸν δὲ τὸ

¹ Here Plotinus returns to the question raised in ch. 2 and deferred at the beginning of ch. 3.

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generate number in yourself and actualise the quantitative and the dyad. If however you say that virtue is form and it is a kind of tetrad, as its parts come together into one—an *a se* adic [or fourfold] unity like the underlying reality, then you are fitting to it the tetrad which is in you.

17. But what about the number called unlimited?¹? For these arguments of ours give it limit. And this is correct, if it is going to be a number; for unlimitedness clashes with number. Why, then, do we say “The number is unlimited”? Is it with number as it is when we say a line is unlimited? but we say a line is unlimited not because there is any line of this kind but because it is possible with the longest line, that of the universe for instance, to think of a longer.² For when it is known how much a number is it is possible to double it in thought without connecting it to that original number. For how could you attach a thought and mental image which is only in you to things which really exist? Or are we going to assert that there is an unlimited line among the intelligibles? For [otherwise] the line there will be of a certain length, but if it was not of a certain numbered length, it would be unlimited. But its unlimitedness may be of another kind, not like something which you cannot get to the end of. But how is it unlimited? Now in the definition of the absolute line limit is not thought as included. What then is the line there in the intelligible, and where? It is certainly posterior to number; for the one is observed in it: it proceeds from one point and over one

² This is Aristotle's account of mathematical infinity, see *Physics* Γ 7 207b28–34

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τῆς διαστάσεως μέτρον οὐκ ἔχει. ἀλλὰ ποῦ τοῦτο; ἀρά
μόνον ἐν ἐννοήσει οἷον ὁριστικῷ; ἢ καὶ πράγμα, νοερὸν
20 μέντοι, πάντα γάρ ποτε, ὡς καὶ νοερὰ καὶ πως τὸ
πράγμα, καὶ δὴ καὶ περὶ ἐπιπέδου καὶ στρεοῦ καὶ
παντων τῶν σχημάτων, ποῦ καὶ δῶς; οὐ γάρ δὴ ἡμεῖς
τὰ σχήματα ἐπικοοῦμεν, μαρτυρεῖ δὲ τό τε τοῦ παντὸς;
σχῆμα πρὸ ἡμῶν καὶ τὰ ἄλλα, ὅσα φυσικά σχήματα ἐν
25 τοῖς φύσει οὖσαν, ἢ δὴ ἀνάγκη πρὸ τῶν σωμάτων εἶναι
ἀσχημάτιστα ἐκεῖ καὶ πρώτα σχήματα. οὐ γάρ μορφαὶ
εν αλλοις, ἀλλ’ αὐτὰ οὐτῶν οὖν ἐδεῖτο ἐκταθῆναι.
το γάρ ἐκταθεντα ἄλλων. πάντοτε οὖν σχῆμα ἐν ἐν τῷ
30 οἴντι, διεκρίθη δὲ ἦτο, ἐν τῷ ζῷῳ ἢ πρὸ τοῦ ζώου. λέγω
δὲ “διεκρίθη” οὐχ ὅτι ἐμεγεθύνθη, ἀλλ’ ὅτι ἐκαστον
ἐμερίσθη πρὸς ἐκαστον, ὡς τὸ ζῷον, καὶ τοῖς σώμασιν
ἐδόθη τοις ἐκεῖ, οἷον πυρί, εἰ βιούλει, τῷ ἐκεῖ ἡ ἐκεῖ
πυραμίς. δ.δ καὶ τούτο μημεῖσθαι θέλει μὴ δυνάμενον
35 ὑλῆς αἰτίᾳ καὶ τὰ ἄλλα ἀνάλογον, ὡς λέγεται περὶ τῶν
τῆδε. ἀλλ’ οὖν ἐν τῷ ζῷῳ καθ’ ὃ ζῷον; ἢ ἐν τῷ νῷ
πρότερον· ἔστι μὲν γάρ ἐν τῷ ζῷῳ εἰ μὲν οὖν τὸ ζῷον

¹ The pyramid is the “unit and seed” (*οτοσχεῖον καὶ σπέρμα*) of fire in the mathematical physics of the *Timaeus*: see 56B4-5. Plotinus' whole way of thinking about the

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distance; but it does not have a quantitative measure of that distance. But where is this? Is it only in a kind of defining thought? No, it is a thing, but an intellectual thing. For all [beings there] are like this, so as to be intellectual and, in some way, the real thing. And indeed [we must also ask] where and now about plane and solid and all the figures: for it is certainly not we who merely think the figures. The figure of the universe, which was before us, is evidence of this, and the other natural figures in the things which exist by nature, which must exist before the bodies as unfigured figures there in the intelligible, and primary figures. For they are not shapes in something else, but since they are themselves belonging to themselves there was no need for them to be extended: the extended figures belong to other things. Figure, then, is always one in real being, but it has distinctions in it either in the living being or before the living being. But I mean “has distinctions” not in the sense that it has acquired size, but because it has been divided, each part of it in correspondence to each being, and given to the bodies there in the intelligible, as to fire there, if you like, to the pyramid there.¹ This is why this fire here below wants to imitate it, though it cannot by reason of matter, and the other elements in a similar way, as is said about the elements here below. But is figure, then, in the living being in that it is living being? No, it is in Intellect before. For it is certainly in the living being, if therefore the living being was inclusive of Intellect, it would be primarily in the living

intelligible world requires the presence of bodies there, though they cannot be extended in space.

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περιεκτικὸν ἦν τοῦ νοῦ, ἐν τῷ ζῷῳ πρώτως, εἰ δὲ νοῦς κατὰ τὴν τάξιν πρότερος, ἐν τῷ. ἀλλ’ εἰ ἐν τῷ ζῷῳ τῷ παντελεῖ καὶ φυχαῖ, προτερος νοῦς ἀλλὰ νοῦς φησιν σσα ὁρᾶ ἐν τῷ παντελεῖ ζῷῳ· εἰ οὖν ὁρᾶ,
40 ὑπερος ἡ δύνατὸν τὸ “ὁρᾶ” οὐτως εἰρήσθαι, ὡς ἐν τῇ ὁράσει, τῆς ὑποστάσεως γνομένης οὐ γάρ ἀλλος, ἀλλὰ πάντα ἔν, καὶ ἡ νόησις δὲ ψιλὸν ἔχει σφαιραν, τὸ δὲ ζῷον ζῷον σφαιραν.

18. Ἀλλὰ γάρ ὁ ἀριθμὸς ἐκεὶ ὥρισται· ημεῖς δὲ ἐπινοήσομεν πλείονα τοῦ προτεθέντος, καὶ τὸ ἀπειρον οὐτως ἀριθμούντων. ἐκεὶ δὲ ἐπινοήσου πλέον οὐκ ἔστι τοῦ ἐπινοηθέντος· ηδη γάρ ἔστιν· οὐδὲ ἐλείφθη τις οὐδὲ
5 λειφθήσεται, ἵνα τις καὶ προστεθῇ αὐτῷ. εἴη δὲ ἄν κακεὶ ἀπειρος, ὅτι οὐκ ἔστι μεμετρημένος ὑπὸ τίνος γάρ,
ἀλλ’ ὃς ἔστι, πᾶς ἔστι ἐν ᾧ καὶ ὅμοι καὶ ὅλος δὴ καὶ
οὐ περιειλημμένος πέραπι τινι, ἀλλ’ ἐαυτῷ ὧν ὃς ἔστι τῶν
γάρ ὅντων ὅλως οὐδὲν ἐν πέραπι, ἀλλ’ ἔστι τὸ
10 πεπερασμένον καὶ μεμετρημένον τὸ εἰς ἀπειρίαν
καλυθὲν διαμενὲν καὶ μέτρου δεόμενον· ἐκεῖνα δὲ πάντα
μέτρα, δύνεν καὶ καλὰ πάντα, καὶ γάρ, ή ζῷον, καλόν,
ἀμύστηρ τῷ ζῷῳ ἔχον, οὐδεμιᾷ ζωῆ ἐλλείπον, οὐδὲ αὐτὸς
πρὸς θάνατον τιμηγῆ ἔχων τῷ ζῷῷ οὐδὲν γάρ θνητὸν
15 οὐδὲ ἀποθνήσκον· οὐδὲ αὐτὸς οὐδεμιηρή ή ζωὴ τοῦ ζῷου
αὐτοῦ, ἀλλ’ ἡ πρώτη καὶ ἐναργεστάτη καὶ τὸ τραυνὸν
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being, but if Intellect has priority in rank, it is primarily in Intellect. But if in the complete living being there are also souls, Intellect is prior. But, Ploto says, "as many as Intellect sees in the living being"¹; if then it sees, it is posterior. But it is possible that the "sees" is meant in this sense, that the real existence of the living being comes about in the seeing; for Intellect is not other, but all are one, and intellection has the bare sphere but the living being the sphere of the living being.

18. But certainly number there in the intelligible is limited; but we think of a number greater than that which is before us, and the unlimited belongs to us numbering in this way. But there it is not possible to think of more than what is thought of; it is already there, no number is deficient, nor will any be deficient, so that any number could be added to it. But number might be unlimited there also, because it is not measured for what could it be measured by? But what it is it all is, being one and all together and, certainly, a whole, and not bounded by any limit but by its own agency being what it is; for in general none of the real beings is in a limit, but what is limited and measured is what is prevented from running on into indefiniteness and needs a measure; but those real beings are all measures, and therefore are all beautiful. For in that it is a living being it is beautiful, having the best of life, deficient in no life, nor again having life mixed with death; for nothing is mortal or dying; nor again is the life of the living being itself strengthless, but the first and clearest life, having the pure essence of living, like the first

¹ Timaeus 39E7 9.

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ἔχουσα τοῦ ζῆν, ὥσπερ το πρῶτον φῶς, ἀφ' οὐ καὶ αἱ
ψυχαὶ ζῶσι τε ἐκεῖ καὶ αἱ δεῦρο ιοῦσαι κομίζονται. οἴδε
δε καὶ ὅτοι χάρω ζῆν καὶ πρὸς δὲ ζῆν, ἀφ' οὐ καὶ ζῆν εξ οὐ
γέρο, καὶ εἰς δὲ ζῆν ηδὲ πάντων φρόνησις καὶ δὲ πᾶς νοήσις
ἔρων καὶ συνών καὶ ὄμοιον ὡν ἀγαθώτερον αὐτῷ
ἐπιχρώπας καὶ συγκερασάμενος φρόνησιν σεμνότερεν
αὐτοῦ τὸ κάλλος παρέχεται. ἐπεὶ καὶ ἐνταῦθι φρόνιμος
ζωὴ τὸ σεμών καὶ τὸ καλὸν κατὰ ἀλήθειάν ἔστι, καίτοι
25 ἀκυρώσις ὁράται. ἐκεὶ δὲ καθαρῶς ὁράσαι δίδωσι γάρ
τὸ ὄρωντι δρασιν καὶ δυναμιν εἰς τὸ μᾶλλον ζῆν καὶ
μᾶλλον εὐτόνως ζῶντα ὁράν καὶ γενέσθαι δὲ ὁρά.
ἐνιαύσθι μὲν γάρ η προσβολὴ καὶ πρὸς ἄφυκτην η πολλή,
καὶ ὅταν πρὸς ζῷα, τὸ μὴ ζῶν αὐτῶν τροφεβληται, καὶ
η ἔνδον ζωὴ μέμικται. ἐκεὶ δὲ ζῷα πάντα καὶ δλα ζῶντα
35 καὶ καθαρα κάν οὐν ζῷον τι λάβῃ, ἐξελαμφεν αὐτοῦ
εἰθέως καὶ αὐτὸ την ζωήν. τὴν δὲ οὐσίαν ἐν αὐτοῖς
διαβάσον, ἀκίνητον εἰς μεταβολὴν παρέχουσαν αὐτοῖς
την ζωήν, καὶ την φρόνησιν καὶ την εν αὐτοῖς σοφίαν
καὶ ἐπιστημην θεασάμενος τῇ κάτω φύσιν ἀπασαν
γελάσει τῆς εἰς οὐσίαν προσποιήσεως. παρὰ γάρ ταύτης
μένει μὲν ζωὴ, μένε. νοῦς, ἔστηκε δὲ ἐν αἰῶνι τὰ ὄντα.
ἔξιστησ δὲ οὐδὲν οὐδέ τι τρέπει οὐδὲ παρακινεῖ αὐτό·
οὐδὲ γάρ ἔστι τι ὃν μετ' αὐτό, δὲ φάσεται αὐτοῦ· εἰ δέ τι
ηρ, ὑπὸ τούτου ἀ τι. καὶ αὶ ζωντίον τι ηρ, ἀπαθήτης ἀν ηρ
45 τοῦτο ὑπ' αὐτοῦ τοι ἐναντίον· δὲ αὐτὸ οὐκ ἀ τούτῳ

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light, from which the souls live there, and those which come down here bring it with them. But it knows for what reason it lives and towards what it lives, towards that from which also it lives, for that from which its life comes is also that to which it goes. But the thought of all [the beings in it] and universal Intellect is upon it and accompanies it and is closely together with it and by giving it a colour of greater goodness and mixing thought into it makes its beauty more majestic. For even here below a thoughtful life is majesty and beauty in truth, though it is dimly seen. But there it is seen clearly, for it gives to the seer sight and power to live more, and by living more intensely to see and become what he sees. For here below most of our attention is directed to lifeless things, and when it is directed to living beings what is lifeless in them stands in the way, and the life within them is mixed. But there all are living beings, living as wholes and pure; and if you take something not to be a living being it immediately itself flashes out its life. But when you contemplate the substance running through them, giving them a life which does not move by changing, and the thought and the wisdom and knowledge in them, you will laugh at the lower nature for its pretension to substantiality. For by this substance life abides and intellect abides, and the real beings stand still in eternity, nothing puts it out of itself or alters it or makes it deviate, for there is nothing beside it to get a grip on it; but if there was anything, it would exist because of it. And if there was any thing opposed to it, it would be unaffected by this very opposed thing; but, existing itself it would not have made this opposite exist, but some other com-

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έποίησεν δι', ἀλλ' ἔτερον πρὸ αὐτοῦ κοινόν καὶ ἣν ἔκεινο
τὸ ὅν ὥστε ταῦτη Παρμενίδης ὄρθως ἐν εἰπὼν τὸ ὅν
καὶ οὐδὲ δι' ἐρημίαν ἄλλου ἀπαθέσ, ἀλλ' ὅτι δι' ὃν μόνῳ γάρ
τούτῳ παρ' αὐτοῦ εστιν εἶναι. πιὸς ἀν οὐν τις
45 τὸ δι' παρ' αὐτοῦ ἀφέλοιτο ἡ ὅτιον ἄλλο, ὅσα ὅντος
ἐνεργείᾳ καὶ ὅσα ἀπ' αὐτοῦ, ἔως γάρ ἂν ἦ, χορηγεῖ ἔστι
δὲ ἀπει ὥστε κάκεῖνα. οὕτω δὲ ἔστιν εἰ δυνάμει καὶ
κάλλει μέγα, ὥστε θέλγειν καὶ τὰ πάντα ανηρτήσθαι
αὐτοῦ καὶ ἵχνος αὐτοῦ παρ' αὐτοῦ ἔχοντα ἀγαπᾶν καὶ
50 μετὰ τοῦτο τάγαθδι¹ ζητεῖν τὸ γαρ εἶναι πρὸ ἔκεινου
ώς πρὸς ἡμᾶς καὶ δὲ πᾶς δὲ κοίμιος οὐτις καὶ ἔντις ποὺς
φουνέν, ἵνα ἦ, θέλει, καὶ πάσα ψυχὴ καὶ πᾶς νοῦς δὲ
ἔστιν εἶναι τὸ δὲ εἶναι αὐταρκες ἔαυτῷ

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mon cause before it, and that would be the really existent, so that Parmenides¹ in this way was right in saying that being was one; and it is not unaffected because of the absence of anything else, but because it really exists, for real being alone can exist of and by itself. How then could anyone take being from it, or anything else of all the things which exist by being's activity and come from itself? For as long as it exists, it gives of its store of being; but it exists for ever, so that they do also. But in this way it is great in power and beauty, so that it is enchanting and all things depend on it and are happy when they have a trace of it and seek the Good with it; for being stands in front of the Good from our point of view. And this whole universe wants to live and think that it may be, and every soul and every intellect wants to be what it is; but being is sufficient to itself.

¹ Kirchhoff: μετὰ τοῦτο ἀγαθὸν Enn. μετ' αὐτοῦ τὸ ἀγαθὸν
H S

The reference is a genera. one to the Second Hypothesis of Plato's *Parmenides*, beginning at 142B.

VI 7 HOW THE MULTITUDE OF THE FORMS CAME INTO BEING, AND ON THE GOOD

Introductory Note

THIS treatise, perhaps the greatest of the single works of Plotinus, is number 38 in Porphyry's chronological order. It is separated in that order by only three short works on minor questions from its predecessor in the *Enneads*, VI. 6 *On Numbers*, and is immediately followed by its successor in the *Enneads*, VI. 8, the great treatise on divine freedom. The chronological order and the Ennead order coincide here more closely than anywhere else in Porphyry's edition. VI. 7 is the most intellectually and spiritually powerful of all Plotinus' "ascents of the mind to God". It begins in this world here below, and in the philosophical lecture-room, with a discussion of what for Plotinus (and other late Platonists) was the most important question raised by Plato's mythical account of the making of the world in the *Timaeus*: how far is Plato's description of that making in terms of the activity of a Demiurge or craftsman to be taken literally? Does God plan the world and then make it? Is divine wisdom to be understood in terms of the sort of intelligent, purposive, over-all planning characteristic of a good architect or civic designer? In showing that it is not and in displaying the true nature of the creativity of the Divine Intellect, Plotinus builds up his fullest and most impressive account of the nature and contents of the intelligible world, showing us how everything here below is there too, and only here because it is there, and not there in the form of a system of abstractions but in a more vital reality than we apprehend it here: it is a world "boiling with life", an eternal world

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which somehow contains time and movement and change and process. In the end we are left with the very strong impression that for Plotinus there are not two worlds but one real world apprehended in different ways on different levels. It is from our highest and truest apprehension of this intelligible world of which we ourselves are parts that we ascend to the Good. For, as Plotinus shows here with particular care and clarity, ascend we must. The intelligible world which he has displayed in all its beauty is not our goal. Intellect and the intelligible cannot finally satisfy us. The demonstration of transcendence culminates in Plotinus' fullest and strongest account of the soul's union with the Good in the self-transcendence of Intellect, an account which shows more clearly than anything else in the *Enneads* the consonance of his mysticism and his metaphysics. The treatise concludes with a section which confirms the transcendence of the One or Good above Intellect by a full demonstration that the One does not think.

Synopsis

When God or the gods were making man, did they plan his senses with a view to self-preservation in the sense-world? No, there is no planning in the intelligible; but everything is there in such a way that when it is unfolded into time here below it looks as if it had been perfectly planned (ch. 1). In the intelligible the thing and the reason why it is are one (ch. 2). Man in the intelligible has senses so that the whole may be complete and everything may be there, but does not this mean that Intellect inclines to and plans for the sense-world (ch. 3)? The complexity of man not just a soul, but also the formative principle of body and the form in body (chs. 4 and 5). A like complexity exists in the intelligible, including senses and perhaps bodies, and the possibility of existing on different levels, from god to beast (ch. 6). There is nothing unnatural about the making of the lower animals; co-operation of universa, and

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Individual souls in making things here below; sense-perceptions here below imitate intellections in the intelligible (ch. 7). But how can there be irrational animals in the intelligible? Intellect is not the One and so must be multiple and its multiplicity must be all inclusive (ch. 8). All is living thought there, so what are irrational animals here below are living thought there (ch. 9). Horns and teeth and claws, which are to supply deficiencies here below are there in the intelligible as part of the fully varied perfection of the whole (ch. 10). Plants and the four elements are in the intelligible world as well as animals; the elements are alive in their own way here below, and more intensely alive there (ch. 11). The glorious unity in diversity of the intelligible world, containing all that is in the universe of sense, in perfect unity and boiling with life (ch. 12). Only the last and lowest forms are single and simple. Intellect is vastly complex because it is all activities. How the Platonic categories of Otherness and Movement operate in Intellect to produce endless change, variety and movement all contained in its substance of living thought (ch. 13). Analogy from the complexity of lower forms, e.g. the form of a face. The unity in love without confusion of Intellect (ch. 14). Beginning of the ascent from Intellect to the Good. Intellect receives everything in it from the Good, but in receiving it breaks up the primal unity into its own unity in diversity (ch. 15). The need to go higher than Intellect, how Intellect comes from the Good and the Good is cause both of its substance and its vision (ch. 16). The giver is greater than the gift. The Good gives Intellect what it does not have; it is the giver of form, itself beyond form and limit (ch. 17). What "being in the form of good" means when applied to Intellect and the Forms in Intellect, why the Good is supremely desirable so that we must go beyond Intellect to find it (chs. 18-21). Intellect and the Forms in Intellect need another light from the Good to be desirable besides the glory immanent in themselves (which they received from it), without this light and life they would be uninteresting and undesirable (chs. 22-23).

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21-22. Necessity of the supreme Good, before all evils, which is before all things and makes all things (ch. 23). But what, after all, is "his Good"? What does it do for us and why do we desire it (ch. 24)? Exegesis of Plato's conclusion about pleasure in the *Philebus* ascent through the scale of goods to the ultimate (ch. 25). The Good cannot be an illusion or a subjective feeling (ch. 26). The good for anything is not simply what is most akin to it (ch. 27). Could matter which is evil, choose and desire the Good (ch. 28)? Difficulty of the unintellectual man with talk about Intellect as good, perhaps he has some dim awareness of a Good beyond Intellect (ch. 29). Return to and full explanation of Plato's mixture of pleasure and intelligence in the *Philebus* (ch. 30). The light and life which come to Intellect and Soul from the Good, the soul moved by the Good to love, is carried by its love from bodies to the Forms in Intellect (ch. 31). The unbounded, formless source of the beauty of the Forms (ch. 32). Rejection of discursive reasoning about the Forms as a hindrance to the love which must go on beyond form to the formless (ch. 33). The experience of the final union or vision, in which the soul attains to the Good in the eternal self-transcendence of Intellect (chs. 34-6). The Good does not think, rejection of the Peripatetic idea that the First Principle thinks its own thinking, and full working out of the implications of saying that the Good is beyond being and intellect (chs. 37-42).

VI. 7. (38) ΠΩΣ ΤΟ ΠΛΗΘΟΣ ΤΩΝ ΙΔΕΩΝ ΥΠΕΣΤΗ ΚΑΙ ΗΕΡΙ ΤΑΓΑΘΟΓ

1 Εἰς γένεσιν πέμπων ὁ θεὸς ἡ θεός τις τὰς φυχας φωσφόρα περὶ τὸ πρόσωπον ἔθηκεν δύματα καὶ τὰ ἄλλα ὅργανα ταῖς αἰσθήσεσιν ἐκάσταις ἔδωκε προορώμενος, ὡς οὖτος ἐν σψίζοιτο, εἰ προσρώτο καὶ διπλακούοι καὶ ἀβαμένη τὸ μέν φεύγοι, τὸ δὲ διώκαι πόθεν δὴ προιδών ταῦτα, οὐ γάρ δὴ πρότερον γενομένων ἄλλων, εἴτα δι' ἀρουσίαν αἰσθήσεων φθαρέντων, ἔδωκεν ὑστερον ἢ ἔχοντες ἔμελλοι ἀνθρώποι καὶ τὰ ἄλλα ζῶα τὸ παθεῖν φυλάξασθαι. ἡ εἶπο. ἀν τις, ἥδει, ὅτι ἐν θερμοῖς καὶ ψιχροῖς ἔσοιτο τὸ 10 ζῷον καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις σωμάτων πάθεσιν τοιποτε δὲ εἰδίπτι, ὅπως μὴ φθείροιτο ῥᾳδίας τῶν ζῴων τὰ σώματα, τὸ

¹ Plotinus is here commenting on the whole account of the making of the material universe, the sending of souls into it, and the preparation of their bodies, in the *Timaeus*. He writes 'God or one of the gods' because in the *Timaeus* (44E5 ff.) it is not the great Craftsman but his children, the younger gods, who make the human body and its organs (the "light-bearing eyes" 45B3). Plato's whole description of the activity both of Craftsman and of younger gods is in terms of reasoning (e.g. 34A8-B1) and planning. The exegetical problem for Plotinus is to show that this is not to be taken literally.

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1. When God or one of the gods was sending the souls to birth he put "light-bearing eyes" in the face and gave them the other organs for each of the senses, foreseeing that safety would be ensured in this way, if one saw and heard beforehand and by touching could avoid one thing and pursue another.¹ But really, where did this foreseeing come from? For it certainly was not because others had come into existence before and then perished because of the absence of senses that he afterwards gave what human beings and other living things were going to avoid suffering by having.² Now someone might say that he knew that the living being would be in heats and colds and other afflictions of bodies³, and because he knew this, so that the bodies of living things might not be easily destroyed he gave them

² Plotinus may have in mind here the curious "natural selection" of Empedocles as reported by Aristotle *Physics* B 8. 198b29-33, in a context (the discussion of the appearance of purposiveness in the processes of nature) very relevant to his argument here.

³ This is exactly what Plato does say in *Timaeus* 33A, though he is speaking here not of individual human bodies but of the necessity of including all of each of the four elements in the body of the universe

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αἰσθάνεσθαι ἔδωκε, καὶ δι’ ὃν ἀνεργήσουσιν αἱ
αἰσθήσεις ὄργάνων. ἀλλ’ οὗτοι ἔχούσαις ταῖς δυνάμαις
θῶκε τὰ ὄργανα η̄ ἄμφῳ. ἀλλ’ εἰ μὲν ἔδωκε καὶ τὰς
15 αἰσθήσεις, οὐκ ήσαν αἰσθητικαὶ πρότερον ψυχαὶ οὖσαι·
εἰ δὲ εἶχον, ὅτε ἐγένοντο ψυχαί, καὶ ἐγένοντο, ὥς εἰς
γένεσιν ἦσσοι, σύμφυτον αὐταῖς τὸ εἰς γένεσιν ἱέναι
ταρὰ φύσων ἄρα τὸ ἀπὸ γενέσεως καὶ ἐν τῷ νοητῷ εἴναι,
καὶ πεποίηνται δῆ, ἵνα ἀλλοι ὡσι καὶ ἵνα ἐρ κακῷ εἴεν
20 καὶ η̄ πρόνοια, ἵνα σάζουστο ἐν τῷ κακῷ, καὶ ὁ
λογισμὸς ὁ τοῦ θεοῦ οὐτος καὶ ὅλος λογισμός. ἀρχαὶ δὲ
λογισμῶν τίνες, καὶ γάρ, εἰ ἔξι ἄλλων λογισμῶν, δεῖ ἐπὶ^{τι}
τὸ πρὸ λογισμοῦ η̄ τινά γε πάντως ἱέναι.. τίνες οὖν
ἀρχαὶ; η̄ γάρ αἰσθησις η̄ οὗτος ἀλλὰ αἰσθησις μὲν οὕτω
οὗτος ἄρα. ἀλλ’ εἰ νοῦς αἱ προτάσεις, τὸ συμπτέρασμα
25 ἐπιστημη̄ περὶ αἰσθητοῦ οὐδενὸς ἄρα. οὐδὲ γάρ ἀρχὴ μὲν
ἐκ τοῖς νοητοῦ, τελευτὴ δὲ εἰς νοητὸν ἀφικνεῖται, πῶς
ἔτι ταῦτην τὴν ἔξι πρὸς αἰσθητοὶ διανόσιων
ἀφικνεῖσθαι; οὐτ’ οὖν [ζώου πρόνοια οὕθ’ ὅλως τοῦδε τοῦ]
παντὸς ἐκ λογισμοῦ ἐγένετο· ἐπει οὐδὲ ὅλως λογισμὸς
30 οὔτως, ἀλλὰ λέγεται λογισμὸς εἰς ἐνδειξιν τοῦ πάρτα
οὔτως, ὡς [ἄλλος οὐφός]¹ ἐκ λογισμοῦ ἐν τοῖς ὑστερον,
καὶ προόρασις, διτι οὔτως, ὡς ἐν τις οὐφός [ἐν τοῖς
ὑστερον]² προϊδοίτο. ἀ γάρ τοις μὴ γνωμένοις τρὸ

del Harder.
del Theiler

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sense perception and organs for the senses to work through. But he either gave the organs to souls which already had the powers or gave both at once. But if he gave the senses also, then, although they were souls before, they did not have sense-perception, but if they had sense-perception when they came into being as souls, and came into being that they might go to birth, then going to birth was connatural to them. So it would be against nature for them to be away from birth and in the intelligible, and they would actually have been made in order to belong to something else and to be in evil, and the purpose of the forethought would be that they might be kept safe in the evil, and this would be God's planning, and it would be altogether planning. But what are the principles of plans? For even if they derive from other plans, they must be directed to an end or ends prior to planning. What then are the principles? They are either sense perception or intellect. But there is no sense-perception yet, therefore intellect. But if the premises are intellect the conclusion is knowledge: not, then, about any sense-object. For how can that of which the beginning is from the intelligible and which comes in its end to the intelligible, being a disposition of this kind, come to the understanding of a sense-object? Therefore neither forethought for a living thing nor forethought for this universe in general derived from a plan, since there is no planning there at all, but it is called planning to show that all things there are as they would be as a result of planning at a later stage, and foresight because it is as a wise man would foresee it. For in things which did not come to be before planning, planning is useful because of the

PLOTINUS: ENNEAD VI. 7.

λογισμοῦ δὲ λυγισμὸς χρήσιμοι ἀπορίᾳ διηγέμεως τῆς
 35 τρὸς λογισμοῦ, καὶ προόρασις, ὅτι μὴ ἣν δύναμις τῷ
 προορῶντι, καθ' ἣν οὐκ ἐδεήθη προοράσεως. καὶ γάρ ἡ
 προόρασις, ἵνα μὴ τοῦτο, ἀλλὰ τούτο, καὶ οἰον φοβεῖται
 τὸ μὴ τοιούτον οὐδὲ τοῦτο μόνον, οὐ προόρασις. καὶ δὲ
 λογισμὸς τοῦτο ἀντὶ τούτου. μονον δὲ δύντος θατέρου τί¹
 40 καὶ λογίζεται; πῶς οὖν τὸ μόνον καὶ ἐν καὶ ἀπλῶς ἔχει
 αναπτυγμένον τὸ "τοῦτο, ἵνα μὴ τοῦτο" καὶ "ἔμελλε
 γάρ τοῦτο, εἰ μὴ τοῦτο" καὶ "χρήματα τοῦτο ἀνεφάνη
 καὶ σωτήριον τοῦτο γενόμενον"; προεδρεῖ ἄρα καὶ
 προελογίσατο ἄρα καὶ δὴ καὶ—τὸ νῦν ἐξαρχῆς
 περιθέν τὰς αἰσθήσεις διὰ τοῦτο καὶ ἔδοκε [τὰς
 45 δυνάμεις]² εἰ καὶ ὅτι μάλιστα ἄπορος ἡ δύσις [καὶ
 τῶς].³ οὐ μην ἀλλ' εἰ δεῖ ἐκάστην ἐνέργειαν μη ἀτελῆ
 εἶναι, μηδὲ θεμέτον θεοῦ δύτιον ὃν ἀλλο τι νομίζειν η
 ὅλου τε καὶ παν, δει εἰ ὁτῳδιν τῶν αὐτοῦ πάντων
 ἐνυπάρχειν δει τοῖνν καὶ τοῦ ἀεὶ εἶναι.⁴ δεῖ τοῖνν καὶ
 τοῦ μέλλοντος ἥδη παρόντος εἶναι. οὐ δὴ ὑστερόν τι ἐν
 50 ἐκείνῳ, ἀλλὰ τὸ ἥδη ἐκεῖ παρὸν ὑστερον ἐν ἀλλῷ
 γίνεται.. εἰ οὖν ἥδη πάρεστι τὸ μέλλον, ἀνάγκη οὕτω
 παρεῖναι, ὡς προνοιογμένον εἰς τὸ ὑστερον· τοῦτο δέ
¹ delevimus, ut glossam e lin. 13 arcessitam
² delevimus
³ δεῖ . εἶναι om. H S².

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lack of the power before planning, and foresight, because the one who foresees did not have the power by which there would be no need of foresight. For foresight is in order that there should not be this but that, and there is in it a kind of fear of what is not just so. But where there is only this, there is not foresight. And planning is "this instead of that". But when there is only one of them, why should there be a plan? How then can the alone and the one and the simple contain explicitly the 'this that there should not be that', and "there had to be this if not that" and "this appeared useful and this preservative when it came to be"? So then it saw beforehand and planned beforehand, and indeed as was said at the beginning of the present discussion—also gave the senses because of this, no matter how puzzling the giving. But all the same, if every divine activity must not be incomplete and it is not permitted to suppose that anything which is of God is other than whole and all, then everything must exist in any thing which is his. So existing for ever must be there also.¹ So the future must also be already present there. For there is certainly nothing which comes later in that [divine world], but what is already present there comes to be later in another [world]. If then the future is already present, it must necessarily be present as if it had been thought out beforehand with a view to what comes later; but this means so

¹ δεῖ τοῖνν καὶ τοῦ ἀεὶ εἶναι is found only in the quotation in Philoponus *De Aeternitate Mundi* II 5 p. 398. H-S¹ print it in the text. H-S² omit it as being a comment of Philoponus, but there seems no sufficient reason for being certain that it is so

ἔστιν, ὡς μηδὲν δεῖσθαι μηδενὸς τότε, τοῦτο δέ ἔστι μηδὲν ἐλλεάφοντος πάντα ἄρα ἥδη ἦν καὶ τέλος ἦν ὡς εἰπεῖν οὐσιῶν τάδε μετὰ τόδε ἐκτεινόμενον μὲν γάρ καὶ οἶον ἀπλούμενον ἔχει διεκνύναι τόδε μετὰ τόδε, ὅμοιος δέ ὁν πᾶν τόδε τοῦτο δέ ἔστι ἔχον ἐν ἑαυτῷ καὶ τὴν αἰτιαν

2. Διὸ καὶ ἐντεῦθεν ἄν τις οὐχ ἥττον καταμάθοι τὴν νοῦ φιλιαν, ἣν καὶ τλέον τῶν ἄλλων ὄρώμενον οὐδὲ ὡς δοσον ἔστι τὸ νοῦ χρῆμα ὄρώμενον. τὸ μεν γάρ "ὅτι" διδομενοι αὐτὸν ἔχειν, τὸ δέ "διότι" οὐκετι, ἢ, εἰ δοίημεν, εἰ χωρίς. καὶ ὄρώμενον ἀνθρωπον ἢ ὄφθαλμόν, εἰ τύχοι, ὥσπερ ἄγαλμα ἢ ἀγάλματος· τὸ δέ ἔστιν ἐκεῖ ἀνθρωπος καὶ διὰ τί ἀνθρωπος εἴτε καὶ νοερὸν αὐτὸν δεῖ τον ἐκεῖ πνηθρωπον εἶναι, καὶ ὄφθαλμός¹ καὶ διὰ τί ἢ οὐκ ἀν δλως εἴη, εἰ μὴ διὰ τί. ἐνταῦθα δέ ὥσπερ ἔκαστον τῶν μερῶν χωρίς, οὕτω καὶ τὸ "διὰ τί" ἐκεῖ δέ ἐν ἐν πάντα, ὥστε ταῦτα τὸ πρᾶγμα καὶ τὸ "διὰ τί" τοῦ πράγματος πολλαχοῦ δέ καὶ ἐνταῦθα τὸ πρᾶγμα καὶ τὸ "διὰ τί" ταῦτόν, οἷς τι εστιν ἐκλεψις. τι οὖν κωλύει καὶ ἔκαστον διὰ τί εἶναι καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων, καὶ τούτῳ εἴωται τὴν οὐσίαν ἔκαστου; μᾶλλον δέ ἀνάγκη καὶ

¹ θειλερ ὄφθαλμὸν Ἐπι

This passage (line 49 to end), together with IV. 4. 16, anticipates the doctrine of Iamblichus and other later Neoplatonists of the pre-existence of time in the higher world. On this see S. Sambursky and S. Pines *The Concept of Time in Late Neoplatonism* (a selection of texts with

that there will be no need of anything then and this means that there will be no deficiency. All things, then, existed already and existed for ever, and existed in such a way that one could say later this after that", for when it is extended and in a sense unfolded it is able to display this after that, but when it is all together it is entirely this but this means having its cause also in itself.¹

2. And so even starting from here one could none the less come to know the nature of Intellect, which we see even more clearly than the others, but not even so do we see how great Intellect is. For we grant that it has the "that" but not the "why", or, if we do grant it the "why", it is as separate. And we see man, or, if it happens so, eye, as an image or belonging to an image. But in reality there in the intelligible there is man and the reason why there is man, if the man there must also himself be an intellectual reality, and eye and the reason why there is eye; or they would not be there at all, if the reason why was not. But here below, just as each of the parts is separate, so also is the reason why. But there all are in one, so that the thing and the reason why of the thing are the same. But often here below also the thing and the reason why are the same, as for instance "what is an eclipse".² What then prevents each and every thing being its reason why, in the case of the others too, and this being its substance? Rather, this is necessary; and when we try in

translation and commentary), Jerusalem 1971

² Plotinus in what follows is characteristically developing an Aristotelian distinction for his own purposes. Cf. Aristotle *Metaphysics* H 4. 1044b9-15 and *Posterior Analytics* B 2. 90a15

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15 πειρωμένος οὗτως τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι λαμβάκειν ὄρθως συμβαίνει δὲ γόρι ἐστιν ἔκαστον, διὰ τούτο ἐστι. λέγω δὲ οὐχ ὅτι τὸ εἶδος ἔκάστῳ αἴτιον τοῦ εἶναι—τοῦτο μὲν γάρ ἀληθές—ἀλλ’ ὅτι, εἰ καὶ αὐτὸν τὸ εἶδος ἔκαστον πρὸς αὐτὸν ἀναπτύγτοις, εὑρήσεις ἐν αὐτῷ τὸ “διὰ τί”
 20 ἀργὸν μὲν γάρ ὃν καὶ ζωὴν *{μὴ}*¹ ἔχοι τὸ “διὰ τί” οὐ πάντων ἔχει, εἶδος δὲ ὁν καὶ νοῦ ὃν πόθεν ἀν λάθοι τὸ “διὰ τί”, εἰ δὲ παρὰ νοῦ τοι λέγοι, οὐ χωρίς ἐστι, εἴ γε καὶ αὐτόν ἐστιν εἰ οὖν δεῖ ἔχειν ταῦτα μηδενὶ ἐλλείποντα, μηδε τῷ “διὰ τί” ἐλλείπειν νοῦς δὲ ἔχει το διὰ τί οὗτως ἔκαστον τῶν ἐν αὐτῷ τὰ δὲ ἐν αὐτῷ
 25 αὐτὸς ἔκαστον ἀν εἴη [τῶν ἐν αὐτῷ],² ὥστε μηδὲν προσδεισθαι τον διὰ τι γεγονεν, ἀλλ’ ὅμοι γέγονε καὶ ἔχει ἐν αὐτῷ τὴν ὑποστάσεως αἵτιαν, γεγονός δὲ οὐκ εἰκῇ οὐδὲν ἀν παραλειψμένοι ἔχοι τοι “διὰ τί”, ἀλλὰ νάν ἔχει καὶ τὸ καλῶς ὅμοι τῆς αἵτιας καὶ
 30 τοῖς ἄρα μεταλαμβάνοντας οὕτω δίδωσιν, ὡς τὸ “διὰ τί” ἔχειν, καὶ μήν, ὥσπερ ἐν τῷδε τῷ παντὶ ἐκ πολλῶν συνεστηκότι συνείρεται πρὸς ἄλληλα τὸ πάντα, καὶ ἐν τῷ πάντα εἶναι ἐστι καὶ τὸ διότι ἔκαστον—ὥσπερ καὶ ἐφ’ ἔκαστου τὸ μέρος πρὸς τὸ ὅλον ἔχον ὄράται τὸ
 ἀν τούτον γενομένου, ἔτα τούτου μετὰ τόδε, ἀλλὰ πρὸς ἄλληλα ὅμοι τὴν αἵτιαν καὶ τὸ αἵτιαν συνιστάντων, οὕτω χρὴ πολὺ μᾶλλοι ἔκει τά τε πάντα πρὸς τὸ ὅλον ἔκαστα καὶ ἔκαστοι πρὸς αὐτόν εἰ οὖν ἡ συνυπάσπιτος

¹ The.ler

² delevimus

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this way to grasp the essential nature of a thing, it comes out right. For what a thing is is the reason why it is. But I do not mean that the form is cause of existence for each thing—this is of course true—but that, if also you open each individual form itself back upon itself, you will find the reason why in it. For a thing which is inert and does not have life does not at all have the reason why, but if it is a form and belongs to Intellect, where would it get its reason why from? But if someone were to say "from Intellect", it is not separate, supposing that it is also itself Intellect; if then Intellect must have these things in no way deficient, they must not be deficient in the reason why. But Intellect in this way has each and every reason why of the things in it; but it is itself individually all the things in it, so that none of them has come to be in need of a reason why, but it has come to be along with it and has in itself the cause of its existence. But since there is nothing casual in its coming to be it would not have any of its reason why left out but in having everything it has that of its cause which makes it exist beautifully. So it also gives to the things which participate in it in such a way that they possess their reason why. And truly, just as in this All here below, which is composed of many things, all of them are linked to each other, and each individual reason why is contained in their being all—just as in each individual the part is seen relating to the whole—it is not that this comes to be, and then this after that, but they jointly establish cause and caused together in relation to each other, so much more there in the intelligible must all things be each of them related to the whole and each to itself. If therefore there is a joint

όμοιον πάντων καὶ οὐκ εἰκῇ πάντων καὶ δεῖ μὴ
ἀπηρτήσθαι, ἐν αὐτοῖς ἀν ἔχοι τὰ αἰτιατὰ τὰς αἰτίας,
40 καὶ τοιούτων ἔκαστοι, οἷον ἀναιτίως τὴν αἰτίαν ἔχειν εἰ
οὖν μὴ ἔχει αἴτιαν τοῦ εἶναι, αὐτάρκη δέ ἔστι καὶ
μεμυωμένα αἰτίας ἔστιν, εἰη ἀν ἐν αὐτοῖς ἔχοντα σὺν
αντοῖς τὴν αἰτίαν καὶ γάρ αὐτὸν εἰ μηδέν ἔστι μάτην ἔκει.
πολλὰ δὲ ἐν ἔκάστῳ ἔστι, πάντα δοσα ἔχει ἔχοις ἀν εἰπεῖν
45 διότι ἔκαστον προτὶ ἄρα καὶ συνῆγ τὸ διότι ἔκει οὐκ δὲ
διότι, ἀλλ᾽ ὅτι μᾶλλον δὲ ἀμφω ἕν τί γάρ ἀν καὶ
περιττὸν είχε νου, ὡς ἀν νου νοημα μη τοιούτον δν, οἷον
μὴ τέλεον γέννημα; εἰ οὖν τέλεον, οὐκ ἔστιν εἰπεῖν διώ
ἔλλειπει, οὐδὲ διὰ τί τοῦτο οὐ πάρεστι, παρὸν ἄρα ἔχοις
50 ἀν εἰπεῖν διότι παρεστιν ἐν ἄρα τῇ ὑποστάσει το διὰ τί
ἐν ἔκάστῳ τούτου νοήματι καὶ ἐνεργήματι οἷον καὶ
ἀνθρώπου τας προεθάνη ἐνθρωπος συμφέρων ἐαυτὸν
αὐτῷ, καὶ πάντα δοσα ἔχει ἔξαρχης ὁμού ἔχων ἔταιμος
ἔντον δλος εἴτα, εἰ μὴ πᾶς ἔστι, ἀλλὰ δεῖ τι αὐτῷ
55 προσθέναι, γεννήματός ἔστιν. ἔστι δέ αὐτός πᾶς
ἔστιν ἀλλ' οὐ γυνήμενος ἀνθρωπος γενητός.

3 Τί οὖν κινδύνει προβούλεύσασθαι περὶ αὐτοῦ; η
κατ' ἔκεινόν ἔστιν, ὥστε οὕτε τι ὀφελεῖν δεῖ οὕτε

existence of all things together of all things with nothing random about it, and there must be no separation, then the things caused would have their causes in themselves, and each would be of such a kind as to possess its cause causelessly. If then the intelligibles have no cause of their being but are self sufficient and independent of cause, they would be in possession of their cause in themselves and with themselves. For again, if nothing there is purposeless, and there are many things in each, you could say that all the things which each individual has are each individual reason why. So there in the intelligible the reason why was before and with the things and was not a "why", but a "that"; but rather both are one. For what could an intelligible have over and above Intellect, so as not to be of such a kind being a thought of Intellect, as to be a perfect production? If then it is perfect, it is impossible to say in what it is deficient, nor why this is not present in it. If then something is present, you could tell the reason why it is present; so the reason why is contained in its existence, in each thought, then, and active actualisation of Intellect, man for instance, the whole man is manifest, bringing himself along with the thought of him, and, since all he has he has all together from the beginning he is all ready as a whole. Then, if he is not whole there, but something has to be added to him, this belongs to something generated; but he exists for ever; and so he is all complete. But the man who has come to be is generated.

3 What, then, is there to prevent there being previous deliberation about him? Now he is according to that intelligible man, so that one must not

προσθεῖναι, ἀλλὰ τὸ βουλεύσασθαι καὶ λελογίσθαι διὰ τὴν ὑπόθεσιν· ὑπέθετο γαρ γνόμενα. καὶ οὕτω μὲν ἡ 5 βούλευσις¹ καὶ ὁ λογισμός· τῷ δὲ “αεὶ γνόμενα” ἐνδείξασθαι καὶ διὰ λογίζεται ἀνείλεν σὺ γάρ ἔνι λογίζεσθαι ἐν τῷ ἀεί· καὶ γάρ αὐτὸν ἐπιλεληφθέντος ἦν, δῆτας καὶ πρότερον. εἶτα, εἰ μὲν ἀμινών ὑστερον, οὐκ ἀν καλὰ πρότερον εἰ δὲ ἦν καλά, ἔχει τὸ ὠσαύτως. καλὰ δὲ 10 ἐστὶ μετὰ τῆς πίτίας ἐπεὶ καὶ νῦν καλόν τι. διὰ τάντα — τοῦτο γάρ καὶ εἴδος τὸ πάντα—καὶ διὰ τὴν ὕλην κατέχειν κατέχει δέ, εἰ μηδὲν αὐτῆς ἀμόρφωτον καταλείπει. δε, εἰ τις μυρφή ἐλλείνου, οὖν δόθαλμὸς ἢ ἄλλο τι· ὥστε αἰτιολογῶν πάντα λέγεις. διὸ 15 τί οὖν δόθαλμοι; ἵνα πάντα. καὶ διὰ τί ὀφρύες, ἵνα πάντα καὶ γαρ εἰ ἔνεκα σωτηρίας λέγοις, φυλακτικού τῆς οὐσίας λέγεις ἐν αὐτῇ υπάρχον τοῦτο δὲ εἶναι συμβαλλόμενον. οὕτως ἄρα οὐσία ἦν πρὸν καὶ τοστό, καὶ το αἵτιον ἄρα μέρος τῆς οὐσίας· καὶ ἄλλο τοίνυν τοῦτο, 20 δὲ δὲστι, τῆς οὐσίας. τάντα τοίνυν ἀλλήλοις καὶ ἡ δῆλη καὶ τελεῖα καὶ πάσα καὶ τὸ καλῶς μετὰ τῆς αἰτίας καὶ εἰ τῇ αἰτίᾳ, καὶ ἡ οὐσία καὶ τὸ τέλον εἶναι καὶ τὸ διότι

¹ R^{2mg} (*deliberatio Ficinus*): βούλησις Επ. n.

¹The reference is to Plato's distinction between the realm of real being and the realm of becoming in *Timaeus*

take away or add anything but deliberation and reasoning are due to [Plato's] assumption: for he assumed that things had come into being. And this is why there is deliberation and reasoning; but by saying "always coming into being" he also abolishes the idea that God reasons.¹ For it is not possible to reason in what is always: for to do so would belong to someone who had forgotten how it was before. And then if things were better afterwards, they would not have been beautiful before; but if they were beautiful, they keep the same. But they are beautiful because they are with their cause; since now also a thing is beautiful, because it is everything—for this is what form is, being everything—and because it controls matter; but it controls matter if it leaves no part of it unshaped; but it does so leave it if any shape is wanting, an eye, for instance, or something else, so that when you tell the cause, you tell all. Why then eyes? That there shall be everything. And why eyebrows? That there shall be everything. For even if you say "for preservation", you are speaking of a safeguard of the substance which exists in it; but this means you are saying that it contributes to its essential nature. Thus, then, the substance existed before this safeguard and the cause therefore was a part of the substance; and this safeguard, then, is something other, but what it is belongs to substance. All things therefore are for each other, and the whole is perfect and all-complete and its existing beautifully is with the cause and in the cause, and the substance and

27D5 28A4. It is Plotinus, not Plato, who draws the conclusion from it that God does not reason

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ἐν εἰς τούναν ἔγκειται τὸ αἰσθητικὸν εἶναι καὶ οὕτως
αἰσθητικὸν ἐν τῷ εἴδει οὐτὸς ἀδίστητον ἀνάγκης καὶ
τελειότητος νοῦ ἐν αὐτῷ ἔχοντος εἰπερ τελευτής. τὰς
25 αἰσίας, ὡστε ημᾶς ὑστερον ἴδειν, ὡς ἄρα ὥρθισι οἵτις
ἔχει ἐκεῖ γάρ ἐν καὶ συμπληρωτικὸν τὸ αἴτιον καὶ
οιχὶ δὲ ἀνθρώπος ἐκεῖ μόνον νοῦς ἦν, προσε-έθη δὲ τὸ
αἰσθητικόν, ὅτε εἰς γένεσιν ἐστέλλετο—πῶς οὐκ ἂν
ἔκεινος δὲ νοῦς πρὸς τὰ τῆρας ὁρέοι; τί γὰρ ἀν εἴη
30 αἰσθητικὸν ἢ ἀντιληπτικὸν αἰσθητόν; πῶς δὲ οὐκ
διποτοι, ἐκεῖ μὲν αἰσθητικὸν ἐξ διδούντος ἐνταῦθα δὲ
αἰσθάνεσθαι καὶ τῆς ἐκεῖ δυνάμεως τὴν ἐνέργειαν
πληροῦσθαι ἐνταῦθα, ὅτε χείρων ἡ ψυχὴ γίγνεται;

4 Πάλιν οὖν πρὸς ταῦτην τὴν ἀπορίου ἀνατίθεν
ληπτέοι τὸν ἀνθρώπον δοτις ἐκείνος ἐστιν. ἵστως δὲ
πρότερον χρή τὸν τῆρας ἀνθρώπον δοτις ποτέ ἐστιν
εἰπεῖν—μήποτε οὐδὲ τοῦτο ἀκριβῶς εἰδότες ὡς
5 ἔχοντες τούτον ἐκείνον ζητοῦμεν. φανείη δὲ ἵστως
τοιοὺς δὲ αὐτὸς οὐδέτες τε κακένος εἶναι. ἀρχὴ δὲ τῆς
σκέψεως ἐντεῦθεν ἀρά δὲ ἀνθρώπος οὐδος λόγος ἐστι
ψιχῆς ἔτερος τῆς τον ἀνθρώποι τοντον ποιούσης καὶ
ζῆν αὐτὸν καὶ λογίζεσθαι παρεχομένης; ή η ψυχὴ ἡ
10 τοιαύτη δὲ ἀνθρώπος ἐστιν; η η τῷ σώματι τῷ τοιῷδε
ψυχὴ προσληρυστη; ἀλλ' εἰ μὲν ζῶντος λογικὸν δ

The Platonic text with which Plotinus is concerned here is the conclusion drawn in *Alcibiades* I 129E-130A that man is a soul living a body which acquired a rather disproportionate weight and importance in later Greek thought. It was an important source of sharp body-soul dualism not only for later Platonists but for Stoics and

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the essential nature and the reason why are one. If, therefore, having senses, and senses of this kind, is contained in the form by eternal necessity and the perception of Intellect which, if it is perfect, possesses .he causes in itself, so that we afterwards see that this then is the right way for things to be—for there in the intelligible the cause is one with and an essential completion of the substance—and if man is there not only an intellect, sense-perception being added when he was sent to birth, how could that Intellect not incline to the world here below? For what could sense perception be except the apprehension of sense-objects? But how would it not be absurd for there to be sense-perception from eternity, but for it to do its perceiving here below, and for the power there in the intelligible to accomplish its activity here below, when the soul becomes worse?

4. To deal with this difficulty, therefore, we must go back and take up the question of who that man in the intelligible world is. But perhaps we should first say exactly who this man here below is—in case we go looking for that man on the supposition that we have got this one, though we do not even know this one accurately. But perhaps it might seem to some people that this man and that man are the same. This is the starting-point of our investigation: is this man a rational forming principle belonging to soul other than the soul which makes this man and provides him with life and reason? Or is the soul of this kind the man? Or the soul which uses a body of such a kind? But if man is a rational living being but a Gnostic. On its history in Greek philosophy see J. Pépin *Idees Grecques sur l'Homme et sur Dieu* (Paris 1971), Part I *La Tradition du 1^{er} Alcibiade*

PLOTINUS: ENNEAD VI. 7.

ἄνθρωπος, ζῶον δὲ τὸ ἐκ ψυχῆς καὶ σώματος, οὐκ ἀνέστη ὁ λόγος οὗτος τῇ ψυχῇ ὁ αὐτός ἀλλ' εἰ τὸ ἐκ ψυχῆς λογικής καὶ σωματοῦ λόγος τοι ἄνθρωπου, πως ἀνείη ὑπόστασις ἀδίος, τοιούτον τοῦ λογου τοῦ τοιούτου 15 ἄνθρωπου γνωμένου, ὅταν σῶμα καὶ ψυχὴ συνέλθῃ; ἔσται γαρ ὁ λόγος οὗτος δηλωτικὸς τοῦ ἐσομένου, οὐκ οὐδεὶς ὅν φαμεν αὐτοάνθρωπος, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον ἐσικὼς ὅρα, καὶ τοιούτῳ οἷῷ μηδὲ δηλωτικῷ τοῦ τοῦ ἡνὸς εἶναι. οὐδὲ γάρ εἴδους ἔστι τοῦ ἐνύδου, ἀλλὰ τὸ συναμφότερον 20 δηλων, ὃ ἔστιν ἥδη. εἰ δὲ τούτῳ, οὕπω εὑρηται ὁ ἄνθρωπος· ἣν γάρ ὁ κατὰ τὸν λόγον. εἰ δέ τις λέγοι “τὸν λόγον δεῖ τὸν τῶν τοιούτων εἶναι συναμφότερόν τι, τόδε ἐν τῷδε”, καθ' ὃ ἔστιν ἔκαστον, οὐκ ἀξιοῦται λέγειν· χρὴ δέ, καὶ εἰ διτι μάλιστα των ἐνύλων εἶδαν καὶ μετὰ ὅλης 25 τοὺς λόγους χρὴ λεγειν, ἀλλὰ τὸν λόγον αὐτὸν τὸν πεποιηκότα, οὐν τὸν ἄνθρωπον, λαμβάνειν καὶ μάλιστα, ὅσοι τὸ¹ τί ἦν εἶναι αἱ ἀξιούσαι ἐφ' ἔκαστον δηρίζεσθαι, ὅταν ικρίως ὅρίζωνται. τί οὖν ἔστι τὸ εἶναι ἄνθρωπψ; τούτο δ' ἔστι, τί ἔστι τὸ πεποιηκός τούτοις 30 τὸν ἄνθρωπον ἐνυπάρχον, οὐ χωριστόν, ἀρ' οὖν αὐτὸς ὁ λόγος ζῶόν ἔστι λογικόν, η τὸ συναμφότερον, αὐτὸς δέ τις ποιητικὸς ζῶου λογικούς τίς ἀντός; η τὸ ζῶον

Krähhofer τοῦ Enn.

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living being is what is composed of soul and body, this rational form would not be the same as soul. But if what is composed of rational soul and body is the rational form of man, how could it be something eternally existent, since this rational form of this kind of man comes into existence when body and soul come together? For this rational form will be explanatory of what is going to be, not the sort we say is absolute man, but more like a definition, and the kind of definition which does not explain the essential nature. For it is not even a definition of the form in matter, but explains the composite, which already exists. But if this is so, the man is not yet found; for he was going to be the one according to the rational form. But if someone were to say "The rational form of such beings must be something composite, this in this", he does not think fit to say by what each exists; but one must, however much one must also speak of the rational forming principles of forms in matter as including matter, grasp the forming principle itself which makes, for instance, man; this applies especially to those who claim to define the essential nature in each case, when they define strictly and properly.¹ What is it, then, to be a man? That is, what is it which has made this man here below, which exists in him and is not separate? Is, then, the rational forming principle itself a rational living being, or is the living being the composite, but the principle itself one which makes the rational living being? What is it then

Plotinus is here critically concerned with Aristotle's discussion of essence and definition in *Metaphysics* Z 4-5 1029b1-1030a14.

ἀντὶ ζωῆς λογικῆς ἔτι λόγων. Ζωὴ τούναν λογικὴ ὁ ἄνθρωπος. ἀρ' οὖν ζωὴ ἀνευ φυχῆς; ή γάρ η φυχὴ¹ παρέξεται τὴν ζωὴν τὴν λογικὴν καὶ ἔσται ὁ ἄνθρωπος ἐνέργεια φυχῆς καὶ οὐκ οὐσία, η η φυχὴ ὁ ἄνθρωπος ἔσται. ἀλλ' εἰ η φυχὴ η λογικὴ ὁ ἄνθρωπος ἔσται, ὅταν εἰς ἄλλο ζῷον ἵη² η φυχή, πῶς οὐκ ἄνθρωπος;

5. Λογον τοίνυν δει τὸν ἄνθρωπον ἄλλον παρά τὴν φυχὴν εἶναι τί καλύει συναμφότερόν τι τὸν ἄνθρωπον εἶναι, φυχὴν ἐν τοιῷδε λογῷ, ὃντος τοῦ λόγου οἷον ἐνεργείας τοιάποδε τῆς δὲ ἐνέργειας μὴ δινομένης ἀνει δ τοῖς ἐνέργοῦντος εἶναι; οὕτα γάρ καὶ οἱ ἐν τοῖς σπέρμασι λόγοι οὔτε γάρ ἀνευ φυχῆς οὔτε φυχαὶ ἀπλώς. οἱ γάρ λόγοι οἱ ποιοῦντες οὐκ ἄφυχοι, καὶ θαυμαστὸν οὐδὲν τὰς τοιαύτας ούσιας λόγους εἶναι οἱ οὖν δὴ³ ποιοῦντες ἄνθρωπον λόγοι πούς φυχῆς ἐνέργεια, ἀρα τῆς 10 φυτικῆς, η τῆς ζῴου ποιούσης, ἐναργεστέρας τινὸς καὶ αὐτὸ τοῦτο ζωτικώτερας. η δὲ φυχὴ η τοιαύτη η ἐγγενομένη τῇ τοιαύτῃ ψλή, ἀτε οὖσα τούτῳ, οἷον οὕτα διακεψένη καὶ ἀνει τοῦ οώματος, ἄνθρωπος, ἐν σώματι δὲ μορφώσασα κατ' αὐτὴν καὶ ἀλλο εἰδῶλοι 15 ἄνθρωπον δον ἔθεχετο τὸ σώμα ποιήσασα, ὥσπερ καὶ τούτου αὐτοικειού δ ζωγράφος ἔτι ἐλάττω ἄνθρωποι τινι, τὴν μορφὴν ἔχει καὶ τοὺς λόγους η τὰ ηθη, τὰς διαθέσεις, τὰς δυνάμεις, ἀμυνδρὰ πάντα, ἔτι μὴ οὗτος πρώτος καὶ δὴ καὶ [εἰδη αἰσθήσεων ἄλλων]⁴ αἰσθήσεις 20 ἄλλας ἐναργεῖς δοκούσας εἶναι, ἀμυνδροτέρας δὲ ὡς πρὸς τὰς πρὸς αὐτῶν καὶ εἰκόνας. ο δὲ ἐπὶ τούτῳ ἄνθρωπος

¹ Creuzer (*transit Plotinus, et testatur Theologie*); ² Enn.

³ Orth. μη Enn.

⁴ delevimus, ut glossam ad αἰσθήσεις ἄλλας

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itself? Or does "living being" stand for "rational life" in the form? Then man is rational life. Is he then life without soul? For either soul will provide the rational life and the man will be an activity of soul and not a substance, or the soul will be the man. But if the rational soul is going to be the man, how is the soul not man when it goes into another living being?

5. Man, therefore, must be a rational forming principle other than soul. What is there to prevent man from being a composite, a soul in a particular kind of forming principle, the principle being a sort of particular activity, and the activity being unable to exist without that which acts? For this is how the forming principles in seeds are; for they are neither without soul nor simply souls. For the rational forming principles which make things are not soulless, and there is nothing surprising in substances of this kind being rational forming principles. Of what kind of soul, then, are the forming principles which make man activities? Of the growth-soul? Rather of that which makes a living being, a clearer one and just because of that more alive. And the soul of this kind which enters into matter of this kind, just because this is what it is, being in a way disposed like this even without the body, is man, it makes shapes in body according to itself, and makes an other image of man as far as body allows, just as the painter in his turn makes yet another image of this, a kind of still lesser man; it has the shape and the forming principles or traits of character, the dispositions, the powers, all dim because this man is not the first; and it also has other senses, which seem to be clear, but are dimmer in comparison with those before them and are images. But the man over this

ψυχῆς ἥδη θειοτέρας, ἔχουσης βελτίων ἀνθρωπον καὶ αἰσθήσεις ἐναργευτέρας. καὶ εἴη ἀν δὲ τὸν πλάτων τούτου ὅριον μενον, τροσθεὶς δὲ τὸ λόγον εἰς τὸ σώμα τι,
 25 ὅτι ἐποχεῖται τῇ ήτις προσχρήται πρώτως σώματι, ἥ δὲ
 δευτέρως ἡ θειοτέρα. ἥδη γάρ αἰσθητικοῦ ὄντος τον
 γνωμόνεον ἐπηκολούθησεν πιᾶτη τρανστέραν ζωὴν
 δόδοντα· μᾶλλον δ' οὐδὲ ἐπηκολούθησεν, ἀλλὰ οἶν
 προσέθηκεν αὐτην· οὐ γάρ ἔξισταται τον νοητον, ἀλλὰ
 πναφαμένη οἶνον ἐκκρεμαμένην ἔχει τὴν κάτω
 30 συμμίξασα ἑαντὴν λόγων πρὸς λόγον. θεν καὶ ἀμιδρὸς
 οὗτος ὁν ἐγένετο φανερὸς τῇ ἐλλάμψει.

6 Πῶς οὖν ἐν τῇ κρείττονι τὸ αἰσθητικόν; ἥ τὸ
 αἰσθητικὸν τῶν ἔκει ἀν αἰσθητῶν,¹ καὶ ὡς ἔκει τὰ
 αἰσθητά. διὸ καὶ οὕτως αἰσθάνεται τῇ αἰσθητὴν
 ἀρμονίαν, τῇ δὲ αἰσθήσει παραδεξαμένον τοὺς
 5 αἰσθητικοῦ ἀνθρώπον κα. συναρμόσαντος εἰς ἔσχατον
 πρὸς τὴν ἔκει ἀρμονίαν, καὶ πυρὸς ἐναρμόσαντος πρὸς
 τὸ ἔκει πῦρ, οὐ αἰσθησις ἦν ἔκεινη τῇ ψυχῇ ἀνάλογον
*(τῇ)*² τοι πιρὸς τοῦ ἔκει φύσεω εἰς γάρ ἦν ἔκει σώματα
 ταῦτα, ἤσαν αὐτῶν τῇ ψυχῇ αἰσθήσεις καὶ ἀντιλήψεις.
 10 καὶ ὁ ἀνθρωπος ὁ ἔκει, ἡ τοιαντη ψυχή, ἀντιληπτική
 τούτων, θέτει καὶ ὁ ὕστερος ἀνθρωπος, τὸ μέμημα εἶχε
 τοὺς λόγους ἐν μνήσει καὶ ὁ ἐν νῷ ἀνθρωπος τὸν ποδ
 τάντων τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἀνθρώπον ἐλλάμψει δὲ οὗτος
 τῷ δειπτέρῳ καὶ οὗτος τῷ τρίτῳ ἔχει δέ πως πάντας ὁ

¹ Schwyzer, testatur *Theologia*: των ἔκει ανασθήτων Α^{ac} (ἀν εἰρ., EBUCQ: τῶν ἔκει. ἀνασθήτων).

² Reutler

one belongs to a soul already more divine which has a better man and clearer senses. And this would be the man Plato was defining, and by adding "using a body" he indicated that it rides upon the one which primarily uses a body, and the one which does so secondarily is diviner.¹ For when the man who came to be already had sense-perception, this soul followed on and gave a brighter life; or rather it did not follow, but in a way attached itself; for it does not go out of the intelligible, but instead to it has the lower soul in a way hanging from it, mixing itself in, forming principle to forming principle. And so this man, who is dim, becomes clearly visible by the illumination.

6. How, then, is there a power of sense-perception in the better soul? It would be a power of perceiving the sense-objects there, and would correspond to the sense-objects there. This is the way, therefore, in which the better soul perceives the melody of sense, when the man of the sense-world receives it by sense-perception and comes into tune, to the last and lowest degree, with the melody there in the intelligible, and fire is tuned to the fire there, of which that better soul had a perception which corresponded to the nature of the fire there. For if there were bodies there, the soul had perceptions and apprehensions of them, and the man there, the soul of this kind, was able to apprehend these bodies; and that is why the later man, the imitation, had their forming principles in imitation; and the man in Intellect apprehends the man before all men. But this man shines on the second, and this second on the third; and the

¹ Agan. *Alcibiades* I 129E-130A.

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15 ἔσχατος, οὐ γινόμενος ἐκεῖνοι,¹ ἀλλὰ παρακείμενος
ἐκείνοις ἐνέργει δὲ ὁ μὲν ἡμίουν κατὰ τὸν ἔσχατον, τῷ δέ
τι καὶ παρὰ τοῦ πρὸ αὐτοῦ, τῷ δέ καὶ παρὰ τοῦ τρίτου ἡ
ἐνέργεια, καὶ ἔστιν ἔκαστος καθ' ὃν ἐνέργει, καίτοι
πάντας ἔκαστος ἔχει καὶ αὐτὸν ἔχει. τοῦ δὲ σώματος
20 χωρισθείσης τῆς τρίτης ζωῆς καὶ τοῦ τρίτου ἀνθρώπου,
εἰς ουνέπους, οὐδὲ δευτέρᾳ,² συνέποιτο δὲ μὴ χωρισθεῖσα
τὸν ἄνω, οὐδὲ ἐκεῖνη καὶ αὐτῇ λέγεται εἶναι.
μεταλαβούσης δὲ θήρειον σώμα θαυμάζεται δέ, πῶς
λογος ούσα ἀνθρώπου, ἡ πάντα ἦν, ἀλλοτε δὲ ἐνέργει
κατ' ἄλλον καθαρὰ μὲν οὖσα καὶ πρὶν κακυνθῆναι
25 ἀνθρώπου θέλει καὶ ἀνθρώπος ἔστι καὶ γαρ κάλλιαν
τοῦτο, καὶ τὸ κάλλιον ποιεῖ ποιὲι δὲ καὶ δαίμονος
προτέρους, ὅμος δεῖς τῷ τῷ³ ἀνθρώπου καὶ ὁ πρὸ⁴
αὐτῆς δαιμονιώτερος, μᾶλλον δὲ θεός, καὶ ἔστι μίμημα
θεοῦ δαίμων εἰς θεόν ἀνηργημένος, ὥσπερ ἀνθρώπος εἰς
30 δαίμονα⁵ οὐ γάρ λέγεται θεός, εἰς ὃν ὁ ἀνθρώπος ἔχει
γαρ διαφοράν, ἡν ἔχουσι φυχὰ πρὸς ἀλλήλαις, καν ἐπ
τοῦ αὐτοῦ δαιμονίου⁶ λέγει δὲ δεῖ δαίμονας εἶδος
δαιμόνων, οὓς φησιν ὁ Πλάτων δαιμόνως. ὅταν δὲ
35 συνέπηται τῇ⁷ θύρεον φύσων ἐλομένη φυχὴ⁸ ἡ
συνηρημένη [τῇ]⁹ δέ τε ἀνθρώπος ἦν, τὸν ἐν αὐτῇ

¹ Geiger, testatur *Theologia* ἐκείνοις Επν.

² comecimus. η δευτέρα Enn.

³ η η Π Θ γ wBUCQ τὸν η.

⁴ Volkmann ἀνθρώπου Enn

⁵ Volkmann: στίχοι Enn.

⁶ Theiler τῷ Enn

⁷ F3mg (=Ficinus) φυχὴ Enn.

⁸ del. Kirchhoff

Plotinus is probably thinking of two passages in Plato *Symposium* 202D-E and *Timaeus* 90A. These give rather

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last man somehow possesses all men, not becoming those other men, but set alongside them. And one of us is active according to the last and lowest man, but another has something also from the one before him, and another's active actuality comes even from the third, and each is the man according to whom he is active, though each of us has all of them – and again does not have them. And when the third life and the third man are separated from the body, if the third life follows the second, and follows it without being separated from the things above, then this life is said to be also where that life above is. But when the soul takes the body of a beast one wonders how it does it when it is the forming principle of man. Now it was all things, but is active at different times according to different ones. When it is pure, then, and before it is spoilt it wills man and is man; for this is finer, and it does what is finer. But soul makes the spirits which come before man, which are of the same kind as the soul which makes man and he who is before the soul is more of a spirit, or rather is a god, and a spirit is an imitation of a god, dependent on the god as man is on the spirit; for the being on whom man is dependent is not called a god. He has the difference from a god which souls have from each other, even if they belong to the same order. But, one must call spirits that kind of spirits whom Plato calls spirits.¹ But when the soul which was joined to it when it was a man follows the soul which has chosen the nature of a beast, it gives the forming principle in it which different accounts of the nature of spirit in the *Timaeus* the personal δαίμων or guardian spirit is demythologised and said to be the highest part of our soul the immortal reason. Plotinus reconciles the two in III 4.5

PLOTINUS ENNEAD VI 7

λόγον ἐκείνου τοῦ ζών ἔδωκεν. ἔχει γάρ, καὶ ἡ
ἐνέργεια αὗτη χείρων

7. Ἀλλ' εἰ κακυθεῖσα καὶ λεύκων γενομένη
πλάτει θήρειν φύσιν, οὐκ ἦν δὲ ἔξαρχὴς βιων ἐποίει ἂ
ἴππου, καὶ ὁ λόγος δὲ ἵππου καὶ ἵππος παρὰ φύσιν. ἢ
ἔλαττον, οὐ μῆν παρὰ φύσιν, ἀλλ' ἐκείνο πως καὶ
ἢ ἔξαρχῆς ἵππος ἢ κύων. καὶ εἰ μὲν ἔξει, ποιεῖ τὸ κάλλιον,
εἰ δὲ μῆ, δὲ δύναται, ἢ γε ποιεῖν προσταχθεῖσα οὐα καὶ
οἱ πολλὰ εἶδη ποιεῖν εἰδότες δημονυργοί. εἴτα τοῦτο
ποιοῦντες, ἢ δὲ προσετάχθησαν, ἢ δὲ ἢ ὑλὴ ἐθέλει τῇ
ἐπιτηδειότητι. τί γάρ κωλύει τὴν μὲν δύναμιν τῆς τοῦ
10 παντὸς ψυχῆς προϋπογράφειν, ὅτε λόγον παντα οὖσαν,
πρὶν καὶ παρ' αὐτῆς ἥκειν τὰς φυχικὰς δυνάμεις, καὶ
τὴν προυπογραφὴν οἷον προδρόμοις ἐλλάμψεις εἰς
τὴν ὑλὴν σῖναι, ἥδη δὲ τοῖς τοιούτοις ἰχνεσιν ἐπ-
ακολουθοῦσαν τὴν ἔξεργαζομένην ψυχὴν κατὰ μέρη
15 τὰ ἱχνη διαμθυῖσιν ποὺς καὶ γενέσθαι ἐκάστη
τοῦτο, φ προσῆλθε σχηματίσασα ἑαυτήν, ὡμπερ τὸν ἐν
δοχησι. πρὸς τὸ δοθὲν αὐτῷ δρᾶμα; ἀλλὰ γερ
ἐπισπόμενοι τῷ ἐφεξῆς εἰς τούτο ἥκομεν. ἦν δὲ ήμιν ὁ
λόγος, τὸ αἰσθητικὸν δύνατον τοῦ ἀνθρώπου καὶ πῶς οὐκ
ἐκεῖνα πρὸς γένεσιν βλέπει καὶ ημιν ἐφανετο καὶ ο
20 λόγος ἔδεικνεν οὐκ ἐκεῖνα πρὸς τὰ τῆδε βλέπειν, ἀλλὰ
ταῦτα εἰς ἐκεῖνα ἀνηρτήσθαι καὶ μυεῖσθαι ἐκεῖνα, καὶ

¹ Here and in what follows in ch. 7 Plotinus is explaining P'ati's doctrine of animal re-incarnation as stated in *Timaeus* 42B-C

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belongs to that living thing in the intelligible world
For it possesses it, and this is its worse form of
activity.

7. But if it is when it is spoilt and has become
worse that the soul makes a beast-nature, it was not
from the beginning the principle which made horse
or ox, and the forming principles of horse, and horse,
were against nature No, a lesser thing, certainly not
an unnatural one, but that which made them was
somehow from the beginning horse or dog. And if the
soul has the opportunity, it makes what is finer, but
if not, what it can; it is foreordained to make in any
case. it is like the craftsmen who know how to make
many forms and then make just this one, for which
they had the order or which their material by its
particular characteristics required. For what is
there to prevent the power of the Soul of the All from
drawing a preliminary outline, since it is the universal
forming principle, even before the soul-powers
come from it, and this preliminary outline being like
illuminations running on before into matter and the
soul which carries out the work following traces of
this kind and making by articulating the traces part
by part, and each individual soul becoming this to
which it came by figuring itself, as the dancer does to
the dramatic part given him? Well, by following up
one line of thought after another we have arrived at
this point. But our discussion was about how the
power of sense-perception belongs to man and how
those intelligible realities do not look to coming to
birth; and it appeared to us, and our argument
showed, that those realities do not look to the things
here below but these are dependent on those and
imitate those, and that this man here below has his

τοῦτον τὸν ἄνθρωπιν παρ' ἐκείνου ἔχοντα τὰς δυνάμεις πρὸς ἐκεῖνα, καὶ συνέζενθαι ταῦτα ταὶς αἰσθητὰ τούτῳ, ἐκεῖνα δὲ ἐκεῖνοι ἐκεῖνα γάρ τὰ αἰσθητά ἢ οὗτοι 25 ὀνομάσαμεν, ὅτι σώματα,¹ ἄλλον δὲ τρόπον ἐν ἀντιλήψει καὶ τήδε τὴν αἰσθησιν² ἀμυνδροτέραν εἶναι³ τῆς ἐκεὶ ἀντιληφεως, ἣν ὀνομάζομεν αἰσθησιν διὰ σωμάτων ἥν⁴ ἐναργεστέραν οἴσαν.⁵ καὶ διὰ τούτου καὶ τούτοις αἰσθητικόν, ὅτι ἐλαττόνων καὶ ἐλαττόνων 30 ἀντιληπτικὸς εἰκόνων ἐκεινῶν ὥστε εἶναι τὰς αἰσθήσεις ταυτας ἀμυδράς νοήσεις, τὰς δὲ ἐκεὶ νοήσεις ἐναργεῖς αἰσθήσεις.

8. Ἀλλὰ τὸ μὲν αἰσθητικὸν οὔτως, τὸ δὲ ἵππος⁶ δύτως⁶ καὶ ἐκαστον τῶν ζῴων ἐκεὶ πῶς οὐ πρὸς τὰ ἐν, αὐθα δὲ θέλεις βλέπειν, ἀλλ' εἰ μέτρον, ἵνα ἡτανθά ἵππος γένοιτο η ἄλλο τι ζῷον, ἐξεὑρε νόησαν ἵππον; καίτοι 5 πῶς οἶον τὸ ἥν βουλομενον ἵππον ποιῆσαι νοῆσαι ἵππον; ηδη γάρ δῆλον διὰ ὑπῆρχεν ἵππον νόησις, εἴπερ ηβουλήθη ἵππον ποιῆσαι ώστε οὐκ ἔστιν, ἵνα ποιῆση, νοῆσαι, ἀλλὰ πρότερον εἴναι τὸν μὴ γενόμενον ἵππον πρὸ τοῦ μετὰ ταῦτα ἐσομένου. εἰ οὖν πρὸ τῆς γενέσεως 10 ἦν· καὶ οὕτω, ἵνα γένηται, ἐνοήθη, οὐ πρὸς τὰ τήδε βλέπων εἶχε παρ' ἐαυτῷ οὐ εἶχε τοὶ ἐκεὶ ἵππον, οὐδὲ ἵνα

¹ E²⁵ (*corpora Ficinus*): ἀσώματα AEBxUCQ, H S²

² post αἰσθησιν transp. διὰ σωμάτων ἥν Steinhart, H S²

³ Theiler οὖσαν Επι., H S²

⁴ αἰσθησιν διὰ σωμάτων ἥν del. H S²

⁵ Theiler εἶνα Επι., H S²

⁶ Igual δύτως EBxUCQ: δύτος A.

In this difficult passage I remain closer to the MSS (and H S²) than to H-S². But in line 25 I read σώματα with Ficino (who translates *corpora*) and in lines 26 and 28 I

powers from that intelligible man and looks to those realities, and these sense-objects are linked to this man and those others to that; for those sense-objects, which we called so because they are bodies, are apprehended in a different way; and that this sense-perception here below is dimmer than the apprehension there in the intelligible, which we called sense-perception because it is of bodies and which is clearer.¹ And for this reason this man here has sense-perception, because he has a lesser apprehension of lesser things, images of those intelligible realities, so that these sense-perceptions here are dim intellections, but the intellections there are clear sense-perceptions.

8. But so much for the power of sense-perception. But all the same, how do "horse" and each and every one of the animals not intend to look to the things here below? But supposing God discovered the thought of horse in order that a horse (or some other animal) might come into being here below? Yet how would it be possible for him when he wanted to make a horse to think a horse? For it is already clear that the thought of horse existed if he wanted to make a horse; so that it is not possible for him to think it in order to make it, but the horse which did not come into being must exist before that which was to be afterwards. If then it existed before its generation and was not thought of that it might be generated, he who possessed the horse there in the intelligible did not possess it in himself in looking to the things here below, nor that he might make the things here transpose σύναντα and εἴλαντα with Theiler. The presence of bodies in the intelligible world is suggested in the previous chapter, lines 7-9, and clearly affirmed in VI. 2. 21. 52-53.

τα γῆδε ποιήσῃ, εἶχε τοῦτον τε καὶ τὰ ἄλλα, ἀλλὰ οὐ μὲν
έκεινα, ταῦτα δὲ ἐπηκολούθει εἴς ἀνάγκης ἔκεινοις οὐ
γαρ ήν στήναι μέχρι των ἑκεί. τὸς γάρ αὐτὸς οὐτος
15 διναμιν μένειν τε καὶ προέναι δυναμένης; ἀλλα διὰ τί
ἔκει ζῷα ταῦτα; τί γὰρ ἐν θεῷ ταῦτα; τὰ μὲν γὰρ λογικὰ
ἔστω ἀλόγων δὲ τοσούτοι πλῆθος τί τὸ σεμιὸν ἔχει; τί
δὲ οὐ τούμαντόν; ὅτι μὲν οὖν πολλὰ δεῖ τοῦτο τὸ ἐν εὖ πο
στὶ μετὰ τὸ πάντη ἔν, δῆλον η οὐκ ἂν ην μετ' ἔκεινο,
20 ἀλλ' ἔκεινο. μετ' ἔκεινο δε οὐ ὑπὲρ μὲν ἔκεινο πρὸς τὸ
μᾶλλον ἐν γενέσθαι οὐκ ήτι, ἐλλεῖπον δέ ἔκεινον τούτον δέ
ἀρίστου οὐνος ἐνός ἐνός εἶδει πλέον η ἐν εἶναι τὸ γὰρ πλῆθος
ἐν ἐλλείψει τί οὖν κωλύει δυάδα εἶναι; η ἔκατερον τῶν
ἐν τῇ δυάδι οὐχ οὖν τε ην ἐν παντελῶς εἶναι, ἀλλὰ πάλι
25 αὐτὸς δύο τοὐλάχιστον εἶναι, καὶ ἔκεινων αὐτὸς ὡσαύτως
εἶτα καὶ κίνησις ην ἐν τῇ δυάδι τῇ πρώτῃ καὶ στάσις, ην
δέ καὶ νοῦς, καὶ ζωὴ ην ἐν αὐτῇ¹ καὶ τέλεος νοῦς καὶ
ζωὴ τελεία ην τούνν οὐχ οὐς νοῦς εἰς, ἀλλὰ πᾶς καὶ
πάντας τοὺς καθ' ἔκαστα νοῦς ἔχων καὶ τοσούτος δοσι
πάντες, καὶ πλειστον καὶ ἔξη οὐχ οὐς ψυχὴ μία, ἀλλ' οὐς
30 πάσαις, καὶ πλειστον δύναμις εἰς τὸ ποιεῖν φυχὰς ἔκαστας
ἔχων, καὶ ζῷον παντελὲς ην οὐκ ἄνθρωπον ἐν
αἵτι μονον ἔχων μόνον γὰρ ἄνθρωπος ἐνταῦθα ην.

Ω. Ἀλλ' ἔστω, φήσαι τις, τὰ τίμια τῶν ζῷων πάσι

¹ Harder testatur *Theologia*: αὐτῷ Enn.

² AJP, H-S² πλειστον EBRUQ, H S om. C.

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below, but those intelligibles existed and these things here necessarily followed upon them; for it was not possible to stop at the intelligibles there. For who could bring to a stop a power able both to abide and to go forward? But why these animals there in the intelligible? For why should they be in God? Rational animals, yes, but what majesty does so great a multitude of irrational ones have? Why does it not have just the opposite? Now it is clear that this one must be many, because it exists after the altogether One; or it would not have been after that One, but it would have been that One. But, being after it, it could not be above it in the direction of being more one, but had to fall short of it, but, as the best was one, it had to be more than one, for multiplicity is deficient. But what prevents it from being a dyad? Now each of the ones in the dyad could not be absolutely one, but must again be at least two, and again it is the same with each of those, and then there was in the first dyad movement as well as rest, and there was also intellect, and life was in it: and perfect intellect and perfect life.¹ Then it was not one as Intellect but all, and possessing all the particular intellects, and as many as all of them and more, and it lived not as one soul, but as all, and as possessing more power to make all the individual souls, and it was the "complete living being",² not having only man in it for otherwise there would only be man here below.

9 "But yes," someone will say, "I grant the valuable living beings, but on the other hand, how could

Cp. Plato *Sophist* 249A C

² Plato *Timaeus* 31B1

PLOTINUS ENNEAD VI. 7.

αὐτὰς εἰτεπῆ καὶ τὰ ἄλογα ἦν, τὸ εὐτελές δηλουνότι των
ἄλογων ἔχοιται εἰ τῷ λογικῷ τὸ τίμιον καὶ εἰ τῷ νοερῷ
τὸ τίμιον, τῷ μνοήτῳ τὸ ἐνταῦθα. καί τι πώς ἀνόδοντον ἡ
διάλογον ἐκείνον ὅντος ἐν φύσει αὐτοῖς οὐδὲ οὐδὲ; πρὸ δὴ τῶν
περὶ ταῦτα καὶ πρὸς ταῦτα λεχθησομένων λάβωμεν, ὡς
ὅ ἀνθρωπος ὁ ἐνταῦθα οὐ τοιούτος εστιν, οἷος εκείνος,
ώστε καὶ τὰ ἄλλα ζῷα οὐχ οὐαὶ τὰ ἐνταῦθα κάκει, ἀλλὰ
μειζόνως δεῖ ἐκείνα λαμβάνειν εἴται οὔτε τὸ λογικὸν
10 ἐκεῖνον ὕδε γάρ ἵσως λογικός, ἐκεῖ δὲ ὁ ποὸς τοῦ
λογίζεσθαι διὰ τί οὖν ἐνταῦθα λογίζεται οὗτος, τὰ δὲ
ἄλλα οὐδὲ διάφορον ὅντος ἐκεῖ τοῦ νοεῖν ἐν τε ἀνθρώπῳ
καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ζῷοις, διάφορον καὶ τὸ λογίζεσθαι ἐπὶ²
γάρ πως καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ζῷοις πολλὰ διανοίας ἔργα διὰ
15 τοῦ οὐκ ἐπίστηται λογικά; διὸ τί δὲ ἀνθρωποι πρὸς
ἄλληλοις οὐκ ἐπίστηται, δεῖ δὲ ἐνθυμεῖσθαι, ὡς τὰς πολλὰς
ζωῆς οἰνού κινήσεις οὖσαι καὶ τὰς πολλὰς νοήσεις οὐκ
έχουσι τὰς αὐτὰς εἶναι, ἀλλὰ καὶ ζωὰς διαφόρους καὶ
νοήσεις ωσπάτως τὰς δὲ διαφοράς πως φωτεινοί ἔρασιν
20 καὶ ἐναργεστέρας, κατὰ¹ τὸ ἑγγύς δὲ τῶν πρώτων
πρώτας καὶ δευτερας καὶ τρίτας. διοπέρ τῶν νοήσεων αἱ
μὲν θεοί, αἱ δὲ δευτερόν τι γενοί, ἐν φύσει τὸ λογικὰ
ἐπικλινένταῦθα, ἐξ οὓς διὸ τούτων τὸ ἄλογον κληθέτε.
ἐκεῖ δέ καὶ τὸ ἄλογον λεγομένον λόγος ἦν, καὶ τὸ ἄνουν

H. S. καὶ Εππ.

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the cheap and irrational ones be there?" Their cheapness obviously comes by irrationality, if being valuable comes by rationality, and if they are valuable by their intellectual quality, they are the reverse by their unintellectual or irrational when it is that Intellect in which each and every one exists or from which they come? Before, then, beginning the arguments about and against this position, let us grasp that man here is not like that intelligible man, so that the other living beings are not the same here and there, but one must have a greater and nobler apprehension of those there; and then too there is no rationality there, for here perhaps man is rational but in that world there is the man before reasoning. Why, then, does this man here reason, but the others do not? Now, there in the intelligible, intelligence is different in man and the other living beings, and reasoning is also different; for there are present somehow also in the other living beings many works of deliberate thought. Why then are they not equally rational? And why are men not equally so in comparison to each other? But one must consider that the many lives, which are like movements, and the many thoughts should not have been the same, but different lives and in the same way different thoughts; and the differences are, somehow, in brilliance and clarity, firsts and seconds and thirds according to their nearness to the first principles. And for this reason some of the thoughts are gods, and some of a second kind, in which is included what we call rational here below, and in sequence from these what is called irrational. But there what we say is irrational was also a rational principle, and

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τινὸς δὲν, ἐπεὶ καὶ ὁ νοῦν ὑπουργὸς ἐστι, καὶ οὐδὲν τὸ νόητον
 25 ὑπουργὸς δέν. ἀλλ' εἰ μὲν νόησις μόνον, ἀποπονοῦντες τὴν νόησιν αὐτὴν νόησιν οὐδενὸν ἀνυψήσουν εἰναι· τὸν δὲν τούτον τὸν νόητον τῷ πράγματι, πῶς η μὲν νόησις,
 ἀνόητον δὲ τὸ πράγμα; οὕτω γαρ ἀν νοῦς ἀνοητον
 30 ἔνιοιν πυωμὲ. η σύκη ἀνόητον, ἀλλὰ νοῦς τοιόσθιος ζωὴ³⁵
 γάρ τοιάδε. ὡς γάρ ητισούν ζωὴ οὐκ ἀπῆλλακται τοῦ
 εἶναι ζωὴ, οὗτας οὐδὲν νοῦς τοιόσθιος ἀπῆλλακται τοῦ
 εἶναι νοῦς ἐπει. οὐδὲ δ νοῦς δ κατὰ διοῖν ζῶον
 ἀπῆλλακται αὐτὸν εἶναι πάντων, οἷον καὶ
 ἀνθρώπου, εἴπερ ἔκαστον μερος, δ τι ἀν λάβης, πάντα
 αλλ ἵστις αλλως. ενεργεια μὲν γαρ εκεινο, δύναται δὲ
 40 πάντα· λαμβάνομεν δὲ καθ' ἔκαστον τὸ ἐνεργείφ τὸ δ'
 ἐνεργεία ἔσχατον, ὥστε τοῦδε τοῦ οὐ τὸ ἔσχατον ὑπουργὸν
 εἶναι, καὶ η ἐληξεις προιαν αἱ εἰς ἐλάττω ζωὴν, ὑπουργὸν
 εἶναι, ἀλλοι δὲ κατωτέρω ληξαι ἔξελιπτόμενοι γάρ οἱ
 δυνάμεις καταλείπονται αἱ εἰς τὸ ἄνω προιασι δέ τι
 45 ἀφιεῖσαι καὶ εν τῷ ἀφεῖναι δὲ ἀλλα ἀλλαι διὰ τὸ ἐνδεικεῖν
 τοῦ ζῶον τοῦ φανέντος ἐκ τοῦ ἐλλείποντος ἔτερον
 ἔξευροισα. προσθεῖναι οὖν ἐπει οἰκηστι τὸ ἰκανὸν
 εἰς ζωὴν, ἀλεφάνη δύναται καὶ τὸ γαμφώνυχον η τὸ

¹ Η Σ· ὅλα αλλα Επν

² Up Aristotle *Metaphysics* A 9. 107b1-5 Both in Aristotle and Plotinus it is divine thought which is being considered, but the conclusions they draw from the

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the mindless was mind, since the thinker of horse is mind and the thought of a horse was mind. But if it was only a thought, there would be nothing out of the way in the thought itself as a thought being of something thoughtless; but as things are, if the thought is the same as the thing,¹ how can the thought be thought and the thing thoughtless? For in this way thought would make itself thoughtless. But now it is not thoughtless but a particular kind of intellect, for it is a particular kind of life. For just as any particular life does not cease to be life, so neither does an intellect of a particular kind cease to be intellect: since the intellect appropriate to any particular living being does not on the other hand cease to be the intellect of all, of man also, for instance, granted that each part, whichever one you take, is all things, but perhaps in different ways. For it is actually one thing, but has the power to be all, but we apprehend in each what it actually is; and what it actually is, is the last and lowest, so that the last and lowest of this particular intellect is horse, and being horse is where it stopped in its continual outgoing to a lesser life, but another stops lower down. For as the powers unfold they always leave something behind on the higher level, and as they go out they lose something, and in losing different things different ones find and add on something else because of the need of the living being which appeared as a result of the deficiency; for instance, since there is not yet enough for life's purpose, nails appeared, and having claws and fangs and the na-

principle of the identity of perfect immaterial thought with its object are startlingly different.

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καρχαρόδον ἡ κέρατος φύσις· ὥστε, οὐ κατῆλθεν ὁ νοῦς,
45 ταύτη πάλιν αὐτῷ αὐτάρκει τῆς φύσεως ἀνακύψαι καὶ
εὑρεῖν ἐν αὐτῷ τοῦ ἐλλείποντος κειμένην ἵστιν

10 Ἀλλὰ πῶς ἔκει ἐνέλειπε, τὸ γάρ κέρατα ἔκει
τρὸς ἄμυνας; ἡ πρὸς τὸ αὐτάρκες ὡς ζώου καὶ τὸ
τέλεον. ὡς γάρ ζῶον ἔδει τέλεον εἶναι, καὶ ὡς νοῦν δὲ
τέλεον, καὶ ὡς ζωὴν δὲ τέλεον ὥστε, εἰ μὴ τοῦτο, ἀλλὰ
5 τούτο. καὶ ἡ διαφορὰ τῷ ἄλλῳ ἀντὶ ἄλλοι, ἡναὶ ἐκ
πάντων μὲν τὸ τελειότατον ζῶον καὶ ὁ τέλεος νοῦς καὶ
ἡ τελειοτάτη ζωὴ, ἔκαστον δὲ ὡς ἔκαστον τέλειον. καὶ
μήν, εἰ ἐκ πολλῶν, δεῖ εἶναι αὐτὸν δὲ πάντων ἡ αὐτάρκεις ἢ
10 διὸ οὐ. δεῖ τούτου ἐξ ἑτέρων ἀσὶ καὶ εἰδος, ἅπερ καὶ
πᾶν σύνθετον, καὶ σωζομένων ἔκάστων, οἷαι καὶ αἱ
μορφαὶ καὶ οἱ λόγοι. αἱ τε γάρ μορφαὶ, οὖν ἀνθρώπου
ἐξ ὄσων διαφορών, καίτοι τὸ ἐπὶ πάσα τὸν καὶ βελτία
καὶ χείρα ἀλλήλων, ὄφθαλμὸς καὶ δάκτυλος, ἀλλ’ ἕνσις
15 καὶ οἱ χεῖροι τὸ πᾶν, ἀλλ’ ὅτι οὐ-ω, βέλτιον καὶ ὁ
λόγος δὲ ζῶον καὶ ἄλλο τι, δημητρίου τῷ “ζῶον”. καὶ
ἀρετὴ δὲ τὸ κοινὸν καὶ τὸ ἴδιον καὶ τὸ ὅλον καλὸν
ἀδιαφόρου τοῦ κυριοῦ ὅντος.

11 Λέγεται δὲ οὐδὲ ὁ οὐρανός—καὶ πολλὰ δὲ
φαίνεται—οὐκ ἀτιμάσαι τὴν τῶν ζόμενων πάντων φύσιν.

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ture of horn; so that where the intellect came down to, at that very point it comes up again by the self-sufficiency of its nature and finds stored in itself the cure for the deficiency.

10. But how was it deficient there in the intelligible? For why should there be horns for defence there? They are for its self-sufficiency as a living being and its completeness. For it had to be complete as living being and complete as intellect and complete as life; so that if it did not have this, it must have that. And the difference is by having one thing instead of another, so that from all living beings [there may be composed] the most perfect living being and the perfect intellect and the perfect life, and each individual may be perfect as an individual. And certainly, if it is composed of many, it must on the other hand be one; now it is not possible for it to be composed of many and all of them the same if it was, it would be a self-sufficient one. It must then be composed of things again and again differing in form, like every composite being, and each individual must be preserved, as their shapes and forming principles are. For the shapes also, of man for instance, are composed of so many different elements, though that over all is one. And they are better and worse than each other, eye and finger, but they belong to one; and the whole is not worse but, because it is so, is better, and the rationally defined forming principle is living being and something else, which is not the same as “living being”. And it is a virtue to be both general and particular, and the whole beautiful—the general is not differentiated.

11. But it is said that even the heaven and many living beings are manifest in it does not think

ἐπεὶ καὶ τόδε τὸ πάντα ἔχει πόθεν οὖν ἔχει; πάντα
οὖν ἔχει, ὅσα ἐνταῦθα τάκει; ἢ ὅσα λόγω πεποίηται καὶ
5 κατ' εἶδος ἀλλὰ ὅταν πύρ ἔχῃ, καὶ ὕδωρ ἔχει, ἔχει δὲ
πάντως καὶ φυτά. πῶς οὖν τὰ φυτὰ ἔκει, καὶ πῶς πύρ
ἔχει, οὐαὶ πῶς γῆ; ἢ γάρ τῇ οὐκ οὐκέτι ἔπιπλον ἔκει, ὥστε
μή πάντα τὸ ἔκει τῇ. καὶ τί δλως ἔστιν ἔκει καὶ τινά; τὰ
μὲν οὖν φυτὰ δύνανται ἀντὶ λόγω συναρμόσαι· ἐπεὶ καὶ
10 τὸ τῆρας φυτὸν λόγος ἔστιν ἐν ζῷῃ κείμενος. εἰ δὴ ὁ
ἔνυλος λόγος ὁ τοῦ φυτοῦ, καθ' ὃν τὸ φυτόν ἔστι, ζῷῃ
τίς ἔστι, τοιάδε καὶ φυχή τις καὶ ὁ λόγος ἐν τι. ήτοι τὸ
τρώτον φυτόν ἔστιν οὐτος ἡ οὐ, ἀλλὰ πρὸ αὐτοῦ φυτὸν
τὸ τρώτον, ἀφ' οὐ καὶ τοῦτο. καὶ γάρ ἔκεινο ἐν, ταῦτα
15 δὲ πολλὰ καὶ ἀφ' ἑνὸς ἐξ ἀνάγκης εἰ δὴ τοῦτο, δει πολὺ¹
πρότερον ἔκεινο τῇ καὶ αὐτὸδ τοῦτο φυτὸν εἶναι, ἀπ'
εκείνοις δὲ ταῦτη δειπέρως καὶ τρίτως καὶ κατ' ἔχος
ἔκεινον τῇ. γῆ δὲ πῶς; καὶ τί τὸ γῆ εἶναι; καὶ τίς ἡ ἔκει
γῆ τὸ τῇ ἔχουσα; ἢ πρότερον τίς αὐτῇ, τοῦτο δὲ ἔστι τί
20 τὸ εἶναι ταύτη; δει δὴ μορφήν τινα εἶναι καὶ ενταῦθα καὶ
λόγον. ἔκει μὲν οὖν ἐπὶ τοῦ φυτοῦ τῇ καὶ ὁ τῆρας αὐτοῦ
λόγος ἀφ' οὐ καὶ ἐν τῇδε τῇ γῆ; ἢ εἰ λάβοιμεν τὰ
μάλιστα γήνα γεννώμενα καὶ πλαττόμενα ἐν αὐτῇ,
εὔροιμεν ἂν καὶ ἐνταῦθα την γῆς φυσιν. λίθωι τοίνυν

worthless the nature of all living things, since also this All here has all of them. From where, then, does it have them? Does then the world there have every thing that is here? Yes, everything that is made by forming principle and according to form. But when it has fire, it also has water, and it most certainly also has plants. How then are there plants there? And how does fire live? And how does earth? For it either lives or it will be a kind of dead body there, so that not everything there lives. And how in general can these things here be there in the intelligible? Well, the plants could fit into the argument, for the plant here is a rational forming principle resting in life. If then indeed the forming principle in matter, that of the plant, by which the plant exists, is a particular life and a soul, and the forming principle is some one thing, then this principle is either the first plant or it is not, but the first plant is before it, and this plant here derives from it. For that first plant is certainly one, and these plants here are many, and necessarily come from one. If this is really so, that plant must be much more primarily alive and be this very thing, plant, and these here must live from it in the second and third degree and from its traces. But how does earth live? And what is it to be earth? And what is the earth there which has life? Or rather, first, what is this earth here? That is, what being does it have? It must certainly even here below be a pattern and a forming principle. Well, in that case of the plant, its forming principle here too was alive. Does it then so live in the earth here? Now, if we were to take the most earthly things generated and shaped in it, we should find here below too the nature of earth. The growth, then, and shaping of

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25 αὐξήσεις τε καὶ πλάσεις καὶ ὑπῶν ἀναφυομένων ἔνδον
μορφώσεις πάντως τον λογου ἐμφίχου δημιουργοῦντος
ἔνδυσεν καὶ εἰδοποιοῦντος λρὴ τομῆσαι γίνεσθαι καὶ
τοῦτο εἶναι τὸ εἶδος τῆς γῆς τὸ ποιοῦν, ὡσπερ ἐν τοῖς
δένδροις τὴν λεγομένην φύσιν, τῷ δὲ ξύλῳ τοῦ δένδρου
30 ἀνάλογον τὴν λεγομένην εἶναι γῆν, καὶ ἀποτμηθέντα τὸν
λίθον οὕτως ἔχειν, ὡς εἰ ἐκ τοῦ δένδρου τι κοπεῖη, μη
παθόντος δὲ τούτου, ἀλλ’ ἔτι συνηρτημένου, ὡς τὸ μὴ
κοπὲν ἐκ τοῦ ζῶντος φυτοῦ. τὴν <δῆ>¹ δημιουργοῦσαν
ἔγκαθημένην τῇ γῇ φυσιν ζωὴν ἐν λόγῳ διευρύντες
πιστούμεθα ἂν τὸ ἐντεῦθεν ῥάβδιος τὴν ἐκεῖ γῆν πολὺ²
35 πρότερον ζῶσαν εἶναι καὶ ζωὴν ἔλλογον γῆς, αὐτογῆν
καὶ πρώτως γῆν, ἀφ' ἣς καὶ ἡ ἐντοῦθι γῆ εἰ δὲ καὶ τὸ
πῦρ λόγος τις ἐν ὑλῃ ἔστι καὶ τὰ ἄλλα τὰ τοιαῦτα καὶ
οὐκ ἐκ τοῦ αὐτομάτου πῦρ—πόθεν γάρ; οὐ γάρ ἐκ
ταρατρίψεως, ὡς ἀν τις οἰηθείη· ηδη γάρ οὗτος
40 ἐν τῷ παντὶ πυρὸς ἡ παράτριψις ἔχοντων τῶν
ταρατρίζομένων σωμάτων οὐδὲ γάρ ἡ ψλη οὕτως
δυνάμει, ὡστε παρ' αὐτῆς—εἰ δὴ κατὰ λόγον δεῖ τὸ
τοιοῦν εἶναι ὡς μορφῶν .. ἀν εἴη ἡ φυσιὴ ποιῶν πῦρ
δυναμένη; τοῦτο δὲ ἔστι ζωὴ καὶ λόγος. ἐν καὶ ταῦτὸ
ἔμφω. διὸ καὶ Πλάτων ἐν ἑκάστῳ τούτων φυχὴν φησιν
45 εἰναι οὐκ ἄλλας ἡ ὡς ποιοῖσαν τοῦτο δὴ τὸ αἰσθητὸν
πῦρ ἔστιν οὖν καὶ τὸ ἐνταῦθα τοιοῦν πῦρ ζωὴ τις

¹ R²s (*nuntiatur Fiebus*), Kirchhoff

² In IV. 4. 27 (where Plotinus also speaks, as he does here of the living rock growing) it is strongly asserted that earth here below not only has a soul, but a divine soul. She is in accordance with all Greek tradition, a goddess.

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stones and the inner patterning of mountains as they grow one must most certainly suppose take place because an ensouled forming principle is working within them and giving them form, and this is the active form of the earth, like what is called the growth-nature in trees, and what we call earth corresponds to the wood of the tree, and when the stone is cut out it is in the same state as if something is chopped from a tree, but if this does not happen to it and it is still joined on it is like what has not been chopped off from a living plant. Now surely when we have discovered the working nature seated in earth as a life in a forming principle we shall easily be confident about what comes next, that the earth there in the intelligible is much more primarily alive and is the life of earth in its forming principle, absolute earth and primary earth, from which the earth here below derives. But if fire also is a forming principle in matter, and so are the other things of this kind, and fire is not spontaneously generated for where could it come from? Not from friction, as one might think: for friction occurs when fire is already in the All and the bodies being rubbed together have it, also, matter is not able to be fire in such a way that fire can come from it—if then what makes fire must do so by forming principle, as structuring it, what could it be except a soul able to make fire? But that is a life and a forming principle, both one and the same. This is why Plato says that there is a soul in each of these elements,² in no other way than as making this perceptible fire. So then what

² Plotinus here appears to be thinking of *Epinomis* 981B-C and 984B-C

PLOTINUS ENNEAD VI. 7.

πυρίη, ἀληθέστερον πῦρ τὸ ἄρα ἐπέκεινα πῦρ μᾶλλον
ἢ πῦρ μᾶλλον ἀν εἰη ἐν ζωῇ· ζῆ ἀρα καὶ αὐτὸ τὸ πῦρ. ὁ
δὲ αὐτὸς λόγος καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων, ὅδατός τε καὶ αερός
50 ἀλλὰ διὰ τί οὐκ ἔμψυχα καὶ ταῦτα ὥσπερ ἡ γῆ ὅτι μὲν
οὖν καὶ ταῦτα ἐν ζῷῳ τῷ παντί, δῆλον που, καὶ ὅτι
μέρη ζῷον· οὐ φαίνεται δὲ ζωὴ ἐν αὐτοῖς, ὥσπερ οὐδὲ
ἐπὶ τῆς γῆς· συλλογίζεοθαί δε ἣν κάκει καὶ ἐκ τῶν
μικρέστων ἐν αὐτῇ ἀλλὰ γίνεται παῦρὶ ζῷα, καὶ ἐν
55 οἷσι δὲ φανερώτερον· καὶ δέρινοι δὲ ζῷων συστάσεις.
γινόμενον δὲ τὸ πῦρ ἔκαστον καὶ ταχὺ σφεννύμενον τὴν
ἐτῷ ὅλῳ ψιχήν παρέρχεται· εἰς τε δύκον οὐ γεγένηται
μένον, ἵν' ἔδειξε τὴν ἐν αὐτῷ ψυχήν· ἀήρ τε καὶ ὕδωρ
ωσαύτως ἐπει, εἰ παγείη πως κατὰ φύσιν, δεῖξεν ἀν-
60 ολλ' ὅτι ἔδει εἶναι κεχυμένα, ἢν ἔχει οἱ δείκνυσι, καὶ
κινδυνεύει ὅμοιον εἶναι οἷον τὸ ἐπὶ τῶν ὑγρῶν τῶν ἐν
ημέν, οἷον αἷματος· ἢ μὲν γίρα σάρκα ἔχειν δοκεῖ καὶ δι-
ἀν σάρξ γένηται ἐκ τοῦ αἵματος, τὸ δὲ αἷμα αἰσθησον οὐ
ταρεχομενον ἔχειν οὐ δοκεῖ—καίτοι ἀνάγκη ἐνεισαι καὶ
65 εν αὐτῷ—ἐπεὶ καὶ οὐδέν ἔστι βίαιον γινόμενον περὶ
αὐτό. ἀλλ' ἔτοιμοι ἔστι διεστάναι τῆς ἐννυπαρχούσης
ψιχῆς, οἷον καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν στοιχείων τῶν τριῶν δεῖ
νομίζειν εἶνα· ἐπεὶ καὶ ὅσα ἐξ αέρος συστάτος μᾶλλον
ζῷα ἔχει τὸ μὴ αἰσθάνεσθαι εἰς τὸ παθεῖν. ὥσπερ δε ὁ

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makes the fire here below is also a fiery life, a truer fire. The transcendent fire, then, since it is more fire would be more in life; so then absolute fire also lives. And the same argument applies to the others, water and air. But why are these too not ensouled like the earth? Now it is clear, I suppose, that these are in the universal living being, and that they are parts of the living being; but life is not apparent in them, as it is not in the case of the earth; but one could deduce the presence of life there too from the things which came into being from it, but in fire also living things come to be, and more obviously in water; and there are living organisms in the air. But the individual fire which comes to be and is quickly quenched moves past the soul in the whole and has not come to be static in a bulk, when it would have shown the soul in it, and it is the same with air and fire, since, if they were naturally fixed, they would show their soul; but since they had to be flowing, they do not show the soul which they have. It is likely that their state resembles that of the liquids in us, blood for instance; for the flesh and whatever becomes flesh from the blood seems to have soul, but the blood because it does not give a sense-perception does not seem to have it—though it must exist in it also—since also nothing violent happens to it. But it is easily liable to separate from the soul which exists in it, as one must think is so with the three elements; since all the living beings which are composed of air¹ coming together do not have any sense perception which affects them. For just as the air

¹ These are *δαιμόνες*, who Platonists generally believed, had bodies of air Cp. III 5 6. 37 and the passages there referred to.

PLOTINUS: ENNEAD VI. 7.

ἀήρ τὸ φῶς ἀτενὲς ὁν καὶ μένον, ἔνις μένει, αὐτὸς
70 παρερχεται, τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον πάρεισι¹ καὶ τὴν ψυχὴν
αὐτοῦ κύκλῳ καὶ οὐ πάρεισι καὶ τὰ ἄλλα ὡσαύτως.

12. Ἀλλὰ πάλιν ὅδε λέγωμεν ἐπεὶ γάρ φαμεν πρὸς
οἰν παράδειγμα ἔκεινον τόδε τὸ πᾶν εἴναι, δεῖ κάκει
ποστερον τὸ παν ζωον εἴναι καί, εἰ παντε λέστε εἴναι
αὐτῷ, πάντα εἴναι καὶ πύραν δὴ ἔκει ζῶον εἴναι, καὶ
5 οὐκ ἔρημον τούννα ἀστραν τῶν ἐνταῦθα τοῦτο
λεγομένων οὐρανόν, καὶ τὸ οὐρανῷ εἴναι τοντο. ἔστι δὲ
ἔκει δηλονότι καὶ γῆ οὐκ ἔρημος, ἀλλὰ πολὺ μᾶλλον
ἔζωμένη, καὶ ἔστιν ἐν αὐτῇ ζῷα ξύμπαντα, οσα πεὶς
καὶ χερσαία λέγεται ἐνταῦθα, καὶ φυτὰ δηλονότι ἐν τῷ
10 ζῆν ιδρυμενα· καὶ θάλασσα δέ ἔστιν ἔκει, καὶ πᾶν ὕδωρ
ἐν ρῷ καὶ ζῷῃ μερούσῃ, καὶ τὰ ἐν ὕδατι ζῷα πάντα,
ἀέρος τε φύσις τοῦ ἔκει παντὸς μοίσα, καὶ ζῷα ἀέρια ἐν
αὐτῷ ἀνάλογον αὐτῷ τῷ ἀέρι. τὰ γάρ ἐν ζώντι πῶς ἂν
οἱ ζῶνται, ὅπου δὴ καὶ ἐνταῦθα: πῶς οὖν οὐ πᾶν ζῶον ἐξ
15 ἀνάγκης εἰκεῖ; ὡς γάρ ἔκαστον τῶν μεγάλων μερῶν
ἔστιν, ἐξ ἀνάγκης οὐτεις ἔχει, καὶ ἡ τόν ζῷων ἐν αὐτοῖς
φύσις. ὅπως οὖν ἔχει καὶ ἔστιν ἔκαι οὐρανός, οὐτεις καὶ
ἔχει καὶ ἔστιν ἔκει τὰ ἐν οὐρανῷ ζῷα πάντα, καὶ οὐκ
ἔστι μὴ εἴναι ἡ οὐδὲ ἔκεινα ἔσται. ὁ οὖν ζητῶν πόθεν
20 ζῷα, ζητεῖ πόθεν οὐρανός ἔκει· τοῦτο δὲ ἔστι ζητεῖν
πόθεν ζῶον, τοῦτο δὲ ταῖτὸν πόθεν ζωὴ καὶ ζῷὴ πᾶσα

¹ Kirchhoff's πάρεισι Enn.

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itself moves past the light which does not give way
and abides as long as it abides, in this way it passes
round its soul and does not pass; and the same with
the other elements.

12. But again, let us put it this way: since we
maintain that this All exists after the pattern (so to
call it) of that, the universal living being must exist
there too first, and, if its existence is to be complete,¹
must be all living beings. And certainly the sky there
must be a living being, and so a sky not bare of stars,
as we call them here below, and this is what being
sky is. But obviously there is earth there also, not
barren, but much more full of life, and all animals
are in it, all that walk on and belong to the land here
below, and, obviously, plants rooted in life; and sea
is there, and all water in abiding flow and life, and
all the living beings in water, and the nature of air is
part of the universe there, and aerial living things
are there just as the air itself is. For how could the
beings in what lives not be living, when they most
certainly are so even here below? How then can
every living being not be there of necessity? For as
each of the great parts of the universe is there, so is
of necessity the nature of the living beings in them.
As, therefore, the sky is there, and in the way in
which it is there, so and in that way all the living
beings in the sky are there, and it is impossible for
them not to be, or else those great parts would not be
there. If one enquires, therefore, where the living
beings come from, one is enquiring where the sky
there comes from, and this is to enquire where the
universal living being comes from, and this is the
same as where life comes from, and universal life and

An allusion to *Timaeus* 31B1

καὶ φυχὴ πᾶσα καὶ νοῦς ὁ ξύμπτας μηδεμιᾶς ἔκει πενίας
μηδὲ ἀπορίας οὔσης, ἀλλὰ πάντωι ζωῆς πεπληρωμένωι
καὶ οἷον ζεόντων ἔστι δὲ αὐτῶν ἡ οἶνον δοὺς ἐκ μιᾶς
25 πηγῆς, οὐχ οἶνον ἐνός τυπού πνεύματος ἢ θερμότητος
μιᾶς, ἀλλὰ οἶνον εἴ τις ἦν ποιότης μὲν πάσας ἐν αὐτῇ
ἔχουσα καὶ σώζοισα τὰς ποιότητας, γλυκύτητος μετὰ
εὐωδίας, καὶ ὅμοιον οἰνώδης ποιότητος καὶ χυλῶν ἀπάντων
δυνάμεις καὶ χρωμάτων ὄφεις καὶ ὅσα ἀφαί
γινώσκουσιν ἔστωσαν δὲ καὶ ὅσα ἀκοαὶ ἀκούονται,
30 πάντα μέλη καὶ ρύθμος πᾶς

13. "Ἔστι γάρ οὕτε νοῦς ὑπλοῦν, οὕτε ἡ ἔξ αὐτοῦ
φυχή, ἀλλὰ ποικίλα πάντα δσω ἀπλά, τοῦτο δὲ δσω μηδὲ
σύνθετα καὶ δσψ αρχαὶ καὶ δσψ ἐνέργειαι. τοῦ μὲν γάρ
ἐσχάτου ἡ ἐνέργεια ὡς ἀν ληγοντα ἀπλή, τοῦ δὲ
5 πρώτου πᾶσα· νοῦς τε κινούμενος κινέται μὲν
ώσαντις καὶ κατὰ ταντά καὶ ὅμοια ἀεί, οὐ μέντοι
ταντὸν καὶ ἐν τι ἐν μέρει, ἀλλὰ πάντα ἐπεὶ καὶ τὸ ἐν
μέρει ἀν οὐχ ἔν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῦτο ἀπειρον διαιρούμενον
ἀπὸ τύπος δέ φαμεν ἀν καὶ πάντως ἐπὶ τί ὡς ἐσχάτου, τὸ
δὲ μεταξὺ πάν δρα ὥσπερ γραμμή, ἡ ὥσπερ ἔτερον
10 σῶμα ὀμοιομερέσ τι καὶ ἀποικιλον; ἀλλὰ τί τὸ σεμνόν;

¹This remarkably powerful phrase is probably suggested to Plotinus by *De Anima* A 2 405b26-29, where Aristotle says that Pre-Socratic ideas about soul and life followed their etymologies some connected ζῆν (live) with ζεῖν (boil) and so thought of soul as something hot.

²Plotinus may be suggesting here that the life of the intelligible world in its complex unity is not to be thought of in terms of Stoic πνέων.

universal Soul and universal Intellect, when there is no poverty or lack of resource there, but all things are filled full of life, and, we may say, boiling with life.¹ They all flow, in a way, from a single spring, not like one particular breath or one warmth,² but as if there was one quality which held and kept intact all the qualities in itself of sweetness along with fragrance, and was at once the quality of wine and the characters of all tastes, the sights of colours and all the awarenesses of touch, and all that hearings hear, all tunes and every rhythm

13. For neither is Intellect simple, nor the soul which derives from it, but all are varied in proportion to their simplicity, that is, in so far as they are not composites and in so far as they are principles and in so far as they are activities. For the activity of the last and lowest is simple as coming to a stop, but of the first is all activities; and Intellect in its movement moves along in the same way and on one same and identical course, but still is not the same one partial thing, but all things: since also the partial thing is in its turn not one, but this too is infinite when it is divided. But from what should we say that it began, and to what does it move as the ultimate point? And is all in between like a line or like another body, homogeneous and unvaried? But what majesty would there be in that?³ For if it has

¹There may be an allusion here to Plato *Sophist* 249A1. Plotinus is certainly much concerned in this chapter with the discussion in the *Sophist* which begins there, and, as he often does, describes the living world of Intellect in terms of the "very important kinds" (*Sophist* 254D4) which appear in the course of that discussion, Being, Motion, Rest, Same and Other.

εἰ νὰρ μηδεμίαν ἔχει ἐξαλλαγὴν μηδέ τις ἔξεγείρει αὐτὸν εἰς τὸ ζῆν ἑτερότης, οὐδὲ ἀν ἐνέργεια εἴη οὐδὲν γάρ ἀν τοιαύτη κατάστασις μὴ ἐνέργειας διαφέροι. καν κάνησις δὲ γι τουαύτη, οὐ πανταχῶς, μοναχῶς δὲ ἀν εἴη ζωή δεῖ 15 δὲ πάντα ζῆν και πανταχόθεν και οὐδὲν μὴ ζῆν ἐπὶ πάντα οὖν κινεῖσθαι δεῖ, μᾶλλον δὲ πεκινῆσθαι. ἀπλοῦτος δὴ εἰ κινοῖτο, ἔκεινο μόνον ἔχει· και η αὐτὸν και οὐ προύβη εἰς οὐδέν, η εἰ προύβη, ἄλλο μένον ὥστε δύο και εἰ ταύτων τοῦτο ἔκεινω. μένει δὲν και οὐ 20 προελήλυθε, εἰ δὲ στερον, προῆλθε μετὰ ἑτεροτητος και ἐπισήμεν εἰς ταῦτα των και στέρουν τρίτον οὐ γενόμενον δὴ ἐκ ταύτων και ἐτέρου τὸ γενόμενον φύσιν ἔχει ταύτων και ἐ-ερον εἶναι· ἑτερον δὲ οὐ τί, ἀλλὰ πάντας ἑτερον και γάρ τὸ ταύτων αὐτου παν. παν δὲ ταύτων οὐ 25 και πάντας ἑτερον οὐδὲν ἔστιν δι τι ἀπολείπει τῶν ἐτέρων φύσιν ἄρα ἔχει ἐπὶ πάντας ἑτεροιδούσθια. εἰ μὲν οὖν ἔστι πρὸ αὐτοῦ τα ἐτέρα πάντα, ηδη πάσχοι ἀν ύπο αὐτων εἰ δὲ μὴ ἔστιν, οὗτος τὰ τάντα ἐγένεται, μᾶλλον δὲ τὰ πάντα ήν οὐκ ἔστιν ἄρα τα σόντα εἶναι μὴ νοῦ ἐνεργήσαντος, ἐνεργήσαντος δὲ ἀεὶ ἄλλο μετ’ ἄλλο και οἷον 30 πλανηθέντος πάσαν πλάνην και ἐν αὐτῷ πλανηθέντος, οἷα νοῦς εἰς αὐτῷ ὁ ἀληθινὸς πέφυκε πλανᾶσθαι· πέφυκε δὲν οὐσίας πλανᾶσθαι συνθεοι σῶν τῶν οὐσιῶν ταῖς αὐτοῦ πλάναις. πανταχοῦ δὲ αὐτός ἔστι μένουσαν οὐδὲν

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no change in it, and no otherness wakes it to life, it would not even be an active actuality: for such a state would be undistinguishable from non-actual inactivity. And even if it were a movement of this [simple and straightforward] kind it would be life not in all ways, but in one way only, but it must live all things and from all directions and there must be nothing it does not live. It must therefore move to all, or rather have moved to all. Certainly if it moves a simple movement it has that one alone, and it is either itself and it has not gone forward to anything, or, if it has gone forward, it is another thing as staying behind; so there are two, and if this [one of the two] is the same as that, it remains one and has not gone forth; but if it is other, it has gone forth with otherness and from a same and another has made a third one. Now certainly if what has come to be has come to be from the same and the other, it is its nature to be the same and the other; and not just any other, but universal other: for its same also is universal. But since it is all that is the same and all that is other, there is no one of the others that it leaves out. Its nature therefore is to become other in every way. If then all the other things exist before it, it would already be affected by them; but if they do not, then this Intellect generated them all, or rather was them all. It is not then possible for the real beings to exist if Intellect is not actively at work, for ever working one thing after another and, we may say, wandering down every way and wandering in itself, as it is natural for the true Intellect to wander in itself; and it is natural for it to wander among substances while the substances run along with its wanderings. But it is everywhere itself; so its wan-

PLOTINUS: ENNEAD VI. 7.

ἔχει τὴν πλάνην. η δέ πλάνη αὐτῷ ἐν τῷ τῆς
 35 ἀληθείας πεδιῳ, οὐκ οὐκ ἐκβαίνει. ᔁχει δὲ
 καταλαβών πάν καὶ αὐτῷ ποιήσας εἰς τὸ κινέσθαι οὐν
 τόπον, καὶ δό τόπος ο αὐτὸς τῷ οὐ τόπος ποικίλον δέ
 ἔστι τὸ πεδίον τοῦτο, οὐν καὶ διεξίου εἰ δὲ μη κατὰ πᾶν
 καὶ δεῖ ποικίλον, καθόσον μη ποικίλον, ἔστηκεν εἰ δέ
 40 ἔστηκεν, οἱ νοεῖν ὥστε καί, εἰ ἔστη, οὐ νενόγκεν εἰ δὲ
 τοῦτο, οὐδὲ ἔστιν. ἔστιν οὖν νόγκοις η δὲ κάνησις πάση
 πληρούμα σούσιαν πάσαν, καὶ η πάσα σούσια νόγκοις πάση
 ζωὴν περιλαβούμα πάσαν καὶ μετ' ἄλλο περὶ ἄλλο, καὶ δό
 τι αὐτοῦ ταῦτον, καὶ ἄλλο, καὶ διαρροῦντι μετὰ τὸ ἄλλο
 ἀναφαίνεται πάσα δὲ διὰ ζωῆς η πορεία καὶ διὰ ζώων
 45 πάσα, ὥσπερ καὶ τῷ διὰ γῆς οὖντι πάντα, ἀ διέξεισι, γῆ,
 καὶ διαφορὰς ἔχῃ η γῆ, καὶ ἑκεῖ η μὲν ζωή, δι' οὐ, η
 αὐτή, δτ, δὲ ἀεὶ ἄλλη, οὐχ η αὐτή, ἀεὶ δέ ἔχων τὴν αὐτὴν
 διε τῶν οὐκ αὐτῶν δέξοδον, δτ, μη ἀμείβει, ἄλλα
 σύνεστι τοῖς ἄλλοις τὸ ὠσαύτως καὶ κατὰ ταῦτα ἔὸν
 50 γαρ μη περὶ τὰ ἄλλα τὸ ὠσαύτως καὶ κατὰ τα αυτα,
 ἀργεὶ πάντη καὶ τὸ ἐνεργείᾳ καὶ η ἐνέργεια οὐδαμού
 ἔστι δὲ καὶ τὰ ἄλλα αὐτός, ὥστε πᾶς αὐτός καὶ εἴπερ
 αὐτός, πᾶς, εἰ δὲ μη, οὐκ αὐτός, εἰ δὲ πᾶς αὐτός καὶ πᾶς,
 δτ, τα πάντα, καὶ οὐδέν ἔστιν, δ τ, μη συντελεῖ εἰς τὰ
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dering is an abiding one. And its wandering is in "the plain of truth",¹ which it does not leave. And it encompasses and possesses it all, and makes a kind of place for its movement, and the place is the same as that of which it is the place. But this plain is varied so that Intellect may travel through it, but if it was not in every way and for ever varied, in so far as it was not varied, Intellect would stand still. But if it stands still, it does not think; so that if it came to a standstill, it has not thought; but if this is so, it does not even exist. It is, then, thought; that is, all movement filling all substance, and all substance is all thought encompassing all life, and always one thing after another, and whatever of it is the same is also other, and as one is dividing it the other is always appearing. But all its journeying is through life, and all through living beings, as when someone travels through the earth, all he travels through is earth, even if the earth has its differences. And there in the intelligible, through which [the journey goes,] the life is the same, but because it is always other, not the same. But Intellect keeps always the same journeying through the things which are not the same, because it does not change, but unaltering sameness is present with the things which are other; for if unaltering sameness is not in the things which are other, Intellect is altogether inactive and its actuality and activity are nowhere. But it is also itself the other things, so that it is all itself. And if it is itself it is all, and if it is not, it is not itself. But if it is itself all, and all because it is all things, and there is no thing which does not make its contribution to

¹ Plato *Phaedrus* 248B6

65 παντα, οὐδάν ἔστιν αὐτοῦ, δ τι μὴ ἄλλο, ὥντα ἄλλο δι και
τοῦτο συντελῆ. εἰ γάρ μη ἄλλο, ἀλλὰ ἄλλῳ ταῦτόν,
ἔλα, ὡσεὶ αὐτοῦ τὴν οὐσίαν ἔδιαν οὐ παρεχόμενον τὸ
συντέλειαν αὐτοῦ φύσιν

14. Έστι δὲ καὶ παραδειγμασι νοεροῖς χρώμενον
εἰδέναι οὖν εστιν τοῦς, ὡς οὐκ ἀνέχεται οἷον πατὰ
μονάδα μηδ ἄλλος εἴναι τίνα γαρ καὶ βούλει εἰς
παράδειγμα λαβεῖν λόγον εἴτε φυτοῦ εἴτε ζώου; εἰ γάρ
5 ἐν τι καὶ μη ἐν τούτῳ ποιητικοῦ, οὐτ' ἀν λόγος εἴη, τό τε
γενήμενον ἢλη ἢν εἴη τοῦ λόγου μηδ πάντα γενομένον εἰς
τὸ πανταχοῦ τῆς ὑλῆς ἐμπεσόντα μιδὲν αὐτῆς ἔᾶσαι τὸ
αὐτὸν εἶναι οἷον πρόσωπον οὐκ δικαίως εἰτο, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἕνεκ
καὶ ὄφθαλμοί καὶ ἡ ῥῆσις οὐχὶ οὐσίᾳ ἐν, ἀλλ' ἔτερον, τὸ δ'
10 ἔτερον αὐτὸν αὐτῆς, εἰ ἔμελλε ῥῆσις εἶναι· ἐν γάρ π
ἀπλίκεις οὐταπ λόγικος ἢν τῇ μόνον καὶ τῷ ἀπειρον οὐτως ἐν
νῷ, διτε ἐν¹ ὡς ἐν πολλά, οὐχ ὡς ὄγκος² εἰτο, ἀλλ' ὡς
λόγος πολὺς ἐν αὐτῷ, ἐν ἐνὶ σχηματινοῦ οὖν οἰον περιγραφῆ
ἔχων περιγραφὰς ἐντὸς καὶ σχηματισμοὺς αὐτὸν διαίρεσιν καὶ
15 δινάμεις καὶ νοήσεις καὶ τὴν διαίρεσιν μηδ κατ' εἰδῶν,
ἄλλ' εἰς τὸ ἐντος ἀει, οἷον τοῦ παντος ζώου ἐμ-
περιεχομένας ζώων φύσεις, καὶ πάλιν αὐτὸν ἄλλας ἐπὶ τὰ
μικρότερα τῶν ζώων καὶ εἰς τὰς ἐλάττους δινάμεις,
ὅπου στήσεται cīs cīdos ἀτομον. ἡ δὲ διαίρεσις ἔγκειται
οὐ συγκεχυμένων, καίτοι εἰς ἐν ὄντων, ἀλλ' ἔστιν ἡ

Porphyryus Sent., testimoniū in Theologia. &c. Enn.

² Porphyrius Sent., testimoniū Theologia: oikos Enn.

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the totality of things, then there is nothing of it which is not other, that by being other it may make this contribution. For if it is not other, but the same as something else, it will diminish the substance of Intellect by not bringing to its completeness its own particular nature

14 But it is also possible by using examples taken from the intellectual realm to understand what Intellect is like, that it does not endure to be not other like a unit. For what forming principle of plant or animal would you like to take as an example? For if it was one thing and not this one varied thing, it would not be a forming principle, and what came to be would be matter, if the principle did not become all things so that by penetrating every point of the matter it allowed nothing of it to be the same. A face, for instance, is not one lump, but has both nostrils and eyes, and the nose is not one thing, but there is one part and again another of it, if it is going to be a nose, for if it was simply and solely one thing it would be a lump. And the unbounded is in Intellect in this way, that it is one as one-many, not like one lump but like a rational forming principle multiple in itself, in the one figure of Intellect holding as within an outline outlines inside itself and again figurations inside and powers and thoughts, and its division does not go on in a straight line, but moves always to the interior, as the natures of living beings are included in and belong to the universal living being, and again other natures going on to the smaller living things and the weaker powers, where it will come to a stop at the indivisible form. But the division which is in Intellect is not of things confused, though of things existing in unity, but this is

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20 λεγομένη ἐν τῷ παντὶ φιλίᾳ τούτῳ, οὐχ ἡ ἐν τῷδε τῷ παντὶ μιμεῖται γάρ αὐτῇ ἐκ διεστηκότων οὖσα φίλη τῇ δὲ ἀληθῆς πάντα ἐν εἶναι καὶ μηποτε διακριθηναι. διακρίνεσθαι δέ φησι τὸ ἐν τῷδε τῷ οὐρανῷ.

15. Ταύτην οὖν τὴν ζωὴν τὴν πολλὴν καὶ πᾶσαν καὶ πρώτην καὶ μίαν τις ιδὼν οὐκ ἐν ταυτῇ εἶναι δυπάξεται τὴν ἄλλην πᾶσαν ἀτιμάσσας; οκότος γάρ αἱ ἄλλαι αἱ κάτω καὶ υμαριναὶ καὶ ἀμυδραὶ καὶ εὐτελεῖς¹ καὶ οἱ 5 καθαραὶ καὶ τὰς καθαρὰς μολένουσατ. κανὸς εἰς αὐτὰς ἴδης, οὐκέτι τὰς καθαρὰς οὔτε ὄρφας οὔτε ζῆτος ἐκείνας τὰς πάσας ὁμοῦ, ἐν αἷς οὐδέν ἔστιν ὅ τι μη̄ ζῆται καὶ καθαρῶς ζῆται καὶ οὐδὲν ἔχον τὰ γάρ κακὰ ἐνταῦθα, ὅτ. Ὁχνος ζωὴς καὶ νοῦ ἕχνος ἐκεῖ δὲ τὸ ἀρχέτυπον το 10 ἀγαθὸς εἰδέσθαι φησιν, ὅτ. ἐν τοῖς εἴδεσι τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἔχει. τὸ μὲν γάρ ἔστω ἀγαθόν, ὃ δὲ ἀγαθός ἔστιν ἐν τῷ θεωρεῖν τὸ ζῆται ἔχων θεωρεῖν δὲ ἀγαθοειδῆ δύτα τὰ θεωρούμενα καὶ αὐτά, ἀ ἐκτήσατο, ὅτε ἔθεωρει τὴν τοὺς ἀγαθοῦ φύσιν. ἥλθε δε εἰς αὐτὸν οὐχ ὡς ἐκεῖ ήν, ἀλλ' ὡς 15 αὐτὸς ἔσχει ἀρχὴν γάρ ἐκείνος καὶ ἐξ ἐκείνου ἐν τούτῳ καὶ οὗτος ὁ ποιήσας ταῦτα ἐξ ἐκείνου οὐ γάρ ἦν θέμις βλέποντα εἰς ἐκείνον μηδὲν νοεῖν οὐδὲν αὐτὸν τὰ ἐν ἐκείνων οὐ γάρ ἀν αὐτὸς ἐγέννα διναμιν οὖν εἰς τὸ γεννῶν εἶχε

W ἀπελεῖς BxUCQ, H 5¹

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what is called¹ the love in the All, not the love in this All; for this is an imitation, since it is a loving of things which are separate; but the true love is all things being one and never separated. But Empedocles says that what is within this our sky is separated.

15. This life then, multiple and universal and primary and one—who is there who when he sees it does not delight to be in it, despising every other life? For the other lives, the lives below, are darkness and little and dim and cheap they are not pure and pollute the pure lives. And if you look at them you no longer either see or live the pure lives, those lives all together in which there is nothing which does not live, and live purely, having no evil. For the evils are here below, because there is [only] a trace of life and a trace of Intellect; but there, Plato says, is the archetype, which "has the form of good"² because it possesses the Good in the Forms. That then is the Good, but Intellect is good by having its life in that contemplation and it contemplates the objects of its contemplation as having the form of good and as the ones which it came to possess when it contemplated the nature of the Good. But they came to it, not as they were there, but as Intellect itself possessed them. For that Good is the principle, and it is from that that they are in this Intellect, and it is this which has made them from that Good. For it was not lawful in looking to him to think nothing, nor again to think what was in him for then Intellect itself would not have generated them. In

¹ By Empedocles; cp. e.g frs. B 17 7 and 26. 5 DK

² Plato Republic 509A3.

παρ' ἐκείνου καὶ τῷ αὐτῷ πληροῦσθαι γεινημάτων
 20 διδόντος ἐκείνου ἂ μὴ εἶχεν αὐτός. ἀλλ' ἐξ ἑνὸς αὐτοῦ
 πολλὰ τούτῳ· ἢν γὰρ ἐκυμίζετο δύναμιν ἀδυνατῶν ἔχειν
 συνέθραυνε καὶ πολλὰ ἐποίησε τὴν μίαν, ὥν οὕτω δύναται
 κατὰ μέρος φέρειν. ὅτι οὖν ἐγέννα, ἀγαθοῦ ἐκ δυνάμεως
 ἦν καὶ ἀγαθοειδὲς ἦν, καὶ αὐτὸς ὁ γαθὸς ἐξ ἀγαθοειδῶν,
 25 ἀγαθὸν τοικίλον διὸ καὶ εἴ τις αὐτὸν ἀπεικάζει σφαιρέ
 ζάσῃ ποικῆλη εἴτε παμπρόσωπό τι χρῆμα λάμπον
 ξάσι προυωποις εἴτε ψυχᾶς τὰς καθαρὰς πάσας εἰς τὸ
 αὐτὸν συνδραμούσας φαντάζοιτο οὐκ ἐνδεεῖς, ἀλλὰ
 παντα τὰ αὐτῶν ἔχουσας, καὶ νοῦν τὸν πάντα ἐπ' ἄκραις
 30 αὐταῖς ἴδρυμένοι, ὡς φέγγει νοερῷ καταλαμπεσθαι τὸν
 τόπον—φανταζόμενος μὲν οὐτας ἐξω πως ἄλλος ὃν
 ὀρκήμ ἀλλον δεῖ δὲ αὐτῷ¹ ἐκεῖνο γενόμενοι τῇ θέᾳ
 ἐντὸν ποιήσασθαι.

16 Χρὴ δε μηδέ ἀεὶ ἐν τῷ πολλῷ τούτῳ καλῶ
 μενειν, μεταβαλνειν δ' ἔτι πρὸ, τὸ ἄνω ἀίξαντα, ἀφέντα
 καὶ τούτο, οὐκ ἐκ τούτου τοῦ οὐρανοῦ, ἀλλ' ἐξ ἐκείνου,
 θαυμάσαντα τίς δ' γεννησας καὶ ὥπως ἐκποτον μὲν οὖν
 5 εἶδος, ἔκαστον καὶ ἴδιος οἷον τύπος· ἀγαθοειδὲς δὲ ὡς

¹ Igal· ἐσαντὸν Εππ

¹ Cp. V 3. 11. In the next chapter (16, lines 10-24) Plotinus carefully criticises and refines this account of the pluralising contemplation of Intellect.

² There is a reminiscence here of Plato's description of

tellect therefore had the power from him to generate and to be filled full of its own offspring, since the Good gave what he did not himself have. But from the Good himself who is one there were many for this Intellect; for it was unable to hold the power which it received and broke it up and made the one power many, that it might be able so to bear it part by part.¹ Whatever it generated, then, was the power of the Good and had the form of good, and Intellect itself is good from [the many] which have the form of good, a good richly varied. And so, if one likens it to a living richly varied sphere,² or imagines it as a thing all faces, shining with living faces, or as all the pure souls running together into the same place, with no deficiencies but having all that is their own and universal Intellect seated on their summits so that the region is illuminated by intellectual light—if one imagined it like this one would be seeing it somehow as one sees another from outside; but one must become that, and make oneself the contemplation.

16 But we must not remain always in that manifold beauty but go on still darting upwards, leaving even this behind, not out of this sky here below, but out of that, in our wondering about who generated it and how. Now each thing there is a form, and each has a kind of distinctive character of its own, but, being in the form of good, all of them have in

the true surface of the earth in the myth of the *Phaedo* (110B7). What follows is strangely reminiscent of Indian many-faced representations of the gods (it is possible, though of course by no means certain, that Plotinus might have seen some small Indian image of this kind in Alexandria or elsewhere).

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κυνον τὸ ἐπιθέοι ἐπὶ πᾶσι πάντα ἔχει. ἔχει μὲν οὖν καὶ τὸ ὃν ἐπὶ πᾶσιν, ἔχει δὲ καὶ τὸ ζῷον ἔκαστον ζωῆς κοινῆς ἐπὶ πᾶσιν ὑπαρχούσης, τάχος δὲ οὐ καὶ ἄλλα ἀλλὰ καθ' ὅσων ἀγαθά καὶ δι' ὅτι ἀγαθός, τί ἀν εἴη; πρὸς 10 δὴ τὴν τουατῆτρην ικέψιν τάχ' ἂν εἴη προσύργον ἄρξασθαι ἐντεῦθεν. Δρα, ὅτε ἐώρα πρὸς τὸ ἀγαθόν, ἐνδει ὡς πολλὰ τὸ ἐν ἐκεῖνῳ καὶ ἐν ὃν αὐτὸς ἐνόει αἰτὸν πολλά, μερίζων αὐτὸν παρ' αὐτῷ τῷ νοεῖν μὴ δῆλον ὅμιλον δύνασθαι, ἀλλ' οὐπά νοῦς ἦν ἐκεῖνο βλέπων, ἀλλ' ἔβλεπεν ἀνοήτως. Ἡ 15 φατέον ὡς οὐδὲ ἔώρα πώποτε, ἀλλ' ἔξη μὲν πρὸς αὐτὸν καὶ ἀνήρτητο αὐτοῖς καὶ ἐπέστραπτο πρὸς αὐτό, ή δὴ κινησις αὐτῇ πληρωθείσα τῷ ἐκεὶ κινεῖσθαι καὶ περὶ εκείνῳ επλήρωσεν αὐτὸν καὶ οὐκέτ. κινησις ἦν μόνον, ἀλλὰ κινησις διακορής καὶ πλήρης ἔξης δὲ πάντα 20 ἐγένετο καὶ ἔγνω τοῦτο ἐν συνασθήσει αὐτοῦ καὶ νοεῖς ἥδη ἦν, πληρωθεὶς μέν, ἵν' ἔχει, δὲ σφετερι, βλεπων δὲ αὐτὰ μετὰ φωτὸς παρὰ τοῦ δόντος ἐκεῖνα καὶ τοῦτο κομιζόμενος. διὰ τοῦτο οὐ μόνον λέγεται τῆς οὐσίας, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῦ ὄρασθαι αὐτὸν αἰτιος ἐκεῖνος εἶναι ὡσπερ 25 δε ὁ ἥλιος τοῦ ὄρασθαι τοῖς αἰσθητοῖς καὶ τοῦ γένεσθαι αἰτιος ὢν αἰτιος πως καὶ τῆς ὄψεως ἐστιν—οὕκον οὐτε ὄψις οὔτε τὰ γινόμενα—οὔτως καὶ ἡ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ φύσις αἰτία οὐσίας καὶ νοῦ οὖσα καὶ φῶς κατὰ¹ τὸ ἀνάλογον τοῖς ἐκεῖ ὄρασθαι καὶ τῷ ὄραντι οὔτε τὰ ὄντα

¹ A^{2nd} ms (= Ficinus): καὶ Επι.

¹ Here Plotinus begins to develop from Plato's analogy of the Sun (*Republic* 509E2-8) the idea of the light which

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common what runs over them all. They of course have also being over them all, and each has the living being as there is a common life over all, and perhaps they have other things [in common]. But what is it according to which and by which they are good? For this kind of enquiry perhaps it would be profitable to begin from here. Did Intellect, when it looked towards the Good, think that One as many, and because it was itself one being, think him as many, dividing him in itself by not being able to think the whole at once? But it was not yet Intellect when it looked at him, but looked unintellectually. Or rather we should say that it did not even see the Good, but lived towards it and depended on it and turned to it, and its movement was fulfilled because it moved there and round that Good and filled Intellect, and was not just movement but movement satiated and full, and thereupon it became all things, and knew this in its own intimate self-consciousness and was now at this point Intellect, filled full that it might have what it was going to see, but looking at them in a light, receiving this light too from the giver of them.¹ This is why that Good is said to be the cause not only of substance but of its being seen. And just as the sun, which is cause for sense objects both of their being seen and their coming into being, is also in some way cause of sight—and therefore is neither sight nor the things which have come to be—in this way also the nature of the Good, which is cause of substance and intellect and light, according to our analogy, to the things seen there and the seer,

shines upon Intellect from the Good, which becomes important later (chs. 21 and 22).

30 οὐτε νοῦς ἔστιν, ἀλλὰ αἴτιος τούτων καὶ *(νοεῖν καὶ)*¹ νοεῖσθα. φωτι τῷ ἐπιπού εἰς τὰ ὄντα καὶ εἰς τὸν νοῦν παρέχων πληρώματος μεν οὖν ἐγίνετο, πληρωθεὶς δὲ ἦν, καὶ ὅμοι ἀπετελέσθη καὶ ἔώρα. ὀρχὴ δὲ αὐτοῦ ἐκεῦνό τε δ² πρὶν πληρωθῆναι ἦν, ἐπέρα δὲ ὀρχὴ οἰονεὶ 35 ἔξωθεν ἡ πληροῦσα ἦν, ἀφ' ἣς οἶον ἐτυποῦτο πληρούμενος

17. Ἀλλὰ πῶς ταῦτα ἐν αὐτῷ καὶ αὐτός, οὐκ ὄντων ἐκεῖ ἐν τῷ πληρώσαντι οὐδὲ αἱ ἐν αὐτῷ τῷ πληρούμενῳ, δτε γάρ μήπω ἐπληυσάσι, οὐν εἰχεν. ἡ οὐκ ἀνάγκη, ὃ τις διδάσκει, τοῦτο ἔχει, ἀλλὰ δεῖ ἐν τοῖς 5 τοιούτοις τῷ μὲν διδόναι μείζοι νομίζειν, τὸ δὲ διδόμενον ξεπαττον τῷ διδόντος. τουπίτη γαρ η γένεσις ἐν ταῖς οδοῖς πρώτον γάρ δεῖ τὸ ἐνεργείᾳ εἶναι, τὸ δ' ὑστερηπ 10 εἶναι δικάμει τὸ προ αὐτῶν καὶ τὸ πρώτου δὲ ἐπέκεινα τῶν δευτέρων καὶ τοῦ διδομένου τὸ διδόναι ἐπέκεινα ἦν. κρέπτον γάρ εἴ τι τοίνυν ἐνεργείας πρότερον, ἐπέκειτα 15 ἐνεργείας, ὥστε καὶ ἐπέκεινα ζωῆς εἰ οὖν ζωὴ ἐν τούτῳ, ὃ διδόναις ἔδωκε μὲν ζωὴν, καλλιών δὲ καὶ τριμιτερος ζωῆς. εἶχεν οὖν ζωὴν καὶ οὐκ ἔδειτο ποικίλου τοῦ διδόντος, καὶ ἦν ἡ ζωὴ ἵχνος τι ἐκείνου, οὐκ ἐκείνου ζωὴ. πρὸς ἐκάντο μὲν οὖν βλέπουσα 20 ἀδριστος ἦν, βλέψασα δὲ ἐκεῖ ὀρίζεται ὁκείνους ὅρους οὐκ ἔχοντος. εὐθὺς γάρ πρὸς ἐν τι ιδεῦσα ὀρίζεται τούτῳ καὶ ὕσχει ἐν αὐτῇ ὅρον καὶ πέρας καὶ εἶδος· καὶ τὸ εἶδος 25 ἐν τῷ μορφωθέντι, τὸ δὲ μορφώσαν ἀμορφον ἦν. ὃ δὲ

¹ Igal² τε ὁ Igal το Enn.

is neither the real beings nor intellect but cause of these, giving by its own light thinking and being thought to the real beings and to intellect. So then Intellect came to be by being filled, and when it was filled it was, and simultaneously it was perfected and saw Its principle was that which it was before being filled, but another principle, in a way external to it, was the one that filled it, from which it received its character in being filled

17. But how can these be in Intellect, and be Intellect, when they are not there in what fills it, nor, again, in it itself which is filled? For when it was not yet filled, it did not have them. Now, there is no necessity for anyone to have what he gives, but in this kind of situation one must consider that the giver is greater, and that what is given is less than the giver; for that is how coming to be is among the real beings. For that which is actual must be first, and those that come after must be potentially those before them; and the first transcended the seconds and the giver transcended the gift: for it was stronger. So if there is anything prior to actuality, it transcends actuality, so that it also transcends life. If then there is life in this Intellect the giver gave life, but is nobler and worth more than life. Intellect therefore had life and had no need of a giver full of variety, and its life was a trace of that Good and not his life. So when its life was looking towards that it was unlimited, but after it had looked there it was limited, though that Good has no limit. For immediately by looking to something which is one the life is limited by it, and has in itself limit and bound and form; and the form was in that which was shaped, but the shaper was shapeless. But the boundary is

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ὅρος οὐκ ἔξωθεν, οἷοι μεγέθει περιτεθείς, ἀλλ' ἦν πάσης
 20 ἐκείνης τῆς ζωῆς ὅρος πολλῆς καὶ ἀπείρου οὕσης, ὡς ἂν
 παρὰ τοιαυτῆς φύσεως ἐκλαμψάσης. Ζωή τε ἦν οὐ
 τοῦδε ὥριστο γαρ ἀν ως ἀτόμου ἥδη· ἀλλ' ὥριστο
 μέντοι· ἦν ἄρα ὑμισθεῖσα ως ἐνός τυνος πολλού—ὥριστο
 δὴ καὶ ἔκαστον τῶν πολλῶν—διὰ μὲν τὸ πολὺ τῆς ζωῆς
 25 πολλα ὁρισθεῖσα, διὰ δὲ αὐτὸν ὅρον ἐν τε οὖν τῷ “ἐν
 ὥρισθη”; νοῦς· ὁρισθεῖσα γάρ ζωὴ νοῦς. τί δὲ τὸ
 “πολλά”; νθει πολλού. πάντα οὖν νόει, καὶ ὁ μὲν πᾶς
 νοῦς, οἱ δὲ ἔκαστοι νοῦι. ὁ δὲ πᾶς νοῦς ἔκαστον περέχων
 ἀρα ταῦτὸν ἔκαστον περιέχει; ἀλλ' ἐντο πᾶν περιείχεν. εἰ
 30 οὖν πολλοί, διαφορὰν δεῖ εἶνα.. πάλιν οὖν πῶς ἔκαστος
 διαφορὰν ἔσχεν; ἢ ἐν τῷ καὶ εἰς ὅλως γενέσθαι εἴχε τὴν
 διαφοράν· οὐ γάρ ταῦτὸν ὅτουοῦν νοῦν το πᾶν. ἦν οὖν ἡ
 μὲν ζωὴ δύναμις πᾶσα, ἡ δὲ ὄρασις ἡ ἐκεῖθεν δύναμις
 πάντων, ὁ δὲ γενόμενος νοῦς αὐτὰ ἀνεφάνη τὰ πάντα· ἡ
 35 δὲ ἐπικάθηται αὐτοῖς, οὐχ ἵνα ἴδρυθῇ, ἀλλ' ἵνα ἴδρυσῃ
 εἰδος εἰδῶν τῶν πρώτων ἀνείδεον αὐτό· καὶ νοῦς δὲ
 γίνεται πρὸς φυχὴν οὕτως φῶς εἰς αὐτήν, ως ἐκείνος εἰς

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not from outside, as if it was surrounded by a largeness, but it was a bounding limit of all that life which is manifold and unbounded, as a life would be which shines out from a nature of this kind. And it was not the life of this or that; or it would be limited to being the life of an indivisible minimum, but all the same it was limited and defined; it was therefore defined as the life of one manifold thing—and each individual of the many things in the manifold was certainly also defined—and it was defined as many because of the multiplicity of its life, but on the other hand as one because of the defining limit. What then does “it was defined as one” mean? Intellect: for life defined and limited is intellect. And what “as many”? Many intellects. All then are intellects, and all as a whole Intellect, and the individuals intellects. But does the whole Intellect in comprehending each individual comprehend each as the same? But if it did, it would comprehend only one. If then the intellects are many, there must be difference. Again, then, how did each one have difference? It had its difference in altogether becoming one: for what is the same in any intellect is not the all. The life of Intellect, then, is all power, and the seeing which came from the Good is the power to become all things and the Intellect which came to be is manifest as the very totality of things. But the Good sits enthroned upon them, not that it may have a base but that it may base the “Form” of the first “Forms”,¹ being formless itself. And in this way Intellect is to soul a light upon it, as that Good is a

¹ Νοῦς is said to be εἴδος εἰδῶν by Aristotle *De Anima* Γ 8 432a2

νοῦν καὶ σταύρων καὶ οὐτος δράση τὴν φυχήν, λογικὴν ποιεῖ
δοὺς αὐτῇ ὡν ἔσχεν ἵχνος. ἕχνος οὖν καὶ νοῦς ἐκείνους
40 ἐπεὶ δὲ ὁ νοῦς εἶδος καὶ ἐν ἐκτασεῖ¹ καὶ πληθεῖ, ἐκείνος
διμορφός καὶ ἀνεύδεος· οὕτω γάρ εἰδοποιεῖ εἰ δὲ ἢ
ἐκείνος εἶδος, ὁ νοῦς ἦν ἀν λόγος ἔδει δὲ τὸ πρώτον μὴ
πολὺ μηδαμώς εἶναι ἀνήργητο γάρ ἀν τὸ πολὺ αὐτοῦ
εἰς ἔτερον αὖ πρὸ αὐτοῦ.

18 Ἀλλ ἀγαθοειδῆ κατὰ τί τὰ ἐν τῷ ιῷ, ἀρά ἢ
εἶδος ἐκαστον ἢ ἡ καλὰ ἢ τί; εἰ δὴ τὸ παρὰ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ
ἥκουν πᾶν ἔχνος καὶ τύπον ἔχει ἐκείνους ἢ ἀπ' ἐκείνου,
ῶστε τὸ ἀπὸ πυρὸς ἔχνος πυρὸς καὶ τὸ ἀπὸ γλυκέος
5 γλυκέος ἔχνος, ἥκει δὲ εἰς πῦν καὶ ζωὴν ἀπ' ἐκείνους ἐκ
γαρ τῆς παρ' ἐκείνους ἐνεργείας ὑπέστη καὶ νοῦς δὲ δὲ
ἐκείνουν καὶ τὸ ίών εἰδῶν κάλλος ἐκσίθεται, πάντα ἀν
ἀγαθοειδῆ εἴη καὶ ζωὴ καὶ νοῦς καὶ ιδέα. ἄλλα πί τὸ
κοινόν, οὐ γάρ δὴ ἀρκεῖ το ἀπ' ἐκείνους πρὸς τὸ ταῦτοι
10 ἐν αὐτοῖς γάρ δει το κοινον εἶναι καὶ γάρ ἀν γένοιτο
ἀπὸ τοῦ αὐτοῦ μη ταῦτὸν ἢ καὶ δοθὲν ἀσαύτως ἐν τοῖς
δεξιομένοις ἄλλο γίνεσθαι ἐπεὶ καὶ ἄλλο τὸ εἰς πρωτηρ
ἐνέργειαν, ἄλλο δὲ τὸ τῇ πρώτῃ ἐνέργεια δοθέν, τὸ δὲ
ἐπὶ τῷ τοις ἄλλο ἥδη ἢ οὐδὲν κωλυει καθ ἐκαστον μὲν
15 ἀγαθοειδὲς εἶναι, μάλλον μὴν κατ ἄλλο. τι οὖν καθό
μαλιστα, ἄλλα πρότερον ἐκείνο ἀναγκαῖον ἴδειν· ἀρά γε

¹ Theiler: ἐκστάσι Enn

light upon Intellect; and when Intellect also defines and limits the soul it makes it rational by giving it a trace of what it has. Therefore Intellect too is a trace of that Good, but since Intellect is a Form and exists in extension and multiplicity, that Good is shapeless and formless, for this is how he makes forms. But if that was a form, Intellect would have been [only a derived] rational principle. But the first must be not in any way multiple: for its multiplicity then would depend on another again before it.

18. But in what way do the things in Intellect have the form of good? Is it in that each of them is a Form, or in that they are beautiful, or what is it? Certainly, if everything which comes from the Good has a trace and an imprint which is his or derives from him, as what comes from fire is a trace of fire and what comes from a sweet thing a trace of sweet, and if also life comes from that Good to Intellect for it came to exist from the activity derived from him and Intellect exists through him and the beauty of the Forms comes from there, all would have the form of good, life and Intellect and idea. But what is it that is common to all? For coming from that Good does not suffice for sameness; for what is common should be in them themselves, for what is not the same could come to be from the same, or, also, what is given in sameness might become different in the things which are going to receive it; since, too, what pertains to the first activity is one thing and what is given by the first activity another, and what depends on these another again. Now, nothing prevents it having the form of good in each way, but more in one of them. What then is it by which most of all it is thus? But first of all it is necessary to look at

άγαθὸν ἡ ζωὴ διὰ τὸ τοῦτο ζωὴ [ἥ]¹ φυλὴ θεωρουμένη καὶ ἀπογεγυμνωμένη; τῇ δὲ² ζωὴ ἡ ἀπὸ αὐτοῦ. τὸ δὲ "ἀπὸ αὐτοῦ" ἀλλο πι ἡ³ τοιαύτη, οὐδὲν οὖν εἰ δὲ τοιαύτη ζωή, 20 η ἀγαθὸν ἀλλ' οὐκ αὐτοῦ ἡ, ἀλλὰ ἐξ αὐτοῦ. ἀλλ' εἰ ἐν τῇ ζωῇ ἐκείνῃ ἐνίσιτο ἐξ ἐκείνου καὶ ἐστιν ἡ ὄντως ζωή, καὶ οὐδὲν ἄιμον παρ' ἐκείνου [λεκτέον εἴναι],⁴ καὶ καθό ζωή, ἀγαθὸν <λεκτέον>⁵ εἶναι, καὶ ἐπὶ νοῦ δὲ τοῦ ἀληθινοῦ ἀνάγκη λέγειν τὸν πρώτον ἐκείνου, ὅπι 25 σε ἀγαθὸν. καὶ δῆλον ὅτι καὶ εἴδος ἔκαστον ἀγαθὸν καὶ ἀγαθοειδές, διὰ οὗν τι ἔχει ἀγαθόν, εἴτε κοινόν, εἴτε μᾶλλον ἀλλο, εἴτε τὸ μὲν τράτως, τὸ δὲ τῷ ἐφεξῆς καὶ διατέρως ἐπεὶ γὰρ αἱ λόγιφαμεν ἔκαστον ὡς ἔχον ἥδη ἢ τῇ οἰστῇ αὐτοῦ ἀγαθὸν τι καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ἡν ἀγαθόν—καὶ 30 γερ ἡ ζωὴ ἡν ἀγαθὸν οὐχ ἀπλῶς, ἀλλ' ὅτι ἐλέγετο ἀληθινὴ καὶ διὰ παρ' ἐκείνου, καὶ νοῦς ἡ ὄντως—δεῖ τοῦ αὐτοῦ ἐν αὐτοῖς ὀρᾶσθαι. διαφόρων γὰρ ὄντων, διαν τὸ αὐτὸν αὐτῶν κατηγορήται, κωλύει μὲν οὐδὲν ἐν τῇ οἰστῇ αὐτῶν τοῦτο ἐντορχεῖν, οἷμας δὲ ἐστι λαβεῖν αὐτὸν χωρὶς τῷ λόγῳ, οἷον καὶ τὸ ζῷον ἐπ' ἀνθρώπου 35 καὶ ἵππου, καὶ τὸ θερμὸν ἐπὶ ὕδατος καὶ πυρός, τὸ μὲν ὡς γένος, τὸ δὲ ὡς τὸ μὲν πρώτως τὸ δε δευτέρως· ἡ διμωνύμως ἀν ἐκάτερον ἡ ἔκαστον λέγοιτο ἀγαθόν ἀρ' οὖν ἐνυπάρχει τῇ οὐσίᾳ αὐτῶν τὸ ἀγαθόν; ἡ δλον ἔκαστον ἀγαθόν ἐστιν, οὐ καθ' ἐν τὸ ἀγαθόν. πῶς οὖν, ἡ

¹ del. Theler § H. S¹.² Harder ἡ Enn³ Igai.

the following: is life a good in that it is this very thing, life considered bare and stripped of all else? Rather, in that it is the life which comes from the Good. But does this "from the Good" mean anything else but that it is of a particular kind? Again, then, what is "life of a particular kind"? It is life of the Good. But it was not life of the Good, but deriving from the Good. But if in that life the authentic life from that Good has entered and is, and nothing from that is valueless, it must be said to be good also in that it is life, and it is necessary to say also of that true and first Intellect that it is good, and it is clear also that each individual Form is good and has the form of good, in that, therefore, it has some good, either common, or more particularly one rather than another, or one primarily and another by succession and secondarily. For, since we took each Form as having something good in its substance, and it was good for this reason—for its life was not good simply as life, but because it was called true life and because it came from that Good, and Intellect because it was real Intellect—something of the same must be visible in them. For, as they are different, when the same Jung is predicated of them there is nothing to prevent this being immanent in their substance, but all the same it is possible to take it separately in thought, as, for instance, "living thing" in man and horse, and "hot" in water and fire, in the one case as the genus, and in the other as one primarily and the other secondarily; otherwise each of them or each particular one of them would be called good equivocally. Is then the good immanent in their substance? Now, each of them is good as a whole; its good does not depend on just one constitu-

40 ὡς μέρη; ἀλλὰ ἀμερὲς τὸ ἀγαθόν. η̄ ἐν μὲν αὐτῷ, οὐτωσὶ δὲ τόδε, οὐτωσὶ δὲ τόδε. καὶ γὰρ η̄ ἐνέργεια τὸ πρώτη ἀγαθὸν καὶ τὸ εἰ̄ται αὐτῇ ὅρος θὲτον αγαθὸν καὶ τὸ συνάνθρωπον καὶ τὸ μὲν ὅτι γενόμενον ἵππον αὐτοῦ, τὸ δὲ ὅτι κόσμος ἀπ’ αὐτοῦ, τὸ δὲ διὰ συνάμφιον ἀπ’ αὐτοῦ οὖν, καὶ οὐδὲν 45 ταῦτόν οἷον εἰ̄ται ἀπὸ τοῦ αὐτοῦ φωνῆς καὶ βάδισις καὶ ὄλλοι τοιούτοις. ἀλλὰ πατορθούμενα. ἡ ἐσταύθα, ὅτι τάξις καὶ ρυθμός ἔκει δὲ τοῖς; ἀλλ’ εἴποι τις διὸ ὡς ἐνταῦθα ὅλον εἴ̄ται τὸ καλῶς ἔξωθεν διαφόρων ὄντων τάξιν περ. ἢ η̄ τάξις, ἔκει δὲ καὶ αὐτά. ἀλλὰ διὰ τοὺς καὶ αὐτά; οὐ γὰρ ὅτι ἀπ’ 50 ἔκεινου δεῖ πιστεύοντας ἀφεῖναι δεῖ μὲν γὰρ συγχωρεῖν ἀπ’ ἔκεινου ὅντα εἶναι τίμια, ἀλλὰ ποθεῖ ὁ λογος λαβεῖν, κατὰ τοῦ τὸ ἀγαθὸν αὐτῶν.

19. Ἐφ’ οὖν τῇ ἐφέσει καὶ τῇ φυχῇ ἐν τοῖς ρέψιμον τὴν κρίσιν καὶ τῷ ταύτης πάθει πιστεύσαρτες τὸ ταύτη ἐφε-ὸν ἀγνιθὸν φήσομεν, διότι δὲ ἐφίεται οὐ ζητησομεν, καὶ τί μὲν ἔκαστον περὶ τούτου ἀποδεῖξεις κομισθεῖν, 5 τὸ δὲ ἀγαθὸν τῇ ἐφέσει δώσομεν; ἀλλὰ πολλὰ ἀποτα τίμιν φαίνεται, πρῶτον μὲν, διότι καὶ τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἐν τι τῶν περ. ἔπειτα, διότι πολλὰ τὰ ἐφιέμενα καὶ ἄλλα ἄλλων·

ent. Well then, are they good as parts? But the good is partless. Now, it is one itself, but is in this way, this particular good, and in that way, that. For the first activity is good and what is defined following upon it is good and the pair of them together; and the one is good because it is brought into being by the Good, and the other because it is an ordered world which comes from it, and the last because it is both of them together. They come from the Good then, and not one of them is the same, as from the same [Form of man] talking and walking and a variety of other things come, all correct [according to the Form]. Now here below this is because there is order and rhythm: but why there in the intelligible? But one might say that here below always what brings about the excellence comes from outside, and the things with which the order is concerned are different [from the order], but there the things themselves also are good. But why are they also good? For we should not just trust that it is because they come from that Good and give up; for we must agree that it is because they are from that Good that they are valuable, but the discussion is anxious to grasp the reason for their goodness

19. Shall we then hand over the decision to desire and to the soul and, trusting in this soul's experience, maintain that what is desired by this is good, and not enquire why it desires? And shall we produce demonstrations of what each and every thing is, but commit the good to desire? But we see many absurdities in this. First, because the good also will become one of the accompaniments. Then, because there are many that desire, and different ones desire different things, how then shall we decide by the

πῶς οὖν κρινοῦμεν τῷ ἔφιεμένῳ, εἰ βέλτιον ἀλλ’ ίσως οὐδὲ τὸ βέλτιον γνωσόμεθα τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἀγνοοῦντες. ἀλλὰ 10 δῆτα τὸ ἀγαθὸν δριούμεθα κατὰ τὴν ἑκάστου ἀρετήν, ἀλλ’ οὕτως εἰς εἶδος καὶ λόγον ἀνάξομεν, ὅρθως μὲν πορευόμενοι. ἀλλὰ ἐλθόντες ἐκεὶ τὶ ἔροῦμεν αὐτὰ ταῦτα 15 ζητοῦντες πῶς ἀγαθά; ἐν μὲν γάρ τοῖς χείρισιν, ως ἔοικε, γιγνώσκομεν ἀν τὴν φύσιν τὴν τοιαύτην καίτοι 20 οὐκ ἔχοντες εἰλικρινῶς, ἐπειδὴ¹ οὐ τράτως, τῇ πρὸς τὰ χείρα παραβέσσει, δύον δὲ μηδέν ἔστι κακόν, αὐτὰ δὲ ἐφ’ ἕαυτῶν ἔστι τὰ ἀμείνω, ἀπορήσομεν. Δῆτα δὲ,
ἐπειδὴ *(δ)*² λόγος τὸ διότι ζητεῖ, ταῦτα δὲ ἀγαθὰ παρ’ αὐτῶν, διὰ τούτο ἀπορεῖ τον “διότι” τὸ “δτι” ὄντος, 25 ἐπεὶ κανὸν ἄλλο φᾶμεν αἴτιον, τὸν θεόν, λόγου μὴ
φθάνοντος ἐκεὶ δροίως ή ἀπορίᾳ. οὐ μην ἀποστατέον, εἴ τη κατ’ ἄλλην ὅδὸν πορευομένοις τι φανεῖται.

20. Ἐπειδὴ τούντιν ἀπιστοῦμεν ἐν τῷ παρόντι ταῖς δρέξεσι πρὸς τὰς τοῦ τί ἐπτι τῇ ποίην ἔστι θέσεις,³ δῆτα χρή πρὸς τὰς κρίσεις ἔναι καὶ τὰς τῶν πραγμάτων ἐναντιώσεις, οἷον τάξιν ἀταξίαν, σύμμετρον δὲ ἀσύμμετρον, ὑγείαν νόσον, εἶδος ἀμορφίαν, οὐσίαν φθοραν, δῆλος αυστασίαν ἀφάνισιν; τούτων γάρ τὰ πρώτα καθ’ ἑκάστην συζητεῖν τίς ἀν ἀμφισβήτησε μὴ οὐκ ἐν ἀγαθοῦ εἴδει εἴναι; εἰ δὲ τούτο, καὶ τὰ ποιητικὰ

¹ Gollwitzer ἐκεὶ δὲ Εὐη.

² Kirchhoff

³ R^o (ad asseverandum Ficinasi), Creuzer θεοὶ Ενν.

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desirer whether the desired is better [than other objects of desire]? But perhaps we shall not even know the better if we are ignorant of the good. But shall we then define the good according to each thing's excellence? But in this way we shall refer to Form and reason-principle, certainly a correct manner of proceeding. But when we have got there, what are we going to say when we enquire how these very Forms are good? For in the things which are inferior, it seems likely, we might recognise the nature of this kind, though it is not in a pure state, since it does not exist primarily, by comparison with things which are [still] worse. But where there is nothing evil, but the Forms themselves by themselves are the better things, we shall be in difficulties. Is the difficulty, then, there for this reason, that, since our rational discourse seeks the reason why but these are good in themselves, the "why" is the "that"? Since even if we also assert another cause, God, the difficulty remains all the same while our discourse has not arrived there. We must certainly not give up while there is any chance of something appearing if we proceed by another way.

20. Since, then, we do not at present rely on our impulses for establishing what a thing is or what it is like, should we then turn to judgements and the oppositions of things, for instance order, disorder, symmetrical, unsymmetrical, health, sickness, form, shapelessness, substance, destruction, and in general coherence and dissolution? For who is there who would argue that the first of these in each pair is not in the form of good? But if this is so, it is

¹ This is how Aristotle defines human good in *Nicomachean Ethics* A 7, 1098a16-17.

πάτῶν ἀνάγκη ἐν ἀγαθοῦ λοίρᾳ τίθεσθαι καὶ ἀρετὴ δῆ
 10 καὶ νοῦς καὶ ζωὴ καὶ φυχή, ἥ γε ἔμφρων, ἐν ἀγαθοῦ
 εἴθει καὶ μν ἐφίεται τούντιν ἔμφρων ζωἰ. τί σὺν ω
 στησόμεθα, φήσει τις, εἰς νοῦν καὶ τοῦτο τὸ ἀγαθον
 θησόμεθα; καὶ γὰρ φυχὴ καὶ ζωὴ νοῦ ἵχη, καὶ τούτου
 ἐφίεται φυχὴ καὶ κρίνει τούντιν καὶ ἐφίεται νοῦ,
 κρίνουσα μὲν δικαιοσύνην ἀρτ' ἀδικίας ἄμεων καὶ
 15 ἕκαστον εἶδος ἀρετῆς πρὸ κακίας εἴδους, καὶ τῶν αὐτῶν
 ἡ προτίμησις, ὡν καὶ ἡ αὔρεσις. ἀλλ' εἰ μὲν νοῦ μόνον
 ἐφίεται, τάχα ἀν πλείονος ἐδέησε λόγου δεικνύντων, ὡς
 οὐ το ἐπιχατον ὁ νοῦς καὶ νοῦ μὲν οὐ πάντα, ἀγαθοῦ δὲ
 πάντα. καὶ τῶν μὲν μὴ ἔχόντων νοῦν οὐ πάντα νοῖν
 20 κτησάσθαι ζητεῖ, τὸ δ' ἔχοντα νοῦν οὐχ ἴσταται ἥδη,
 ἀλλὰ πάλιν τὸ ἀγαθὸν ζητεῖ, καὶ νοῦν μὲν ἐκ λυγισμού,
 τὸ δ' ἀγαθον καὶ πρὸ τοῦ λόγου. εἰ δὲ καὶ ζωῆς ἐφίεται
 καὶ τοῦ ὅσιος εἶναι καὶ ἐνεργεῖν, οὐχ ἥ νοῦς ἀν εἴη τὸ
 ἐφετόν, ἀλλ' ἥ ἀγαθὸν καὶ ἀπὸ αγαθοῦ καὶ εἰς ἀγαθόν
 ἐπει καὶ ἡ ζωὴ οὐτως

21. Τί οὖν ἐν ὃν ἐν πᾶσι τούτοις ποιεῖ ἀγαθὸν
 ἕκαστον; ὡδε τούτην τετολμήσθω εἶναι μὲν τὸν νοῦν καὶ
 τὴν ζωὴν ἐκείνην ἀγαθοειδῆ, ἐφεστιν δὲ εἶναι καὶ
 τούτων, καθόσυν ἀγαθοειδῆ ἀγαθοειδῆ δὲ λέγω τῷ τὴν
 5 μὲν τάγαθον εἶναι ἐνέργειαν, μᾶλλον δὲ ἐκ τάγαθου
 ἐνέργειαν, τῷ δὲ ἥδη ὀρισθεῖσαν ἐνέργειαν. εἶναι δ'

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necessary to put their makers also on the good side. And surely virtue and intelligence and life and soul, thinking soul at least, are in the form of good; and so, then, are what thinking life desires. Why then, someone will say, do we not stop at Intellect and posit this as the Good? For soul and life are traces of Intellect, and it is this Intellect that soul desires. And so in its judgements also it desires Intellect, judging righteousness better than unrighteousness, and preferring each form of virtue to the [corresponding] form of vice, and judging more valuable the same things which it chooses. But if it only desires Intellect, perhaps it might be in need of further reasoning to show that Intellect is not the ultimate and that not all things desire Intellect but all things desire the Good. And not all of the things which do not have intellect seek to gain possession of it, and the things that have intellect do not stop there, but again seek the Good, and they seek Intellect from their reasoning, but the Good even before reason. And if they also seek life, and everlasting existence and activity, what they desire is not Intellect in so far as it is Intellect, but in so far as it is good and from the Good and directed to the Good: since this is so also with life.

21. What therefore is it which is one in all these and makes each and every one of them good? Let us, then, make bold to say this: Intellect and that life of its are in the form of good and there is desire of these also in so far as they are in the form of good: I mean "in the form of good" in the sense that life is the activity of the Good, or rather an activity from the Good, and Intellect is the activity already bounded and defined. But they are both filled full of glory and

αἰτά μεστὸν μὲν ἀγλαῖας καὶ διώκεσθαι ὑπὸ φυχῆς, ὡς
ἐκεῖθεν καὶ πρὸς ἐκεῖνα αὐτὰ τοίνυν οἰκεῖα, ἀλλ’ οὐχὶ¹
ἀγαθόντα μάγαθοις δέ ὅντα μᾶδε ταύτη τούτῳ ληφθῆτα εἶναι.
10 τὸ γὰρ οἰκεῖον, εἴ μή ἀγαθὸν εἴη, οἰκεῖον μέντοι ἔστι,
φεύγει δέ τις αὐτῷ ἐπεὶ καὶ ἄλλα πόρρω ὅντα καὶ κάτω
κινήσειν ἄν. γίνεται δέ πρὸς αὐτὰ ἔρως ὁ σύντονος οὐχ
ὕπου ἢ ἅπερ ἔστιν, ἀλλ’ ὅταν ἐκεῖθεν ἤδη ὅντα² ἅπερ
ἔστιν ἄλλο προσλάβῃ. οἷον γὰρ ἐπὶ τῶν σωμάτων
φωτὸς ἐμμεμιγμένου δύμας δεῖ φωτὸς ἄλλον, ἵνα καὶ
15 φανεῖται τὸ ἐν αἵτοις χρῶμα τὸ φῶς, μῆτων τοι δεῖ καὶ ἐπὶ³
τῶν ἑκεῖ καίπερ πολὺ φῶς ἔχοντων φωτὸς κρειττονός
ἄλλοι, ἵνα κάκεῖνα καὶ ὑπὸ αὐτῶν καὶ ὑπὸ ἄλλου ὀφθῆ.

22. Όταν οὖν τὸ φῶς τοῦτό τις ἴδῃ, τότε δὴ καὶ
κινεῖται ἐπ’ αὐτὰ καὶ τον φωτὸς του ἐπιθέόντος ἐπ
αὐτοῖς γλυκόμενος εὐφραίνεται, ὥσπερ καπτὶ² τῶν
ἐνταῦθα σωμάτων οὐ τῶν ὑποκειμένων ἔστιν ὁ ἔρως
ἢ ἄλλα τοῦ ἐμφανταζομένου κάλλους ἐπ’ αὐτοῖς ἔστι γὰρ
ἐκαστον δὲ ἔστιν ἐφ’ αὐτοῦ ἐφετὸν δὲ γίνεται
ἐπιχρύσαντος αὐτὸν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ, ὥσπερ γάρ τας δόντος
αὐτοῖς καὶ τὰς ἐφιέμενας ἔρωτας, καὶ τούτη φυχὴ¹
λαβούσα εἰς αὐτὴν τὴν ἐκεῖθεν ἀπορροήν, κινεῖται
καὶ ἀναβαίκευται καὶ οἰστρων πίμπλαται καὶ ἔρως

¹ Ficinus: ὃν Enn.

² Beutler: καὶ Enn

are pursued by the soul because it comes from them and again is directed to them; as akin then, but not *as good*; but since they are in the form of good not to be rejected for this reason. For what is akin to one, if it is not good, is indeed akin, but one avoids it, since [if it was otherwise] other things also which are far off and deep below might move one to desire. But there comes to be the intense kind of love for them not when they are what they are but when, being already what they are, they receive something else from there beyond. For just as with bodies, though light is mixed into them, all the same there is need of another light for the light, the colour, in them to appear, so with the things there in the intelligible, though they possess much light, there is need of another greater light that they may be seen both by themselves and by another.

22 When anyone therefore sees this light, then truly he is also moved to the Forms, and longs for the light which plays upon them and delights in it, just as with the bodies here below our desire is not for the underlying material things but for the beauty imaged upon them. For each is what it is by itself, but it becomes desirable when the Good colours it, giving a kind of grace to them and passionate love to the desirers. Then the soul, receiving into itself an outflow from thence, is moved and dances wildly and

10 γίνεται προ τούδε οὐδὲ πρὸς τὸν νοῦν κινεῖται, καίπερ καλὸν ὄντα ἀργόν τε γάρ τὸ κάλλος αὐτοῦ, πρὶν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ φῶς λάθη, ὑπερέστη τὸ ἀραιότωπεν ἡ φυχὴ παρ' αὐτῆς καὶ πρὸς τὸν ἀργῶν ἔχει καὶ παρόντος νοῦ ἐστὶ πρὸς αὐτὸν νωθῆσ. ἐπειδὰν δὲ ἡκή εἰς αὐτὴν 15 ὥσπερ θερμασία ἐκείθει. ῥάννυταί τε καὶ ἐγείρεται καὶ δυντως πτεροῦται καὶ πρὸς τὸ παρακείμενον καὶ πλησίον καίπερ ἐπτοημένη δύμως πρὸς ἄλλο οὖν τῇ μνήμῃ μείζον κουφίζεται. καὶ ἔως τί ἐστιν ἀνωτέρω του παρόντος, αἴρεται φύσε. ἄνω αἱρομένη ὑπὸ τοῦ δόντος 20 τὸν ἔρατα. καὶ νοῦ μὲν ὑπεραίρει, οὐ δύναται δὲ ὑπὲρ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ δραμεῖν, ὅτι μηδέν ἐστι τὸ ὑπερκείμενον. ἐὰν δὲ μεγή εἰ νῷ, καλὰ μὲν καὶ σεμνὰ θεαταὶ, οὕτω μην ὁ ζητεῖ πάντη ἔχει. οἷον γάρ προσώπῳ πελάζει καλῶ μέν, οὕτω δὲ ὄψιν κινεῖν δυναμένω, ὡς μὴ ἐμπρέπει χάρις 25 ἐπιθέουσα τῷ κάλλει. Σιδὸς καὶ ἐνταῦθα φατέον μᾶλλον .. κάλλος τὸ ἐπὶ τῇ συμμετρίᾳ ἐπιλαμπόμενον ἡ τῆτ συμμετρίαν εἶναι καὶ τοῦτο εἶναι τὸ ἔρασμιον. διὰ τί γάρ ἐπὶ μὲν ζῶντος προπάντωι μᾶλλον τὸ φέγγυς τοῦ καλοῦ, ἵχνος δὲ ἐπὶ τεθνηκότος καὶ μήπω τοῦ προσώπου

¹ Plotinus in this chapter is, as so often, inspired by the myth in Plato's *Phaedrus* 246A ff. He refers here particularly to the description of the soul in love in 261B. The phrase "falls flat on its back" in line 12 also comes from the myth (254B8), but the context is startlingly different. In Plato the charioteer of the soul falls back in reverence when he is reminded by the beauty of the bearded of the Form of beauty which he once saw, and drags his horses back with him. In Plotinus the soul lies back in boredom and indifference if it does not see over the Forms

is all stung with longing and becomes love.¹ Before this it is not moved even towards Intellect, for all its beauty, the beauty of Intellect is inactive till it catches a light from the Good and the soul by itself "falls flat on its back" and is completely inactive and, though Intellect is present, is unenthusiastic about it. But when a kind of warmth from thence comes upon it, it gains strength and wakes and is truly winged; and though it is moved with passion for that which lies close by it, yet all the same it rises higher, to something greater which it seems to remember. And as long as there is anything higher than that which is present to it, it naturally goes on upwards, lifted by the giver of its love.² It rises above Intellect, but cannot run on above the Good, for there is nothing above. But if it remains in Intellect it sees fair and noble things, but has not yet quite grasped what it is seeking. It is as if it was in the presence of a face which is certainly beautiful, but cannot catch the eye because it has no grace playing upon its beauty. So here below also beauty is what illuminates good proportions rather than the good proportions themselves, and this is what is lovable. For why is there more light of beauty on a living face, but only a trace of it on a dead one, even if its

the light which comes from beyond them, from the Good. On the significance of this chapter and its relationship to some equally startling remarks on the beauty of the World of Forms in V. 12 see my "Beauty and the Discovery of Divinity in the Thought of Plotinus" (*Plotinian and Christian Studies* XIX).

² This is the clearest statement by Plotinus of something implicit in his whole system that our desire to return to the Good is given by the Good.

ταῖς σαρξὶ καὶ ταῖς σιγμιετρίαις μεμπροσμένους; ταὶς
30 τῶν ἀγαλμάτων δὲ τὰ ζωτικώτερα καλλίω, καὶ
οὐρμή ρύεται τὰ ἔτερα γέ, καὶ αἰσχύλον ζῶν καλλίων τοῦ
ἐν ἀγάλματι καλοῦ; ὅτι τοδὶ ἐφετὸν μᾶλλον τούτο δ'
ὅτι φυχὴν ἔχει τοῦτο δ' ὅτι ἀγαθοειδεστερον τοῦτο δ'
ὅτι ἀγαθοῦ ἀμπηγέπη φωτὶ κέχρασται καὶ χρωσθεῖσα
35 εγήγερται καὶ ἀνακεκούφισται καὶ ἀνακουφίζει ὁ ἔχει,
καὶ ὡς οἶν τε αὐτῷ ἀγαθοποιεῖ αὐτὸν καὶ ἐγείρει.

28 Ἐκεῖ δῆ, ὁ φυχὴ διώκει, καὶ ὁ νῷ φῶς παρέχει
καὶ ἐμπεσόν αἵτον ἔχνος κινεῖ, οὕτοι δεῖ θαυμάζειν,
εἰ τοιαύτην δύναμιν ἔχει ἐλκον πρὸς αὐτὸν καὶ
ἀνακαλούμενον ἐκ πάσης πλάνης, ἵνα πρὸς αὐτὸν
5 αναπαύσαιτο. εἰ γὰρ ἔκ του τὰ πάντα, οὐδέν ἔστι
κρείττον αὐτοῦ, ἐλάττω δὲ πάτα τὸ δὴ ὄριστον τῶν
ὄντων πᾶς οὐ τὸ ἀγαθόν ἔστι, καὶ μὴν εἰ δεῖ τὴν τοῦ
ογαθοῦ φύσιν αὐταρκεστάτην τε εἶναι αὐτῇ καὶ ἀνενδέᾳ
ἄλλουν ὅτανοῦν παντός, τίνα ἀν ἄλλην ἡ ταύτη οὐσαν
10 εὑροι τις, ἥ πρὸ τῶν ἄλλων ἦν ὅπερ ἦν, ὅτε μηδὲ κακά
πα τῇ, εἰ δὲ τὰ κακὰ ὑστερον ἐν τοῖς μηδὲ καθ' ἐν
τούτου μετειληφθεῖ καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἐσχάτοις καὶ οὐδὲν
ἐπέκεινα τῶν κακῶν πρὸς τὸ χείρον, ἐναντίως ἀν ἔχοι
τὰ κακά πρὸς αὐτὸν οὐδὲν ἔχοντα μένουν πρὸς
15 ἀναπτίωσιν τὸ ἄρα ἀγαθὸν τούτο σὺν εἴη ἥ γάρ ποκ
ἄλλο εἴη. εἰ δέ τις λέγοι μὴ εἶναι, οὐδὲ κακὸν ἀν εἴη-

flesh and its proportions are not yet wasted away? And are not the more lifelike statues the more beautiful ones, even if the others are better proportioned? And is not an uglier living man more beautiful than the beautiful man in a statue? Yes, because the living is more desirable; and this is because it has soul; and this is because it has more the form of good; and this means that it is somehow coloured by the light of the Good, and being so coloured wakes and rises up and lifts up that which belongs to it, and as far as it can makes it good and wakes it.

23. There, surely, one need not wonder if that which the soul pursues and which gives light to Intellect and in falling upon it stirs a trace of itself has so great a power, and draws to itself and calls back from all wandering to rest beside it. For if there is something from which all things come, there is nothing stronger than it, but all things are less than it. How can the best of realities possibly not be the Good? And furthermore, if the nature of the Good must be completely sufficient to itself and without need of anything else at all, what other nature than this could anyone find, which was what it was before the others, when there was not yet any badness? But if the evils come later, in things which do not participate in this Good in any way at all, and on the very last and lowest level, and there is nothing beyond the evils on the worse side, the evils would be opposed to it without any middle term for the opposition. This then would be the Good, for either there is no Good at all, or, if it is necessary that there is, it would be this and not something else. But if someone says that there is not, then there would be no evil either; so things would be by nature indifferent for

ἀδιάφορα ἄρα πρὸς αἱρεσιν τῇ φύσει τοῦτο δὲ ἀδύνατον.
ἀδὲ ἄλλα λέγονται ἀγαθά, εἰς τοῦτο, αὐτὸ δὲ εἰς οὐδέν.
τί οὖν ποιεῖ τοιούτοι ῶν; ή ἐποίησε νοῦν, ἐποίησε ζωήν,
20 ψυχᾶς ἐκ τούτου καὶ τὰ ἄλλα, ὅσα λόγου η̄ νοῦ η̄ ζωῆς
μετέχει. δὲ δὴ τούτων πηγὴ καὶ ἀρχὴ, τις ἐν
εἴποι, ὅπως ἀγαθὸν καὶ στον; ἀλλὰ τί νῦν ποιεῖ; η̄ καὶ
νῦν σώζει ἑκεῖνα καὶ νυεῖν ποιεῖ τὰ νοοῦντα καὶ ζῆν τὰ
ζῶντα, ἐμπνέον νοῦν, ἐμπνέον ζωήν, εἰ δέ τι μὴ δύναται
ζῆν, εἶναι.

24. Ἡμᾶς δὲ τί ποιεῖ; η̄ πάλιν περὶ τοῦ φωτὸς
λεγομεν τί τὸ φῶς, φ̄ καταλάμπεται μὲν νοῦς,
μεταλαμβάνει δὲ αὐτοῦ φυχή. η̄ τοῦτο νῦν εἰς ὕστερον
ἀφέντες εἰκότως ἔκεινα πρότερον ἀπορήσωμεν. ἀρά γε
5 τὸ ἀγαθόν, ὅπι ἔστιν ἄλλῳ ἐφετόν, ἔστι καὶ λέγεται
ἀγαθόν, καὶ τινι μὲν ὃν ἐφετόν τινι ἀγαθόν, πάσι δὲ ὃν
τοῦτο λέγομεν εἶναι τὸ ἀγαθόν; η̄ μαρτύριον μὲν ἀν τις
τοῦτο ποιήσαιτο τοῦ εἶναι ἀγαθόν, δεῖ δέ γε φύσαν αὐτὸ
τὸ ἐφετόν ἔχειν τοιαύτην, ὡς δικαίως ἀν τυχεῖν τῆς
.0 τοιαύτης προσηγορίας. καὶ πότερα τῷ τι δεχεσθαι τὰ
ἔφιέμενα ἐφίεται η̄ τῷ χαίρειν αὐτῷ; καὶ εἰ μὲν τι
δέχεται, τί τοῦτο; εἰ δὲ τῷ χαίρειν, διὰ τί τούτῳ, ἀλλὰ
μη̄ ἄλλῳ τινί; ἐν φ̄ δη καὶ πότερα τῷ οἰκείῳ τὸ ἀγαθὸν η̄
ἄλλῳ τινί. καὶ δὴ καὶ πότερα τὸ ἀγαθὸν ὅλως ἄλλου

¹ The phrase is taken from *Phaedrus* 245C9. But Plato uses it there of soul as "source and principle" of movement to all else.

THE FORMS AND THE GOOD

our choice; but this is impossible. But what others call goods are referred to this, but it itself is referred to nothing. What then does it make, if it is like this? It made Intellect, it made life, and from Intellect the souls and all else that has a share in reason or intellect or life. Then, surely, what is "source and principle"¹ of these, how could one say in what way and how greatly it is good? But what is it making now? Now as well it is keeping those things in being and making the thinking things think and the living things live, inspiring thought, inspiring life and, if something cannot live, existence.

24. But what does it make us? Either let us speak again of the light and say what that light is by which Intellect is illuminated and in which Soul has a part. Or else let us leave this till afterwards² and, as is reasonable, deal first with the following difficulties. Is the Good good, and does it have that name, because it is desirable for another, and is it good for one because it is desirable for one, but because it is this for all we say that it is the Good? Now one might offer this as evidence that the Good exists, but surely the object of desire itself must have such a nature that it is right to call it this. And do its desirers desire it because they receive something, or because they delight in it? And if they receive something, what is it? But if it is because of delight, why do they delight in this and not in something else? And in this the question is certainly involved whether the good is so by kinship or by something else. And, indeed, the further question whether the good is altogether the good of another, or whether the good is good for

² Ch. 31 onwards.

15 ἔστιν, η και αὐτῷ τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἀγαθόν ἔστιν· η δ ἄν διαγείθων, πάντῳ μὲν οὐκ ἔστιν, ἄλλου δὲ ἐξ ἀναγκῆς; καὶ τίνι φύσει ἀγαθὸν ἔστιν; ἔστι δέ τις φύσις, οὐ μηδὲν ἀγαθὸν ἔστι; κάκινο δὲ οὐκ ἀφετέον, διότι τὸν τινὰ δυσχεραντικὸν ἀνὴρ εἴποι, ὡς “ὑμεῖς, μὲν οὐτοι, τι διαποιεῖτε τοῖς ὄντας”¹ ἀνα καὶ κάτω ζωὴν 20 ἀγαθὸν λέγοντες καὶ τοῦν ἀγαθὸν λέγοντες καὶ τις ἐπέκεινα τούτων; τι γάρ ἄν και ὁ τοῦς ἀγαθὸν εἶη; η τί οντων τα εἰδη αὐτὰ ἀγαθὸν ἔχοι αὐτὸν ἔκαστον θεωρῶν, η πατημένος μὲν γάρ ἄν και ηδόμενος ἐπὶ τούτοις τάχα ἀν ἀγαθὸν λέγοι και τὴν ζωὴν ηδεῖαν οὐσαν· στὰς δὲ 25 τῷ ἀνήδονος εἶναι διὰ τὸν φύσειν ἀγαθά; η τὸ αὐτὸν εἶναι; τι γάρ ἄν ἐκ τοῦ εἶναι καρπώσαιτο, η τί διαφέροι ἐν τῷ εἶναι η δλως μὴ εἶναι, εἰ μή τις τὴν πρὸς αὐτὸν φιλίαν αἰτίαν τούτων θεῖτο, ὥστε διὰ ταύτην τὴν ἀπίτην φυσικὴν οἰσπαι και τὸν φόβον τῆς φθορᾶς τὴν 30 τῶν ἀγαθῶν νομισθῆναι θέσιν.”

25. Ο μὲν οὖν Πλάτων ἡδονὴν τῷ τέλει μιγνὺς και τὸ ἀγαθὸν οὐχ ἀπλουν οὐδὲ ἐν τῷ μόνῳ τιθεμένος, ὡς ἐν τῷ Φιλήβῳ γέγραπται, τάχα μὲν αἰσθόμενος ταύτης τῆς ἀπορίας οὕτε παντάπασιν ἐτὶ τὸ ηδὺ οὐθεσθαι τὸ ἀγαθὸν

¹ Ηδεῖα: δημιουρη Επη.

¹ Plotinus is rather more sympathetic than might be expected to this down-to-earth and anti-metaphysical person. He gives him here a good, forcible statement of his case, and answers him seriously and carefully in ch. 29, where he indicates (lines 21-22) that he and this awkward

itself: or is whatever may be good not good for itself but necessarily the good of another? And for what nature is it good? And is there any nature for which nothing is good? And we must not leave out the following remarks which some cantankerous person might make,¹ “Really, you people, why do you use this pompous language up and down and all around, saying life is good, and intellect is good, and something transcending these?” For why should intellect be good? Or what good could the thinker of the Forms have as he contemplates each of them? If he takes a deceptive pleasure in them he might perhaps say intellect was good, and life, because it was pleasant; but if he is stuck in a pleasureless state, why should he say they are good? Is it because he exists? What then would he gain from existence? What difference would there be in existing or altogether not existing, unless one makes affection for oneself the reason for all this? In that case it would be this natural deception and the fear of dissolution which would account for the acceptance of the supposition of goods.”

25. Plato, then, who mixes pleasure into the end object and does not posit the good as simple or in intellect alone, as it is written in the *Philebus*,² perhaps because he was aware of this difficulty was not inclined to place the good altogether in the pleasant—and in this he was right—nor did he think

character have at least this in common, that the good of Intellect is not enough for them by itself

² The passages in Plato's *Philebus* which Plotinus is discussing in this chapter (21D-22A and 61B-D) are important, in his understanding of them, for his thought about Intellect and the Good.

5 ἐτράπετο, δρθῶς πιλῶν, οὕτε τὸν νοῦν ἀνήδονον ὅντα
 ὥηθη δεῖν θέσθαι ἀγαθὸν τὸ κινσῦν ἐν αὐτῷ οὐχ ὄρῶν.
 τάχα δὲ οὐ ταίτιγ, ἀλλ' ὅτι ἡξίου τὸ ὀχυρόν ἔχον φύσιν
 ἐν αὐτῷ τοιαύτην δεῖν ἐξ ἀνάγκης χαρτὸν εἶναι, τό τε
 ἐφετὸν τῷ τυγχάνοντι καὶ τυχόντι πάντως ἔχειν τὸ
 10 χάρεν, ὥστε, φημή τὸ χαίρειν, ἀγαθὸν μηδὲ εἶναι, καὶ
 ὥστε, εἰ τὸ χαίρειν τῷ ἐφιεμένῳ, τῷ πρώτῳ μη εἴναι
 ὥστε μηδὲ τὸ ἀγαθόν καὶ οὐκ ἀποπον τούτοις αὐτὸς γάρ
 οὐ τὸ πρώτον ἀγαθὸν ἐξήτει, τὸ δὲ ἡμῶν, καὶ ὅλως
 ἐτέρου ὅντος ξεινού πάντοις ἔτερον ὃς αὐτοῦ, ἐλλαστοῦς
 15 ὅντος αὐτοῦ καὶ ἵσως συνθέτου· δύνειν καὶ τὸ ἐρημον
 καὶ μόνον ον μηδὲν ἔχειν ἀγαθόν, ἀλλ' εἶναι ἑτέρος καὶ
 μειόνως. ἐφετὸν μὲν οὖν δεῖ τὸ ἀγαθὸν εἶναι, οὐ μέντοι
 τῷ ἐφετὸν εἶναι ἀγαθὸν γίγνεσθαι, ἀλλὰ τῷ ἀγαθῷ,
 εἶναι ἐφετὸν γίγνεσθαι. Δῆλον τῷ μὲν ἐσχάτῳ ἐν τοῖς
 οὖσι τὸ πρὸ αὐτοῦ, καὶ ἀεὶ ή ἀνάβασις τὸ ὑπέρ ἐκαστον
 20 διδούσα ἀγαθὸν εἶναι τῷ υπὲρ μόνῳ, εἰ ή ἀνάβασις οὐκ
 ἐξστατο τοῦ ἀνάλογον, ἀλλὰ ἐπὶ μείζοι δεῖ προχωροῖ;
 τότε δὲ στήσεται. ἐπ' ἐσχάτῳ, μεθ' ὁ οὐδέν ἐστιν εἰς τὸ
 πᾶν λαβεῖν, καὶ τοῦτο τὸ πρώτον καὶ τὸ ὅντως καὶ τὸ
 μαλιστα κιρίως ἔσται, καὶ αἵτιον δὲ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις.
 25 τῇ μὲν γὰρ ὅλῃ τὸ εῖδος—εἰ γὰρ αἰσθησιν λάβοι,
 ἀπόσαστ’ ἄν—τῷ δὲ σώματι φυχή—καὶ γὰρ οὐδὲ ἄν

The phrase is again taken from the *Philebus* (33B7-8) but can only be applied to the Good by a very strained exegesis.

¹ Plotinus speaks, in the treatises in which he deals with matter, of matter desiring form or soul or good (I. 8. 14. 35-36; III. 6. 11. 32, 14. 9. 10). But in I. 8 and III. 6 he goes to considerable trouble to show that matter can never really

that he ought to posit intellect which was without pleasure as the good, since he did not see what there was in it to move [us to desire it]. But perhaps it was not for this reason, but because he thought it right that the good, since it had such a nature in itself should of necessity be delightful, and that the desired object must altogether hold delight for the one who is attaining or has attained it, so that who does not have delight does not have good, and so that, if delight belongs to the desirer, it does not belong to the First; so that neither does the good. And this is not unreasonable; for Plato himself [here] was not looking for the First Good, but for our good, and since this is altogether different, there is for him a Good other than it; for it is deficient, and perhaps composite; this is why he says that the "solitary and alone"¹ has nothing good in it, but is [the Good] in another, greater way. The Good, therefore, must be desirable, but must not become good by being desirable, but become desirable by being good. Is it then so that the good for the last and lowest among beings is what lies before it, and there is a continuous ascent which gives that above a thing to be good for what is below it, on the assumption that the ascent never gets beyond relative proportion, but goes on for ever to greater good? But it will come to a stop at the ultimate at that after which one cannot grasp anything higher, and this is the First and the really good and the Good in the strictest sense, and the cause also of the other goods. For form is the good for matter—for if it were conscious, it would welcome it²—and soul for body—for without it it could receive form or be changed by it from its own evil nature. Cp. ch. 28 lines 1-12 and n. 1, p. 173.

εἰη οὐδὲ ἀν σάξοιτο—ψυχὴ δὲ ἀρετὴ. ἥδη δὲ καὶ ἀνωτέρω νοῦς καὶ ἐπὶ τούτῳ ἦν δῆ φαμεν πρώτην φύσιν. καὶ δὴ καὶ τούτων ἔκαστον ποιει τι εἰς τα ἄν 30 ἀγαθά ἔστι, τὰ μὲν τάξιν καὶ κόσμον, τὰ δὲ ἥδη ζωήν, τα δέ φρονεῖν και ζήν εὖ, τῷ δὲ υἱῷ τὸ ὄγαθον, δ φαμεν καὶ εἰς τούτο ἥκειν, καὶ ὅτι ενέργεια εξ αὐτοῦ, καὶ ὅτι καὶ νῦν δίδωσί <τι>¹ φῶς λεγόμενον· δ δὴ τί ποτ᾽ ἔστιν, οὔτερον.

26 Καὶ δὴ τὸ πεφικος αἰσθάνεσθαι παρ' αὐτὸν, εἰ ἥκει αὐτῷ τὸ ὄγαθον, γινώσκειν καὶ λέγειν ἔχειν. τι οὖν, εἰ ἡπάτηται; δεῖ ἄρα τινὰ εἶναι ὄμοιώσιν, καθ' ἣν ἡπάτηται. εἰ δὲ τούτῳ, ἐκεῖνο ἀγαθὸν ἀν αὐτῷ εἴη [ἀφ' 5 οὐ ἡπάτηται]² ἐπεὶ καὶ ὅταν ἐκεῖνο ἥκη, ἀφίσταται ἀφ' οὐ ἡπάτηται καὶ η ἔφεσις δ' αὐτοῦ ἔκαστου καὶ η ἀδίστητηρει, διτι ἔστι τι ἀγαθὸν ἔκαστοι. τοῖς μὲν γὸρ ἀφύγοις παρ' ἄλλου τοῦ ὄγαθοῦ αὐτοῖς η δόσις, τῷ δὲ ψυχὴν ἔχοντι η ἔφεσις τὴν δίνειν ἐργάζεται, ὥσπερ καὶ 10 τοῖς ιεκροῖς γεγενημένοις σάμασι παρὰ τῶν ζώντων η ἐπιμέλεια καὶ η κῆδευσις, τοῖς δὲ ζῶσι παρ' αὐτῶν η πρόνοια. διτι δὲ στυχεῖ, πιστοῦται, διτι θέλησιν τη γίνηται καὶ ἀμετανόητον η καὶ πεπληρώσθαι αὐτῷ γίγνηται καὶ ἐπ' ἔκεών μένη καὶ μὴ ἄλλο ζητεῖ. διὸ καὶ 15 η ηδονὴ οὐκ αὐτωρκει ωρ γάρ αγαπή ταῦτον οὐ γάρ, δ

¹ Igal.

² del. Harder.

not exist or be preserved—and virtue for soul. And now, still higher, there is intellect, and above this what we call the first nature. And certainly each of these effects something for those of which they are the good, some arrangement and ordered beauty, some already life, and some thought and living well, but for Intellect the Good effects something, the Good which we maintain comes also to this, both because its active actuality comes from it and because now also it gives something called light. what this is, we shall see later.¹

26. And surely what has by itself the natural power to perceive, if the Good comes to it, has the power to know and to say that it has it. Well then, what if it is deceived? There must then be some likeness [to the Good] which accounts for the deception. But if there is this, that would be the good for it; since also, when that [Good] comes, it leaves that which was the origin of its deception. And each and every thing's desire and birth pangs of longing bear witness that there is some good for each. For to things without soul the gift of the good comes from another, but for that which has soul it is the desire which brings about the pursuit, just as when bodies have become corpses they are tended and prepared for burial by the living, but the living take thought for themselves. But the attainment is confirmed when a thing becomes better and has no regrets, and fulfilment comes to it and it remains with the Good and does not seek something else. This is why pleasure is not self sufficient, for one is not satisfied with the same thing: for what pleasure is satisfied with

¹ Ch. 32 ff.

τι ἡδονη¹ πάλιν, ταῦταν ἀλλογὰρ οὐκ τὸ ἐφ' φὶ ἡδεῖται
δεῖ δὴ τὸ ἀγαθόν, δὲ πρέπει τοι, εἴναι οὐ τὸ πάθος τὸ ἐπὶ²
τῷ τυχόντι· διὸν καὶ κενὸς μένει δὲ τοῦτο ἀγαθὸν
νομίζων, τὸ πάθος μόνον ἔχων, δὲ ἔσχει ἀντὶ τοῦ
ἀγαθοῦ. διὸ οὐκ ἀνάσχοιτό τις τοῦ πάθους, ἐφ' ωὐκ
ἔχων, οἶον ἐπὶ τῷ παιδὶ, στὶ πάρεστιν, ἡδεῖται οὐ
παρόντος· οὐδέ γε οἷμαι οἷς ἐν τῷ πληρούσθαι
σωματικῶς τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἡδεῖται ὡς ἐσθίοντα μὴ
ἐσθίοντα, ὡς ἀφροδισίοις χράμενον μὴ συνόντα ἢ
ἔβούλετο, ηδὲ οὐδὲ δρῶντα.

27. Ἀλλὰ τίνος γεννομένου ἐκείνῳ τὸ αὐτῷ
προσῆκον ἔχει; ηδὲ οὗτος τιὸς φήσομεν καὶ γὰρ τῇ ὑλῇ
εἶδος, καὶ ψυχῇ ηδὲ ἀρετῇ εἶδος. ἀλλὰ τὸ εἶδος τοῦτο ἀρά
γε τῷ οἰκείον εἴναι ἀγαθὸν ἐστιν ἐκείνῳ, καὶ ηδὲ τοῖς
5 πρὸς τὸ οἰκεῖον; ηδὲ οὐδὲ καὶ γὰρ τὸ δρμοῖον οἰκεῖον, καλὸν
ἔθελη αὐτὸν καὶ γαίρη τῷ ὄμοιώ, οὐπω τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἔχει.
ἀλλ' οὐκ οἰκείον φήσομεν ἀγαθὸν εἰπόντες εἴναι; ηδὲ
φατέοντοι οἱ οἰκεῖον τῷ κρείττονι κρίνειν δεῖ καὶ τῷ
βελτίωνι αὐτοῦ, πρὸς τὸ δυνάμεις ἐστίν. Νῦν γάρ δυνάμεις
10 πρὸς οὐδὲν ἐστιν, ἐνδεέες ἐστιν αὐτοῦ, οὐδὲ ἐνδεέες ἐστι

Beutler ἡδονὴ Enn.

This is the doctrine of *oīkeiaous*, fundamental in Stoic ethics. See SVF I 197 and III 178 ff. Plotinus' criticism of it develops Diotima's rejection of Aristophanes' account of

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again is not the same; for that which gives one pleasure is always something else. Certainly the good which one chooses must be something which is not the feeling one has when one attains it, that is why the one who takes this for good remains empty, because he only has the feeling which one might get from the good. This is the reason why one would not find acceptable the feeling produced by something one has not got, for instance, one would not delight in a boy because he was present when he was not present; nor do I think that those who find the good in bodily satisfaction would feel pleasure as if they were eating when they were not eating or as if they were enjoying sex when they were not with the one they wanted to be with, or in general when they were not active.

27. But what is it by the coming of which to each one it has what is appropriate to it? We shall maintain that it is a form; for form is the appropriate good for matter, and virtue is form for soul. But is this form good for that which has it by being akin to it, and is its desire directed to what is akin? No: for what is like it is akin, and if it wishes the like and delights in it, it does not yet have the good. But when we say that something is good, are we not going to maintain that it is akin? Rather we must maintain that one must judge the good by what is higher than what is akin and by what is better than the thing itself, to which it is potentially directed. For, since it is potentially directed to what it is, it is in need of it, and what it is in need of as something

the origin of love (the story of the bisected spherical proto-humans) in Plato *Symposium* 205D10–206A1

κρείττονος ἄντος, πάγιθον ἔστιν αὐτῷ ἐκένο τὸ δὲ ὅλη πάντων ἐνδεέστατον καὶ τὸ ἔσχατον εἶδος προσεχές αὐτῇ μετ' αὐτῇ γὰρ πρὸς τὸ ἄντον εἰ δὲ δὴ καὶ αὐτὸν αὐτῷ ἀγαθὸν ἔστι, πολὺ μᾶλλον ἀντὶ ἀγαθῶν αὐτῷ τὸ 15 τελειότης αὐτοῦ καὶ τὸ εἶδος, καὶ τὸ κρείττον αὐτοῖς, καὶ τῇ ἑαυτοῦ φύσει δὲ τοιούτον καὶ αὐτῷ. δῆτα καὶ αὐτὸν ἀγαθὸν ποιεῖ. ἀλλὰ διὰ τὸ αὐτῷ ἀγαθὸν ἔσται; ἀρ τοιοῦτον αὐτῷ; η οὐ· ἀλλ' ὅτι ἔστι τις ἀγαθὸν μοίρα. διὸ καὶ μᾶλλον οἰκείωσις πρὸς αὐτοὺς τοῖς εἰλικρινέσι 20 καὶ τοῖς μᾶλλον ἀγαθοῖς. ἄποτον δὴ τὸ ζητεῖν, διὰ τὸ ἀγαθὸν δὲ αὐτῷ ἀγαθὸν ἔστιν, ὥσπερ δέον πρὸς αὐτὸν ἔξιστασθαι τῆς αὐτοῖς φύσεως καὶ μὴ ἀγαθῶν ἑαυτὸν ὡς ἀγαθὸν. ἀλλὰ ἐπὶ τοῦ ἀπλοῦ τούτου σκεπτέον, εἰ, δῆπου μηδαμῶς ἐν. ἀλλο, τὸ δὲ ἀλλο, ἔστω τὸ οἰκείωσις πρὸς αὐτό, *(καὶ εἰ αὐτὸν)*¹ ἀγαθὸν ἔστιν ἑαυτῷ. νῦν δέ, εἰ 25 ταῦτα ὅρθως λέγεται, καὶ τὸ ἔπαντος πιστεῖ τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἐν φύσει τινὶ κείμενον καὶ οὐχ ἡ ἔφεσις ποιεῖ τὸ ἀγαθόν, ἀλλ' ἡ ἔφεσις, ὅτι ἀγαθόν, καὶ γίνεται τι τοῖς κτωμένοις καὶ τοῦ ἐπὶ τῷ κτήσει ηδύ. ἀλλὰ τὸ μὲν "εἰ μὴ ἔποιτο ἡδονή"² αἱρετέον τὸ ἀγαθόν" καὶ κατὸ ζητητέον.

28. Τὸ δὲ ἐκ τοῦ λόγου συμβαῖνοι νῦν ὀπτέον. εἰ γὰρ πανταχοῦ τὸ παραγωγμένον ὡς ἀγαθὸν εἴδος, καὶ τῇ ἐλῇ δὲ εἶδος ἐν τῷ ἀγαθῷ, πότερον ἡθελησεν ἢν ἡ ὅλη, εἴπερ ἦν αὐτῇ τὸ θέλειν, εἶδος μόνον γενέσθαι; ἀλλ' εἰ διανιστοῦσι, ἀπολέσθαι θελήσει τὸ δὲ ἀγαθὸν αὐτῷ πᾶν

¹ H. S.

² Steinhart. ἔποιετο ἡδονή Enn.

higher than it, that is its good. And matter is the neediest of all, and the last and lowest form is next to it, for it comes after it in the upward direction. But even if a thing is a good for itself, its perfection and its form and what is higher than it would much more be a good, both because it is such by its own nature and again because it makes the thing good. But why will anything be a good for itself? Is it because it is the most akin to itself? No, but because it is a part of good. This is why those who are pure and more good have a closer kinship with themselves. It is therefore absurd to enquire why a thing which is good is good for itself, as if it would have as regards itself to get out of its own nature and not be content with itself as good. But when something is simple we must consider this question, whether, where in no way there is in it one part and another, there is kinship to itself, and if it is a good for itself. But now, if these conclusions are correct, the movement upwards grasps the good present in a particular nature, and it is not the desire which makes the good but there is desire because there is a good, and something comes to those who possess it, and also pleasure in the possession. But we must also enquire into the saying "even if pleasure did not follow, the good should be chosen."¹

28. Now we must look at what follows from the discussion. For if everywhere what comes as a good is form, and one single form is the good for matter, would matter wish, if it had the power of wishing, to become only form? But if so, it will wish to perish,

A paraphrase of Aristotle *Nicomachean Ethics* K 3. 1174a6-8. Plotinus discusses this in ch. 29.

PLOTINUS: ENNEAD VI 7

ζητεῖ. ἀλλ’ ίσως οὐχ ὅλη εἶναι ζητήσει, ἀλλὰ εἶναι,
τούτο δ’ ἔχονσα ἀφεῖναι αὐτῆς θελήσει τὴν κάκην. ἀλλὰ
τὸ κακὸν πώς ἔφεσιν ἔξει τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ; η οὐδὲ τὴν ὅλην
ἐν ἐφέσει ἐπιθεμεθα, ἀλλ’ ὑπόθεσιν ἐποιείτο ὁ λόγος
10 αἰσθησιν δούς, εἴπερ ολόν τε ἣν δοῦναι ὅλην τηροῦσιν
ἀλλὰ του εἰδους ἐπελθόντος, ὡσπερ δινέρατος ἀγαθοῦ,
ἐν καλλίονι τάξει γεγονέναι εἰ μὲν οὖν το κακὸν ἡ ὅλη,
cōρηται· εἰ δ’ ἄλλο τι, οἷον κακία, εἰ αἴσθητην λάβοι τὸ
εἶναι αὐτῆς, δρ’ οὖν ἔτι τὸ οἰκεῖον πρὸς τὸ κρείττον τὸ
15 ἀγαθὸν ἔσται; η οὐχ ἡ κακία ἢν ἡ αἴρουμένη, ἀλλὰ τὸ
κακουμενον. εἰ δὲ ταῦτον τὸ εἶναι καὶ τὸ κυκύρ, οὐν
τούτο τὸ ἀγαθὸν αἱρήσεται; ἀλλ’ ἀρά γε, εἰ αἴσθησιν
αὐτοῦ λάβοι τὸ κακόν, ἀγαπήσει αὐτό; καὶ πῶς
20 ἀγαπητὸν τὸ μὴ ἀγαθὸν¹ ἔσται; οὐ γάρ δὴ τῷ οἰκείῳ
ἔθεμεθα τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ ταῦτα μὲν ταύτῃ ἀλλ’ εἰ εἶδος
τὸ ἀγαθὸν πανταχοῦ καὶ μᾶλλον ἐπαναβάμουσι μᾶλλον
εἶδος—μᾶλλον γάρ ψυχὴ εἶδος η σώματος εἶδος, καὶ
ψυχῆς τὸ μὲν μᾶλλον, τὸ δὲ ἐπιμᾶλλον, κα. νοῦς
ψυλῆς—τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἀπὸ προσχωροῦ τῇ τῆς ὅλης² ἐναντίω
25 κα. οἷον καθαρομένω καὶ ἀποτιθεμένω κατὰ δύναμι
μὲν ἔκαστω, τὸ δὲ μάλιστα πᾶν ὅ τι τὴν ἀποτιθεμένω
κα. δὴ καὶ η του ἀγαθοῦ φύσις πᾶσαν ὅλην φυγεῖν,

Igal ἀγαπητὸν Εὔη.

² A^{3mg} (= Ficinus): ψυχῆς Φην

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but everything seeks what will be good for itself. But perhaps it will not seek to be matter, but to be, and in possessing this to let its evil go. But how can evil have a desire of the good? But we did not assume that matter was desirous, but our argument framed a hypothesis by giving it perception—if it was possible to give it and still keep it as matter; but we assumed that when form came upon it, like a good dream, it came to be in a fairer order. If then matter is [absolute] evil, enough has been said¹; but if it is something else, badness for instance, if its essential being acquired perception, will what is akin to it on the higher side still be the good? Now it was not [on this supposition] badness which chose, but what had become bad. But if its being and evil were one and the same, how can this choose the good? Well then, if evil acquired a perception of itself, would it be satisfied with itself? And how could what is not good be satisfactory? For we certainly did not identify the good with the kindred. And so much for that. But if form is everywhere the good, and the higher the ascent goes the more there is form—for soul is more form than the form of body, and one part of soul more form, and another very much more, and Intellect more than soul—the Good would come to that which was opposed to matter, and, we may say, which was purified from it and had put it away, according to the capacity of each, and most to that which put away everything belonging to matter. And certainly the nature of the Good, which has escaped from all matter, or rather never in any way

¹ This is Plotinus' own view. this passage is his amplification and correction of a possibly misleading general remark in ch 25 lines 24-5 see n. 2 there, p 165

μᾶλλον δὲ οὐδαμῆ οὐδαμῶς πλησίον γνωμένη, ἀναπεφευγία ἀν εἴη εἰς τὴν ἀνείδεο φύσιν, ἀφ' οὗ τὸ πρώτον εἶδος. ἀλλὰ περὶ τούτου μάκρερον.

29. 'Αλλ' εἰ μὴ ἔποιτο ήδονὴ τῷ ἀγαθῷ, γάνωιτο δὲ πρὸ τῆς ήδονῆς τι, δι' ὃ καὶ η̄ ήδονή, διὰ τί οὐκ ἀσπαστόν; η̄ εἰπόντες ἀσπαστόν ήδονὴν ηδη εἰπομεῖται. ἀλλ' εἰ ὑπάρχει μέν, ὑπάρχαντος δὲ δυνατὸν μὴ μάσπαστόν εἶναι, ἀλλ' εἰ τοῦτο, παρόντος τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ αἰσθησιν ἔχον τὸ ἔχον οὐ γνώσεται, διτι. η̄ τέ καλέει καὶ γιγνώσκειν καὶ μὴ κινεῖσθαι ἄλλως μετά τὸ αὐτὸ ἔχειν, δι μᾶλλον ἀν τῷ σωφρονεστέρῳ υπάρχοι καὶ μᾶλλον τῷ μὴ ἐνθεεῖ. διό οὐδὲ τῷ πρώτῳ, οὐ μόνον δι τὸ ἀπλοῦν, ἀλλ' δι τὴν κτήσιν δειθέντος ηδεῖα. ἀλλὰ καὶ τοιτὶ καταφανές ἔσται τὰ ἄλλα ὅσα λοιπά προανακαθηραμένοι¹ καὶ ἐκεῖνον τὸν ἀντίτυπον λόγον ἀπωσαμένοις ἔντι δὲ οὐδεὶς <ιοῦ>² δι απορεῖ, τί ἂν καρπώσαιτο δι τοῦτο η̄ οὐδὲν ἔχων εἰς ἀγαθοῦ μοῖραν, οὐδὲν πληγτόμενος, ὅταν ταῦτα ἀκούῃ, τῷ μὴ σύνεσιν αὐτῶν 15 ἴσχειν, η̄ διομα ἀκούων η̄ ἄλλο τι ἔκαστον αντῶν υπολαμβάνων η̄ αἰσθητόν τι ζητῶν καὶ τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἐν χρήμασιν η̄ τισι τοιούτοις τιθέμενος. πρὸς δὲ λεκτέον,

¹ Harder προσ. Enn.

² Theiler

at all come near it, will have escaped up into the formless nature from which the first form comes. But we shall speak of this later.¹

29. But if pleasure does not follow upon the Good, but there comes to be something before pleasure through which there is also pleasure, why is it not to be welcomed? Now in saying 'to be welcomed' we have already said "pleasure". But suppose that it exists but, though it exists, there is a possibility of its not being welcome. But if this is so, when the Good is present, what has it, though it has a perception of it, will not know it is there. Or what is to prevent it from knowing and not being moved in any other way going beyond the actual possession? This would be more likely to happen to a more self-controlled person, and more likely if he was without needs. This is why the First has no pleasure, not only because it is simple but because it is the acquisition of something needed which is pleasant. But this will be luminously clear when we have first cleared up all the remaining difficulties and repelled that opposing argument. This argument is that of someone² who has a difficulty about what a man with intelligence would get out of it in the way of good, being in no way disconcerted when he hears these arguments of ours because he does not know what they mean: he either hears only the words or understands each thing [spoken of] differently or is looking for something perceptible [by the senses] and locating the Good in property or something of the sort. One must

¹ In chs. 32 and 33

² This is the objector who states his position forcibly in ch. 24: see n. 1, p. 162.

ώς, δταν πάντα ἀτιμάζῃ, όμολογει τίθεσθαι τι παρ'
αντφ ἀγαθόν, ἀπορῶν δ' ὅπῃ, τῇ ἐννοίᾳ τῇ παρ' αὐτῷ
20 ταυτα εφαρμοττει. οὐ γάρ ἔστι λέγειν "μή τυῦτο"
πάντη ἀπειρον καὶ ἀκεννόητον ὄντα τούτου. τάχα δὲ καὶ
τὸ ὑπὲρ νοῦν ἀπομαντεύεται. ἔπειτα δέ, εἰ τῷ ἀγαθῷ ἡ
τῷ ἔγγυς τούτου προσβάλλων ἀγνοεῖ, ἐκ τῶν
ἀντικειμένων εἰς ἔννοιαν ἵτω. η οὐδὲ κακὸν τὴν ἄνοιαν
25 θησσαται; καίτοι πᾶς οἱρέτης νοεῖν καὶ νοῶν σεμνύνεται..
μαρτυροῦσι δὲ καὶ αἱ πισθῆσεις εἰδήσεις εἶναι θέλουσα..
εἰ δὴ νοῦς τίμων καὶ καλὸν καὶ νοῦς ὁ πρώτος μάλιστα,
τι ἀν φαντασθεῖτ τις, εἰ τις δύναται, τὸν τούτου
γεννητὴν καὶ πατέρα; τὸ δὲ εἶναι καὶ τὸ ζῆν ἀτιμάζων
30 ἀντιμαρτυρεῖ ἔαυτῷ καὶ τοῖς ἔαυτοῖ πάθεσι πᾶσιν. εἰ δέ
τις δυσχεραίνει τὸ ζῆν, φθάνατος μέρικται, τὸ τοιούτο
δυσχεραίνει, οὐ τὸ ἀληθῶς ζῆν

30. Ἀλλὰ εἰ δεῖ τῷ ἀγαθῷ τὴν ἡδονὴν μεμιχθει. καὶ
μή τέλεον ἔστι τὸ ζῆν, εἴ τις τα θεῖα θεῷτο καὶ μάλιστα
τὴν τούτων ἀρχῆν, νῦν ἰδεῖν ἐφαπτυμένους τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ
πάντως προσηκε.. τὸ μὲν οὖν οἰεσθαι τὸ αγαθὸν ἐκ τε
5 τοῦ νοῦ ὡς ὑποκειμένου ἐκ τοῦ πάθους τῆς ψυχῆς ὁ
γινεται ἐκ τοῦ φρονεῖν, οὐ τὸ τέλος οὐδὲ αὐτὸ τὸ ἀγαθον
το συναμφότερόν ἔστι τιθέντος, ἀλλὰ νῦν ἀν εἴη τὸ
ἀγαθόν, ημεῖς δὲ χαρούτες τῷ τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἔχειν. καὶ εἴη

say to him that when he despises these things he admits that he does posit some good for himself, but, since he finds it difficult to see how [the Good is good], he fits these things to his own idea of it. For it is not possible to say "not this" if one has no experience or conception of "this". But perhaps also he has a prophetic intuition of what is above Intellect. But then, if when he applies his mind to the Good or that which is near it he does not recognise them, let him come to some idea of them from the things opposed to them. Or will he not even regard unintelligence as evil? Yet everyone prefers to be intelligent and is proud of himself when he uses his intelligence. And our sense-perceptions bear witness to this when they want to be knowings. But if intellect is honourable and beautiful, and above all the first Intellect, as what would one image, if one could, this Intellect's generator and father? But if [our opponent] despises existence and life, he brings evidence against himself and all his own experiences. But if anyone is dissatisfied with life with which death is mixed, it is this kind of life he is dissatisfied with, not true life.

30. But whether pleasure must be mixed with the good and life is not perfect, if someone contemplates the divine things and above all their principle, is a question which it is in every way appropriate to keep in sight now that we are getting into touch with the Good. Well then, to think that the good consists of Intellect as underlying reality and of the experience of the soul which comes from thinking does not belong to one who posits the composite of both as the goal or the Good itself, but Intellect would be the Good, and ourselves in the enjoyment of possessing

PLOTINUS: ENNEAD VI. 7.

ἀν αὐτη τις δοξα περὶ ἀγαθοῦ ἐτέρα δὲ εἴη πᾶν παρὰ
 10 ταῦτη, η μέξασα τῷ ωτῷ τὴν ἡδονὴν ὡς ἐν τι εἴξ ἀμφοῦ
 ὑπουργίαν τοῦτο τίθεται εἶναι. ἵν’ ἡμεῖς τὸν τουλάντοι
 νοῦν κτησάμενοι ἔκαὶ ιδόντες τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἔχωμεν τὸ γάρ
 ἕρημον καὶ μόνον σύντετον γενέσθαι οὕτω αἱρετὸι
 εἴναι δυνατὸν ὡς ἀγαθόν πώς ἀν οὖν μιχθείη τοῦτος ἡδονῆ
 15 εἰς μίαν συντέλειον φύσεως; διτὶ μὲν οὖν τὴν πάματος
 ἡδονῆς οὐκ ἄν τις οἰηθείη νέῳ δυνατην εἶναι μέγυνοθαι,
 παντὶ δήποτος δῆλον ἀλλ’ οὐδὲ ὅσαι χαραὶ φυχῆς ἢ
 ἄλογοι γένονται. ἀλλ’ ἐπειδὴ πάσῃ ἐνεργείᾳ καὶ
 διαβέσει δὲ καὶ ζωῇ ἐπεισθαι δεῖ καὶ συνέναι οὖν τι¹
 20 ἐπιθέον, καθὼ τῷ μέν ἔστι κατὰ φύσιν ίούση τὸ
 ἐμποδίζον καὶ τι τοῦ ἐνοπτοῦ παρομειωγμένον, δούλη
 ἐφ τὴν ζωὴν ἔστηται εἶναι, τῷ δὲ καθαρὸν καὶ
 εἰλικρινὲς τὸ ἐνέργημα καὶ η ζωὴ ἐν διαβέσει
 φαιδρῷ, τὴν τοιαύτην τοῦ νοῦ κατάστασιν ἀσμασιστή²
 25 καὶ αἱρετατάτην εἶναι τιθέμενοι ἡδονῆ μεμιχθαι
 λέγουσιν ἀπορίᾳ οἰκείας προστηρούσις, οὐα ποιούσι καὶ
 τὰ ἄλλα ὄντα παρ’ ἣμὲν ἀγαπάμενα μεταφέροντες
 τὸ “μεθυσθεῖς ἐπὶ τοῦ νέκταρος” καὶ “ἐπὶ δαίτα καὶ
 ἐστίασιν” καὶ τὸ “μείδησος δὲ πατήρ” οἱ ποιηται καὶ

Sleeman τὸ Εν.

¹ Again *Philebus* 63D7-8, but here in a more appropriate context (see ch. 25, n. 1, p. 164). In this chapter Plotinus is concerned to explain and justify Plato's doctrine in the *Philebus* that the good life must be a mixture of pleasure and intelligence, taking account also of Aristotle's discussion of pleasure in *Nicomachean Ethics* K 1.5 112a 1176a

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the Good. And this would be one opinion about good. But there would be another contrary to this, which mixes pleasure with intellect as one thing made from both and posits this as the underlying reality, so that we, by possessing, or even seeing, this kind of intellect may possess the Good, for what is "isolated and single"¹ could not come to be or to be chosen as the Good. How then could intellect be mixed with pleasure into one composite perfection of nature? Well, it is, I suppose, clear to everyone that nobody would think that bodily pleasure could possibly be mixed with intellect but neither could all the irrational joys of the soul which may occur. But, since a sort of something extra and external must follow upon and accompany every activity and disposition and life, in so far as to one of them going its natural way there will be a hindrance and something of its opposite mixed into it, which does not allow the life to be independent, but another will have its activity "pure and unmixed"² and its life will be a state of luminous clarity, the philosophers,³ assuming that such a state of intellect is most pleasing and acceptable, say that it is mixed with pleasure because they cannot find an appropriate way of speaking about it; this is what the other words which we are fond of do metaphorically, like "drunk with the nectar"⁴ and "to feast and entertainment"⁵ and what the poets say, "the father smiled",⁶ and thousands and

² *Philebus* 52D6-7

³ Plato is meant: see previous note.

⁴ Plato *Symposium* 203B5 (Poros in the garden of Zeus)

⁵ Plato *Phaedrus* 247A8 (with ἔστασις for θόλη)

⁶ A formula-phrase from Homer (not very appropriate in this context): *Iliad* 5.426; 15.47

30 ἄλλα τοιαίτα μαρία. ἔστι γάρ καὶ τὸ ἀνημενονόν ὅντως
ἔκει καὶ τὸ ἀγαπητότατον καὶ τὸ ποθεινότατον, οὐ
γνωμενον οὐδὲ ἐν κινήσει, αὕτων δὲ ἡ ἐπιχρῶσαν αὐτὰ
καὶ ἐπιλάρψαν καὶ φαιδριναν. διὸ καὶ ἀλήθειαν τῷ
μηγματι προστίθησι καὶ τὸ μετρήσαν πρὸ αὐτοῦ ποιεῖ
καὶ ἡ συμμετρία καὶ τὸ καλλος ἐπὶ τῷ μήγματι ἔκειθέν
35 φρουν εἰς τὸ καλὸν ἐλήλυθεν. ὥστε κατὰ τούτο ἀνήμεις
καὶ ἐν τούτῳ μοίρας· τὸ δὲ ὅντως ὄρεκτὸν ἡμιν ἄλλας
μὲν ἡμεῖς αὐτοῖς εἰς τὸ βέλτιστον ἔαντων ἀνάγοντες
ἔαντούς, τούτο δὴ τὸ σύμμετρον καὶ καλὸν καὶ εἶδος
ἀσύνθετον· καὶ ζωὴν ἐναργῆ καὶ νοερὰν καὶ καλήν.

31. Ἀλλ' ἐπεὶ ἐκαλλίνθη τὰ πάντα ἐκείνων τῷ πρὸ⁵
τούτων καὶ φῶς ἔσχε, νοῦς μὲν τὸ τῆς ἐνεργειας τὰς
νοερᾶς φέγγος, ὃ την φύσιν ἔξελαμψε, φυχὴ δὲ δύναμιν
ἔσχεν εἰς τὸ ζῆν ζωῆς πλείονος εἰς αὐτὴν ἐλθούσης
δη τῇ μὲν οὖν ἔκει, καὶ ἔμεινεν ἀγαπήσας οὐ περὶ ἐκείνων
εἰναι ἐπιστραφέσα δὲ καὶ φυχὴ ἡ δυνηθεῖσα, ὡς ἔγνω
καὶ εἴδεν, ησθη τε τῇ θέᾳ καὶ δοσον οἷα τε ἦν ιδεῖν
ἐξεπλάγη, εἰδε δὲ οἷον πληρεῖσα καὶ ἀντὶ ἔχοντά τι
αὐτοῦ συνήσθετο καὶ διατεθεῖσα ἐγένετο ἐν πόθῳ,
10 ὥσπερ οἱ ἐν τῷ εἰδώλῳ τοῦ ἑρασμίου κυνούμενοι εἰς τὸ
αὐτὸν ιδεῖν ἐθέλειν τὸ ἑρώμενον. ὥσπερ δὲ ἐνταῦθα
σχηματίζονται εἰς ὁμοιότητα τῷ ἑραστῷ οἵ ἄντες,
καὶ τὰ σώματα εἰπρεπέπτερα καὶ τὰς ψυχὰς ἀγοντες εἰς
ὅμοιότητα, ὡς μὴ λείπεσθαι κατὰ δύναμιν θέλειν τῇ

¹ Η Σ·: ανθετον Επν.

¹ In *Philebus* 61B–65A.

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thousands of others. For there in the realm of Intellect is true delight and the greatest satisfaction, the most loved and longed for, which is not in process of becoming nor in movement, but its cause is what colours and shines upon and glorifies the intelligibles. This is why Plato adds truth to the mixture, and puts what measures it before it, and says that from there the good proportion and beauty in the mixture come to the beautiful.¹ So we should be according to this and have our parts in it; but in another way what is really worth aspiring to for us is our selves, bringing themselves back for them selves to the best of themselves; this is the well-proportioned and beautiful and the form which is not part of the composite and the clear, intelligent, beautiful life.

31. But since all things were made beautiful by that which was before them and held its light, Intellect held the resplendence of its intelligent activity, with which it illuminated its nature, and soul held power to live, since a greater life came to it. So Intellect was raised to that height and stayed there, happy in being around that Good, but the soul also which was able turned to it and, when it knew and saw, rejoiced in the vision and, in so far as it was able to see, was utterly amazed. It saw, as if in utter amazement, and, since it held something of it in itself, it had an intimate awareness of it and came into a state of longing, like those who are moved by an image of the loved one to wish to see that same beloved. And just as here below those who are in love shape themselves to the likeness of the beloved, and make their bodies handsomer and bring their souls into likeness, since as far as they can they do

PLOTINUS ENNEAD VI. 7.

15 τοῦ ἐρωμένου σωφροσύνη τε καὶ ἀρετῆ τῇ ἀλλῃ—ή
ἀπόβλητοι ἀν εἰεν τοῖς ἐρωμένοις τοῖς τοιούτοις—καὶ
οὐτοί εἰσιν οἱ συνένα, δινάμενοι, τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον καὶ
ψυχὴ ἐρῆ μὲν ἐκείνου ὃν' αὐτὸς ἐξ ἀρχῆς εἰς τὸ ἐρῶν
κυνηθείσα, καὶ η πρόχειρον ἔχοντα τὸν ἐρωτα ὑπό-
20 μνησμον οὐ περιμένει ἐκ τῶν καλῶν τῶν τῆδε, ἔχοντα δὲ
τὸν ἐρωτα, καὶ ἀν ἀγνοῆ ὅτι ἔχει, ζητεῖ ἀει καὶ πρὸς
ἐκείνο φέρεσθαι θέλουσα ὑπεροφίαν τῶν τῆδε ἔχει, καὶ
ἰδούσα τὰ ἐν τῷ παντὶ καλὰ ὑποφίαν ἔχει πρὸς
αὐτά, ὅτι ἐν σαρξὶ καὶ σώμασιν ὁρᾷ αὐτὰ ὄντα καὶ
μιανόμενα τῇ παρούσῃ οἰκήσει καὶ τοῖς μεγέθεοι
25 διειλημμένα καὶ οὐκ αὐτὰ τὰ καλὰ ὄντα· μὴ γάρ ἂ
τολμήσαι ἐκεῖνα οὐλά ἔστιν εἰς βόρβορον σωμάτων
ἔμβηναι καὶ ρυπάνα, ἔντα καὶ ἀφανίσαι ὅταν δὲ καὶ
παραρρέοντα ἵδη, ἥδη παντελῶς γιγνώσκει, ὅτι ἀλλοθε
ἔχει, οὐ διν αὐτοῖς ἐπιθένον. εἰτ' ἐκε, φέρεται δεινὴ
30 ἀπευρεῖν οὐπερ ἐρῆ οὐπα, καὶ οὐκ ἀν τρὶν ἐλεῦ
ἀποστάσα, εἰ μὴ πού τις αὐτῆς καὶ τὸν ἐρωτα ἔξελοι
ἔνθα δὴ εἴδε μὲν καλὰ πάντα καὶ ἀληθῆ ὄντα, καὶ
ἐπερρώσθη πλέον τῆς τοῦ ὄντος ζωῆς πληρωθεῖσα, καὶ
ὄντως οὐ καὶ αὐτῇ γενομένη καὶ σύνεσιν ὄντως λαβοῦσα
ἔγγονα σύνου αἰσθάνεται οὐ πάλαι ζητεῖ.

¹ Plotinus is thinking of the philosophic lovers in *Phaedrus* 250–257. But here, as in I 6. 9, it is himself, not as in Plato the beloved, whom the lover shapes to the divine likeness; this of course suits the present context considerably better.

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not want to fall short of the integrity and all the other excellence of the loved one—if they did they would be rejected by loved ones like these—and these are the lovers who are able to have intercourse¹; in this way the soul also loves that Good, moved by it to love from the beginning. And the soul which has its love ready to hand does not wait for a reminder from the beauties here, but because it has its love, even if it does not know that it has it,² it is always searching and in its wish to be borne away to that Good has a contempt for the things here, and when it sees the beauties of this world it distrusts them, because it sees that they are in bodies of flesh and polluted by their present dwelling and disintegrated by magnitudes and are not the true beautiful things themselves, for those, being as they are, would never bring themselves to enter the mud of bodies and dirty themselves and disappear. But when it sees the beauties here flowing past it, it already knows completely that they have the light which plays on them from elsewhere. And then it is borne away there, skilled in finding what it loves, and not leaving off till it catches it, unless someone were to take even its love away. There certainly it sees that all things are beautiful and true and gains greater strength, since it is filled with the life of real being, and has become truly real itself also, and has true awareness, and it perceives that it is near to what it has long been seeking.

² Here, as in V. 5. 12, the unperceived presence and unconscious love of the Good are prior to the conscious recollection of the beauty of the World of Forms aroused by the beauties here.

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32. Ποῦ οὖν ὁ ποιήσας τὸ τοσούτον κάλλος καὶ τὴν τοσαντηρύ ζωὴν καὶ γεννήσας οὐσίαν, ὅρφς τὸ ἐπ’ αὐτοῖς μπανι πυεκάλοις οὖσιν εἶδεσι κάλλος. καλὸς μὲν ἀδί⁵ μένειν ἀλλ’ ἐν καλῷ ὄντα δεῖ βλέπειν, ὅθεν ταῦτα καὶ 5 ὅθεν καλά. δεῖ δ’ αὐτὸς εἶναι τούτων μηδὲ ἐν τὶ γὰρ αὐτῶν ἔσται μέρος τε ἔσται. οὐ τούτου οὐδὲ τοιαύτη μορφὴ οὐδέ τις δύναμις οὐδὲ αὖτις πάσαι αἱ γεγενημέναι καὶ οὖσαι ἐνταῦθα, ἀλλα δεῖ ὑπὲρ πάσας εἶναι δυνάμεις καὶ ὑπὲρ πάσας μορφάς. ἀρχὴ δὲ τὸ ἀνεῖδεον, οὐ τὸ 10 μορφῆς δεόμενον, ἀλλ’ ἀφ’ οὗ πᾶσαι μορφὴ νοερά τὸ γὰρ γενόμενον, εἴπερ ἐγώνετο, ἔδει γενέσθαι τι καὶ μορφὴν ὡσιαν ἔσχεν· δὲ μηδεὶς εποιησε, <τι>¹ τις ἀν¹⁵ ποιήσειεν; οὐδὲν οὖν τοῦτο τῶν ὄντων καὶ πάντα οὐδὲν μέν, ὅτι ὑστερά τὰ ὄντα, πάντα δέ, ὅτι ἐξ αὐτοῦ. πάντα 15 δὲ παιεῖν δυνάμενον τι ἀν μέγεθος ἔχοι; η ἀπειρος ἀν εἴη, ἀλλ’ εἰ ἀπειρος, μέγεθος ἀν ἔχοι οὐδέν. καὶ γὰρ μέγεθος ἐν τοῖς ὑστάτοις· καὶ δεῖ, εἰ καὶ τοῦτο ποιήσει, αὐτὸς μὴ ἔχειν. τό τε τῆς οὐσίας μέγα οὐ ποσόν ἔχοι δὲν καὶ ἄλλο τι μετ’ αὐτὸν τὸ μέγεθος. τὸ δὲ μέγα αὐτοῦ 20 τὸ μηδὲν αὐτοῦ εἶναι δυνατώτερον παρισοῦσθαι τε μηδὲν δύνασθαι· τίνι γὰρ τῶν αὐτοῖς εἰς ίσον ἀν τι ἐλθοι μηδὲν ταῦτὸν ἔχον; τό τε εἰς δεῖ καὶ εἰς πάντα οὐ μέτρον

¹ <τι> τὸ coniecumus τὸ Καν

Plotinus normally uses ἔκει (there) for the World of Forms and ἐνταῦθα (here) for the material world. But in this

32 Where then is he who made the beauty which is so great and the life which is so great, he who is the generator of substance? You see the beauty which rests upon the very Forms, all of them richly varied. It is beautiful to abide here, but when one is in beauty one must look to see whence these Forms come and whence they derive their beauty. But this itself must not be any one of them, for then it will be one of them and will be a part. Nor, then, can it be a shape of any kind or an individual power, nor again all those which have come to be and exist here above,¹ but it must be above all powers and above all shapes. The principle is the formless, not that which needs form, but that from which every intelligent form comes. For what came to be, if it did come to be, came to be something and had its own particular shape; but who could have made what no one made anything? Therefore it is none of these things and all of them: none of them because the real beings are later, but all of them because they come from it. But what size could that have which has the power to make all? Now he would be unbounded, but if unbounded he would have no size. For there is size in the last and lowest things, and, even if he makes size, he himself must not have it. And the greatness of substance is not quantitative; but something else posterior to him might also have size. But his greatness is that nothing can be more powerful than him and nothing can be compared with him; for to what that belongs to him could anything come to equality which has nothing the same? And being for ever and

passage he is speaking as one who is already in the World of Forms and seeking to go beyond it.

αἰτῷ διδωσιν οὐδὸν αὐτὸν ἀμετρίαν· πῶς γάρ ἂν τὰ ἄλλα μετρήσειεν, οὐ τούντιν αὐτὸν οὐδὲ σχῆμα. καὶ μήν, ὅτου ἂν ποθεινόν σύντος μήτε σχῆμα μήτε μορφὴν ἔχεις λαβεῖν, ποθεινάταν καὶ ἐρασμάταν ἂν εἴη, καὶ ὁ ἔρως ἂν ἀμετρος εἴη. οὐ γάρ ὥρισται ἐνταῦθα ὁ ἔρως, ὅτι μηδὲ τὸ ἔρωμενον, αλλ᾽ ἀπειρος ἂν εἴη ὁ τούτου ἔρως, ὡστε καὶ τὸ κάλλος αὐτοῦ ἄλλον τρόπον καὶ κάλλος ὑπὲρ 30 καλλιού. οὐδὲν γάρ ὃν τί κάλλος; ἐράσμιον δὲ ὃν τὸ γεννών ἂν εἴη τὸ καλλού. δύναμις οὖν παντὸς καλοῦ ἄνθος ἔστι, κάλλος καλλοποιόν. καὶ γάρ γεννᾷ αὐτὸν καὶ καλλιού ποιεῖ τῇ παρ' αὐτοῦ περιουσίᾳ τοῖς καλλούς, ὡστε ἀρχὴν καλλούς καὶ πέρας καλλούς. οὖν δὲ 35 καλλούς ἀρχὴ ἐκεῖνο μὲν καλὸν τοιεῖ οὐδὲ ἀρχή, καὶ καλὸν τοιεῖ οὐκέ τινα μορφὴν ἄλλα καὶ αὐτὸν τὸ γενομένον ἀμορφεῖν, ἄλλον δὲ τρύπου ἐν μορφῇ. η γάρ λεγομένη αὐτὸν τούτο μόνον μορφὴ ἐν ἄλλῳ, ἐφ' ἔαυτής δὲ οὐδαμορφον. τὸ οὖν μετέχον καλλούς μεμόρφωται, οὐ τὸ καλλού.

33. Διὸ καὶ δταν καλλος λέγηται, φευκτεον μάλλον ἀπὸ μορφῆς τοιαιάτης. ἀλλ' οὐ πρὸ οἰμιάτων ποιητέον, ἵνα μὴ ἐκπέσῃς τοῦ καλοῦ εἰς τὸ ἀμυνδρᾶ μετοχῆ καλὸν λεγόμενον. τὸ δὲ ἀμορφον εἶδος καλόν, εἴπερ εἶδος ἔστι, δ καὶ δσφ ἄν ἀποσυλήσας εἴης πασαν μορφήν, πᾶν καὶ την ἐν λόγῳ, γε διαφέρειν ἄλλο ἄλλου λέγομεν, ὡς δικαιοσύνην καὶ σωφροσύνην ἄλλήλαι ἔτερα, καίτοι

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for all things gives him no measure—nor on the other hand measurelessness: for [if he was measureless] how could he measure the others? Nor again ~~as~~ he form either. Truly, when you cannot grasp the form or shape of what is longed for, it would be most longed for and most lovable, and love for it would be unmeasurable. For love is not limited here, because ~~as~~ either is the beloved, but the love of this would be unbounded, so his beauty is of another kind and beauty above beauty. For if it is nothing, what beauty can it be? But if it is lovable, it would be the generator of beauty. Therefore the productive power of all is the flower of beauty, a beauty which makes beauty. For it generates beauty and makes it more beautiful by the excess of beauty which comes from it, so that it is the principle of beauty and the term of beauty. But since it is the principle of beauty it makes that beautiful of which it is the principle, and makes it beautiful not in shape; but it makes the very beauty which comes to be from it to be shapeless, but in shape in another way, for what is called this very thing [~~, shape.~~] is shape in another, but by itself shapeless. Therefore that which participates in beauty is shaped, not the beauty.

33. Therefore, even when it is called beauty, one must even more avoid shape of this kind, but it must not be set before the eyes, that you may not fall out of beauty ~~as~~ what is called beauty by obscure participation. But the shapeless form is beautiful, since it is form and is so in proportion to the length you go in stripping all shape from it, the shape in reasoning, for instance, by which we say that one form differs from another, as we say that righteousness and integrity are different from each other,

κπλὴ ὅντα ἐπειδὴ ὁ νοῦς ἴδιόν τι νοεῖ, ἡλάττωται, καν
δμοῦ πάντα λάβῃ ὅσα ἐν τῷ νοητῷ καν ἔκαστα, μίαν
10 μορφὴν νοητὴν ἔχει ὅμου δέ παντα οἰον ποικιλῆ τινα,
ἐπὶ ἐν δεήσει, οἷον δεῖ θεάσασθαι ὃν ὑπὲρ ἐκεῖνο τὸ
πάγκαλον καὶ ποικίλον καὶ οὐ ποικίλον, οὐ ὀρέγεται μὲν
ψυχὴ οὐ λέγουσα διὰ τί τοιούτοι ποθεῖ, οὐ δε λόγος
λέγει, ὅτι τοῦτο τὸ ὄντως, εἴπερ ἐν τῷ πάντῃ ἀνειδέω ἡ
τοῦ ἀρίστον φύσις καὶ ἡ τοῦ ἐμπαθετάτου διὰ τοῦτο
15 εἰς εἶδος ἀνάγων τῇ ψυχῇ δεικνύεται, ἐπὶ τούτῳ ἀλλο τὸ
μορφῶσαν ζητεῖ. λέγει δὴ ὁ λόγος, ὅτι τὸ μορφὴν ἔχον
κπλὴ μορφὴ καὶ τὸ εἶδος μεμετρημένον πάν, τοῦτο δὲ
οὐ πάν οὐδὲ αὐταρκες οὐδὲ παρ' αὐτοῦ καλόν, ἀλλὰ καὶ
τοῦτο μέμεκται δεῖ τούτῳ ταῦτα μὲν καλά, τὸ δὲ ὄντως
20 ἡ τὸ ὑπέρκαλον μὴ μεμετρήσθαι εἰ δὲ τοῦτο, μὴ
μεμορφῶσθαι μηδὲ εἶδος εἶνα. ἀνειδέον ἄρα τὸ πρώτως
καὶ πρώτον καὶ ἡ καλλονὴ ἐκεῖνο ἡ τοῖς ἀγαθοῖ φύσις.
μαρτυρεῖ δὲ καὶ τὸ τῶν ἐραστῶν πάθος, ὡς, ἔως ἐστὶν εν
ἔναιντι τῷ τύπῳ¹ αἰσθητὸν ἔχοντι οὐπτι ἐρᾶ. ὅταν δ'
25 ἀτ' ἐκείνοι αὐτὸς ἐν αὐτῷ οὐκ αἰσθητὸν γεννήσῃ τύπον
ἐν ἀμερεῖ ψυχῇ, -ότε ἔρως φύεται. βλέπειν δὲ ζητεῖ τὸ
ἐριθμενον, ὥν ἐκεῖνο ἐπάρδοι μαρανόμενον. εἰ δὲ

Sleeman: τὸν wBxUC: τὸ Q

although they are beautiful When the intellect thinks one particular thing, it is diminished, as it is also even if it takes together all things that are in the intelligible realm, if it thinks an individual, it has one intelligible shape; if it thinks all together it has a kind of variegated shape still in need [and trying to discover] how it should contemplate that which is above that which is all-beautiful and variegated and not variegated; that which the soul desires without saying why it longs for something like this, but our reasoning says that this is the real thing, since the nature of the best and the nature of the most lovable is in the altogether formless. Therefore, whatever you bring into form and show to the soul, it seeks something else over it which gave it shape. Our reasoning insists that what has shape, and shape, and form, all this, is measured and limited, that is, it is not all or self-sufficient or beautiful of itself, but this too is mixed. These beautiful things, then, must be measured and limited, but not the really beautiful or rather the super-beautiful, but if this is so, it must not be shaped or be a form. The primarily beautiful, then, and the first is without form, and beauty is that, the nature of the Good The experience of lovers bears witness to this, that, as long as it is in that which has the impression perceived by the senses, the lover is not yet in love; but when from that he himself generates in himself an impression not perceptible by the senses in his partless soul, then love springs up. But he seeks to see the beloved that he may water him when he is withering.¹ But if he should

¹ An allusion to *Phaedrus* 251E1 4.

σύνεσιν λάβοι, ὡς δεῖ μεταβαίνειν ἐπὶ τὸ ἀμορφότερον,
ἐκείνου ἀν ὄρέγοιτο· καὶ γὰρ οὐ ἔξ αὐχῆς ἐπαθεῖ, ἐκ
τοῦ πέλλαις ἀμορφοῦ ἔρως φωτὸς μεγάλου τὸ γὰρ ἔχον τοῦ
ἀμορφου μορφή τούτο γοῦν γεννᾷ τὴν μορφήν, οὐχ ἡ
μορφὴ τοῦτο, καὶ γεννᾷ, ὅταν ὑλη προσέλθῃ. οὐδὲ ὑλη
παρρυπιτάτι ἐξ ἀιώγκης, σὺ τι μηδὲ τῶν ὑστάτων μορφῶν
παρ' αὐτῆς τινα ἔχει. εἰ οὖν ἔρασμιον μὲν οὐχ ἡ ὑλη,
35 ἀλλὰ τὸ εἰδοποιηθὲν διὰ τὸ εἶδος, τὸ δὲ ἐπὶ τῇ ὑλῃ
εἶδος παρὰ φυχῆς, φυχὴ δὲ μᾶλλον εἶδος καὶ μᾶλλον
ἔρασμιον καὶ νοῦς μᾶλλον ταύτης εἶδος καὶ ἔτε μᾶλλον
ἔρασμιότερον, ἀνείδεον δεῖ τὴν καλοῦ τίθεσθαι φύσιν
την πρότιτην

34 Καὶ οὐκέτι θαυμάσομεν τὸ τοὺς δεινοὺς πόθους
παρέχοι εἰ πάντη ἀτήλλακται καὶ μορφῆς οὐσητῆς ἐπὶ¹
καὶ φυχῆς, ὅταν πάντοι ἔρωτα σύντονον λάβῃ. ἀποτίθεται
πᾶσαν ἥν ἔχει μορφήν, καὶ ἡτοι ἀν καὶ οὐρητοὶ γένεται αὐτῇ.
οὐ γάρ ἔστιν ἔχοντά τι ἄλλο καὶ ἐνεργοῦντα περὶ αὐτῷ
οὐτε ἵδεν ποτὲ ἐντριγγωσθῆναι πάλλι δεῖ μήτε κακὸν, μήτ'
αὐτὸν ἀγαθὸν μηδὲν ἄλλο πρόσχειρον ἔχειν, ἵνα δεξῆται
μόνη μόνον δταν δὲ τούτου εὐτυχίσῃ η φυχὴ καὶ ἡκο
πρὸς πινήν, μᾶλλον δὲ παρὸν φινή, ὅταν ἐκείνη ἐκνεύσῃ
10 τῶν παρόντων καὶ παρασκευάσασα αὐτὴν ὡς ὅτι
μάλιστα καλὴν καὶ εἰς ὁμοιότητα ἐλθοῦσα (η δὲ
παραποτηὴ καὶ η κατημητις δηλη τοι τοι
παρασκευαζομένοις), ιδούσα δὲ ἐν αὐτῇ ἔξαιρντης
φανέντα (μεταξὺ γὰρ οὐδεν οὐδὲ ἔτι δύο, ἀλλ' ἐν ἀμφα-

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come to understand that one must change to that which is more formless, he would desire that, for his experience from the beginning was love of a great light from a dim glimmer. For the trace of the shapeless is shape; it is this which generates shape, not shape this, and it generates it when matter comes to it. But matter is necessarily furthest from it, because it does not have of itself any one even of the last and lowest shapes. If then what is lovable is not the matter, but what is formed by the form, and the form upon the matter comes from soul, and soul is more form and more lovable, and intellect is more form than soul and still more lovable, one must assume that the first nature of beauty is formless.

84. And we shall no longer be surprised if that which produces these strangely powerful longings is altogether free from even intelligible shape; since the soul also, when it gets an intense love of it, puts away all the shape which it has, even whatever shape of the intelligible there may be in it. For it is not possible for one who has anything else and is actively occupied about it to see or to be fitted in. But one must not have evil, or any other good either, ready to hand, that the soul alone may receive it alone. But when the soul has good fortune with it, and it comes to it, or rather, being there already, appears, when that soul turns away from the things that are there, and has prepared by making itself as beautiful as possible and has come to likeness (the preparation and the adornment are clearly understood, I think, by those who are preparing themselves) and it sees it in itself suddenly appearing (for there is nothing between, nor are there still two but

οὐ γὰρ ἀν διακρίναις ἔτι, ἐως πάρεστι μίμησις δὲ
 15 τούτου καὶ οἱ ἐνταῦθα ἐραπτνὶ καὶ ἐρώμενοι συγκρίναι
 θέλοντες), καὶ οἵτε σήματος ἔτι αἰσθάνεται ὅτι ἐστὼν
 ἐν αὐτῷ, οὔτε ἔσυτὴν ἄλλο τι λέγει, οὐκ ἀνθρωποι, οὐ
 ζῷον, οὐκ ὅν, οὐδὲ πᾶν (ἀνώμαλος γὰρ ἡ τούτων πᾶς
 θέτ), καὶ οὐδὲ σχολὴν ἄγει πρὸς αὐτὰ οὔτε θέλει, ἀλλὰ
 20 καὶ αὐτὸς ζητήσασα ἐκείνη πιρόντι ἀπαντᾷ κάκεινο
 ἀντ' αὐτῆς βλέπει τίς δὲ οὖσα βλέπει, οὐδὲ τοῦτο
 σχολάζει ὄραν. ἐνθα δὴ οὐδὲν πάντων ἀντὶ τούτου
 ἀλλάξαιτο, οὐδὲ εἴ τις αὐτῇ πάντα τὸ οὐρανὸν
 ἐπιτρέποι, ὡς οὐκ ὄντος ἄλλου ἔτι ἀμείνονος οὐδὲ
 μᾶλλον ἀγαθοῦ οὔτε γὰρ ἀνωτέρω τρέχει τὰ τε ἄλλα
 25 πάντα κατιούσης, καν δή ἂν. ὥστε τότε ἔχει καὶ τὸ
 κρίνειν καλῶς καὶ γιγνώσκειν, ὅτι τοῦτό ἐστιν οὐ
 ἐφίέτο, καὶ τίθεσθαι, ὅτι μηδέν ἐστι κρείττον αὐτοῦ οὐ
 γαρ ἐστιν ἀπάτη ἐκεῖνη ἡ ποὺ ἀν τοῦ ἀληθοῦς
 30 ἀληθεύτερον τύχοι, δοὺν λέγει, ἐκεῖνό ἐστι, καὶ ὑστερον
 λέγει, καὶ σωπῶσι δὲ λέγει. καὶ εὐπαθοῖσα οὐ
 φεύδεται, ὅτι εὐπαθεῖ οὐδὲ γαργαλιζομένου λέγει τοῦ
 σωματος, ἀλλὰ τοῦτο γενομένη, δο πάλαι, ὅτε εὐτίχει.
 ἀλλὰ καὶ τὰ ἄλλα πάντα, οἷς πρὶν ἤδετο, ἀρχαῖς ἡ
 35 δινάμεσιν ἡ πλούτοις ἡ κάλλεσιν ἡ ἐπιστήμαις, ταῦτα
 ἵπεριδόνσα λέγει οὐκ ἀν εἰποῖσα μὴ κρείττον

¹ "There is nothing between" is said of Intellect and Soul in IV. 4. 2. 27 28, and, more unexpectedly, of Intellect and the material universe at V. 8. 7 13. ἐν ἀμφῳ is always used by Plotinus of a perfect union in which the two united

both are one¹; nor could you still make a distinction while it is present; lovers and their beloveds here below imitate this in their will to be united), it does not still perceive its body, that it is in it, and does not speak of itself as anything else, not man, or living thing, or being, or all (for the contemplation of these would be somehow disturbing) and it has no time for them nor wants them, but it has been seeking it, and meets that when it is present, and looks at that instead of itself; but it has not even time to see who the soul is that looks. There, truly, it would no exchange this for anything in the world, not even if someone handed over the whole universe to it, because there is nothing still better, and nothing that is more a good; for it does not run up higher, and all the other things are on its way down, even if they are in the realm above. So then it has the ability to judge rightly and to know that this is what it desired, and to establish that there is nothing better than it. For there is no deceit there; or where could it find any thing truer than the truth? What it speaks, then, is that, and it speaks it afterwards, and speaks it in silence, and in its happiness is not cheated in thinking that it is happy, and it does not say it is happy when the body tickles it, but when it has become that which it was before, when it is fortunate. But it says it in contempt of all the other things in which it delighted before, offices or powers or riches or beauties or sciences, and it would not have spoken if it had not met better things than

retain their distinct natures. See Lexicon Plotinianum s. v. ἀμφω (b). Its use in IV. 4. 2. 29. ἐν ἐστιν ἀμφω κα. δύο, of Soul and Intellect, brings out its meaning clearly.

35 συντιχούσα τεύτων οὐδὲ φοβεῖται μή τι πάθῃ, μετ' ἐκείνους οὓσα οὐδὲ ὅλως ἴδούσα εἰ δὲ καὶ τα ἄλλα τα περὶ αὐτὴν φθιέροιτο, εἰ μάλα καὶ θούλαται, ἵνα πρὸς τούτῳ ἥ μόγον εἰς τόσον ἡκει εὐπαθείας.

35. Οὗτο δὲ διάκειται τότε, ὡς καὶ τοι νοεῖν καταφρονεῖν, ὃ τὸν ἄλλον χρόνον ἤσταξε, ὅτι τὸ νοεῖν κίνησίς τις ἦ, αὐτῇ δὲ οὐ κινεῖσθαι θέλει, καὶ γάρ οὐδὲ ἐκείνον φησιν, ὃν ὄρφ, καίτοι νοῦς γενόμενος αὐτῷ 5 θεωρεῖ οὖν ηοθεῖσα καὶ ἐν τῷ τόπῳ τῷ φυοητῷ γενομένη· ἀλλὰ γενομένη μὲν ἐν αὐτῷ καὶ περι αὐτὸν ἔχοντα τὸ ιοητὸν νοεῖν, ἐπῆρ δὲ ἐκείνον ίδη τὸν θεόν πάντας ἥδη σφίησιν, οἷοι εἰ τις σιπλήθω εἰς οὐκοι ποικίλον καὶ οὕτω καλὸν θεωροῦ ἔνδον ἔκυστα τῶν ποικιλμάτων καὶ θαιμάζον, πρὸν ίδειν τὸν τοῦ οἴκου 10 δεοπότην, ίδων δὲ ἐκείνον καὶ ἁγασθεὶς οὐ κατὰ τὴν τῶν ἀγαλμάτων φίσιν ὄντα, ἀλλ' ἄξιον τῆς ὄντως θέας ἀφεὶς ἐκεῖνα τούτον μόνον τοῦ λοιποῦ βλέποι, εἴτα βλέπων καὶ μὴ ἀφαιρῶν τὸ δῆμα μηκέτι δράμα βλέποι τῷ συνεχεῖ τῆς θέας, ἀλλὰ τὴν δύψιν αὐτοῖς 15 συγκεράσαιτο τῷ θεάματι, θαστε ἐν αὐτῷ ἥδη τὸ δρατὸν πρότερον δύψιν γεγονέναι τῶν δὲ ἄλλων πάντων ἐπιλάθοιτο θεαμάτων καὶ τάχα ἂν σώζοι τὸ ἀνάλογον η εἰκάν, εἰ μὴ ἀνθρωπος εἶη δὲ ἐπιστάς τῷ τὰ τοῦ οἴκοι θεωμένῳ, ἀλλά τις θεός, καὶ οὗτος οὐ κατ' δύψιν φανεῖς,

The phrase "the intelligible place" here and in line 41 is taken from Plato's *Republic* (508C1 and 517B5)

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these; it is not afraid, either, that anything may happen to it, since it does not even see it while it is with that; but if all the other things about it perished, it would even be pleased, that it might be alone with this: so great a degree of happiness has it reached.

35. And the soul is so disposed then as even to despise intelligence, which at other times it well cometh, because intelligence is a kind of movement, and the soul does not want to move. For it says that he whom it sees does not move either; yet when this soul has become intellect it contemplates, when it has been, so to speak, made intellect and has come to be in the intelligible place¹; but when it has come to be in it and moves about it, it possesses the intelligible and thinks, but when it sees that god it at once lets everything go; it is as if someone went into a house richly decorated and so beautiful, and within it contemplated each and every one of the decorations and admired them before seeing the master of the house, but when he sees that master with delight, who is not of the nature of the images [in the house], but worthy of genuine contemplation, he dismisses those other things and thereafter looks at him alone, and then as he looks and does not take his eyes away, by the continuity of his contemplation he no longer sees a sight, but mingles his seeing with what he contemplates, so that what was seen before has now become sight in him, and he forgets all other objects of contemplation. And perhaps the likeness would keep in conformity with the reality if it was not a mortal who encountered the one who was seeing the sights of the house but one of the gods, and one who did not appear visibly but

20 ἀλλὰ τὴν φυχὴν ἐμπλήσας τοῦ θεωμένου, καὶ τὸν νοῦν τούντην μὲν ἔχειν δύναμιν εἰς τὸ νοεῖν, ἢ τὰ ἐν πάτῳ βλέπει, τὴν δέ, ἢ τὰ ἐπόκεινα πάτην ἐπιβολὴ τῶν καὶ παιδιοῦχῆ, καθ' ἣν καὶ πρότερον ἔναρα μόνον καὶ ὄρῶν ὑστερον καὶ νοῦν ἔσχε καὶ ἐν ἔστι. καὶ ἔστιν ἐκείνη μὲν ἡ θέα νοῦς ἔμφρονος, τίτην δὲ νοῦς ἔρων, δταν ἀφρων 25 γένεται, μεθ' νοθεῖς τοῦ νέκταρος· τότε ἔρων γίνεται ἀπλωθεὶς εἰς εὐπάθειαν τῷ κόρψ· καὶ ἔστιν πάτην μεθίνειν βελτιών ἢ σεμνοτέρων εἶναι τοιαύτης μέθης. παρα μέρος δέ ὁ νοῦς ἐκείνος ἀλλα, τὰ δὲ ἄλλοτε ἀλλα ὄρφα; ἢ οὐδὲ λόγος διδάσκων γινόμενα ποιεῖ, τὸ 30 δὲ ἔχει τὸ νοεῖν ἀλλ. ἔχει δὲ καὶ τὸ μη νοεῖν, ἀλλὰ ἄλλως ἐκείνον βλέπειν, καὶ γάρ ὄρῶν ἐκείνον ἔσχε γενητήματα καὶ συνήσθετο καὶ τούτων γενομένων καὶ ἐνοντων καὶ ταῦτα μὲν ὄρῶν λέγεται νοεῖν, ἐκεῖνο δέ ἢ δυνάμει 35 μελλε νοεῖν. ἢ δὲ φυχὴ οἴον συγχέασα καὶ ἀφανίσασα μένοντα τὸν ἐν αὐτῇ νοοῦν, μαλλον δὲ ὁ νοῦς αὐτῆς ὄρφα πρώτος, ἔρχεται δὲ ἡ θέα καὶ εἰς αὐτὴν καὶ τὰ δύο ἐν γίνεται. ἐκταθὲν δὲ τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἐπ' αυτοῖς καὶ συναρμοσθὲν τῇ ἀμφοτέρων συντάσσει ἐπιδραμὸν καὶ ἐνώσαν τὰ δύο ἔπειστιν αὐτοῖς μακαρίαν διδοὺς αἰσθησιν

Plotinus may be thinking here particularly of possession by Apollo or Dionysus.

² For this "pre-intellectual" vision of Intellect see III 8. 9, 29-32, V. 4. 2, 4-7; V. 8. 11-4. 12; it is the first moment in Intellect's eternal generation, its properly "intellectual" vision being the second.

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filled the soul of the beholder.¹ Intellect also, then, has one power for thinking, by which it looks at the things in itself, and one by which it looks at what transcends it by a direct awareness and reception, by which also before it saw only, and by seeing acquired intellect and is one.² And that first one is the contemplation of Intellect in its right mind, and the other is Intellect in love, when it goes out of its mind "drunk with the nectar";³ then it falls in love, simplified into happiness by having its fill; and it is better for it to be drunk with a drunkenness like this than to be more respectfully sober. But does that Intellect see in part, at one time some things and at another others?⁴ No, but our rational discourse instructing us makes them come to be, but Intellect always has its thinking and always its not thinking, but looking at that god in another way. For when it saw him it had offspring and was intimately aware of their generation and existence within it; and when it sees these it is said to think, but it sees that by the power by which [later] it was going to think. But the soul sees by a kind of confusing and annulling the intellect which abides within it—but rather its intellect sees first and the vision comes also to it and the two become one. But the Good is spread out over them and fitted in to the union of both, playing upon them and uniting the two it rests upon them and

¹ Again the drunkenness of Poros from Plato *Symposium* 203B5, see ch. 30, n. 4, p. 179. The application of it to Intellect's eternal self-transcendence in vision of and union with the One is strikingly powerful and paradoxical. Intellect must be eternally out of its mind with drink or love to be the Divine Mind.

καὶ θέαν, τοσοῦτον ἄρας, ὥστε μήτε ἐν τόπῳ εἶναι
40 μήτε ἐν τῷ ἀλλῷ, ἐν οἷς πέφυκεν ἄλλο ἐν ἀλλῷ εἶναι
οὐδὲ γάρ αυτός που· ο δεινος τὸς τὸ ποσὸς ἐν αὐτῷ
αὐτὸς δὲ οὐκ ἐν ἀλλῷ διὸ οὐδὲ κινεῖται ἡ ψυχὴ τότε, ὅτι
μηδὲ ἔκεινο οὐδὲ φυχὴ τούτου, ὅτι μηδὲ ζῆ ἔκεινο, ἀλλὰ
ὑπὲρ τὸ ζῆν οὐδὲ νοῦς, ὅτι μηδὲ νοεῖ· ὅμοιούσθαι γάρ
45 δεῖ νοεῖ δὲ οὐδὲ ἔκεινο, ὅτι οὐδὲ νοεῖ.

36 Τὰ μὲν γάρ πλλα δῆλα, εἴρηται δέ τι, καὶ περὶ¹
τούτου ἀλλ’ ὅμιως καὶ μὲν ἐπ’ ὀλίγοις λεκτέοις
ἀρχομένοις μὲν ἔκειθεν, διὰ λογισμῶν δὲ προϊόντων
ἐστι μεν γαρ η τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ εἴτε γνῶντος εἴτε ἐπαφῆ
δι μέγιστοι, καὶ μέγιστον φροντοῦτον εἶναι μάθημα,
οὐ τὸ πρὸς αὐτὸν ὕδεῖν μάθημα λέγων, ἀλλὰ περὶ αὐτοῦ
μαθεῖν τι πρότερον. διδάσκοισι μὲν οὖν ἀναλογια τε
καὶ ἀφαιρέσεις καὶ γνώσεις τὰν ἐξ αὐτοῦ καὶ
ληπτισμοὶ τινες, πορεύοντο δὲ καθάρσεις πρὸς αὐτὸν καὶ
ἀρεταὶ καὶ κοσμήσεις καὶ τοῦ νοητοῦ ἐπιβάσεις καὶ ἐπ’
10 αὐτοῦ ἴδρυσεις καὶ τῶν ἔκει ἑστιάσεις ὅστις <δὲ
γέγενηται¹ ὁμοῦ θεα, ἢς τε καὶ θέαμα αὐτὸς αὐτοῦ καὶ
τῶν ἀλλων καὶ γενόμενος οὖστα καὶ νοῦς καὶ ζωον
παντελέστι μηκέτι ἔξωθεν αὐτὸν βλέποι —τοῦτο δὲ
γενόμενος ἔγγυς ἐστι, καὶ τὸ ἐφεξῆς ἔκεινο, καὶ πλησίον

¹ conlectimus.

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gives them a blessed perception and vision, lifting them so high that they are not in place nor in anything other, among things where it is natural for one thing to be in another, for he is not anywhere either; but the intelligible place is in him, but he is not in another. Therefore the soul does not move then either, because that does not move. Nor, then, is it soul, because that does not live, but is above life. Nor is it intellect, because that does not think either, for one must be made like. It does not even think that it does not think.

36 The rest, then, is clear, and something has been said also about this. But all the same, even now we must speak of it for a little, starting from that [experience] but proceeding by rational discourse. The knowledge or touching of the Good is the greatest thing, and Plato says it is the "greatest study",¹ not calling the looking at it a "study", but learning about it beforehand. We are taught about it by comparisons and negations and knowledge of the things which come from it and certain methods of ascent by degrees, but we are put on the way to it by purifications and virtues and adornings and by gaining footholds in the intelligible and settling ourselves firmly there and feasting on its contents. But whoever has become at once contemplator of himself and all the rest and object of his contemplation, and, since he has become substance and intellect and "the complete living being",² no longer looks at it from outside—when he has become this he is near, and that Good is next above him, and already close

¹ Plato *Republic* 505A2 (of the Idea of the Good).

² Plato *Timaeus* 31B1

PLOTINUS ENNEAD VI. 7.

15 αὐτὸν ἡδη ἐπὶ παντὶ τῷ νοητῷ ἐπιστήθιον. ἔνθα δὴ έάνας τις πάν μάθημα, καὶ μέχρι του παιδαγωγηθεῖς καὶ ἐν καλῷ ὕδρυθεῖς, ἐν φι μεν εστι, μέχρι τούτοι νοεῖ ἐξενεχθεῖς δὲ τῷ αὐτοῦ¹ τοῦ νοῦ οἰον κύματι καὶ ψφοῖ ὑπ αὐτοῦ οἰον οἰδήσαστος ἀρθεῖς εἰσεῖδεν ἔξαίφνης οὐκ 20 ίδων ὅπως, ἀλλ' ἡ θέα πλήσασα φωτος τὰ ὄμματα οὐ δι αὐτοῖ πεποίηκεν ἄλλο δρᾶν, ἀλλ' αὐτὸ τὸ φῶς τὸ ὅραμα ἦν οὐ γάρ ἦν ἐν ἐκείνῳ τὸ μὲν ὄρώμενον, τὸ δὲ φῶς αὐτοῖ, οὐδὲ νοῦς καὶ νοούμενον, ἀλλ' αὐγὴ γεννωσα τῶτα εἰς ὕστερον καὶ ἀφείσα εἴναι παρ' αὐτῷ αὐτὸς δὲ αὐγὴ μόνον γεννῶσα νοῦν, οὕτι σφέσασα αὐτῆς ἐν τῷ 25 γεννήσαι, ἀλλὰ μείνασα μὲν αὐτῇ, γενομένου δὲ ἐκείνου τῷ τούτῳ εἴναι. εἰ γάρ μὴ τούτῳ τοιούτον ἦν, οὐκ ἂν ὑπέστη εκεών.

37 Οἱ μὲν οὖν νόησιν αὐτῷ δόντες τῷ λόγῳ τῶν μὲν ἐλαττόνων καὶ τῶν ἐξ αὐτοῦ οὐκ ἔδοσαν· καίτοι καὶ τοῦτο ἀποπο τὰ ἄλλα, φασὶ τῷες, μὴ εἰδέναι· ἀλλ' οὐδὲ ἐκεῖνοι ἄλλο τιμώτερον αὐτοῦ οὐχ εὑρόντες τὴν νόησιν 5 αὐτῷ αὐτοῦ εἴναι ἔδοσαν, ὥσπερ τῇ νοήσει σεμνοτέρου αἴτον ἐσομένου καὶ οὐ νοεῖν κρείττονος ἡ κατ' αὐτὸν δὲ ἐστιν ὅντος, ἀλλ' οὐκαυτοῦ σεμνύνοντος τὴν νόησιν. τίνι γάρ τὸ τέμνον ἔξει, τῇ νοήσει ἡ αὐτῷ; εἰ μὲν τῇ νοήσει, αὐτῷ οὐ τέμνων ἡ ἡττον, εἰ δὲ αὐτῷ, πρὸ τῆς νοήσεως 10 ἔστι τέλειος καὶ οὐ τῇ νοήσει τελειωμένος εἰ δὲ δι

¹ Harder αὐτῷ wBUCQ: αὐτὸ J: αὐτῷ vel αὐτὸ R.

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by, shining upon all the intelligible world. It is there that one lets all study go; up to a point one has been led along and settled firmly in beauty and as far as this one thinks that in which one is, but is carried out of it by the surge of the wave of Intellect itself and lifted on high by a kind of swell and sees suddenly, not seeing how, but the vision fills his eyes with light and does not make him see something else by it, but the light itself is what he sees. For there is not in that Good something seen and its light, nor intellect and object of intellect, but a ray which generates these afterwards and lets them be beside it; but he himself is the ray which only generates Intellect and does not extinguish itself in the generation, but it itself abides, and that Intellect comes to be because this Good exists. For if this was not of the kind it is, that would not have come into existence.

37. Those who in their reasoned account attribute thinking to the Good do not attribute to him thinking of the lesser things which derive from him¹, yet some people do say that this is absurd, that he should not know the other things; but, however that may be, those [Peripatetics], since they did not find anything of more worth than himself, attributed to him thought of himself, on the supposition that he would become more majestic by thinking and that thinking was better than what he is in himself, but that it was not he himself who conferred majesty on thinking. For by what does he have his worth, by thinking or by himself? If it is by thinking, he is in himself of no worth or lesser worth, but if by himself he is perfect before thinking and not perfected by

¹ See Aristotle *Metaphysics* A 1074b17-35

ἐνέργειά ἔστιν, ἀλλ' οὐ δύναμις, δεῖ νοεῖν, εἰ μὲν οὐσία
 ἔστιν ἀεὶ νοούσα καὶ τούτῳ ἐνέργειαν λέγουσι, δύν
 δύμας λέγουσι, την οὐσίαν καὶ τὴν νόησιν, καὶ οὐχ
 ἀπλοῦν λέγουσιν, ἀλλά τι ἔτερον προσιθέασιν αὐτῷ,
 ὡσπερ ὄφθαλμοῖς τὸ ὄράν κατ' ἐνέργειαν, καὶ ἀεὶ¹⁵
 βλεπωσιν. εἰ δὲ ἐνέργειά λέγουσιν ὅτι ἐνέργειά ἔστι καὶ
 νόησις, οὐκ ἀν οὐδσα νόησις νοοῖ, ὡσπερ οὐδὲ κίνησις
 κινοῦται ἀν τί οὐδεν, οὐ καὶ αὐτοὶ λέγετε οὐσίαν καὶ
 ἐνέργειαν εἶναι ἐκεῖνα, ἀλλα πολλὰ ταῦτα ὄμοιογοῦμεν
 εἶναι καὶ ταῦτα ἔτερα, τὸ δὲ πρωτον ἀπλούν, καὶ τὸ ἔξ
 20 ἄλλου διδομεν νοεῖν καὶ οἷον ζητεῖν αὐτοῦ τὴν οὐσίαν
 καὶ αὐτὸ καὶ τὸ ποιῆσαν αὐτό, καὶ ἐπιστραβέν ἐν τῇ θέᾳ
 καὶ γνωρίσαν νοῦν ἥδη δικαίως εἶναι τὸ δὲ μήτε
 γερόμενον μήτ' ἔχον τρὸ αὐτοῦ, ἀλλ' ἀεὶ <οὐ>¹ ὅ ἔστι
 τίς αὐτία τοῦ νοεῖν ἔξειν;² διὸ ωπέρ νοῦν φησιν ὁ
 25 Πλάτων εἶναι δρθῶς. νοῦς μὲν γάρ μη νοῦν ἀνόητος· φ
 γάρ η φύσις ἔχει τὸ νοεῖν, εἰ μὴ τοῦτο πράττοι, ἀνόητον· φ
 δὲ μηδὲν ἔργον ἔστι, τί ἀν τούτῳ τις ἔργον προσάγων
 κατὰ στέρησιν αὐτοῦ κατηγοροῦ τοῦτο, ὅτι μὴ πράττει,
 οἷον εἰ ἀνέταρον αὐτὸν τις λέγοι. μηδὲν δὲ ἔργον εἶναι
 αἰτημα, ὅτι μηδὲν ἐπιβαλλει αὐτῷ ποιεῖν ἀρκεῖ γάρ

¹ Kirchhoff² Igit. Ζε. Enn

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thinking. But if he has to think because he is active actuality, but not potency, if he is a substance always thinking and it is because of this that they say he is active actuality, they are all the same speaking of two things, substance and thinking, and are not saying that he is simple, but adding something else to him, as actually seeing is an addition to the eyes, even if they are always looking. But if they say that he is actual because he is active actuality, that is, thought, if he was thought he would not think, just as movement is not in motion. "Well then, do you not yourselves say that those higher things are substance and active actuality?" Yes, but we agree that these are many, and being many are different, but the first is single and simple, and we attribute thinking to what comes from another, and a kind of seeking its substance and its self and what made it, and say that in turning back in its contemplation and recognising itself it is at that point rightly and properly Intellect¹, but that what has not come to be and has nothing before it, but is always what it is—what reason will it have to think? This is why Plato rightly says that it is above Intellect. Now Intellect, if it did not think, would be unintelligent; for if that whose nature includes thought did not think, it would be unintelligent, but when something has no work to do, why should one put a work to it and then predicate the absence of this work of it because it does not do it? It would be as if one were to call him unmusical. But he has no work to do because there is no obligation on him to do anything; for he is sufficient and does not have to

¹ See ch. 35, n. 1, p. 194.

30 αὐτὸς καὶ οὐδὲν δεῖ ζητεῖν παρ' αὐτὸν ὑπὲρ τὰ πάντα
οὗτα ἀρκεῖ γὰρ αὐτῷ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ὡν αὐτὸς ὁ ἔστιν
38. Εἰσι δὲ οὐδὲ τὸ "ἔστιν" οὐδὲν γὰρ οὐδὲ πούτοι
δείχται ἐπει οὐδὲ τὸ "ἀγαθός ἔστι" κατὰ τούτου, ἀλλὰ
καθ' οὐ τὸ "ἔστι"· τὸ δὲ "ἔστιν" οὐχ ὡς κατ' ἄλλυν
ἄλλο, ἀλλ' ὡς σημαῖνον ὁ ἔστι λέγοντες δὲ τάγαθὸν περ'.
5 αὐτοὶ λέγοντες οὐκ αὐτὸ οὐδὲ κατηγοροῦντες, ὅτι αὐτῷ
ὑπάρχει, ἀλλ' ὅτι αὐτό εἴτα οὐδὲ "ἔστιν ἀγαθὸν" λέγειν
ἀξιοῦντες οὐδὲ τὴν "τὸ" προτιθέναι αὐτοῦ, δηλοῦν δὲ οὐ
δυνάμενοι, ἐ τις αὐτὸ παντάπασιν ἀφέλοι, ἵνα μη ἄλλο,
τὸ δὲ ἄλλο ποιῶμεν, ὡς μὴ δεῖσθαι τοῦ "ἔστιν" ἔτι,
10 οὔτω λέγομεν "τάγαθόν". ἀλλὰ τις παραδέξεται φύσιν
οὐκ οὐσιν (ἐν)¹ αἰσθήσει καὶ γνώσει αὐτῆς; τί οὖν
γνώσεται; "ցցώ εἰμι"; ἀλλ' οὐκ ἔστι διὰ τί οὖν οὐκ ἔρει
τὸ "ἀγαθόν εἰμι"; η πάλιν τὸ "ἔστι" κατηγορήσει
αὐτοῦ. ἀλλὰ τὸ "ἀγαθὸν" μόνον ἔρει τι προσθείσις
"ցցածն" μὲν γὰρ νοήσειν ἀν τις ὀψει τοῦ "ἔστιν", εἰ
15 μὴ κατ' ἄλλου κατηγοροῦ ὁ δὲ αὐτὸν² νοῶν ὅτι ἀγαθὸν
παντως νοήσει τὸ "ցցώ εἰμι τὸ ἀγαθὸν". εἰ δὲ μή
ἀγαθὸν μὲν νοήσει, οὐ παρέσται δὲ αὐτῷ τὸ δὲ αὐτὸς
ἔστι τούτῳ νοεῖν δεῖ οὖν τὴν νόησιν εἶναι, ὅτι "ἀγαθὸν
εἰμι". καὶ εἰ μὲν νοήσις αὐτὴ τὸ ἀγαθόν, οὐκ αὐτοῦ
20 ἔσται νόησις, ἀλλ' ἀγαθὸν, αὐτὸς τε οὐκ ἔσται τὸ
ἀγαθόν, ἀλλ' ή νόησις. εἰ δὲ ἐτέρᾳ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ή νόησις
τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ, ἔστιν ηδη τὸ ἀγαθὸν πρὸ τῆς νοήσεως

¹ A^{3a} (= Ficinus)² Kierhoff εὐτε Ενν.

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seek anything but himself who is above all things; for he suffices for himself and all else by being what he is.

38. But he is not even the "is" for he has no need whatever even of this, for "he is good" is not applicable to him either, but to that to which the "is" applies; but the "is" [, when said of him,] is not said as one thing of another, but as indicating what he is. But we say "the Good" about him, not speaking of him himself nor predication of him that good belongs to him, but saying it is himself; so then, since we do not think it proper to say "is good" nor to put the article before it, but are unable to make ourselves clear, if one takes it away altogether we say "the good" so as not to still need the "is", that we may not make one thing and then another. But who is going to accept a nature which is not in a state of perception and knowledge of itself? What then will he know? "I am"? But he is not. Why then will he not say "I am the Good"? Again he will predicate the "is" of himself. But [perhaps] he will only say "good", with some addition; for one could think "good" without "is", if one did not predicate it of something else. But he who thinks that he is good will in every case think "I am the Good", if not, he will think good but the thought will not be present to his mind that he is this good. The thought, then, must be "I am good".¹ And if the thought itself is the Good, it will not be a thought of himself but of good, and he himself will not be the Good, but the thought will. But if the thought of the Good is different from the Good the Good is there already before the

¹ Cp. the closely parallel discussion in V. 3. 10.

PLOTINUS ENNEAD VI. 7

αὐτοῖς εἰ δ' ἔπει τρὸς τῆς νοήσεως το ἀγαθὸν αὔταρκες,
αὔταρκες δὲ αὐτῷ εἰς ἀγαθὸν οὐδὲν ἀν δέοιτο τῆς
25 νοήσεως τῆς περὶ αὐτοῦ ὥστε γὰρ αγαθὸν οὐ νοεῖ ἐαυτό

39 Ἀλλὰ γὰρ τί; οὐδὲν δὲλλο πάρεστιν αὐτῷ, ἀλλ' ἀπλῆ τις ἐπιβολὴ αὐτῷ πρὸς αὐτὸν ἔσται. ἀλλὰ οὐκ ὄντος οἷον διαστήματός της οὐδὲ διαφορᾶς πρὸς αὐτὸν τὸ ἐπιβαλλειν ἐαυτῷ τί ἀν εἴη γὰρ αὐτό; διὸ καὶ ὅρθως δὲ ἐτερότητα λαμβάνει, δύναμις καὶ ιδεῖα. δεῖ γάρ τὸν νοὸν ἀεὶ ἐτερότητα καὶ ταῦτητα λαμβάνειν εἴπερ νοήσει. ἐαυτὸν τε γάρ οὐ διακρινεῖ ἀπὸ τοῦ νοητοῦ τῇ πρὸς αὐτὸν ἐτέρου σχέσει τὰ τε πάντα οὐ θεωρήσει, μηδεμιᾶς ἐτερότητος γενομένης εἰς τὸ πάντα ἐνναν οὐδὲ 10 γάρ ἀν οὐδὲ δύο. ἔπειτα, εἰ νοήσει, οὐ δήπον εἴπειτὸν μονον νοήσει, εἴπερ δὲλλος νοήσει διὰ τί γαρ οὐχ ἄγαντα, ή ἀδυνατήσει, ὅλως δὲ οὐχ ἀπλοῦς γίνεται νοῶν ἐαντόν, ἀλλὰ δεῖ τὴν νόησων τὴν περὶ αὐτοῦ ἐτέρους εἶναι, εἰ τι δὲλλος δύναται νοεῖν αὐτό. ἐλεγομέν δέ, δητι οὐ νόησις τούτην,¹ οὐδὲ εἰ ἄλλον αὐτὸν ἐθέλοι ιδεῖν. νοήσας 15 δὲ αὐτὸς πολὺς γίνεται, νοητός, νοῶν, κινούμενος καὶ ὅσα ἀλλα τροπήκει νῷ πρὸς δὲ τούτοις κάκεινο ὄραν προσήκει, ὅπερ εἴρηται ἡδη ἐν ἀλλοις, ως ἑκαστῃ

¹ Igal: τοῦτο Επν.

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thought of it. But if the Good is sufficient to itself before the thought, since it is sufficient to itself for good it will have no need of the thought about it; so, as good, it does not think itself.

39. But as what, then? Now nothing else is present to it, but it will have a simple concentration of attention on itself. But since there is no distance or difference in regard to itself, what could its attention be other than itself? Therefore Plato rightly understands that there is otherness and sameness where there is intellect and substance.¹ For one must always understand intellect as otherness and sameness if it is going to think. For [otherwise] it will not distinguish itself from the intelligible by its relation of otherness to itself, and will not contemplate all things if no otherness has occurred to make all things exist: for [without otherness] there would not even be two. Then, if it is going to think, it will not presumably think itself alone, if it is going to think at all; for why will it not think all things? Will it not be able to? But in general intellect is not simple when it thinks itself, but its thought about itself must be thought of another if it is to be able to think itself as anything at all. But we said that there is no thinking of this Good, not even if he wanted to see himself as another. But if he himself thinks he becomes many, intelligible, intelligent, in motion and everything else appropriate to Intellect. But besides this it is appropriate to observe that point which has been discussed elsewhere,² that each

¹ Plotinus' usual application of the "very important kinds" of Plato *Sophist* 254-5 to Intellect

² Cp. e.g. VI. 9. 2.

νόησις, εἴπερ νόησις ἔσται, ποικίλοι τι δεῖ εἶναι, το δέ
ἀπλοῦν καὶ τὸ αὐτὸ πᾶν μὲν κίνημα, εἰ τοιούτον εἴη
οἶν επαφή, οὐδὲν νοερὸν ἔχει. τέ οὐδε, υἱει τὸ μὲν αὐτὸν
αὐτὸν εἰδῆσει; [ἄλλα σεμνὸν ἔστηξεται]¹ τὰ μὲν οὖτι
ἄλλα ὑστερα αὐτοῦ, καὶ ἦν πρὸ αὐτῶν ὁ ἥρ, καὶ
ἐπίκτητος αὐτῶν ἡ νόησις καὶ οὐχ ἡ αὐτὴ ἀι καὶ οὐχ
ἔστηκάτων καὶ τὰ ἔστωτα δὲ νοῆ, πολὺς ἔστιν. οὐ γάρ
δὴ τὰ μὲν ὑστερα μετὰ τῆς νοήσεως καὶ τὴν οἰσίαν ἔξει,
αἱ δὲ τούτοι νοήσεις θεωρίαι κεναὶ μόνον ἔσονται ἡ δὲ
πρόνοια ὀρκεῖ ἐν τῷ αὐτὸν εἶναι, παρ' οὐδὲ τὰ πάντα. τὸ δὲ
πρὸς αὐτὸν πῶς, εἰ μὴ αὐτόν, ἄλλα σεμνὸν ἔστηξεται
30 ἔλεγε μὲν οὖν ὁ Πλάτων περὶ τῆς οὐσίας λέγων, ὅτι
νοήσει, ἀλλ' οὐ σεμνὸν ἔστηξειτο ὡς τῆς οὐσίας μὲν
νοούσης, τοῦ δὲ μὴ νοοῦντος σεμνοῦ ἔστηξομένου,
τὸ μὲν "ἔστηξειτο" τῷ μη ἀλλως ἀν δεδυνήσθαι
ἔρμηνενσαι, σεμνότεροι δὲ καὶ ὄντως σεμνὸν νομίζων
εἶναι τὸ ὑπερβεβηκός τὸ νοεῖν.

40 Καὶ ὅτι μὲν μὴ δεῖ νόησιν περὶ αὐτὸν εἶναι,
εἰδεῖν δὲν οἱ προσαιψάμενοι τοῦ τοιούτου δεῖ γε μὴ
παρατύθει πᾶτα πρὸς τοὺς εἰρημένους κομίζειν. εἰ πῃ
οἶν τε τῷ λόγῳ σημῆναι. δεῖ δὲ τὴν πειθώ μεμογμένην
5 ἔχειν τὴν ἀνάγκην. δεῖ τούτου γυνάσκειν ἐπιστήσαντα,
ὡς νόησις πᾶσα ἔτει τινός ἔστι καὶ τινός επὶ ἡ μὲν

¹ delevimus, ut e lin. 28-9. iteratum

Plotinus is here interpreting Plato Sophist

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thought if it is going to be a thought must be something multiply various, but that kind of movement, simple and all the same, if it is to be something like a touch has nothing intelligent about it. Well then, will he not know the other things or himself? The other things come after him, and he was what he was before them, and the thought of them would be acquired from outside himself, and not always the same, and of things that do not stand still; and even if he thinks the things that stand still, he is many. For it is certainly not true that the things which come after will possess the substance with their thought, but the thoughts of this Good will be only visions empty [of real content]. But it is enough for providence that he exists from whom all things come. But what is his relation to himself, if he does not think himself? But he will stand still in majesty Plato did say, speaking of substance, that it will think, but would not stand still in majesty, meaning that substance thinks, but that which does not think will stand still in majesty; he used "will stand still" because he could not explain what he meant in any other way, and he considered more majestic and truly majestic that which transcends thought.¹

40. And those who have had a contact of this kind would know that thinking cannot pertain to him; but we do need to add some words of encouragement to what has been said, if discourse can indicate it in any way at all. But necessity must have persuasion mixed with it. One must, then, know and understand that all thinking comes from something and is of

248D6-249A2; he seems conscious that his interpretation will seem rather odd.

σινοίσα τῷ ἔξ οὐδὲ ἐστιν ὑποκείμενον μὲν ἔχει τὸ οὐδὲ ἐστιν
νόησις, οἷον δὲ ἐπικείμενον αὐτὴ γίνεται. ἐνέργεια αὐτοῦ
οὖσα καὶ πληρουσα τὸ δυνάμει ἐκεῖνο οὐδὲν αὐτῇ
10 γεννώσα ἐκείνου γάρ ἐστιν, οὐδὲ ἐστι, μόνον, οὐδὲν
τελείωσις. ή δὲ οὖσα νόησις μετ' οὐσίας καὶ
ὑποστήσασα τὴν οὐσίαν οὐκ ἀν δύνατο εν ἐκείνῳ εἶναι,
ἀφ' οὐδὲν ἐγένετο· οὐ γαρ ἀν ἐγένεντο τι ἐν ἐκείνῳ οὖσα
αλλ' οὖσα δύναμις τοῦ γεννᾶν ἐφ' ἑαυτῆς ἐγέννα, καὶ ή
15 ἐνέργεια αὐτῆς ἐστιν οὐσία καὶ σύνεστι καὶ ἐν τῇ οὐσίᾳ,
καὶ ἐστιν οὐχ ἔτερον ή νόησις καὶ η οὐσία αὕτη καὶ αὐτὴ¹
ἡ¹ ἑαυτὴν νοεῖ ή φύσις, οὐχ ἔτερον, αλλ' η λόγω, τὸ
νοούμενον καὶ τὸ νοοῦν, πλήθος ὅν, ὡς δέδεικται
πολλαχῆ, καὶ ἐστιν αὕτη πρώτη ὑπέργεια ὑπόπτασιν
20 γεννήσασα εἰς οὐσίαν, καὶ ὥδαλμα ὃν ἄλλου οὗτως ἐστὶ²
μεγάλου τινός, ὥστε ἐγένετο οὐσία. εἰ δ' ήν ἐκείνου καὶ
μὴ ἀτ' ἐκείνου, οὐδὲ ἀν ἄλλο τι η ἐκείνοι ήν, καὶ οὐκ ἀν
ἐφ' ἑαυτῆς ὑπόπτασις ήν. πρώτη δὴ οὖσα αὕτη ἐνέργεια
καὶ πρώτη νόησις οὐκ ἀν ἔχοι οὔτε ἐνέργειαν προ αὐτῆς
25 οὔτε νόησιν μεταβαίνων τοινυν τις ἀπὸ ταύτης τῆς
οὐσίας καὶ νοήσεως οὔτε ἀπὸ οὐσίαν ἔχει οὐτέ³ ἐπὶ⁴
νόησιν, ἀλλ' ἐπέκεινα ήξει οὐσίας καὶ νοήσεως
ἐπὶ τι θαυμαστόν, δι μήτε ἔχει ἐν αὐτῷ οὐσίαν μήτε
νόησιν, ἀλλ' ἐστιν ἔργμαν αὐτὸν ἐφ' ἑαυτοῦ τῶν ἐξ αὐτοῦ

¹ αὐτὴν ή Theiler: αὐτὴν Enn.

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something. And one kind of thinking, which keeps close to that from which it comes, has as its ground that of which it is the thought and itself becomes a kind of superstructure, being its ground's actuality and fulfilling that ground's potentiality without generating anything itself; for it is only a kind of completion of that of which it is. But the thinking which accompanies substance and has brought substance into existence could not be in that from which it came to be; for it would not have generated anything if it was in that. But since it was a power of generation by itself, it generated, and its active actuality is substance, and also in substance it is there with it, and the thought and this substance are not different things, and, again, in that the nature thinks itself, they are not different except in definition, what is thought and what thinks, that is, a plurality, as has often been demonstrated. And this is the first active actuality, which has generated an existent, which came to be substance, and, being the image of another, is the image of one so great that substance came to be. But if it was intrinsic to that and did not derive from it, it would be nothing else but intrinsic to that and would not be an existent on its own. Certainly, as this is the first active actuality and the first thought, it would have neither actuality or thought before it. So then when one goes on from this substance and thought one will not arrive at substance or thought, but will come, beyond substance and thought, to something wonderful which does not have in it substance or thought, but is alone by itself, with no need of the things which come from

¹ Plato *Republic* VI 509B9.

PLUTINUS: ENNEAD VI. 7.

30 οὐδὲν δεόμενον. οὐ γὰρ ἐνεργήσας πρότερον ἔγένησεν
 ἐνέργειαν· ήδη γὰρ ἀντὶ τοῦ, πρὸν γενέσθαι οὐδὲ τοῖς
 ἔγένησες νόησιν· ήδη γὰρ ἀντὶ νοοήσεως, πρὸν γενέσθαι
 νόησιν. ὅλως γὰρ η νόησις, εἰ μὲν ἀγαθοῦ, χείρον αὐτοῦ·
 ὥστε οὐ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἀντὶ εἴη· λέγω δε οἱ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ, οὐχ
 35 ὅτι μὴ ἔστι νοησις τὸ ἀγαθόν—τοῦτο γὰρ ἔστω ἄλλ'
 σπι ἐν αὐτῷ τῷ ἀγαθῷ οὐκ ἀντὶ εἴη νόησις η ἐν ἔσται
 οὐδὲν τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ τὸ ἔλαττον αὐτοῦ, η νόησις αὐτοῦ.
 εἰ δὲ χείρον ἔσται, οὐδου η νόησις ἔσται καὶ η οὐκεία εἰ δὲ
 κρείττον η νόησις, τὸ νοητὸν χείροις ἔσται· οὐ δὴ· ἐν τῷ
 ἀγαθῷ η νόησις, ἀλλα χείρον οὐσα καὶ διὰ τούτο τὸ
 40 ἀγαθὸν ἀξιωθεῖσα ἐτέρωθι αντὶ εἴη αὐτοῦ, καθαρὸν ἔκενυ
 ὡσπερ τῶν ἄλλων καὶ αὐτῆς ἀφέντα. καθαρὸς δὲ δῆλος
 νοησεις εἰλικρινῶς ἔστιν οὖστιν, οὐ παραποδίζομενον
 τῇ νοήσει παρούσῃ, ὡς μὴ εἰλικρινές καὶ ἐν εἴναι εἰ δέ
 τις καὶ τούτο ἄμα νοοῦν καὶ νοούμενον ποιεῖ καὶ οὐσάν
 45 καὶ νόησιν συνοῦσαν τῇ οὐσίᾳ καὶ οὕτως αὐτὸν νοοῦν
 θέλει ποιεῖν, ἄλλον δεήσεται καὶ τούτου πρὸ αὐτοῦ,
 επείπερ η ἐνέργεια καὶ η νοησις η ἄλλου υποκειμένου
 τελείωσις η συνυπόστασις οὐσα πρὸ αὐτῆς καὶ αὐτῇ
 ἄλλην ἔχει φύσιν, η καὶ τὸ νοεῖν εἰκότως. καὶ γὰρ ἔχει οὐ
 50 νοήσει, ὅτι ἄλλο πρὸ αὐτῆς· καὶ ὅταν αὐτὴ αὐτήν, οἷον
 καταμανθάνει ἡ ἔσχει ἐκ τῆς ἄλλου θεας ἐν αὐτῇ φέδε
 μήτε τι ἄλλο πρὸ αὐτοῦ μήτε τι σύνεστιν αὐτῷ ἔξ

Kirchhoff: οὐδὲ Επ.

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it For it did not act before it generated activity; for then activity would have been there before it came to be; nor did it think before it generated thought; for then it would have thought before thought came to be. For in general thought, if it is of the Good, is worse than it; so that it would not be thought of the Good; but I mean "not of the Good" not in the sense that it is impossible to think the Good—this may well be so—but that there would be no thought in the Good itself; otherwise the Good and what is less than it, would be a unity together. But if [thought] is going to be worse [than the Good], thought and substance will be together. But if thought is better, the object of thought will be worse. Certainly then thought is not in the Good but, being worse and given its value by this Good, would be somewhere else than it, leaving that Good clear of thought itself as well as everything else. But being clear of thought it is purely what it is, not hindered by the presence of thought from being pure and one. But if someone makes this also at once thinker and thought and substance and thought in company with substance, and in this way wants to make it self-thinking, he will need another, and this other prior to itself, since active actuality and thought is either the bringing to completion of something else underlying it or a co-existent and so has itself also another nature prior to it by which thinking comes naturally For it has something to think about because there is something else before it, and when it thinks itself it is in a way comprehending what it had from the vision of another in itself. But that which has nothing else before it nor anything accompanying it from something else—

PLOTINUS. ENNEAD VI. 7.

ἄλλου, τέ καὶ νοήσει η̄ πώς ἐπιτόν; τί γάρ ἔζητε η̄ τί
ἐπύθει, η̄ τὴν δύναμιν αὐτοῦ ὅση, ὡς ἐκτὸς οἰσης αὐτοῦ,
διὸ καθό ἐνσει, λέγω δέ, εἰ ἄλλη μὲν η̄ δύναμις αὐτοῦ, φν
ἔμανθανεν, ἄλλη δέ, η̄ ἔμανθανεν εἰ δὲ μία, τί ζητεῖ,

41. Καὶ δυνεῖται γὰρ βοήθεια τὸ νοεῖν δεδόσθαι ταῖς
φύσεσι ταῖς θειοτέραις μὲν, ἐλάττωσι δὲ οὕσαις, καὶ οἷον
αὐτῶν τυφλαῖς οὕσαις δῆμα ὁ δ' ὀφθαλμὸς τί ἀν δέοιτο
τὸ ὃν ὄραν φῶς αὐτὸς ἦν; ὁ δ' ἀν δέηται, διὸ ὀφθαλμοῦ
δι σκότου ἔχων παρ' αὐτῷ φῶς ζητεῖ εἰ οὖν φῶς τὸ νοεῖν,
τὸ δὲ φῶς φῶς οὐ ζητεῖ, οὐκ ἀν ἐκείνη η̄ αὐγὴ¹ φῶς μὴ
ζητοῦσα ζητήσει νοεῖν, οὐδὲ προσθήσει αὐτῇ τὸ νοεῖν.
τί γαρ καὶ ποιήσει, η̄ τί προσθήσει δεδόμενος καὶ αὐτὸς ὁ
νοος, ἵνα νοῇ, οὐκ αἰσθάνεται οὖν ἑαντοῦ—οὐ γαρ
10 θεῖαι οὐδὲ ἔστι δεο, μᾶλλον δὲ *⟨οὐδὲ⟩*² πλειω, αὐτός,
η̄ νόησις—οὐ γάρ δὴ η̄ νόησις αὐτός—δεῖ δὲ τρίτον καὶ
τὸ νοούμενον εἶναι εἰ δὲ ταῦτα νοῦς, νόησις, νοητόν,
πάντη ἐν γενομένᾳ ἀφανεῖ αὐτὰ ἐν αὐτοῖς διακριθέντα
δὲ τῷ ἄλλῳ πάλιν αἱ οὐκ ἐκεῖνο ἔσται. ἐστέον οὖν τὰ
15 ἄλλα πάντη ἐπὶ φύσεως ἀριστης οὐθεμιᾶς ἐπικονρίας
δεομένης· ὁ γάρ ἀν προσθῆσ, ἐλάττωσας τῇ προσθήκῃ
τὴν οὐδενὸς δεομένην. ημῶν μὲν γὰρ η̄ νόησις καλόν, ὅτι
ψυχὴ δεῖται νοῦν ἔχειν, καὶ νῷ, ὅτι τὸ εἶναι αὐτῷ

¹ Kirchhoff αὐτὴ Ενν

² con lecimus.

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whatever will it think and how will it think itself? For what did it seek and what did it long for? Was it to know how great its power was, as if it was outside it in so far as it thought it? What I mean by this is, if the power which it learnt about was one thing and the power by which it learnt another; but if they were one, what was it seeking?

41. For it seems likely that thinking has been given as a help to the natures which are of the more divine kind, but lesser, and as something like an eye for their blindness. But why should the eye which is itself light¹ need to see real being? But what does need to seek light through the eye because it has darkness in itself. If then thinking is light, and light does not seek light, that ray which does not seek light would not seek to think, and will not add thinking to itself; for what will it do with it? Or what will even Intellect itself add in its need in order to think? So he has no perception of himself—he does not need it—and he is not two, or rather not several, himself, his thinking—for his thinking is certainly not himself and what is being thought must be the third. But if intellect, thinking, and object of thought are the same, if they become altogether one they will make themselves disappear in themselves, but if they are distinguished by being other they will, again, not be that Good. With the best nature, then, which needs no assistance, we must leave aside everything; for whatever you add, you have lessened by the addition the nature which needs nothing. For thinking is a fine thing for us, because the soul needs to possess intellect, and for Intellect, because its

¹ Cp. IV. 5. 4 and 7, V. 5. 7

ταῦτον, καὶ ἡ νόησις πεποίηκεν αὐτὸν συνεῖναι οὖν δεῖ
 20 τῇ νοήσει τούτον καὶ σύνεσιν αὐτοῖς λιμβάνειν ἀεὶ ὅπι
 τουτο τουτο, διτὶ τὰ δύο ἔν· εἰ δὲ ἐν ἣν μόνον, ἤρκειν ἀν
 αὐτὰ καὶ οὐκ ἀν ἐδεήθη λαρεῖν ἐπει καὶ τὸ "γνῶσι
 σαυτὸν" λέγεται τούτοις, οἷ διὰ τὸ πλήθος ἑαυτῶν
 ἔργον ἔχουσι διαριθμεῖν ἑαυτοὺς καὶ μαθεῖν, οσα καὶ
 25 ποιὰ δύνται οὐ πάντα ἴσασα η̄ οὐδέν, οὐδὲ διὰ τὴν ἄρχειν οὐδὲ
 κατὰ τὶ αὐτοῖς. εἰ δέ τι ἔστιν αὐτό, μειζόνως ἔστιν η̄
 κατὰ γνῶσιν καὶ νόησιν καὶ σωματισθησιν αὐτοῦ ἐπει
 οὐδὲ ἑαυτῷ οὐδέν ἔστιν οὐδέν γάρ εἰσάγει εἰς αὐτόν,
 ἀλλὰ ἀρκεῖ αὐτό. οὐ τούτων οὐδὲ ἀγαθὸν αὐτῷ, ἀλλὰ τοῖς
 30 ἄλλοις ταῦτα γαρ καὶ δεῖται αὐτοῦ, αὐτὸ δὲ οὐκ ἀν
 δέοιτο ἑαυτοῦ γελοίον γάρ· οὐτω γάρ πᾶν καὶ ἐνδεὲς ἡ
 αἴτοι. οὐδὲ βλέπει δὴ ἑαυτό· δεῖ γάρ τι εἶναι καὶ
 γνίεσθαι αὐτῷ ἐκ τοῦ βλέπειν τούτων γὰρ ἀπάντων
 παρακεχώρηκε τοῖς μετ' αὐτῷ, καὶ κινδυνεύει μηδὲν
 τῶν προσάντων τοῖς ἄλλοις ἐκείνῳ παρεῖναι, ὥσπερ
 35 οὐδὲ οὐσίᾳ· οὐ τοίνιν οὐδὲ τὸ τοεῖν, εἰπερ ἐνταῦθα η̄
 οὐσία καὶ ἀμοῦ ἀμφοτέρης η̄ πρώτη καὶ κυρίως καὶ
 τὸ εἶναι διὸ διῆτε λόγος οὐτε αἰσθησις
 οὐτε ἐπιστήμη, διτὶ μηδὲν ἔστι κατηγορεῖν αὐτοῦ
 ὡς παρόν.

42. Ἀλλ' ὅταν ἀπορῇς ἐν τῷ τοιούτῳ καὶ ξητήσ.

¹ A reference to Parmenides fr. B 3 DK

being is the same as thinking,¹ and thinking made it; therefore this Intellect needs to keep company with thinking and to be always getting an intimate understanding of itself, that this is this, because the two are one; but if it was only one, it would have sufficed to itself and would not have needed to get understanding. Since also "Know yourself" is said to those who because of their selves' multiplicity have the business of counting themselves up and learning that they do not know all of the number and kind of things they are, or do not know any one of them, not what their ruling principle is or by what they are themselves. But if the Good is anything, it is so in a greater way than by knowledge and thought and self-perception since it is not anything for itself; for it does not bring anything into itself, but itself suffices. It is not, then, even good for itself, but for the others, for they need it, but it could not need itself; that would be ridiculous; for if it did it would be in need of itself. Nor, certainly, does it look at itself; for it must have and get something from the looking. For it has left all these things to the beings which come after it, and, so it seems, none of the additions to the others are with it, just as even substance is not; so not thinking either, since that is where substance is and the primary and authentic thinking and being are both together. Therefore "There is neither discourse nor perception nor knowledge"² because it is impossible to predicate anything of it as present with it.

42. But when in this kind of enquiry you adopt a rational approach to these things and get into dif-

² Plato *Parmenides* 142A3-4

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ὅπου δεῖ ταῦτα θέσθαι, λογισμῷ ἐπ' αὐτὰ στελλομένος
ἀπόθου ταῦτα, ἀ νομίζεις σεμνά εἶναι, ἐν τοῖς δευτέροις.
καὶ μήτρες τὰ δεύτερα προστίθει τῷ πρώτῳ μήτρες τὸ
δ τρίτα τοῖς δευτέροις, ἀλλὰ τὰ δεύτερα περὶ τὸ πρῶτον
τίθει καὶ τὰ τρίτα περὶ τὸ δεύτερον. οὕτω γάρ αὐτα
ἔκαστα ἔάσεις, ὡς ἔχει, καὶ τὰ ὕστερα ἔξαρτήσεις
ἔκεινων ὡς ἔκεινα περιμένοντα εφ' ἔαυτῶν ὄντα. διὸ καὶ
ὁρθῶς καὶ ταῦτη λέγεται περὶ τὸν πάντων
10 βασιλέα πάντα ἔστι κάκείνους ἔνεκα
πάντα, τὰ πάντα ὄντα λέγοντος αὐτοῦ καὶ τὸ εκείνου
ἔνεκα, ἐπειδὴ καὶ τοῦ εἶναι αἴτιος αὐτοῖς καὶ οἷος
δρέγεται ἔκεινου ἐτέρου ὄντος τῶν πάντων καὶ οὐδὲν
ἔχοντος, δ ἔκεινων πάρεστιν οὐκ οὐκέτι τὰ πάντα,
εἴ τι ἔκεινά τῶν ἄλλων τῶν μετ' αὐτὸν παρείη. εἰ οὖν
15 καὶ νοῦς τῶν πάντων, οὐδὲ νοῦς ἔκεινων. αἴτιον δὲ
λέγων πάντων καὶ λόγων τὸ καλὸν ἐν τοῦς εἶδεσι
φάνεται τιθέμενος, αὐτὸ δὲ ὑπὲρ τὸ καλὸν πᾶν τοῦτο
τῶντα δὴ δεύτερα τίθεις εἰς *(αὐτὰ)*¹ τὰ τρίτα φησὶν
ἀνηρτήσθαι τὰ μετὰ ταῦτα γενόμενα, καὶ περὶ τὰ τρίτα
20 δὲ τίθεις εἶναι δῆλον ὅτι τὰ γενόμενα ἐκ τῶν τρίτων,
κόσμον τόνδε, εἰς φυχῆν. ἀνηρτημένη δὲ φυχῆς εἰς νοῦν
καὶ νοῦ εἰς τάγαθόν, οὕτω πάντα εἰς ἔκεινον διὰ μέσων,
των μεν πλησίον, τῶν δὲ τοῖς πλησίον γειτονεύοντων,
ἔσχατην δ' ἀπόστασιν τῶν αἰσθητῶν ἔχόντων εἰς φυχὴν
ἀνηρτημένων.

¹ H. S.

¹ The reference is to *Platonic Letter II* 312E1 2. This

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ficulties and enquire where you should put them, put away these things which you regard as majestic on the second level, and do not add the seconds to the first or the thirds to the seconds but set the seconds around the first and the thirds around the second. For thus you will leave each of them as they are and will make the things which come after depend upon those higher realities which exist in independence as the later things circle round them. This is why it is rightly said in this regard also "All things are around the King of all and all are for the sake of that King"; Plato is speaking of all the real beings and says "for the sake of that King", since he is the cause of their being and they, we may say, strive after him, who is other than all of them and has nothing which belongs to them; otherwise they would not still be "all things" if any of the other things which come after him belonged to him. If then Intellect is one of "all things" it does not belong to him. But when Plato calls him "Cause of all beauties" he is clearly putting beauty in the world of Forms, but the Good itself above all this beauty. Now when he puts these second, he says that the thirds depend on them, that is the things which come to be after them, and what he posits around the thirds, clearly the things that came to be from the thirds, this universe here, he makes depend on Soul. But since Soul depends on Intellect and Intellect on the Good, so all things depend on him through intermediaries, some close to him, some neighbours of those close to him, and the things of sense dependent on Soul at the ultimate distance from him.

cryptic passage, very unlikely to be authentic Plato, had great authority for the Neoplatonists.

VI 8 ON FREE WILL AND THE WILL OF THE ONE

Introductory Note

THIS treatise, number 39, immediately follows in Porphyry's chronological order its predecessor in the *Enneads*, VI. 7 (38). The two together contain the profoundest and most powerful expression of the thought of Plotinus about the One or Good. This First Principle is spoken of here in more strongly positive terms than anywhere else in the *Enneads*: the language of will and love and thought is used about him, and he appears as something more like a "personal God" than he does elsewhere in the *Enneads*. But, as Plotinus makes clear in the treatise, this positive emphasis is in no way intended to be inconsistent with the negative way of approach to the One on which he so strongly insists. It is rather a powerful contribution to that negating of negations which the later Neoplatonists showed clearly was the final stage on the negative way and was necessary to attain that fruitful and illuminating silence in which alone the One can be contemplated.

Plotinus starts the treatise with an analysis of our concept of human freedom and it is from this that he ascends, with considerable trepidation but admitting that he has no better starting-point, to consider the freedom of the One which is the main subject of the work. At chapter 7 he introduces a "rash statement starting from a different way of thinking" which says that since the Good "happens to be as it is, and does not have the mastery of what it is, and is what it is not from itself, it would not have freedom

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and its doing or not doing what it is necessitated to do or not to do is not in its power." It is not clear whether Plotinus regards this as a positive statement of a doctrine other than his own or as an objection to his own doctrine; and if the latter, whether it is a possible objection which he has himself thought of or an objection which he has actually heard from others, a view of my own that it comes from a Christian source much concerned to assert the absolute freedom of God's will has not been generally accepted (A H Armstrong, "Two Views of Freedom" in *Studia Patristica XVIII*, Pergamon Press, Oxford 1982, 397-406). But however that may be, he takes it very seriously, and concentrates in the rest of the treatise on establishing his own doctrine of the One against it. It is in doing this that he uses language more likely than anything else in the *Enneads* to commend his version of Platonism to theists (Platonist, Jewish or Christian) accustomed to think of God as a Supreme Being possessed of intelligence and will; though, as has already been said, he is careful to show that this positive language is in no way inconsistent with his negative theology.

Synopsis

Statement of scope of the enquiry: it is to extend as high as the One, but we must begin with our own experience of "having something in our power" (ch. 1). Problems about the freedom of human beings in our present state, as embodied souls (chs. 2-3). Freedom is power to go to the Good. Intellect possesses this in the fullest degree (ch. 4). Our souls in their highest, contemplative activity can share in this freedom of Intellect (chs. 5-6). How can we drag the lord and master of all things, the Good, into our discussion of freedom? A rash and absurd statement about

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it (ch. 7). Total inadequacy of all our language to the Good (ch. 8). And especial inadequacy of "it happened to be" (ch. 9). Chance is later than and inferior to Intellect; and though the Good necessarily is what he is he is not bound by necessity but is the necessity and law of the others (ch. 10). Questions which cannot properly be asked about the Good, necessity to overcome our persistent tendency to imagine it as in a place (ch. 11). That which gives freedom to substance itself must be still freer; though "master of himself" is inadequate (ch. 12). Yet perhaps we must use this sort of inadequate language, understanding "as if" with every word; then we shall say that the Good is master of himself and is as he willed himself to be (ch. 13). Cause and substance are one in the world of real being; still more in the cause of that world. He is cause of himself, self primarily and beyond being (ch. 14). He is supremely lovable and love of himself; when we attain to him we are far above chance, more than free and more than independent (ch. 15). He is everywhere and nowhere, giving himself existence in being awake to himself (ch. 16). Intellect's beyond providence, choice and chance, and its cause still more so, by himself what he is, related and directed to himself (ch. 17). Intellect and the One image of the circle with the One as centre, being as he wished to be and ought to be (ch. 18). Experience of the Good transcends language: he who made being has no need of being and is so beyond it (ch. 19). He is eternally his own self-making, totally self-determined and at his own disposal (ch. 20). He is his will, truly free and truly himself (ch. 21).

VI. 8. (39) ΠΕΡΙ ΤΟΥ ΕΚΟΥΣΙΟΥ ΚΑΙ
ΘΕΛΗΜΑΤΟΣ ΤΟΥ ΕΝΟΣ

1. Ἐπεὶ καὶ ἐπὶ θεῶν εἰ τί ἔστω ἐπ' αὐτοῖς
ζητεῖν, η̄ ἐι ἀνθρώπων ἀδυναμίαις τε καὶ
ἀμφισβητούμοις δυνάμεσι τὸ τοιοῦτον ὡς πρέποι
ζητεῖν, θεοῖς δὲ τὸ¹ πάντα δύνασθαι ἐπιτρεπτέον καὶ
5 ἐπ' αὐτοῖς οὐ μόνον τι, ἀλλὰ καὶ πάντα εἶναι; η̄ τὴν
δύναμιν δὴ πᾶσαν καὶ τὸ ἐπ' αὐτῷ δὴ πάντα ἐνὶ²
ἐπιτρεπτέον, τοῖς δὲ ἄλλοις τὰ μὲν οὖτως, τὰ δὲ ἐκείνως
ἔχειν, καὶ πίστι² ἐκατέρως; η̄ καὶ ταῦτα μὲν Ζητητέου,
τολμητέον δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν πρωτῶν καὶ τοῦ ἀνωτέρου
10 πάντα ζητεῖν τὸ τοιοῦτον, πᾶς τὸ ἐπ' αὐτῷ, καν̄ πάντα³
συγχωρόμεν δύνασθαι. καίτοι καὶ τὸ δύνασθαι τούτῳ
σκεπτέον πᾶς ποτε λέγεται, μήποτε οὖτως τὸ μὲν
δύναμιν, τὸ δὲ ἐνέργειαν φήσομεν, καὶ ἐνέργειαν
μέλλοισαν. ἀλλὰ ταῦτα μὲν ἐν τῷ παρόντι ἀναβλητέον,
15 πρότερον δὲ ἐφ' ήμῶν αὐτῶν, ἐφ' ὅν καὶ ζητεῖν ἔθος, εἰ

¹ H. S.¹ τε Enn² Harder, Theiler, recte: πίστι H. S.²VI. 8. ON FREE WILL AND THE WILL OF
THE ONE

1. Is it possible to enquire even about the gods whether there is anything which is in their power, or is it true that this kind of enquiry is proper in dealing with human impotences and dubious powers, but we must attribute to the gods omnipotence and say that not just something but everything is in their power? Or is it true that omnipotence and having everything in his power is indeed to be attributed to the One, but with the other gods we should say that some things are this way and some the other way, and of which gods each is true? Now we must certainly enquire about this as well [as human freedom] and we must dare to push our enquiry on to the first beings and to him who is on high above all things, and enquire in this way what "being in his power" means, even if we agree that he is omnipotent. And we must investigate as well what this "potent" means, in case by using this term we intend to say that it sometimes means potency and sometimes actual activity, and an activity which belongs to the future.¹ But we must postpone these questions for the present, and first enquire about ourselves, as we usually do, whether

¹ Plotinus shows himself here very well aware of the ambiguity inherent in the Greek philosophical usage of δύναται, δύναμις which it is often necessary to take into account in reading him.

PLOTINJS. ENNEAD VI. 8.

τι ἐφ' ἡμῖν δν τυγχάνει. πρώτον ζητητέον τί ποτε δεῖ τὸ
ἐφ' ἡμῖν εἶναι τι λέγειν τοῦτο δ' ἔστι τις ἔνοια τοῦ
τοιούτου· οὐτω γὰρ δν πως γνωσθεῖη, εἰ καὶ ἐπὶ θεοὺς
καὶ ἐπὶ μᾶλλον ἐπὶ θεὸν ἀρμόζει μεταφέρειν ἢ οὐ
20 μετενεκτέον ἢ μετενεκτέον μὲν, ζητητέον δέ, πῶς τὸ
ἐπ' αἰτοῦς τοῖς τε ἄλλοις καὶ ἐπὶ των πρώτων. τί τούτην
νοοῦντες τὸ ἐφ' ἡμῖν λέγομεν καὶ διὰ τί ζητοῦντες; ἐγὼ
μὲν οἴμαι, ἐν ταῖς ἔναντίαις κινούμενοι τύχαις τε καὶ
ἀναγκαῖς καὶ παθῶν ἴσχυραῖς προσβολαῖς τὴν ψυχὴν
25 κατεχούσαις, ἅπαντα ταῦτα κύρια νομίσαντες εἶναι καὶ
δουλεύοντες αὐτοῖς καὶ φερόμενοι ἢ ἐκεῖνα ἄγοι, μή
ποτε οὐδέν ἐσμεν οὐδέ τί ἔστιν ἐφ' ἡμῖν ἡ παρῆσαμεν, ὡς
τούτου ἐσορένου ἀν ἐφ' ἡμῖν, δη μὴ τύχαις δουλεύοντες
μηδὲ ἀνάγκαις μηδὲ πάθεσιν ἴσχυροῖς πρίξαμεν ἀν
30 βουληθέντες οὐδένος ἔναντιουμένου ταῖς βουλήσεσιν. εἰ
δὲ τούτο, εἴη ἀν ἡ ἔνοια τοῦ ἐφ' ἡμῖν, δη βουλήσεις
δουλείει καὶ παρὰ τοσοῦτον¹ ἀν γένοιτο ἡ μή, παρ'
ὅσον βουληθείημεν ἀν. ἐκούσιον μὲν γὰρ πᾶν, δη μὴ βίᾳ
μετὰ τοῖς εἰδέναι, ἐφ' ἡμῖν δέ, δη καὶ κύριοι πρᾶξαι. καὶ

Kirchhoff: τοῦτον wBRQ: τοῦτο JU: τοῦτον C.

In this discussion of human freedom, which continues to ch. 6, Plotinus takes account of earlier, mostly Peripatetic, discussions, especially Aristotle's treatment of the voluntary and involuntary in *Nicomachean Ethics* Γ 1-5 1109b30-1114b25. But he is not concerned with

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anything does happen to be in our power.¹ First we must ask what something "being in our power" ought to mean, that is, what is the idea of this kind of thing in our minds; for in this way it might come to be known whether it is suitable to transfer it to the gods and, still more, to God, or whether it should not be transferred; or whether it should be transferred, but we should enquire how "being in their power" is to be applied to the other gods and to the first beings. What then do we have in our minds when we speak of "being in our power", and why are we trying to find out? I myself think that, when we are pushed around among opposing chances and compulsions and strong assaults of passions possessing our soul, we acknowledge all these things as our masters and are enslaved to them and carried wherever they take us, and so are in doubt whether we are not nothing and nothing is in our power, on the assumption that whatever we might do when not enslaved to chances or compulsions or strong passions, because we wished it and with nothing opposing our wishes, this would be in our power. But if this is so, our idea of what is in our power would be something enslaved to our will and would come to pass (or not) to the extent to which we wished it. For everything is a voluntary act which we do without being forced to and with knowledge [of what we are doing], and in our power which we are also competent to do. And refuting or criticising his predecessors but with building up his own distinctive Platonic view of human freedom, that we are only truly free when we live on our highest level in the realm of Intellect.

35 συνθέοι μὲν ἄν πολλαχοῦ ἄμφω καὶ τοῦ λόγοι αἰτᾶν ἐπέρυν ὄντος, ἔστι δὲ οὐκ καὶ διαφωνήσειν ἄν· οἷον εἰ καρκίνος ἢν τοῦ ἀποκτέναι, ἢν ἀν οὐχ ἔκουσσοι αὐτῷ πεπραχότι, εἰ τον πατέρα ἡγγρέι τούτον εἶναι. τάχι δὲ ἀν κάκενψ διαφωνοί ἔχοντι τὸ ἐφ' ἑαυτῷ δεῖ δὴ καὶ 40 τὸν αἴδησιν ἐν τῷ ἔκουσίψ οὐκ εἰ τοῖς καθέκαστα μόνον εἶναι, ἀλλὰ καὶ ὅλως. διὰ τί γάρ, εἰ μὲν ἀγνοεῖ, δητὶ φίλος, ἀκούσιον, εἰ δὲ ἀγνοεῖ, δητὶ μὴ δεῖ, οὐκ ἀκούσιον; εἰ δὲ δητὶ ἔδαι μανθάνειν, οὐκ ἔκοισιον τὸ μὴ εἰδέναι, δητὶ ἔδει μανθάνειν, ἢ τὸ ἀπάγον ἀπὸ τοῦ μανθάνειν

2. Ἐλλ' ἔκεινο ζητητέον τοῦτο δὴ τὸ ἀναφερόμενον εἰς ἡμᾶς ὡς ἐφ' ἥγιον ὑπάρχον τίνι δεῖ διδόναι· ἢ γὰρ τῇ ὅμηρῳ καὶ γῆτινοιν ὁρέξει, οἷον δὲ θυμῷ πράττεται (<ἢ μὴ πράττεται>),² ἢ ἐπιθυμίᾳ ἢ λογισμῷ τοῦ συμφέροντος μιστὸν ὁρέξεως [<ἢ μὴ πράττεται>.]² ἀλλ' εἰ μὲν θυμῷ καὶ ἐπιθυμίᾳ, καὶ παισὶ καὶ θηρίοις τὸ ἐπ' αὐτοῖς τι εἶναι δώσομεν καὶ μαινομένοις καὶ ἔξεστηκόσι καὶ φαρμάκοις ἀλοῦσι καὶ ταῖς προσπιπτούσαις φαντασίαις, ὃν οὐ κύριοι εἰ δὲ λογισμῷ μετ' ὁρέξεως, 10 δέρ' εἰ καὶ πεπλανημένῳ τῷ λογισμῷ, ἢ τῷ ὄρθῳ λογισμῷ καὶ τῇ ὄρθῃ ὁρέξει. καίτοι καὶ ἐνταῦθα ζητήσειν ἄν τις, πότερα δὲ λογισμὸς τὴν ὁρέξιν ἐκινησεν, ἢ τοῦτον ἢ ὁρέξις καὶ γὰρ εἰ κατὰ φίσιν αἱ ὁρέξεις, εἰ μὲν ὡς ζύοις καὶ τοῦ συνθέτου, ἢ κολούθησεν

¹ Kirchhoff συνθοι μὲν UC^{pe} συνθε. μὲν wBxC. συνθείμεν Q. H. S¹.

² transpos. Igal

both may often coincide, even if their definition is different; but sometimes they might be discordant; for instance, if one was competent to kill, it would not be a voluntary act when one did so if one did not know that this man was one's father. But perhaps that ignorance would be incompatible with having something in one's power; and certainly the knowledge involved in a voluntary act must not only apply in the particular circumstances but generally. For why is the action involuntary if one does not know that it is a relation, but not involuntary if one does not know that one ought not to do it? Possibly because one ought to have learnt that? Not knowing that one ought to have learnt it is not voluntary nor is what leads one away from learning

2. But we must enquire into the following to what ought we to attribute this which is referred to us as being in our power? One possibility is to attribute it to impulse and any kind of desire, for instance what is done or not done by passion or lust or calculation of the beneficial accompanied by desire. But if by passion or lust, we shall grant that something is in the power of children and wild animals and madmen and those who are beside themselves and caught by drugs or casually occurring imaginations of which they are not master; but if by calculation accompanied by desire, is this so if the calculation has gone wrong? Should we perhaps attribute it to correct calculation accompanied by correct desire? Yet even here one might enquire whether the calculation set the desire in motion or the desire the calculation. Then also, if the desires are according to nature, if they are of the kind that belong to the living being, that is, the composite, the soul followed

15 ή ψυχὴ τῇ τῆς φίσεως ἀνάγκῃ· εἰ δὲ ὡς ψυχῆς μόνης,
 πολλὰ τῶν νῦν ἐφ' ἡμῖν λεγομένων ἔξω ἀν τούτου
 γίνονται. εἴτα καὶ τίς λογισμὸς φιλὸς πρόεισι τῶν
 παθημάτων; η τε φαντασία ἀνηγκάζοντα η τε ὄρεξις
 ἐφ' ὅ τι ἀν ἄγγελον σώματα πάσι ἐν τούτοις κυρίους ποιεῖ;
 πῶς δ' ὅλως κύριοι, οὐδὲ ἀγόμεθα; τὸ γὰρ ἐνδεές ἔξι
 20 ἀνάγκης πληρώσεως ὄρεγόμενον οὐκ ἔστι κύρον τοῦ
 ἐφ' ὅ παντες ἀγεται. πῶς δ' ὅλως αὐτό τι παρ' αὐτοῖς,
 δ' παρ' ἄλλον καὶ ἀρχὴν εἰς ἄλλο ἔχει κάκεΐθεν
 γεγένηται οὖν ἔστι; κατ' ἑκαντόν γὲ καὶ τὰ ἀψυχα ἔξει τὸ ἐπ' αὐτοῖς
 25 τι εἰληφέναι ποιεῖ γὰρ ὡς γεγένηται καὶ τὸ πῦρ. εἰ δ'
 ὅπει γιγνώσκει τὸ ζῷον καὶ η ψυχὴ δ' ποιεῖ, εἰ μὲν
 αἰσθήσει, τίς η προσθήκη πρὸς τὸ ἐπ' αὐτοῖς εἶναι; οὐ
 γερ η αἰσθήσις πεποίηκε τοῦ ἔργου κύρον ὕδωστα
 μόνον. εἰ δὲ γνώσει, εἰ μὲν γνώσει τοῦ ποιουμένου, καὶ
 30 ἐνταῦθα οὐδὲ μόνον, ἄλλο δὲ ἐπὶ τῷ πρᾶξιν ἄγει· εἰ δὲ
 καὶ παρὰ τὴν ὄρεξιν δ' λόγος ποιεῖ η η γνώσις καὶ
 μεραρχία, εἰς τί ἀναφέρει ζητητέον καὶ ὅλως ποῦ τοῦτο
 συμβαίνει. καὶ εἰ μὲν αὐτὸς ἄλλην ὄρεξιν ποιεῖ, πῶς
 ληπτέον· εἰ δὲ τὴν ὄρεξιν παύσας ἔστη καὶ ἐνταῦθι τὸ
 35 ἐφ' ἡμῖν, οὐκ ἐν πράξει τοῦτο ξεσται, ἀλλ' ἐν τῷ
 στήσεται τοῦτο· ἐπει καὶ τὸ ἐν πράξει πᾶν, καν κρατῆσθαι
 λόγος, μικτὸν καὶ οὐ καθαρὸν δύναται τὸ ἐφ' ἡμῖν ἔχειν.

FREE WILL AND THE WILL OF THE ONE

the necessity of nature; but if they are of the kind that belongs to the soul alone, many of the things which are now said to be in our power will be outside it. Then also, what bare calculation precedes our passions? Or when imagination compels and desire pulls us in whatever direction it leads, how are we given the mastery in these circumstances? And how in general can we have the mastery where we are led? For that which is in need and necessarily desires to be filled does not have the mastery over that to which it is simply being led. But how in general can something be self-originated which comes from something else and whose origin is referred to some thing else and has come to be as it is from thence? For it lives according to that and as it is formed by it, or in this way soulless things will be able to have something in their power; for fire also acts as it has come to be. But if it is because the living being and the soul knows what it does if it knows by sense-perception, what help is that to things being in their power? For sense-perception does not give mastery of the work since it only sees. But if by knowledge, if it is by knowledge of what is being done, here too it only knows, but something else leads to action; but if reason or knowledge acts against the desire and gets the better of it, we must enquire to what this is to be referred, and in general where it takes place. And if reason itself makes another desire, we must understand how; but if it puts a stop to the desire and stands still and this is where what is in our power is, this will not be in action, but will stand still in Intellect; since everything in the sphere of action, even if reason is dominant, is mixed and cannot have being in our power in a pure state.

3. Διὸ σκεπτέον περὶ τούτων ἡδη γάρ αὐτὸν καὶ ἐγγὺς γινόμεθα τοῖς λογου τοῦ περὶ θεῶν ἀναγαγόντες τούνν τὸ ἐφ' ἡμίν εἰς βούλησιν, εἴτα ταυτὴν ἐν λόγῳ θέμενοι, εἴτα ἐν λόγῳ ὄρθῳ—ἴσως δε δεῖ προσθεῖναι τῷ ὄρθῳ τὸ
 5 τῆς ἐπιστήμης· οὐ γάρ, εἴ τις ἐδόξασεν ὄρθως καὶ ἐπραξεν, ἔχοι ἂν ἵστις ἀναμφισβήτητον τὸ αὐτεξύνουσαν,
 εἰ μὴ εἰδὼς διότι ὄρθως, ἀλλὰ τύχη ἡ φαντασία τινὶ¹
 προς τὸ δέον ἀχθείσ· ἐπεὶ καὶ τὴν φαντασίαν οὐκ ἐφ'
 ἡμιν εἶναι λέγοντες τοὺς κατ' αὐτὴν δρᾶντας μηδὲ ἂν εἰς
 10 τὸ αὐτεξύνουσαν τάξαιμεν, ἀλλὰ γάρ ἡμεῖς τὴν μὲν φαντασίαν, ἢν ἀν τις καὶ φυντασίαν κυρίως εἴποι, τὴν
 ἐκ τοῦ σώματος τῶν παθημάτων ἐγειρομένην (καὶ γάρ κεκνώσεις σίτων καὶ ποτῶν φαντασίας οὖν
 15 ἀναπλάττουσι καὶ πληρώσεις αὐτὸν καὶ μεστός τις σπέρματος ἀλλὰ φυντασίας καὶ καθὸς ἐκάστας ποιάτητας ὑγρῶν τῶν ἐν σώματι) τοὺς κατὰ τὰς τοιαύτας φαντασίας ἐνεργούντας εἰς ἀρχὴν αὐτούσιον οὐδὲ τίκυτον διὸ καὶ τοῖς φαύλοις κατὰ ταύτας πράττοντοι τὰ πολλὰ οὔτε τὸ ἐπ' αὐτοῖς οὔτε τὸ
 20 ἑκούσιον δωσομεν, τῷ δὲ διὰ νοῦ τῶν ἐνεργεῶν ἐλευθέρω τῶν παθημάτων τοῦ σώματος τὸ αὐτεξύνουσαν δῶσομεν—εἰς ἀρχὴν τὸ ἐφ' ἡμιν καλλίστην ἀνάγοντες

¹H S. & Enr

¹In his earlier discussion of imagination and memory in his great work on the soul, IV. 3-5 (27-29), Plotinus comes to the conclusion that there are two φαντασίαι, one

FREE WILL AND THE WILL OF THE ONE

3. We must therefore enquire about these matters; for [in doing so] we are already also coming near to our subject of discourse, the gods. Well then, we traced back what is in our power to will, and then placed this in the context of discourse, and then of correct discourse—but perhaps we ought to add to “correct” that it belongs to rational knowledge, for if someone had a right opinion and acted on it he would not indisputably have the power of self determination if he acted, without knowing why his opinion was right, but led to his duty by chance or some imagination, since when we say that imagination is not in our power, how can we put those who act by it in the class of the self-determined? But we do say this about the imagination which one can properly call imagination,¹ that which is roused by the experiences of the body, for being empty, or again full, of food and drink in a way gives the imaginations shape, and one who is full of semen has different imaginations, and so it is according to all the qualities of the bodily fluids, and we shall not class those who are active according to imaginations of this kind among those whose principle of action is self-determined; therefore we shall not grant to bad men, who do most things according to these, either having something in their power or voluntary action, but we shall grant voluntary action to one whose doings depend on the activities of Intellect and who is free from bodily affections. We trace back what is in our power to the noblest

belonging to the higher and one to the lower soul (IV. 3. 31). But here he seems to exclude the higher φαντασία from consideration.

PLOTINUS: ENNEAD VI. 8.

τὴν τοῦ νοῦ ἐνέργειαν καὶ τὰς ἐπτεῦθεις προτάσεις
ἐλευθέρας οὕτως <εἶναι>¹ δῶσομεν, καὶ τὰς ὄρέξεις τὰς
ἐκ τοῦ νοοῦ ἔγειρομένας οὐκ ἀκονοίος [εἶναι
δῶσομεν],² καὶ τοῖς θεοῖς τυντούς ζῶσ τὸν τρόπον [δοσοὶ
νῷ καὶ ὄρέξει τῇ κατὰ νοῦν ζώσι]² φήσομεν παρεῖναι.

4 Καίτοι ζητήσειεν ἄν τις, πῶς πυτε τὸ καὶ ὄρεξιν
γιγνόμενον αὐτεξούσιον ἔσται τῆς ὄρέξεως ἐπὶ τὸ ἔξω
ἀγούσης καὶ τὸ ἐρδεές ἔχουσης ἀγεταὶ γὰρ τὸ
ὄρεγόμενον, καν εἰ πρὸς τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἀγοιτο. καὶ δὴ καὶ
5 περὶ τοῦ νοῦ αὐτοῦ ἀπορητέον, εἰ ὅπερ πέφυκε καὶ ὡς
πέφυκεν ἐνέργων λέγοιτο ἀν τὸ ἐλεύθερον ἔχειν καὶ τὸ
ἐπὶ αὐτῷ, οὐκ ἔχων ἐπ’ αὐτῷ τὸ μη ποιεῖν. ἔπειτα, εἰ
οὖλος κυρίως λέγοιτο ἐπ’ ἑκείνων τὸ επ’ αὐτοῖς, οἷς
πρᾶξις οὐ πάρεστιν. ἀλλὰ καὶ οἷς πρᾶξις, ἢ ἀνάγκη
10 ἔξωθεν· οὐ γὰρ μάτην πράξουσιν. ἀλλ’ οὖν πῶς το
ἐλεύθερον δουλεύεντων καὶ γοίτων τῇ αὐτῷ φύσει; η.
εἰ μὴ ἐτέρῳ ἔπεισθαι ἡνάγκασται, πῶς ἄν τὸ δουλεύειν
λέγοιτο; πῶς δὲ πρὸς τὸ ἀγαθὸν τι φερόμενοι
ἡναγκασμένοι ἀν εἴη ἐκποιτίον. τῆς ἐφέσεως οὐσης. εἰ
15 εἰδὼς ὅτι ἀγαθὸν ὡς ἐπ’ ἀγαθὸν ἔστι; τὸ γὰρ ἀκούσιον
ἀπαγωγὴ ἀπὸ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ καὶ πρὸς τὸ ἡναγκασμένον, εἰ
πρὸς τοῦτο φέροιτο, δι μὴ ἀγαθον αὐτῷ· καὶ δουλεύει
τοῦτο, δι μὴ κύριον ἔστιν ἐπὶ τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἐλθεῖν, ἀλλ’
20 ἐτέρου κρείττονος ἐφεστηκότος ἀπάγεται τῶν αὐτοῦ
ἀγαθῶν δουλεύον ἑκείνῳ. δια τοῦτο γὰρ καὶ δουλεία
φεγεται οὐχ οὐδὲ τις οὐκ ἔχει. ἔξουσίαν ἐπὶ τὸ κακὸν

¹ transposuitus.

² del. H-S¹, ut glossam

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principle, the activity of Intellect, and shall grant that the premises of action derived from this are truly free, and that the desires roused by thinking are not involuntary, and we shall say that the gods who live in this way have selfdetermination.

4. But all the same one might enquire how what happens under the impulse of desire can be self-determined when desire leads one to what is outside [oneself] and has deficiency in it; for that which desires is led, even if it is led to the good. And a difficulty must be raised about Intellect itself, whether, when its activity is what it is by nature and as it is by nature, it could be said to have freedom and anything in its power, when it does not have it in its power not to act. And then whether "in their power" can properly be said of those beings which have no practical action. But the necessity comes from outside also to those beings which are engaged in practical action; for their action will not be purposeless. But then how is there freedom when even these higher beings are slaves to their own nature? Now, where there is no compulsion to follow another, how can one speak of slavery? How could something borne towards the Good be under compulsion since its desire for the Good will be voluntary if it knows that it is good and goes to it as good? For the involuntary is a leading away from the good and towards the compulsory, if something is carried to that which is not good for it and that is enslaved which is not master of its going to the Good, but, since something stronger than it stands over it, it is enslaved to that and led away from its own goods. For it is for this reason that slavery is ill spoken of, not where one has no power to go to the bad, but

PLOTINUS: ENNEAD VI. 8

έλθειν, ἀλλ’ οὐδὲπί το ἄγαθὸν τὸ ἑαυτοῦ ἀγόμενος πρὸς τὸ ἄγαθὸν τὸ ἄλλου. τὸ δὲ καὶ δουλεύειν λέγειν τῇ αὐτοῦ φύσει θύμον ποιοῦντάς ἔστι τὸ τὸ δουλεῦον καὶ τὸ φύσεις 25 δὲ ἀπλῆ καὶ ἐνέργεια μία καὶ οὐδὲ τὸ δυνάμει ἔχονσα ἄλλο, ἄλλο δὲ τὸ ἐνέργεια, πῶς οὐκ ἐλευθέρα; οὐδὲ γὰρ ὡς πέφυκε λέγοντο ἀνὴν ἐνέργειν ἄλληροι οὖσης τῆς οὐσίας τῆς δὲ ἐνέργειας ἄλλης, εἰπερ τὸ αὐτὸ τὸ εἶναι ἔκει καὶ τὸ ἐνέργειν εἰ οὐν οὔτε δὶ ἐτέρον οὔτε ἐφ’ ἐτέρῳ, πῶς 30 οὐκ ἐλευθέρα; καὶ εἰ μή τὸ ἐπ’ αὐτῷ ὅρμοσει, ἄλλι μεῖζον ἐγταῦθα ποὺ ἐπ’ αὐτῷ, καὶ οὗτος ἐπ’ αὐτῷ, ὅτι μή ἐφ’ ἐτέρῳ μηδὲ ἄλλο τῆς ἐνέργειας κύριον οὐδὲ γὰρ τῆς οὐσίας, εἰπερ αρχὴ καὶ εἰ αλληρὸν δὲ ὁ νοῦς ὀρχήτης ἔχει, ἄλλ’ οὐκ ἔξι αὐτοῦ, ἄλλ’ ἐν τῷ ἀγαθῷ. καὶ εἰ κατ’ 35 ἔκεινο τὸ ἄγαθόν, πολὺ μᾶλλον *τὸ*¹ ἐπ’ αὐτῷ καὶ τὸ ἐλεύθερον· ἐπεὶ καὶ τὸ ἐλεύθερον καὶ τὸ ἐπ’ αὐτῷ τις ζητεῖ τοῦ ἄγαθον χάριν. εἰ οὖν κατὰ τὸ ἄγαθον ἐνέργει, μᾶλλον ἀν τὸ ἐπ’ αὐτῷ· ἥδη γὰρ ἔχει τὸ πρὸς αὐτὸ ἐξ αὐτοῖς ὅρμομενον² καὶ ἐν αὐτῷ [εἰπερ πρὸς αὐτού],³ ὁ 40 ὅμεινον ἀν εἴη αὐτῷ ἐν αὐτῷ ἀν εἶναι, εἰπερ πρὸς αὐτό.

5. Ἀρ’ οὖν ἐν νῷ μόνῳ νοοῦντι τὸ αὐτεξουσίον καὶ τὸ ἐπ’ αὐτῷ καὶ ἐν νῷ τῷ καθαρῷ ή καὶ ἐν ψυχῇ κατὰ νοῦν ἐνεργούσῃ καὶ κατὰ ἀρετὴν πραττούσῃ; τὸ μὲν οὖν πραττούσῃ εἰπερ δώσομεν, πρᾶπτον μὲν οὐ πρὸς τὴν

Kirchhof.

² Kirchhof: δράμανοι Enn.

³ delevimus

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where one has no power to go to one's own good but is led away to the good of another. But to speak of being enslaved to one's own nature is making two things, one which is enslaved and one to which it is enslaved. But how is a simple nature and single active actuality not free when it does not have one part potential and one actual? For it could not be said to be active according to its nature as if its substance was one thing and its activity another if being and acting there are the same. If then the activity is neither because of another or in the power of another, how is it not free? And even if "being in its own power" is unsuitable language but there is something higher than being in its power here, even so it is in its own power because it is not in the power of another nor is another master of its activity; nor indeed of its substance, if it is principle of its substance. And even if Intellect does have another principle, it is not outside it, but it is in the Good. And if it is active according to the Good, it is much more in its own power and free; since one seeks freedom and being in one's own power for the sake of the Good. If then it is active according to the Good, it would be still more in its own power; for it has already what goes from itself to it, and in itself what would be better for it, being in it, if it is directed towards it.

5. Is self-determination and being in one's own power, then, only in Intellect when it thinks, that is, pure intellect, or is it also in soul when it is active according to intellect and engaged in practical action according to virtue? Now if we are going to grant it to the soul engaged in practical action, first of all it should not perhaps be granted in reference to

PLOTINUS: ENNEAD VI. 8

5 τεθέντως χρή διδόναι: οὐ γάρ ήμεῖς τοῦ τυχεῖν κύριοι
 εἰ δὲ πρὸς τὸ καλῶς καὶ τὸ πάντα ποιῆσαι τὰ παρ
 αὐτον, τάχι μὲν ἐν τούτῳ ὁρθῷ λέγοντο. ἐκεῖνο δὲ πῶς
 ἐφ ημῖν, οἷον εἰ, διότι πόλεμος, ἀνδριζόμεθα λέγω δε
 τὴν τότε ἐνέργειαν πώς ἐφ' ημῖν, ὅπότε πολέμου μη
 10 καὶ αλαβόντος οὐκ ηἱ τὴν ἐνέργειαν ταύτην πιεῖσθαι.
 ὅμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῷ ἄλλῳ πράξεων τῶν κατὰ ἀρετὴν
 ἀπασῶν πρὸς τὸ προσπίπτον αἱ ἀναγκαζομένης τῆς
 ἀρετῆς τοδ. η τοδὶ ἐργάζεσθαι καὶ γάρ εἴ τις αἱρεσιν
 αὐτῇ δοίη τῇ ἀρετῇ, πότερα βούλεται, οὐ' ἔχοι ἐνέργειν,
 15 εἶναι πολέμους, ὥντα ἀνδρίζοντο, καὶ εἶναι ἀδικίαν, ὥν τα
 δίκαιοι ἀρίζῃ καὶ κατακοπμῇ. καὶ πενίαν, ὥν τὸ
 ἐλευθέριον ἐνδεικνύοντο, η πάντων εἰ ἔχοντων ἡουχίαν
 ἄγειν, ἔλοιτο ἂν τὴν ἡσιχίαν τῶν πράξεων οἰδεῖν
 20 θεραπείας δευμένου τῆς παρ' αὐτῆς, ὥσπερ ἂν εἴ τις
 ἱατρός, οἷον Ἱπποκράτης, μηδένα δεῖσθαι τῆς παρ'
 αὐτοῦ τέχνης. εἰ οὖν ἐνέργοντα ἐν ταῖς πράξεσιν η
 ἀρετὴ ἡγάκασται βοηθείν, πώς ἂν καθαρῶς ἔχοι το ἐπ'
 αὐτῇ; δρ' οὖν τὰς πράξεις μεν ἀναγκαίας, τὴν δὲ
 βοηθησιν τὴν πρὸ τῶν πράξεων καὶ τὸν λόγον οὐκ
 25 ἡγαγκασμένον φήσομεν; ἀλλ' εἰ τοῦτο, εἰ ψιλῷ
 τιθέμενοι τῷ πρὸ τοῦ πραττομένου, ἔξω τῆς πράξεως
 το αὐτεξαύσιον καὶ τὸ ἐπ' αὐτῇ τῇ ἀρετῇ θήσομεν. τί δὲ
 επ' αὐτῆς τῆς ἀρετῆς τῆς κατὰ την ἔξω καὶ τὴν
 διάθεσιν; δρ' οὐ κακῶς ψυχῆς ἔχούσης φήσομεν αὐτὴν
 30 τὰς ὄρέξεις; τίνα οὖν τρόπον λέγομεν ἐφ' ημῖν τὸ

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the accomplishment; for it is not we who are in charge of the accomplishment. But if it is granted in reference to acting finely and doing everything which comes from oneself, perhaps this might be correctly said. But how is that in our power? For instance if we are brave because there is a war; what I mean is, how is the activity then in our power when if war did not break out it would not be possible to carry out this activity? But it is also the same with the other actions done according to virtue, since virtue is always being compelled to do this or that to cope with what turns up. For certainly if someone gave virtue itself the choice whether it would like in order to be active that there should be wars, that it might be brave, and that there should be injustice that it might define what is just and set things in order, and poverty, that it might display its liberality, or to stay quiet because everything was well, it would choose to rest from its practical activities because nothing needed its curative action as if a physician, for instance Hippocrates, were to wish that nobody needed his skill. If then when it is active in practical affairs virtue is compelled to be helpful, how can things be purely and simply in its power? Are we then to assert that the actions are compelled but the will and the reason which are before the action are not compelled? But if this is so, by placing them only in what comes before the action we shall be placing self-determination, and being in the power of virtue itself, outside the action. And what about virtue itself which is according to state and disposition? Are we to say that when the soul is in a bad way it comes to set it to rights by bringing the passions and desires within proper limits? In what

PLOTINUS· ENNEAD VI. 8.

ἀγαθοῖς εἶναι καὶ τὸ ἀδέσποτον τὴν ἀρετὴν, η̄
τοῖς γε θουληθεῖσι καὶ ἐλομένοις· η̄ διτὶ ἐγγενομένη
αὐτῇ καπασικεῖται τὸ ἐλεύθερον καὶ τὸ ἐφ' ἡμῖν καὶ
οὐκέ τέτοιο δούλους εἶναι, ὁν πρότερον ἥμεν. εἰ οὖν οὐσία
35 νοῦς τις ἀλλος ἔστιν ἡ ἀρετὴ καὶ ἔξις οὐσία νοωθῆται τῇ
ψυχῇ παιούσα, πάλιν αἱ ἡγεινοὶ οὐκέ τὸν πράξει τὸ ἐφ' ἡμῖν
ἀλλ' εν υψηλῷ τῶν πράξεων

6. Πῶς οὖν εἰς βούλησα πρότερον ἀνήγομεν τούτοις λέγοντες "οὐ παρὰ τὸ βούληθηναι γένοιτο ἄν"; η̄ κάκει ἐλέγετο "η̄ μὴ γένοιτο". εἰ οὖν τὰ τενῦν ὄρθως λέγεται ἐκεῖνά τε τούτοις σιμφώνως ἔξει, φήσομεν τὴν μὲν 5 ἀρετὴν καὶ τὸν νοῦν κύρια εἶναι καὶ εἰς ταῦτα χρήναι ἀνάγειν τὸ ἐφ' ἡμῖν καὶ τὸ ἐλεύθερον ἀδέσποτα δὲ ὅντα
ιαζειν οὐν μὲν ἐφ' αὐτοῦ εἶναι, τὴν δὲ ἀρετὴν βούλεσθα μὲν ἐφ' αὐτῆς εἶναι ἐφεστῶσαν τῇ ψιχῇ, ὥστε εἶναι ἀγαθήν, καὶ μέχρι τούτου αὐτῆν τε ἐλευθέρων καὶ τῇ
10 ψυχῇ ἐλευθέρων παρασχέσθαι προσπιπτόντων δὲ τῷ ἀναγκαῖον παθημάτων τε καὶ πρᾶξεων ἐφεστῶσαν ταῦτα μὲν μὴ βεβουλῆσθαι γενέσθαι, δύμας γε μὴν καὶ ἐν τούτοις διασώσειν τὸ ἐφ' αὐτῇ εἰς αὐτῇ καὶ ἐνταῦθα ἀναφέρουσαν τὸ γάρ τοῖς πράγμασιν ἐφέψεσθαι, οὐοι 15 σφέζουσα τὸν κυδυνεύοντα, ἀλλ' εἰ δοκοῖ αὐτῇ, καὶ προιεμένην τούτον καὶ τὸ ζῆν κελεύουσαν προεσθαι καὶ χρήματα καὶ τέκνα καὶ αὐτὴν πατρίδα, σκοπον το καλοὶ αὐτῇς ἔχουσαν, ἀλλ' οὐ τὸ εἶναι τῶν ἵππων αὐτῇν
20 ὥστε καὶ τὸ ἐν ταῖς πράξεις αὐτεξουσίον καὶ τὸ ἐφ' ἡμῖν οὐκέ εἴναι τὸ πράττειν ἀνάγεσθαι οὐδὲ εἰς τὴν ἔξω,

A favourite text from the proclamatio which introduces the choice of lives in the Myth of Er. Plato Republic X 617E3.

² Ch. 1, lines 32-3

FREE WILL AND THE WILL OF THE ONE

way then are we saying that being good is in our power and "virtue has no master"¹? Yes, it is if we wish and choose it; or because when virtue comes to be in us it constructs freedom and being in our own power and does not allow us to be any more slaves of what we were enslaved to before. If then virtue is a kind of other intellect, a state which in a way intellectualises the soul, again, being in our power does not belong to the realm of action but in intellect at rest from actions.

6. How then did we refer this before² to will when we said "which would come to pass to the extent that we wished it"? Now it was said there also "or would not come to pass". If then what we are saying now is correctly said and what we said before will be in tune with it, we shall assert that virtue and intellect have the mastery and that we should refer being in our own power and freedom to them; and since these have no master, intellect is independent and virtue wishes to be independent by supervising the soul to make it good, and up to this point is free itself and makes the soul free, but when compulsory passions and actions come in the way it has not in its supervision wished that they should occur, but all the same even among these it will keep its independence by referring back to itself even here, for it will not follow the lead of the facts, for instance by saving the man who is in danger, but, if it thinks fit, it will sacrifice him and command him to sacrifice his life and property and children and even his fatherland, having in view its own excellence and not the existence of what is subject to it; so that also in practical actions self-determination and being in our own power is not referred to practice and outward

PLOTINUS. ENNEAD VI. 8.

ἀλλ' εἰς τὴν ἐντὸς ἐνέργειαν καὶ νόησιν καὶ θεωρίαν
αὐτῆς τῆς ἀρετῆς. δεῖ δὲ τὴν ἀρετὴν ταύτην νοῦν τινα
λέγειν εἶναι ου συναριθμοῦντι, οὐ πάθη τὰ δουλωθέντα η
μετρηθέντα τῷ λόγῳ· ταύτα γάρ ἔνικε, φησίν, ἐγγίσ
25 τι τείνειν τοῦ σώματος ἔθεσι καὶ ἀσκήσεσι
καὶ ορθωθέντα. ὥστε εἶναι σαφέστερον, ὡς τὸ ἄνδρον
ἐστι τὸ ἐλεύθερον καὶ εἰς τοῦτο ἡ ἀναγωγὴ τοῦ ἐφ' ἡμῶν
καὶ αὐτῇ η βούλησις ἡ κυρία καὶ ἐφ' ἐντῆς οὖσα, καὶ εἴ
30 τι ἐπιτάξεις πρὸς τὸ ἔξω ἐξ ἀνάγκης. δοσαὶ οὖν ἐκ ταύτης
καὶ διὰ ταύτην, ἐφ' ἡμῶν, ἔξω τε καὶ ἐφ' αὐτῆς οὐτὶς
βούλεται καὶ ἐνεργεῖ ἀνεμποδίστως, τοῦτο καὶ πρῶτον
ἐφ' ἡμῶν. ὁ δὲ θεωρητικὸς νοῦς καὶ πρῶτος οὗτος τὸ ἐφ'
αὐτῷ, ὅτι τὸ ἔργον αὐτοῦ μηδουμᾶς ἐπ' ἀλλαρι. ἀλλὰ πᾶς
ἐπέστραπται πρὸς αὐτὸν καὶ τὸ ἔργον αὐτοῦ αὐτὸς καὶ
35 ἐν τῷ ἀγαθῷ κείμενος ἀνειδεῖς καὶ πλήρης ὑπάρχων
καὶ οὖν κατὰ βούλησιν ζῶν· η δὲ βούλησις ἡ νόησις.
Βούλησις δ' ἐλέχθη, ὅτι κατὰ νοῦν· η¹ γάρ λεγομένη
βούλησις τὸ κατὰ νοῦν μημεῖται. η γάρ βούλησις θέλει
τὸ ἀγαθόν· τὸ δὲ νοεῖν ἀληθῶς ἐστιν ἐν τῷ ἀγαθῷ. ἔχει
40 οὖν ἐκεῖνος, ὅπερ η βούλησις θέλει καὶ οὐ τυχοῦσα ἀ
ταύτη νόησις γίνεται. εἰ οὖν βούλησει τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ
τίθεμεν² τὸ ἐφ' ἡμῶν, τὸ ηδη ἐι φθέλει η βούλησις εἶναι
ιδρυμένον πᾶς οὐ τὸ ἐφ' αὐτῷ ἔχει: η μεῖζον εἶναι.

Igal: καὶ Enn.

² Theiller. ἐπιθυμεῖ Enn.

¹ Republic 518D10-E2.

² Plotinus is playing here on the common meaning of καὶ νοῦν "according to one's mind", "as one likes it", and καὶ νοῦν "according to the sense required by context here". "according to

FREE WILL AND THE WILL OF THE ONE

activity but to the inner activity of virtue itself, that is, its thought and contemplation. But one must say that this virtue is a kind of intellect and not count in with it the passions which are enslaved and limited by the reason; for these, Plato says, 'come close to the body, since it is by habits and exercises'¹ that they are set in order. So it is still clearer that the immaterial is the free, and it is to this that being in our power is to be referred and the will which has the mastery and is independent, even if something directs it by necessity to what is outside. All therefore that comes from this will and is done according to it is in our power, when it is acting externally and when it is by itself; what it wishes and makes actual without hindrance this is primarily what is in our power. But the contemplative, that is the primary, Intellect is what is in its own power in this way, that its work in no way depends on another, but it is all turned to itself and its work is itself and it rests in the Good, being without need and fulfilled, and, one might say, living according to its will; but its will is its thought, but was called will, because it was to its mind; for what is called will imitates what is to its mind.² For will wants the Good; but thinking is truly in the Good. That Intellect therefore has what its will wants, that by which it becomes thought when it attains it. If then we allot being in our power to willing the Good, surely that which is already firmly settled in what its will wants must possess it. Or else

"Intellect" The Divine Intellect lives, of course, according to itself and so as it likes. The whole passage shows clearly how Plotinus, like other Greek philosophers, makes no sharp distinction between thinking and willing.

PLOTINUS ENNEAD VI. 8

θετέον, εἰ μή τις ἐθέλει εἰς τοίτο ἀναβαίνειν τὸ ἐφ' 45 αὐτῷ

7. Γίνεται οὖν ψυχὴ μὲν ἐλευθέρα διὰ νοῦ πρὸς τὸ ἀγαθὸν σπεύδουσα ἀνεμποδιστως, καὶ ὁ διὰ τοῦτο ποιεῖ, ἐφ' αὐτῇ νοῦς δὲ δι' αὐτόν· ἡ δὲ τῷ ἀγαθοῦ φύσις αἰτὸν τὸ ἐφετὸν καὶ δι' ὃ τὰ ἄλλα ἔχει τὸ ἐφ' αὐτοῖς, 5 ὅταν τὸ μὲν τυγχάνειν ἀνεμποδιστως διηγηται τὸ δὲ ἔχειν. πῶς δὴ αὐτὸν τὸ κύριον ἀπάντων των μερῶν αὐτὸν τημίων καὶ ἐν πρώτῃ ἔδρᾳ ὅν, προς δὲ ἄλλα ἀναβαίνειν θελει, καὶ ἐξήργηται αὐτοῦ καὶ τὰς δυνάμεις ἔχει παρ' αὐτοῦ, ὥστε δύνασθαι τὸ ἐπ' αὐτοῖς ἔχειν, πῶς ἂν τις 10 εἰς τὸ ἐπ' ἐμοὶ ηὔπὶ σοὶ ἄγοι, ὅπου καὶ νοῦς μύλοι, ὅμως δὲ βίᾳ εἰλκετο. εἰ μή τις ιολμηρὸς λόγος ἐ-έρωθεν σταλεῖς λέγοι, ὡς τυχοῦσα οὕτως ἔχειν, ὡς ἔχει καὶ οὐκ οὖσα κυρία τοῦ ὃ ἔστιν, οὖσα τοῦτο δὲ ἔστιν οὐ παρ' αὐτῆς οὔτε τὸ ἐλεύθερον ἂν ἔχοι οὔτε τὸ ἐπ' αὐτῇ 15 ποιουσα ἢ μὴ ποιοῦσα, δὲ ἡνάγκασται ποιεῖν γὰρ μὴ ποιεῖν, δε δὴ λόγος ἀντίτυπός τε καὶ ἀπορος καὶ παντάπαι τὴν τοῦ ἑκουσίου τε καὶ αὐτεξονοίοι φύσιν καὶ τὴν ἔννοιαν τοῦ ἐφ' ἡμῖν εἴη ἀναιράν, ὡς μάτην εἶναι ταντα λεγεσθαι καὶ φωνὰς πραγμάτων 20 ἀνυποστάτων. οὐ γάρ μόνον μηδὲν ἐπὶ μηδενὶ εἶναι λέγειν, ἀλλ' οὐδὲ νοεῖν οὐδὲ συνιέναι ἀναγκαῖον αὐτῷ

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it must be assumed to be something greater, if one does not want being in one's own power to go up so high.

7. The soul, then, becomes free when it presses on without hindrance to the Good by means of Intellect, and what it does through this is in its power but Intellect is free through itself but the nature of the Good is the very goal of the striving and that through which the others have what is in their power, when one is able to attain it without hindrance and the other to have it. Now how can one bring the very lord and master of all things of value after it, that which sits in the first seat, to which all things else want to ascend, and depend on it and have their powers from it so as to be able to have something in their power—how can one bring it [down to the level of] what is in your and my power to which Intellect also was only dragged with difficulty, though it was all the same violently dragged? Unless some rash statement starting from a different way of thinking says that since [the nature of the Good] happens to be as it is, and does not have the mastery of what it is, and is what it is not from itself, it would not have freedom, and its doing or not doing what it is necessitated to do or not to do is not in its power.¹ This statement is indeed contrary and absurd and would altogether do away with the nature of free will and self-determination and our idea of what is in our power, as if this was empty talk and names for non-existent things. For not only must the one who makes it say that nothing is in anyone's power, but he must say that he does not think or

¹ On this statement see *Introductory Note p. 224*

λεγειν ταῦτην τὴν φωνῆν εἰ δὲ ὅμολογοῖ συνιέναι, ἥδη
ἄν ῥᾳδίως ἐλέγχουτο τῆς ἐννοιας τοῦ ἐφ' οἷμιν
ἐφαρμοζομένης οἵς εφαρμοστειν οὐκ ἔφη ή γάρ ἔννοια
25 τὴν οὐσίαν οὐ πολυτραγομονεῖ οὐδὲ ἔκεινην προ-
παραλαμβάνει—ἀδινατον γάρ ἐαυτό τι ποιεῖν καὶ εἰς
ὑπόστασιν ἄγειν—ἀλλὰ ἐθέλει θεωρεῖν ή ἐπίνοια, τι
τῶν ὅντων δούλον ἐτέρων, καὶ τί ἔχει τὸ αὐτεξόνιον
καὶ τί μὴ ἵν' ἄλλω. ἀλλ' αὐτὸ τῆς ἐνεργείας κύριον, ὃ
καθαρῶς <καὶ>¹ τις ἀιδίοις ὑπάρχει [καὶ τοῖς]¹ καθό
30 εἰσιν ἀιδίοι καὶ τοῖς ἀκαλύτως τὸ ἀγαθὸν διώκουσιν ή
ἔχουσιν. ὑπέρ δὴ ταῦτα τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ αὐτοῦ ὅντος οἷον
δόλο παρ' αὐτῷ ἀγαθὸν ἤγρειν ἀτοπον ἐπεὶ καὶ τὸ κατὰ
τύχην λέγειν αὐτὸ εἶναι οὐκ ὄρθον ἐν γάρ τοῖς ὕστεροιν
καὶ ἐν πολλοῖς ή τύχῃ τὸ δὲ πρᾶτον οἵτε κατὰ τύχην ἀν
35 λέγομεν, οἵτε οὐ κύριον τῆς αὐτοῦ γενένεως, οἵτι μηδὲ
γέγονε. τὸ δὲ ὅτι ὡς ἔχει ποιεῖ ἀτοπον, εἴ τις ἀξιοῦ τότε
εἶναι τὸ ἐλεύθερον, ὅταν παρα φύσιν ποιῇ ή ἐνεργή. οὐδὲ
δὴ τὸ² μοναχὸν ἔχον ἀφήρηται τῆς ἔξοντος, εἴ τὸ
μοναχὸν μὴ τῷ καλύτεροι παρ' ἄλλον ἔχοι, ἀλλὰ τῷ
40 τοῦτο αὐτὸ εἶναι καὶ οἷον ἀρέσκειν ἔσαιτῷ, καὶ μὴ ἔχειν
ὅ τι κρέεττοι αὐτοῦ· η οὕτω γε τὸ μάλιστα τυγχάνον
τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἀφαιρήσεται τις τὸ αὐτεξούσιον εἰ δὲ τοῦτο
ἀτοπούτερον ἀν γένοιτο αὐτὸ τὸ ἀγαθὸν
αποστερεῖν τοῦ αὐτεξούσιον, ὅτι ἀγαθὸν καὶ ὅτι ἐφ'
45 αὐτοῦ μένει οὐ δύσμενον κινεῖσθαι πρὸς ἄλλο τῶν ἄλλων

¹ transpossumus² Creuzer. τὸν Enn.

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understand this term. But if he did admit that he understood it, he could be easily refuted, because our idea of what is in our power fits what he said it did not fit. For the idea is not concerned with the substance of a thing and does not take it as well into consideration for it is impossible for a thing to make itself and bring itself into existence—but our idea wants to observe what among beings is a slave of others and what has self-determination and what is not subject to another but itself master of its activity, which is purely and simply the case with eternal beings in that they are eternal, and with those which pursue or possess the good without hindrance. But certainly since the Good is above these it is absurd to seek as if for another good beside it. Then also it is not correct to say that it exists by chance; for chance occurs among things that are later and among many things; but we could not say that the First is by chance and is not master of its own coming to be, because it has not come to be. And the remark that it does as it is is absurd if it involves a claim that there is freedom when it does things or is active against its own nature. Nor indeed does its possession of uniqueness take away its independence, if it possesses uniqueness not because it is obstructed by something else but because it is this very thing and is, we may say, satisfied with itself and has nothing better than itself, otherwise one will take self-determination away from what attains the Good in the highest degree. But if this is absurd it would be more absurd to deprive the Good itself of self-determination because it is good and because it remains on its own and does not need to move to something else, since

PLOTINUS: ENNEAD VI. 8.

κινούμεται πρὸς αὐτὸν καὶ οὐδὲν δεόμενον οὐδενός. ὅτου
δὲ δη̄ ή οἶον ὑπόστασις αὐτοῦ ή οἶον ἐνέργεια ἡ̄ οἵ γάρ
ή μὲν ἔτερον, ή̄ δ' ἔτερόν ἐστω, εἰ γε μηδὲ επὶ τοῦ νοῦ
τοῦτο, δτι μᾶλλον κατὰ τὸ εἶναι ή̄ ἐνέργεια ή̄ κατὰ τὴν
50 ἐνέργειαν τὸ εἶναι—ῶστε οὐκ ἔχει τὸ οἷς πέφυκεν
ἐνεργεῖν, οὐδὲ ή̄ ἐνέργεια καὶ ή̄ οἶον ζωὴ ἀνενεχθῆσται
εἰς τὴν οἶον οὐσίαν, ἀλλ' η̄ οἶον οὐσία συνουστα καὶ οἶον
συγγενομένη ἐξ πάσιν τῇ ἐνεργείᾳ ἐξ ἀμφοῖν αὐτὸν αὐτὸν
ποιεῖ, καὶ ἐπιτῷ καὶ οὐδενός

8. Ἡμέας δὲ θεωροῦμεν οὐ̄ συμβεβηκός τὸ
αὐτεξούσιον ἐκείνῳ, ἀλλὰ ἀπὸ τῶν περὶ τὰ ἄλλα
αὐτεξούσιαν ἀφαιρέσει τῶν ἐναντιων αὐτὸν ἐφ' ἑαυτῷ
πρὸς αὐτὸν τὰ ἐλάττω ἀπὸ ἐλαττόνων μεταφέροντες
5 ἀδυναμία τοῦ τυχεῖν τῶν ἀ̄ προσήκει λέγειν περὶ αὐτοῦ,
ταῦτα ἀν περὶ αὐτοῦ εἴπομεν. καίτοι οὐδὲν ἀν εὑροιμεν
εἰπεῖν οὐχ ὅτι κατ' αὐτοῦ, ἀλλ' οὐδὲ περὶ αὐτοῦ κυρίως·
πάντα γάρ ἐκείνου καὶ τα καλὰ καὶ τὰ σεμνὰ ὑστερα.
τούτων γάρ αὐτὸς ἀρχή καίτοι ἄλλον τρόπον οὐκ ἀρχή.
10 ὁποτιθεμένοις δη̄ πάντα καὶ το ἐπ' αὐτῷ ὡς ὑστερον καὶ
τὸ αὐτεξούσιον—ηδη γάρ εἰς ἄλλο ἐνέργειαν λέγει—
καὶ δτι ἀκεποδίστως καὶ διντων ἄλλων τὸ εἰς αὐτὸν
ἀκωλύτως δεῖ δὲ διλας πρὸς οὐδεν αὐτὸν λέγειν ἔστι
γάρ ὅπερ ἔστι καὶ πρὸ αὐτῶν ἐπεὶ καὶ τὸ “ἔστιν”
15 αφαιροῦμεν, ὥστε καὶ τὸ πρὸς τὰ διντα ὁπωσδοῦν οὐδὲ

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the other things move to it and it has no need of anything. But when his, so to speak, existence is his, as it were, activity for one is not one thing and the other another if this is not even so with Intellect, because¹ its activity is more according to its being than its being according to its activity—so that it cannot be active according to what it naturally is, nor will its activity and its life, as we may call it, be referred to its, in a manner of speaking, substance, but its something like substance is with and, so to put it, originates with its activity and it itself makes itself from both, for itself and from nothing.

8. But we see self determination not as that Good's incidental attribute but itself by itself, by taking away the opposing factors from the self-determinations in other things; we might say this about it by transferring what is less from lesser things because of incapacity to find what we ought to say about it. All the same, we could find nothing to say which is applicable to it, or even really about it; for all noble and majestic things come after it. For he himself is the origin of these; yet, all the same, in another way not their origin. For those who put away everything, “being in his power” [is to be put away] as later, and “self determination” for it already speaks of activity towards another—and “that he is unimpededly active” and “that when others exist his activity directed to them is unhindered.” But we must say that he is altogether unrelated to anything, for he is what he is before them, for we take away the “is”, and so also any kind of relations

¹ I retain *ὅτι* here with H. S. But *οὕτι* (Kirchhoff non Ficino) would fit the context better.

PLOTINUS ENNEAD VI. 8.

δὴ τὸ "ώς πέφυκεν". ὑστερον γὰρ καὶ τοῦτο, καὶ εἰ λέγοιτο καὶ ἐπ ἔκείνων, ἐπὶ τῶν ἐξ ἄλλου ἀν λέγοιτο,
ώστε πρώτως ἐπὶ τῆς οὐσίας, ὅτι ἐξ ἐκείνων ἔφυ· εἰ δὲ ἐν
τοῖς ἐν χρόνῳ ἡ φύσις, οὐδὲ ἐπὶ τῆς οὐσίας. οὐδὲ δὴ τὸ
20 "οὐ παρ' αὐτῆς εἶναι" λεκτέον τὸ τε γὰρ 'εἶναι'
ἀφηρυθμέν, τὸ τε 'οὐ παρ' αὐτῆς" λέγοντο ἀν, ὅταν ὑπ'
ἄλλου οὔτως οὖν συνέβῃ; η οὐδὲ τὸ "συνέβη" ἀκτεον'
οὕτε γάρ αὐτῷ οὕτε πρὸς ἄλλον· ἐν γάρ πολλοῖς τὸ
'συνέβη', ὅταν τὰ μὲν ή, τὸ δὲ ἐπὶ τούτοις συμβῇ. πῶς
25 οὖν τὸ πρώτον συνέβη; οὐδὲ γὰρ ἥλθει, οὐαζητῆς "πῶς
υἱοὶ ἥλθε, οὐχὶ οὐδὲν ἤ ὑπέστησεν αὐτό, "ἐπεὶ οὐδὲ
τύχη πα ἦν οὐδὲ τὸ αἰτόματον δέ· καὶ γὰρ τὸ
αἰτόματον καὶ παρ' ἄλλου καὶ ἐν γινομένοις.

9 'Αλλὰ πρὸς πιπό εἴ τις λαμβάνον τὸ 'συνέβη',
οὗτοι δεῖ πρὸς τὸ δνομα ἵστασθαι, ἀλλὰ ὅπως νοεῖ ὁ
λέγων οινιέναι. τί οὖν νοεῖ; τοῦτο, ὅτι ταύτην ἔχον τὴν
φύσιν καὶ τὴν δύναμιν ἀρχή¹ καὶ γὰρ εἰ ἄλλην εἶχεν, ήν
5 ἄν [ἀρχή]² τοῦτο, διπερ ήν, καὶ εἰ χειρον, ἐνήργησεν ἀν
κατὰ τὴν οἰτοῦ οὐσίαν πρὸς δὴ τὸ το.οῦτον λεκτέον
ὅτι μὴ οἰόν τε ήν ἵρχην οὐδεις πάντων τὸ τυχόν εἶναι,
μὴ ὅτι χειρον, ἀλλ' οὐδὲ ἀγαθὸν μέν, ἀγαθον δὲ ἄλλως,
οῖον ἐνδεέστερον. ἀλλὰ δει κρείττουνα εἶναι τὴν ὄμηρην

Kirchhoff: ἀρχή, Enn.
del. Kirchhoff

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to the real beings, nor, certainly, [do we accept] the 'as he naturally is'; for this also is later, and even if it may be said about those real beings, it would be said about those which come from another, and so first about substance, because it grew naturally from him, but if nature is in the things in time, it cannot be applied to substance. Nor indeed must we say this nature "is not from itself"; for we took away the "is", and the "not from itself" would be said when it [was brought into being] by something else. Did it then just happen to be like this? No, we must not bring in "happened to be"; nothing happened to him or in relation to something else; for "happened to be" applies among many things, when some are there and something happens to be besides them. How then could the First happen to be? For it did not come, so that you might enquire "How then did it come? What chance brought it or established it in being?" For chance did not yet exist, nor accident either, for accident comes from something else, and among things which have come to be.

9. But if someone takes "happened to be" as applying to the Good, one must not stop at the word, but understand what the man who says it has in mind. What, then, does he have in mind? This, that it is because it has this nature and power that it is principle; for if it had another, it would have been what it was, and if it was worse, it would have been active according to its own substance. To this we must reply that it was not possible for it, since it is the principle of all, to be what chanced, and certainly not to be worse, not even to be good but good in another way, a kind of lesser way. But the principle must be better than all the things which come after

PLOTINUS: ENNEAD VI. 8.

10 ἀπάντων τῶν μετ' αὐτήν· δίστε ωρισμένοι τι λέγω δὲ
ώμισμένον, ὅτι μοναχῶς καὶ οὐκ ἐξ ἀνάγκης· οὐδὲ γάρ
ἡν ἀνύγκη ἐν γάρ τοις ἐπομένοις τῇ ἀρχῇ η ἀνάγκη καὶ
οὐδὲ αὐτῇ ἔχουσα ἐν αὐτοῖς τὴν βίαν· τὸ δὲ μοναχὸν
τοῦτο παρ' αὐτοῦ. τούτο οὖν καὶ οὐκ ἄλλο, ἀλλ' ὅπερ
15 ἔχρην εἶναι οὐ τούτου οὐτων συνέβη, ἀλλ' ἔδει γίνεσθαι τὸ
δὲ "ἔδει" τούτῳ ἀρχῇ τῶν οὗτα ἔδει, τούτῳ τοίνυν οὐκ ἄλλο
οὐτως εἴη, ὡς συνέβη· οὐ γάρ ὅπερ ἔτυχεν ἔστιν, ἀλλ
ὅπερ ἔχρην εἶναι μᾶλλον δὲ οὐδὲ ὅπερ ἔχρην. ἀλλί
ἀνημένων δεῖ τὰ ἄλλα, τί ποτε αὐτοῖς ὁ βασιλεὺς
φυνέψῃ, καὶ τοῦτο <αὐτὸν θέσθαι>; ὅπερ ἔστιν πάτος
20 [τοῦτο οὐδιὸν θέσθαι],¹ οὐλίς ὡς συνέβη φανέστα, ἀλλα
οὗτως βασιλέα καὶ οὗτως ἀρχήν καὶ τὸ ἀγαθὸν οὗτως,
οὐκ ἐνεργοῦντα κατὰ τὸ ἀγαθόν—οὕτω γάρ ἀν δόξειεν
ἐπευθεῖς ἄλλως· ἀλλ' οὕτα ἔν, ὅπερ ἔστιν, ὥστε οὐκτέ
έκεινο, ἀλλ' ἔκεινο. εἰ τούτου οὐδὲ ἐπὶ τοῦ οὗτος τὸ
25 "συνέβη"—τῷ γάρ οὕτω, εἴ τι συμβῆσται, τὸ
"συνέβη", ἀλλ' οὐκ αὐτὸ τὸ οὐ συνέβη, οὐδὲ συνέκυρτο
τὸ οὐ οὗτως εἶναι, οὐδὲ παρ' ἄλλου τὸ οὗτως εἶναι, οὐ
ὡς ἔστιν, ἀλλ' αὐτῇ οὗτως φύσις οὐ εἶναι—πῶς μὲν τις
ἐπὶ τοῦ οὐ οὐκεῖναι οὔτος τοῦτο ἐνθιμότο τὸ "οὗτος
συνέβη", φύπαρχε, γεγενημέναι τὸ οὖν, οὐ οὐκ οὗτως
30 συνέβη, ἀλλ' ἔστιν ὡς ἔστιν ἡ οὐσία, οὐσα διπέρ ἔστιν
οὐσίαν καὶ ὑπερ ἔστιν νοῦς; ἔπει οὗτως τις καν² τὸν νοῦν

¹ Igai.

² Theiler καὶ Eun.

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it; so it must be something defined. But I mean defined by its uniqueness, and not of necessity; for there was no necessity; for necessity is in the things which follow the principle and even this [subsequent] necessity does not have power to force them; but this uniqueness comes from the principle itself. It is this, then, and not something else, but what it ought to be; it did not then happen to be like this, but had to be like this; but this "had to be" is principle of all things that had to be. It could not then be this in the sense that it happened to be, for it is not what it chanced to be but what it ought to be; or rather, not what it ought to be, but the other things have to wait and see how their king will appear to them and affirm that he is what he himself is, not appearing as he happened to be but as really king and really principle and really the Good, not active according to the Good—for in this way he would seem to be following another—but being one, what he is, so that he is not active according to that, but is that. If then "happened to be" does not even apply to real being—for, if anything is going to happen, it happens to being, but being itself does not happen, nor is it a casual occurrence that being is like this, nor does it derive being like this from something else, being as it is, but this is really its nature, to be real being—how could one imagine about what transcends being¹ that it happened to be like this, that to which it belongs to have generated being, which did not happen to be like this but is as its substance is, being what substance is and what Intellect is: for in this way one could even say of Intellect "it just

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εἶπι "οὐτῶς συνέβη νοῦν εἶναι", ἀστερ̄ ἂλλο τι ἀν τὸν
νοῦν ἐσόμενον ή τοῦτο, ὃ δὴ φύσις ἔστι νοῦ. τὸ δὴ οὐ
ἰαρκείθηκός ἔστι τό, ἀλλ' ἀκλητὸς ὅτι ἑαυτοῦ, αὐτὸς δὲ
35 τις κυριώτατα λέγοι εἶναι ὁ ἔστι. τί ἀν οὐν τις λέγοι ἔκει
εἰς τὸ ὑπὲρ τοῦτο ἀναβάς καὶ εἰσιδὼν, ἀρύ γε τὸ "οὐτῶς
<συνέβη>".¹ ὡς εἴδεν αὐτὸν ἔχοντα, [τὸ οὐτῶς
συνέβη]¹ ἥ οὔτε τὸ "οὐτῶς" οὔτε τὸ "ὑπασσοῦν συνέβη",
ἀλλ' οὐδὲ ὅλως τὸ "συνέβη". ἀλλὰ τὸ "οὐτῶς μόνον καὶ
οὐκ ἀν ἄλλως, ἀλλ' οὐτῶς"; ἀλλ' οὐδὲ τὸ
40 "οὐτῶς"· οὐτῶς γάρ ἀν ὀρίσας εἶναι καὶ τόδε τι ἀλλ' ἔστι
τῷ δύοντι οὐδὲ τὸ "οὐτῶς" εἰπεῖν δύνασθαι οὐδὲ ἀν τὸ
"μή οὐτῶς". τί γάρ ἀν εἴποις αὐτὸν τῶν οὗτων, ἐφ' ὧν
τὸ "οὐτῶς". ἀλλο τουτο παρ' ἀπαντα τα οὐτῶς. ἀλλ'
ἀρ.στον ἴδων πάντα μὲν ἔξεις εἰπεῖν τὰ μετ' αὐτῷ,
45 φῆσεις δὲ οὐδὲν ἔκείνων εἶναι, ἀλλά, εἰπερ, δύναμιν
τάσσων μάτῆς θνητῶν κυρίαν, τοῦτο οὖσαν διθέλει, μᾶλλον
δὲ διθέλει ἀπορρίψασαν εἰς τὰ ὄντα, αὐτὴν δὲ μείζονα
παντὸς τοῦ θέλειν οὖσαν τὸ θέλειν μετ' αὐτὴν θεμένην.
οὕτοις αὐτῇ ἡθέλησε τὸ "οὐτῶς", ἵνα ἀν εἴπετο. οὔτε
ἄλλος πεποίκεν οὐτῶς.

10 Καὶ τούτην καὶ ἔρωτῆσαι χρὴ τὸν λέγοντα τὸ
"οὐτῶς συνέβη": πῶς ἀν ἀξιώσεις φεῦδος εἶναι τὸ
"συνέβη", εἰ τὸ² εἶναι; καὶ πῶς ἀν τις ἀφέδοι τὸ

¹ Theiler

² Igat. ε. τ. Enn

¹ A clear statement of the necessity of negating one's
negations as the final step in the negative way very

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happened in thus way to be Intellect", as if Intellect was going to be anything else but this which the nature of Intellect is. That, surely, which does not depart from itself, but is its own without declination one would most properly say is what it is. What then, is one to say at the point where one goes up to and looks upon what is above this? Is it what it happens to be as one sees that it is? No, it did not happen to be in this way or in that way, but it did not happen to be at all. But [could one say] "in this way" and 'not otherwise, but in this way'? But [you must] not [say] "in this way"; for in this way you would be defining it, and it would be a particular thing, but the one who sees it cannot say "in this way" or again "not in this way"¹. for you would be saying that it was one of the beings to which "in this way" applies. It is then something else besides all the things which are in this way. But, since you see it as without definition, you will be able to speak of all the things which come after it, but you will affirm that it is none of these, but, if anything at all, that it is all power, really master of itself, being what it wills to be, or rather throwing "what it wills to be" away to the beings, and being itself greater than all willing, setting willing after itself. It did not then will the "in this way" so that it might conform to it, nor did another make it like this.

10. And then one must also put these questions to the one who said "happened to be": on what conditions would he affirm that "happened to be" was false, if there was any [happening to be]? And how

strongly stressed by the Athenian Neoplatonists Proclus and Damascius and by Pseudo-Dionysius.

PLOTINUS: ENNEAD VI. 8.

‘συνέβη’; καὶ εἰ τις¹ εἴη φύσις, τότε φύσει . . .
 5 ἐφαρμόζειν τὸ ‘συνέβη’; εἰ γὰρ τὴν τῶν ἄλλων
 ἀφαροῦσσαι τὸ ‘οὕτω συνέβη’ ἀνατίθησι τύχη, ποὺ
 ποτε το μὴ ἐκ τύχης εἴναι γένοιτο; ἀφαιρεῖ δὲ τὸ ‘ὡς
 ἔτυχεν’ αὐτῇ ἡ ἀρχὴ τῶν ἄλλων εἶδος καὶ πέρας καὶ
 μορφὴν διδοῦσσα, καὶ οὐκ ἔστιν ἐν τοῖς οὗτοις κατὰ λόγουν
 γνωμένοις τύχη ἀναθεῖναι, ἀλλ’ αὐτὸν τούτο λόγῳ τὴν
 10 πάτιαν, ἐν δὲ τοῖς μηπρογνουμένως καὶ μὴ ἀκολούθως.
 ἀλλὰ συμπτώμασιν, ἡ –ύχη. τὴν δὴ ἀρχὴν παντὸς λόγουν
 τε καὶ τάξεως καὶ ὅρου πῶς ἀν τις τὴν τούτου
 θησιασιν ἀναθεῖται τύχη, καὶ μὴν πολλῶν μὲν ἡ τύχη
 κυρία, νοῦ δὲ καὶ λόγου καὶ τάξεως εἰς τὸ γενναν ταυτα
 15 οὐ κυρία· ὅπου καὶ ἐναντίον γέ δοκεῖ λόγῳ εἴναι τύχη,
 πῶς ἀν γεννήτειρα αὐτοῦ γένοιτο; εἰ οὖν μὴ γεννά νοῦν
 τύχην, οὐδὲ τὸ πρὸ νοῦ οὐδὲ τὸ κρείττον νοῦ αἴτε γηρ
 εῖχεν ὅθεν γεννήσει, οὐδὲ τὸ παράπαν αὐτῇ οὐδὲ δῆλως
 ἐν τοῖς ἀιδίοις. εἰ οὖν μηδὲν πρὸ ἑκείνου, αὐτὸς δὲ
 πρῶτος, στῆραι ἐνταῦθα δεῖ καὶ μηδὲν ἔτι περὶ αὐτοῦ
 20 λέγειν, ἀλλὰ τὰ μετ’ αὐτὸν ζητεῦν πῶς ἐγένετο, αὐτὸς δὲ
 μηκέτι δύπως, ὅτ διπτως τοῦτο μὴ ἐγένετο τέ οὖν, εἰ μὴ
 ἐγένετο, ἔστι δὲ οὖδε ἔστιν, οὐκ ἀν τῆς αὐτοὶ οὐσίας
 κύριας, κοὶ εἰ μὴ οὐκαπίς δέ, ἀλλ’ ἀν ὃς ἔστιν, οὐχ
 ὑποστήσας ἔστιν, χωώμενος δὲ ἔστιν οἷς ἔστιν,

¹ Igal c̄ τοις Enn

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would one remove the “happened to be”? And if there is a nature, will he then say that the “happened to be” does not fit? For if he attributes to chance the nature which takes away the “happened to be” from the others, wherever will existence which is not by chance come to be? But this principle takes away the “as it chanced” from the others by giving them form and limit and shape, and one cannot attribute anything to chance in things which come to be rationally in this way, but [must maintain] this very thing that their cause is rational: but chance is in what does not come to be as a result of what goes before and consistently, but is mere coincidence. But as for the principle of all reason and order and limit, how could one attribute the existence of this to chance? Chance is certainly mistress of many things, but is not mistress of intellect and reason and order so as to generate them, when chance even seems to be in direct opposition to reason, how could it be reason’s generator? If then chance does not generate Intellect, then certainly not that which is before Intellect and better than Intellect; for it would not have any resources to generate it from, nor did it exist at all in any way among the eternal beings. If then there is nothing before him, but he is the first, one must stop here and say nothing more about him, but enquire how the things after him came to be, but not how this did, because it really did not come to be. Well then, suppose he did not come to be, but is as he is and is not of his own substance. And if he is not master of his substance, but is who he is, as he did not bring himself into existence but manages with himself as he is, then he is what he is of necessity, and could

25 ἔξανάγκης τούτο ἀν εἴη, ὃ ἔστι, καὶ οὐκ ἀν ἄλλως. η οὐχ
ὅτι οὐκ ἄλλως, οὔτως, ἀλλ' ὅτι τὸ ἄριστον οὕτως πρὸς
μὲν γὰρ τὸ βέλτιον εἰθείν οὐ παν αυτεξουσιον, πρὸς δε
τὸ χείρον ἐλθεῖν οὐδὲν ὑπ' ἄλλου κεκαλυται ἀλλ' ὅτι μὴ
ἡλθε, παρ' αὐτοῦ οὐκ ἐλήλυθεν, οὐ τῷ κεκωλύσθαι,
συ ἄλλᾳ τῷ αὐτῷ εἶναι, δ μὴ ἐλήλυθε καὶ τὸ ἀδύνατον
ἐλθεῖν πρὸς τὸ χείρον οἰκ ἀδυναμίαν σημαίνει τοῦ μὴ
ἥκοντος, ἄλλᾳ παρ' αὐτοῦ καὶ δι' αὐτον τὸ μὴ ἥκειν καὶ
τὸ μὴ ἥκειν τῷδε μηδὲν ἄλλο ι ἡν ὑπερβολὴν τῆς
δυνάμεως ἐν αὐτῷ ἔχει, οὐκ ἀνάγκη κατειλημμένου,
35 ἀλλ' αὐτοῦ ἀνάγκης τῶν ἄλλων οὕσης καὶ νόμου. αὐτὴν
οὖν η ἀνάγκη ὑπέστησεν, η οὐδὲ ὑπέστη τῶν ἄλλων
ὑποστάντων τῶν μετ' αὐτὸ δι' αὐτό. τὸ οὖν πρὸ^τ
ὑποστάσεως πᾶς ἀν η ὑπ' ἄλλου η ὑφ' αὐτοῦ ὑπέστη,

11 Ἀλλὰ το μὴ ὑποπτῶν τοῦτο τί; η σωτήσαντας
δεῖ ἀπελθεῖν, καὶ ἐν ἀπόρῳ τῇ γνώμῃ θεμένους μηδὲν
ἔτι ζητεῖν τί γὰρ ἀν τις καὶ ζητήσειεν εἰς οὐδὲν ἔτι
ἔχων προελθεῖν πάσης ζητήσεως εἰς ἀρχὴν ιούστος καὶ
δ ἐν τῷ τοιούτῳ ἰσταμένης; πρὸς δὲ τούτους ζήτησον
ἀπασαν χρὴ νομίζειν η τοῦ τί ἔστιν εἶναι η τοῦ οἴον η
τοῦ διὰ τί η τοῦ εἶναι. τὸ μὲν οὖν εἶναι, ὡς λέγομεν
ἐκείνο εἶναι, ἐκ τῶν μετ' αὐτῷ. τὸ δὲ διὰ τί ἀρχὴν ἄλλην
ζητεῖν ἀρχῆς δὲ τῆς πάσης οὐκ ἔστιν ἀρχῆ. τὸ δὲ οἴον
10 έστι ζητεῖν τί συμβέβηκεν αὐτῷ, φ συμβέβηκε μηδέν.
τὸ δὲ τί έστι δηλοῖ μᾶλλον τὸ μηδεν δεῖν περὶ αὐτοῦ
ζητεῖν, αὐτὸ μόνοι εἰ δυνατὸν αὐτοῖς λαβόντας ἐν νῷ¹

¹ Kirchhoff τῷ Enn., H. S.

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not be otherwise. Now he is not as he is because he cannot be otherwise, but because being what he is is the best. For not everything has the power over itself to go to the better, but nothing is hindered by another to go to the worse. But that it did not go was due to itself; it was not because it was hindered but because it was itself what did not go, and inability to go to the worse does not indicate the powerlessness of what does not go, but its not going comes from itself and is because of itself. And not going to anything else has in it the extreme of power; [that which does not go] is not held fast by necessity, but is itself the necessity and law of the others. Did necessity, then, bring itself into existence? No, that did not come into existence; the other things after it came to existence through it. How then could that which is before existence have come to existence either by another's agency or by its own?

11. But what is this which did not come to existence? We must go away in silence and enquire no longer aware in our minds that there is no way out. For why should one even enquire when one has nothing to go on to, since every enquiry goes to a principle and stands still in it? And besides, one must consider that every enquiry is about either what something is, or of what kind it is, or why it is or if it is. Now being, in the sense in which we say that that is, [is known] from what comes after it. And the question "why?" seeks another principle; but there is no principle of the universal principle. And to enquire into what kind of thing it is is to enquire what attributes it has, which has no attributes. And the question "what is it?" rather makes clear that we must make no enquiry about it, grasping it, if

μηδὲν αὐτῷ θεμιτὸν εἶναι προσάπτειν μαθόντας. δλως δὲ
ἔσικαμεν ταύτην τὴν ἀπορίαν ἐνθυμηθῆναι, περὶ ταύτης
15 τῆς φύσεως σῦπερ ἐνεθυμήθημεν, ἐκ τοῦ πρωτον μεν
τίθεσθαι χώραν καὶ τόπον, ὡσπερ τι χάος, εἴτα χώρας
ηδη οἰδας ἐπαγγεῖν ταύτην τὴν φύσιν εἰς τὸν ἐν τῇ
φαντασίᾳ ήμῶν γεγονότα η δυτα τόπον, εἰσάγοντες δε
αὐτὸν εἰς τὸν τοιούτον τόπον οὕτω τοι ζητεῦν, οἷον
πόθεν καὶ πῶς ἐλήλυθεν ἐνταῦθα, καὶ ὡσπερ ἐπηλυ
20 δυτα ἔζητηκέναι αὐτου τὴν παρουσίαν καὶ οἷον τὴν
οὐσίαν, καὶ δὴ καὶ ὡσπερ ἔκ τινος βάθους η ἐξ ὑψους
τιὸς ἐνθάδε ἐροῦθαι. διόπερ δει τὸ αἴτιον τῆς ἀπορίας
ἀνιλόντα ἔξω ποιήσασθαι τῆς ἐπιβολῆς τῆς πρὸς αὐτὸν
πάντα τόπον καὶ μηδὲ ἐν ὀτωοῦν τίθεσθαι: αὐτό, μήτε
25 ἀε, κείμενοι ἐν αὐτῷ καὶ ἰδρυμένοι μήτε ἐληλυθότα
ἄλλη οὐτα μόνον, ὡς ἔστι, λεγόμενον ὑπ' ἀνάγκης τῶν
λόγων εἶναι, τὸν δὲ τόπον, ὡστερ καὶ τὰ ἄλλα, ὑστερο
καὶ ὑστερον ἀπάντων τὸ οὖν ἀποτον τοῦτο νοοῦντες, ὡς
νοοῦμεν, οὐδὲν περὶ αὐτὸν ἔπι τιθεντες οἷον κυκλῳ οὐδε
30 περιλαβεῖν ἔχοντες οἶσο, οὐδὲ τὸ οἶσον αὐτῷ
συμβεβηκέναι φήσομεν οὐ μὴν οὐδὲ τὸ ποιόν οὐδὲ γὰρ
μορφή τις περι αὐτὸν οὐδὲ νοητή ἀν εἴη οὐδὲ τὸ πρὸς
ἄλλο· ἐφ' αὐτοῦ γὰρ καὶ ὑφέστηκε, τρὶν ἄλλο τέ ἄν οὐτ
35 ἔπι εἴη τὸ "οὔτω συνέβη"; η πῶς φθεγξόμεθα τοῦτο, δτ
καὶ τὰ ἄλλα ἐν ἀφαιρέσει πάντα τὰ περὶ τούτον

¹ Plotinus is thinking of the Chaos with which Hesiod

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possible, in our minds by learning that it is not right to add anything to it. But in general we probably think of this difficulty, those of us who think about this nature at all, because we first assume a space and place, a kind of vast emptiness,¹ and then, when the space is already there, we bring this nature into the place which has come to be or is in our imagination, and bringing it into this kind of place we enquire in this way as if into whence and how it came here, and as if it was a stranger we have asked about its presence and, in a way, its substance, really just as if we thought that it had been thrown up from some depth or down from some height. Therefore one must remove the cause of the difficulty by excluding from our concentrated gaze upon it all place, and not put it in any place either as resting and settled in it or as having come to it, but [think of it] as being what it is (this is said by the necessity of speech), but that place, like everything else, is afterwards, and last of all afterwards. When therefore we think, as we do think, of this being out of place, and put nothing round it in a kind of circle, and are unable to encompass its extent, we shall not attribute extension to it; and certainly not quality either; for there could not be any shape about it, even intelligible; and not relation to something else for it existed by itself before there was anything else. What then could the "it happened to be like this" still mean? And how shall we be able to say this, because everything else about it is said negatively?

begins his account of the generation of the gods (*Theogony* 116), which he understands as Aristotle does (*Physics* A 1208b31 3) as the empty space or place which things occupy

PLOTINUS: ENNEAD VI. 8.

λεγόμενα; ὥστε ἀληθὲς μᾶλλον οὐ τὸ "οὗτῳ συνέβη",
ἀλλὰ τὸ "οὐδὲ οὗτῳ συνέβη", ὅπου καὶ τὸ "οὐδὲ συνέβη
ὅλως".

12 Τί οὖν, οἰκτήστιν ὁ ἔστι; τοῦ δὲ εἴναι ὁ ἔστιν ἡ
τοῦ ἐπέκεινα εἶναι ὅμοι γε κύριος αὐτός; πάλιν γὰρ ἡ
ψυχὴ ποτὲν τι πεισθεῖσα τοις ειρημένοις ἄπορος ἔστ..
λειτέον τοινιν πρὸς ταῦτα ὁδε, ἂς ἔκαστος μὲν ἡμῶν
εἰ κατὰ μὲν τὸ σῶμα πόρρω ἀν εἴη οὐσίας, κατὰ δὲ τὴν
ψυχὴν καὶ ὁ μάλιστα ἔσμεν μετέχομεν οὐσίας καὶ ἔσμα-
τις οὐσία, τούτο δέ ἔστιν οἶλον σύνθετον τι ἐκ διαφορῶν
καὶ οὐσίας. οὕκουν κυρίως οὐσία οὐδὲ αὐτοουσία· διὸ
οὐδὲ κύριοι τῆς αὐτῶν οὐσίας. ἄλλο γαρ πως ἡ οὐσία
10 καὶ ἡμεῖς ἄλλο, καὶ κύριοι οὐχ ἡμεῖς τῆς αὐτῶν οὐσίας,
ἄλλ' ἡ οὐσία αὐτὸν ἡμῶν, εἴπερ αὐτὴ καὶ τὴν διαφορὰν
προστίθησα. ἄλλ' ἐπειδὴ ὅπερ κύριον ἡμῶν ἡμεῖς πάς
ἔσμει, οὗτω τοι οὐδὲν ἥπτον καὶ ἐνταῦθα λεγούμεθα ἀν
αὐτῶν κύριοι. οὐδὲ¹ δέ γε παντελῶς ἔστιν ὁ ἔστιν
15 αὐτοουσία, καὶ οὐκ ἄλλο μὲν αὐτό, ἄλλο δὲ ἡ οὐσία
αὐτοῦ, ἐνταῦθα ὅπερ ἔστι, τούτου οὐτι² καὶ κύριον καὶ
οὐκέτι εἰς ἄλλο, γε ἔστι καὶ γε ἔστιν οὐσία. καὶ γὰρ αὐτὸν
ἀφείθη κυρίον εἶναι αὐτοῦ γε ο πρωτον εἰς οὐσίαν. τὸ δὴ
πεποιηκός ἐλεύθερον τὴν οὐσίαν, πεφυκός δηλούστι
ποιεῖν ἐλεύθερον καὶ ἐλεύθεροποιὸν ἀν λεχθέν, τίνι ἀν
20 δοῦλον εἴη εἴπερ ὅλως καὶ θεμιτὸν φθεγγυεσθαι τόδε; τῇ

¹ Theiler δ Enn

² Harder: τοῦτο ἔστι. wBU(CQ. om. x

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So that not "it happened to be like this" but "not even like this did it happen to be" is truer, where it is true that it did not happen to be at all.

12 Well then, is he not what he is? And is he himself really master of his being what he is or transcending being? For again the soul is not in the least persuaded by what has been said and sees no way out of its difficulty. So we must say this as well, that each one of us may be far from substance in respect of his body but in respect of the soul and what we most are we participate in substance and are a particular kind of substance, that is a particular kind of composite of substance and difference. We are not then substance in the strict and proper sense or absolute substance; and for this reason we are not masters of our own substance. For in some way substance is one thing and we are another and we are not masters of our own substance, but substance, the very thing itself, is master of us, given that this also adds the difference. But since in some way we are that which is master of us, in this way, all the same, even here below we could be called masters of ourselves.¹ But where absolute substance is completely what it is, and it is not one thing and its substance another, what it is it is also master of, and is no longer to be referred to another in that it is and in that it is substance. For, again, it has been let go into self mastery in that it is what is primarily related to substance. That, then, which has made substance free, which is clearly of a nature to liberate and can be called liberator—to what could it be a slave, if it is even in any way permitted to utter this

¹ The sense in which this is true is explained in V. 3. 4.

αὐτοῦ οὐσίᾳ, ἀλλὰ καὶ αἵτη παρ' αὐτοῖς ἐλευθέρα καὶ
νιστέρα, καὶ αὐτὸς οὐκ ἔχον οὐσίαν εἰ μὲν οὖν ἔστι τις
ἐνέργεια ἐν αὐτῷ καὶ ἐν τῇ ἐνέργειᾳ αὐτὸν θησόμεθα,
οὐδὲ ἂν διὰ τοῦτο εἴη ἂν ἔτερον αὐτοῦ καὶ οὐκ αὐτὸς
25 αὐτοῦ κύριος, ἀφ' οὗ ἡ ἐνέργεια, ὅτι μὴ ἔτερον ἐνέργεια
καὶ αὐτός εἰ δὲ δύλως ἐνέργειαν οὐ δώσομεν ἐν αὐτῷ
εἶναι, ἀλλὰ τὰλλα περὶ αὐτὸν ἐνεργοῦντα τὴν
ὑπόστασιν ἴσχει, ἕπτι μᾶλλον οὕτε τὸ κύριον οὕτε τὸ
κυριευομένον ἐκεῖ σὰν δώσομεν. ἀλλ' οὐδὲ τὸ "αὐτοῦ
30 κύριος", οὐχ ὅτι ἄλλο αὐτοῦ κύριον, ἀλλ' ὅτι τὸ "αὐτοῦ
κύριον" τῇ οὐσίᾳ ἀπέδομεν, τὸ δὲ ἐν τιμιωτέρῳ ἥκατὰ
τούτο εὐθεμεθα. τι οὖν το εν τιμιωτέρῳ τοῦ δέ ἔστιν
αὐτοῦ κύριον; ἡ ὅτι, ἐπειδὴ οὐσία καὶ ἐνέργεια ἐκεῖ δύο
πως ὄντα ἐκ τῆς ἐνέργειας τὴν ἔννοιαν ἐδίδου τοῦ
κυρίου, τούτο δέ ἦν τῇ οὐσίᾳ ταῦτον, διὰ τοῦτο καὶ
35 χωρὶς ἐγένετο το κύριον εἶναι καὶ αὐτὸς αὐτοῦ ἐλέγετο
κύριον. ὅπου δὲ οὐ δύο ὡς ἐν ἀλλὰ ἐν—ἡ γάρ ἐνέργεια
μόνον ἡ οὐδὲ δύλως ενέργεια οὐδὲ τὸ κύριον αὐτοῦ"
ὅρθως

13. Ἀλλ' εἰ καὶ τὰ ὄντα ταῦτα ἐπάγειν δεῖ [οὐκ
ορθῶς] τον ζητουμένου, πάλιν αὐτοὺς το μεν
(οὐκ)² ὥρθως εἰρηται, ὅτι οὐ ποιητέον οὐδὲ ὡς εἰς
ἐπίνοιαν δύο, τὰ δὲ νῦν τῆς πειθοῦς χάριν καὶ τι
παρανοητέον ἐν τοις λόγοις. εἰ γάρ δούμεν ενέργειας

¹ del Theilei

² [ga]

word? To its own substance? But this substance gets its freedom from it and comes after it, and it is not in possession of substance. If then there is an active actuality in him, and we are going to locate him himself in the active actuality, he would not because of this be something else than himself and not himself master of himself, he from whom the active actuality comes, because active actuality and he himself are not different. But if we are not in any way going to grant that there is active actuality in him, but say that the other things have their existence by being active round him, then still more shall we refuse to grant that there is mastery or being mastered at that level. But we shall not even admit the "master of himself", not because something else is master of him, but because we have allotted the "master of himself" to substance, and put him in a more honourable place than this applies to. What then is that which is in a more honourable position than being its own master? It is because, since substance and activity there are in a way two and gave, from the point of view of activity, the idea of mastery, but this was the same thing as substance, for this reason mastery came to be separated, and it was said to be master of itself. But where there are not two as one, but there is one—either only active actuality or not active actuality at all—"master of himself" is not correct.

13. But if one must bring in these names of what we are looking for, let it be said again that it was not correct to use them, because one must not make it two even for the sake of forming an idea of it, but now we must depart a little from correct thinking in our discourse for the sake of persuasion. For if we

αντῷ, τὰς δὲ ἐνεργειας αὐτοῦ οἶν φουλήσει αὐτοῦ—οὐ γαρ ἀβουλῶν ἐνεργεῖ—αἱ δὲ ἐνέργειαι ή οἶσι αὐσία αὐτοῦ. ὁ φουλησις αὐτοῦ καὶ η ούσια ταῦτον ἔσται εἰ δὲ τοῦτο, ὡς ἄρα ἐφούλετο, οὕτα καὶ ἔστιν οὐ μᾶλλον ἄρα 10 ὡς πέφυκς φουλεταί τε καὶ ἐνεργεῖ, η ὡς φουλεταί τε καὶ ἐνεργεῖ η ούσια ἔστιν αὐτοῦ. κύριος ἄρα πάντη ἑαυτοῦ ἐφ' ἑαυτῷ ἔχων καὶ τὸ εἶναι. ιδε δὴ καὶ τόδε τῶν διντων ἔκαστον ἐφιέμενον τοι ἀγαθοῦ φουλεταί ἐκεῖνο μᾶλλον η ἔστιν εἶναι, καὶ τότε μάλιστα οἴεται εἶναι, ὅταν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ μεταλάβῃ, καὶ ἐν τῷ τοιούτῳ 15 αἱρεῖται ἑαυτῷ ἔκαστον το εἶναι καθόσον¹ ἀν παρὰ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἰσχγ, ὡς τῆς τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ φύσεως ἑαυτῷ² δηλούντι πολὺ πρότερον αἱρετῆς οἵσης, εἴπερ το διπτ μᾶρα ἀγαθοῦ παρ' ἀλλω αἱρετωτάτη, καὶ ούσια ἑκούσιος καὶ παραγενομένη θελήσε. καὶ ἐν καὶ ταῦτο 20 οὖσι θελήσει καὶ διὰ θελήσεως ὑποστάσα. καὶ ἔως μὲτ το ἀγαθὸν μὴ εἶχεν ἔκαστον, ηθέλησεν ἄλλο, οὐ δὲ ἐσχεν ἑαυτό τε θέλει ηδη καὶ ἔστιν οὔτε κατὰ τύχην η τοιαύτη, παρουσία οὔτε ἔξω τῆς φουλήσεως αὐτοῦ η ούσια, καὶ τούτῳ καὶ ὅριζεται καὶ ἑαυτῆς ἔστι τούτῳ. εἰ οὖν τούτῳ 25 αὐτό τι ἔκαστον ἑαυτὸ ποιεῖ. δηλον δήπου γύνεται ηδη. ὡς ἐκένω ἀν εἶη ἑαυτῷ τοιούτον πρώτως, φ καὶ τὰ ἄλλα ἔστιν εἶναι, καὶ σύνεστιν αὐτοῦ τῇ οἶν ούσιᾳ η θελησις τοῦ οἶν τοιούτον εἶναι, καὶ τούτη ἔστιν

¹ Kirchhoff καὶ δοσον Enn.

² Theiler: ἑαυτή Enn.

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were to grant activities to him, and ascribe his activities to what we might call his will for he does not act without willing—and his activities are what we might call his substance, his will and his substance will be the same thing. But if this is so, then as he willed so also he is. He does not alien will and act as it is his nature to, any more than his substance is as he wills and acts. So he is altogether master of himself since he has even his being in his own power. Observe this also: every being in its desire for the Good wants to be that Good rather than what it is, and thinks that it is in the highest degree when it participates in the Good, and in such a state each being will choose for itself to be in so far as it has being from the Good, so the nature of the Good is obviously far more worthy of choice for himself, if it is true that whatever share of the Good there may be in something else is most worthy of choice, and is its freely willed substance which comes to it in accordance with its will and is one and the same thing as its will and is established in existence through its will. And as long as each individual did not have the Good it wished something else, but in that it possesses the Good it wills itself, and neither is this kind of presence by chance nor is its substance outside its will, and it is by this Good that its substance is defined and by this that it belongs to itself. If then it is by this that each thing itself makes itself, it becomes, I suppose, obvious that that Good is primarily the kind of thing it is by its own agency, by which the other things also are able to be by their own agency, and that the will, as it were, to be the kind of thing it is goes with its, as we please to call it, substance, and it is not possible to apprehend him

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αντὸν λαβεῖν ἄνευ τοι θέλειν ἔαυτῷ ὅπερ ἔστι, καὶ
 30 σὺνδρομος αὐτὸς ἔαυτῷ θέλων αὐτὸς εἶναι καὶ τοῦτο
 ὁ, ὅπερ θέλει, καὶ ηθελητις κοὶ αὐτὸς ἐν, καὶ τούτῳ
 οιχήττονται, ὅτι μή, ἄλλο αὐτός, ὅπερ ἔτυχεν, ἄλλο δὲ
 τι ὡς ἐβουλήθη ἄν. τί γάρ ἂν καὶ ηθέλησεν η τοῦτο, οὐ
 ἔστι; καὶ γάρ εἰ υποθούμεθα ἐλέσθαι αὐτῷ οὐ τι θέλαι
 γενέσθαι, καὶ ἔξειναι αὐτῷ ἀλλάξασθαι τὴν αὐτοῦ φύσιν
 35 εἰς ἄλλο, μήτ' ἄν ἄλλο τι γενέσθαι βουληθῆναι, μήτ' ἄν
 ἔαυτῷ τι μέμφασθαι ὡς ὑπὸ ἀνάγκης τοῦτο οὖν, οὐ ἔστι,
 τοῦτο τὸ "αὐτὸς εἶναι" ὅπερ αὐτὸς ἀεὶ ηθέλησε καὶ
 θέλει. ἔστι γάρ ὅντως η ἀγαθὸν φύσις θελητις αὐτοῦ οὐ
 δεδεκασμένου οὐδὲ τῇ ἔαυτοῦ φύσει ἐπισπομένου, ἀλλ'
 40 ἔαυτὸν ἐλομένου, ὅτι μηδὲ ην ἄλλο, ἵνα πρὸς εκείνο
 ἐλχθῇ. καὶ μὴ κάκενο ἄν τις λέγοι, ὡς ἐν τῇ αὐτῶν
 ἔκαστον τὰ ἄλλα οὐσίᾳ οὐ περιεληφε τὸν λόγον τὸν τοῦ
 ἀρέσκεσθαι αὐτῷ καὶ γάρ ἄν καὶ δυσχεραντοι τι αὐτῷ.
 45 ἐν δὲ τῇ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ υποστάσει ἀνάγκη τὴν αἵρεσιν καὶ
 τὴν αὐτοῦ θέλησιν ἐμπειριειλημμένην εἶναι η σχολῇ γ'
 οὐ ἄλλῳ ὑγάρχοι ἔαυτῷ ἀρεστῷ εἶναι, ἀ μετουσίᾳ η
 ἀγαθοῦ φινταπούῃ ἀρέσκεσται αὐτοῖς. δεῖ δὲ συγχωρεῖν
 τοῖς ὄντοις, εἰ τις περὶ ἔκείνου λέγων ἔξανάγκης
 50 ἐνθεῖται ἐνεκτικοῖς αὐτοῖς χρήται. ἀ ἀκριβείᾳ οὐκ ἔημεν
 λέγεσθαι· λαμβανέτω δὲ καὶ τὸ 'οἰον' ἐφ' ἔκαστον εἰ
 οὐν ὑφέστηκε το ἀγαθὸν καὶ συνφίστησα αὐτὸ η
 αἴρεσις καὶ η βούλησις—ἄνευ γάρ τούτων οὐκ ἔσται—
 55 δεῖ δὲ τοῦτο μη πολλὰ εἶναι, συνακτέον εἰς¹ ἐν τὴν

¹ Kirchhoff: ὡς Enn.

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without the will to be by his own agency what he is, and that his willing to be himself by his own agency is concurrent with his being what he wills, and his will and he himself are one, and not less one by this, that he himself is not one thing as he happened to be and what he would have liked to be another. For what could he have wished to be except this which he is? For even if we assumed that he could choose to become what he wished, and it was possible for him to change his own nature into something else, he would not wish to become something else, or have any fault to find with himself, as if he is this thing which he is by necessity, this being himself which he always willed and wills. For the nature of the Good is in reality the will of himself, a self not corrupted nor following his own nature, but choosing himself, because there was nothing else at all that he might be drawn to. And one might also make the following point, that the other things do not each of them include in their substance the character of being satisfied with themselves for a thing could even dislike itself. But it is necessary for the choice and willing of itself to be included in the existence of the Good, or it would hardly be possible for anything else to find itself satisfactory, they are satisfied with themselves by their participation in or imagination of the Good. But one must go along with the words, if one in speaking of that Good uses of necessity to indicate it expressions which we do not strictly speaking allow to be used; but one should understand 'as if' with each of them. If then the Good is established in existence, and choice and will join in establishing it—for without these it will not be—but this Good must not be many, its will and substance

βούλησις καὶ τὴν οὐδίαν [καὶ τὸ θέλειν].¹ τὸ δὲ θέλειν
(εἰ)² παρ’ αὐτοῦ, ἀναγκη παρ’ αὐτοῦ καὶ τὸ εἶναι αὐτῷ
55 εἶναι, ὡστε αὐτὸν πεποιηκένται αὐτὸν ὁ λόγος ἀνεύρετο. εἰ
γάρ η βούλησις παρ’ αὐτοῦ καὶ οἷον ἔργον αὐτοῦ, αὗτη,
δὲ ταῦτὸν τη̄ υποστάσει αὐτοῦ, αἵτος ἀν οὐτως
ὑποστήσας ἀν εἴη αὐτός· ὡστε οὐχ ὅπερ ἔτυχεν ἐστιν
ἀλλ’ ὅπερ ἔθουλήθη αὐτός.

14. Ἐτι δεῖ δρᾶν δεῖ καὶ ταύτην ἕκαστον τῶν
λεγομένων εἶναι η̄ ταύτον ἐστι τῷ εἶναι αὐτοῦ, η̄ ἔτερον
οἷον ἀνθρωπος ὅδε ἔτερος, καὶ τὸ ἀνθρώπῳ εἶναι ἄλλο
μετέχει γε μήν ὁ ἀνθρωπος τοῦ ὁ ἐστιν ἀνθρώπῳ εἶναι
ἢ φύσις ἡ δὲ καὶ τὸ ψυχή εἶναι ταῦτα, εἰ
ἄπλοιν ψυχὴ καὶ μὴ κατ’ ἄλλου, καὶ ἀνθρωπος αὐτὸς καὶ
τὸ ἀνθρώπῳ εἶναι. καὶ τὸ μὲν ἀν κατὰ τύχην γένοιτο
ἀνθρωπος, ὅπερ³ ἔτερον τοῦ ἀνθρώπῳ εἶναι, τὸ δὲ
ἀνθρώπῳ εἶναι οἰκισμὸν γένοιτο κατὰ τύχην τούτο δ’
ἐστιν ‘παρ’ αὐτοῦ ἀνθρωπος αὐτός’. εἰ δὴ τὸ ἀνθρώπῳ
10 εἶναι παρ’ αὐτοῦ καὶ οὐ κατὰ τύχην τούτο οὐδὲ
συμβέβηκε, πώς ἀν τὸ ὑπέρ τὸ ἀνθρωπος αὐτό, τὸ
γενητικὸν τοῦ ἀνθρώπου αὐτό, καὶ οὐ τὰ δύντα πάντα,
κατὰ τύχην ἀν λέγοιτο, φύσις ἀπλονοτέρα τοῦ
ἀνθρωπον εἶναι καὶ τοῦ ὅλως τὸ ἀν εἶναι, ἔτι⁴ προς τὸ
15 ἄπλοιν ἴοντι οὐκ ἔστι συναναφέρειν τὴν τύχην, ὡστε καὶ

¹ del. Vitringa.

² A^{3rd} (= Ficinus)

³ H. S¹. δτε Enn

⁴ Harder: εἰ Enn

must be brought into one; but if its willing comes from itself, it is necessary that it also gets its being from itself, so that our discourse has discovered that he has made himself. For if his will comes from himself and is something like his own work, and this will is the same thing as his existence, then in this way he will have brought himself into existence; so that he is not what he happened to be but what he himself willed.

14. And, further, one must look at it also in this way: each of the things which is said to be is either the same as its being or different; for instance, this particular human being is one thing and essential humanity another the human being, of course, participates in essential humanity. But soul and essential soulness are the same thing if soul is simple and not predicated of something else, and the human being as such is the same as essential humanity.¹ And the one might become a human being by chance, in so far as it is different from essential humanity, but essential humanity could not come to be by chance: this means “the human being as such comes to be from himself”. If then essential humanity comes to be from itself and not by chance or as it happens, how could that which is above humanity as such and which generates humanity as such, and to which all the real beings belong, be said to be by chance, a nature simpler than essential humanity and universal essential being? Further, as one goes towards the simple it is not possible to take chance

¹ There is a reference here (with a Platonic correction) to bring in the Form of man) to Aristotle *Metaphysics* H 3 1043b2-4.

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εἰς τὸ ἀπλούστατον ἀδύνατον αναβαίνειν την τύχην. Εἴτι
δὲ κάκειο ἀναμνησθῆναι προσήκει ἡδη ποι εἰρημένου,
ὡς ἔκαστον τῶν κατὰ ἀλήθειαν ὄντων καὶ ὑπ’ ἐκείνης
τῆς φύσεως ἐλθόντων εἰς ὑπόστασιν, καὶ εἴ τι δὲ ἐν τοῖς
20 αἰσθητοῖς τοιοῖτον,¹ τῷ ἀπ’ ἐκείνων τοιούτον λεγώ δὲ
τὸ ποιούντον τὸ σὺν αὐτῶν τῇ οὐσίᾳ ἔχειν καὶ τῆς
ὑποστάσεως τὴν αἰτίαν, ὥστε τὸν ὑστερον θεατὴν
ἔκαστοι ἔχειν εἰνεῖν, διὸ ἔκαστον τῶν ἐνοπαρχόντων,
λέον διὰ τὸ ὑφίσιλμὸς καὶ διὰ τὸ πόδες τοῦνδε τοιοῦντε,
καὶ τὴν αἰτίαν συναπογεινώσαν ἔκαστον μέρος ἔκάστου
25 εἶναι καὶ δι’ ἄλληλα τὰ μέρη εἶναι διὰ τὸ πόδες εἰς
μῆκος· ὅτι καὶ τόδε τοιούνδε καὶ ὅτι πρόσωπον τοιούνδε,
καὶ πόδες τοιούδε, καὶ διὰ τὸ προς ἄλληλα πάντων
συμφωνία ἀλλήλοις αἰτία· καὶ τὸ διὰ τὸ τόδε, διὰ τοῦτο
30 ἔστι τὸ ἀνθρώπῳ εἶναι ἀστε ἐν καὶ τὸ αὐτὸ τὸ εἶναι καὶ
τὸ αἴτιον. ταῦτα δὲ ἐκ μαζῆς πηγῆς οὐτως ἥλθεν οὐ
λειλογισμένης, ἀλλὰ παρεχούσης ὅλοι ἀθρόου τὸ διὰ τὸ
καὶ τὸ εἶναι. πηγὴ σὺν τοῦ εἶναι καὶ τοῦ διατί εἶναι ὁμοῦ
35 ἄμφω διδούσα· ἀλλὰ σία τὰ γενόμενα, πολὺ
ἀρχετυπάτερον καὶ ἀληθέστερον καὶ μᾶλλον η κατ’
ἔκείνα πρὸς τὸ βελτιον τὸ ἀφ’ οὐ ταῦτα. εἰ σὺν μηδὲν
εἰκῇ μηδὲ κατὰ τύχην μηδὲ τὸ ‘συνέβη γάρ οὐτως’ τῶν

¹ τοιοῦτον δε.. Igal, H. S²

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up with one, so that it is impossible for chance to ascend to the simplest of all. And, further, it is appropriate to remember that statement which has already been made somewhere¹ that each and every one of the things which in truth are and have been brought to existence by that nature, and anything among the things of sense which is of this kind, is of this kind by what comes from those higher beings: I mean by "of this kind" having together with their substance also the cause of their existence, so that the observer afterwards can say why each of its inherent parts is there, for instance why there is an eye and why the feet of these particular beings are as they are and the cause which brings into existence together each part of each thing and brings them into existence on account of each other. Why are the legs and feet as long as they are? Because this is as it is, and because the face is as it is the feet and legs are as they are. And in general the harmony of all the parts with each other is their reciprocal cause; and the reason why this part is, is that this is essential humanity; so that the being and the cause are one and the same. But these came in this way from a single source which did not reason but gave the reason why and the being together as a whole. It is the source therefore of being and the why of being, giving both at once; but that from which these come is like the things which have come to be much more originally and more truly and more than as it is on their level in that it is better. If then there is nothing random or by chance and no "it happened to be like

¹ The reference is a general one to the first two chapters of the preceding treatise VI. 7.

ὅσα τὰς αἰτίας ἐν αὐτοῖς ἔχει, ἔχει δὲ τα ἔξι αὐτοῦ
ἀπαντά, λόγου ὥν καὶ αἰτίας καὶ οὐσίας αἰτιώδους
πατήρ, ἢ δὴ πάντα πόρρω ὑπάρχει τύχης, εἴη ἀνάρχη
καὶ οὐσιν παραδειγμα τῶν ὅσα μὴ κεκοινώηται τύχη, τὸ
40 ὄντως καὶ τὸ πρώτον, πραγμής τύχαις καὶ αὐτομάτω καὶ
συμβάσει, αἴτιον ἔαυτοῦ καὶ παρ' αὐτοῖς καὶ δι' αὐτὸν
αὐτός· καὶ γὰρ πρώτως αὐτὸς καὶ ὑπερόντως αὐτός.

15 Καὶ ἐράσμιον καὶ ἔρως ὁ αὐτὸς καὶ αὐτοῦ ἔρως,
ατέ οὐκ ἄλλως καλὸς η παρ' αὐτοῦ καὶ ἐν αὐτῷ καὶ γάρ
καὶ τὸ συνεῖναι ἔαυτῷ οὐκ ἀνάλλως ἔχοι, εἰ μὴ τὸ οὐρίδν
η καὶ τὸ ὡς σύνεστιν ἐν καὶ ταῦτον εἴη. εἰ δὲ τὸ συνον τῷ ὡς
σύνεστιν ἐν καὶ τὸ οἶνον ἐφιέμενον τῷ ἐφετῷ ἔν, τὸ δὲ
ἐφετόν κατὰ τὴν ὑπόστασιν καὶ οὖν ὑποκείμενον, πάλιν
αὐτὸν ἡμῖν ἀνεφάνη ταῦτὸν η ἐφεσις καὶ η οὐσία. εἰ δὲ
τούτο, πάλιν αὐτός ἔστιν οὗτος ὁ παιών ἔαυτοῦ καὶ
10 κέρμας ἔαυτοῦ καὶ οὐχ ὡς τὸ ἔτερον ηθέλησε γενόμενος,
ἀλλ' ὡς θέλει αὐτός καὶ μήν καὶ λέγοντες αὐτὸν οὔτε τι
εἰς αὐτὸν δέχεσθαι οὔτε ἄλλο αὐτὸν καὶ ταντγ ἀν εἴημεν
ἔξι ποιουντες τοῦ τύχης εἶναι ισιούτον οὐ μόνον τῷ
μονοῦν αὐτὸν καὶ τῷ καθαρὸν ποιεῖν ἀπέντων ἀλλ' ὅτι,
εἴ ποτε καὶ αὐτοὶ ἐν αὐτοῖς ἐνίδοιμεν τινα φασιν

There is a reference here to the Platonic Letter VI 323D4, one of the esoteric passages (with Letter II 312E) from dubious genuine letters which were foundation-texts for

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this" with the things which have their cause in themselves, and all things which come from him do have it, for he is the father of reason and cause and causative substance,' which are certainly all far from chance, he would be the principle and in a way the exemplar of all things which have no part in chance, truly and primarily uncontaminated by chances and coincidence and happening, cause of himself and himself from himself and through himself; for he is primarily self and self beyond being.

15. And he, that same self, is lovable and love and love of himself, in that he is beautiful only from himself and in himself. For surely his keeping company with himself could not be in any other way than if what keeps company and what it keeps company with were the one and the same. But if what keeps company is one with what it keeps company with and what is, in a way, desiring is one with the object of desire, and the object of desire is on the side of existence and a kind of substrate, again it has become apparent to us that the desire and the substance are the same. But if this is so, again it is he himself who makes himself and is master of himself and has not come to be as something else willed, but as he himself wills. And further, when we say that he does not receive anything into himself nor does anything else receive him, in this way too we shall be placing something of this kind outside chance existence not only by making him one alone and clear of all things but for this reason: if we ever see in ourselves a nature of this

the Neoplatonists, giving Platonic authority for the doctrine of the Three Hypostases.

PLOTINUS: ENNEAD VI. 8

16 το.αύτην οὐδὲν ἔχοντας τῶν ἄλλων, ὅσα συνήργητα
 ἡμῖν, καθὰ πάσχειν ὁ τέ περ ἀν συμβῆ [καὶ]¹ κατα
 τύχην υπαρχεῖ—πάντα γάρ τὰ ἄλλα, δσα ἡμῖν, δηῦλα
 κάκκείμενα² τύχαις καὶ οὖν κατά τύχην προσελθόντα,
 τούτῳ δὲ μόνῳ τὸ κύριον αὐτον καὶ τὸ αὐτεξόνιον
 20 φωτὸς ἀγαθοεδος καὶ ἀγαθοῦ ἐνεργεῖς καὶ μετ' αὐτοῦ ἡ
 κατὰ νοῦν, οὐκ ἐπακτὸν τὸ ὑπὲρ τὸ νοεῖν ἔχοντος: εἰς δὲ
 δη ἀναβάντες καὶ γενόμενοι τοῦτο μόνον, τὰ δὲ ἄλλα
 ἀφέντες, τι ἀπ εἴποιμεν πάτο δὲ τοι τέ πλέον ἡ ἐλεύθερον,
 καὶ τλέον ἡ αὐτεξόνιον; τίς δὲ ἀν ἡμᾶς προσάψειε τότε
 25 τύχαις ἡ τῷ εἰκῇ ἡ τῷ “συμβέβηκεν” αὐτὸν τὸ ἀληθινὸν
 ζῆν γενομένους ἡ ἐν ιυντῷ γενομένους, διηγὴν ἔχει
 ἄλλο, ἀλλ’ ἔστιν αὐτὸ μόνον; τὰ μὲν οὖν ἄλλα μονούμενα
 οὐκ ἔστιν αὐτοῖς αὐτάρκη εἶναι εἰς τὸ εἶναι: τοῦτο δὲ
 ἔστιν ὁ ἔστι καὶ μονούμενον. ὑπόστασις δὲ πρώτη οὐκ ἐν
 ἀλιγχῷ οὐδὲ ἐν ζωῇ ἀλογῷ· ἀσθενῆς γάρ εἰς τὸ εἶναι καὶ
 30 αὕτη σκέδασις οὐσα λόγου καὶ ἀδριστίᾳ· ἀλλ’ ὅσῳ
 προέισιν εἰς λόγου, ἀπυλεπεῖ τύχην τὸ γάρ κατὰ λόγου
 οὐ τύχη ἀναβαίνοντι δε ἡμῖν ἐκεῖνο μὲν οἱ λόγοι,
 κάλλιον δὲ ἡ λόγος τοσοῦτον ἀπέχει τοῦ τύχη
 ευμβῆναι. ρέζα γὰρ λόγου παρ’ αὐτῆς καὶ εἰς τοῦτο
 35 λήγει τὰ πάντα, ὥσπερ φυτοῖς μεγίστου κατὰ λόγον
 ζῶντος ἀρχῆς καὶ βάσις, μένουσα γὰρ αὐτὴ ἐφ’ ἑαυτής,
 διδουσα δὲ κατὰ λόγου τῷ φυτῷ, δη ἔλαβεν εἶναι

del. H S¹

²coniccumus: καὶ κείμεν. Enn.

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kind which has nothing of the other things which are attached to us by which we have to experience whatever happens by chance—for all the other things which belong to us are enslaved to and exposed to chances, and come to us in a way by chance, but this alone has self mastery and self-disposal by the active presence of a light in the form of good, and good, and greater than that which belongs to Intellect, having its transcendence of Intellect not as something brought in from outside, surely, when we ascend to this and become this alone and let the rest go, what can we say of it except that we are more than free and more than independent? Who could then make us depend on chances or randomness or just happening when we have become the true life itself or come to be in it, which has nothing else but is itself alone? For the other things when they are isolated cannot be self-sufficient enough to exist; but this is what it is also when it is isolated But as first existence it is not in the soulless and not in irrational life, for this also is too weak to exist and is a dispersal of rational principle and an indefiniteness; but in so far as it advances towards rational principle, it leaves chance behind, for that which is in accordance with rational principle is not by chance. But for us as we ascend that is not rational principle but more beautiful than rational principle; so far is it from happening by chance For it is the root of rational principle from itself, and all things come to a stop in it, it is like the principle and fundament of a mighty tree living according to rational principle which remains itself by itself but gives to the tree existence according to the rational principle which it receives.

16. Ἐπεὶ δέ φαμει καὶ δικεῖ πανταχοῦ τε εἶναι τοῦτο καὶ αὐτὸν εἶναι οὐδαμοῦ, τοῦτό τοι χρη ἐνθυμηθῆναι καὶ νοῆσαι, υἱὸν δεῖ καὶ ἀντεῖθαι πιποιμένοις θέσθαι περὶ ὧν ζητοῦμεν. εἰ γάρ μηδαμοῦ, οὐδαμοῦ συμβέβηκε, δ καὶ εἰ πανταχοῦ, δύος ἔστιν αὐτός, τοσοῦτος πανταχοῦ ἀστε τὸ πανταχοῦ καὶ τὸ πάντη αὐτός, οὐκ ἐν ἑκείνῳ ὁν τῷ πανταχοῦ, ἀλλ' αὐτὸς ὁν τουτο καὶ δοὺς εἶναι τοῖς ἄλλοις ἐν τῷ πανταχοῦ παρακεῖθαι. ὁ δὲ ὑπερτάτη ἔχων τάξιν, μᾶλλον δὲ οὐκ ἔχων, ἀλλ' ὁν ὑπέρτυπος αὐτός, δοῦλα τάντα ἔχει, οὐ συμβὰς αὐτοῖς, αὐτῷ δὲ τῶν ἄλλων, μᾶλλον δὲ περὶ αὐτὸν τῷις ἄλλων, οὐ πρὸς αὐτὰ βλέποντος αὐτοῦ, ἀλλ' ἑκείνων πρὸς αὐτὸν δὲ εἰς τὸ εἶσω οἷον φέρεται αὐτοῦ οὖλον ἑαυτὸν εγαπήσας, αὐγὴν καθαράν, αὐτὸς μὲν τούτου, διπερ
15 πηγάπησε· τοῦτο δὲ ἔστιν ὑποστήσας αὐτόν, εἰπερ εὐέργεια μένουσα καὶ τὸ ἀγαπητότατον οἷον νοῦς νοῦς δὲ ἐνέργημα. ἀστε ἐνέργημα αὐτός. ἀλλὰ ἀλλοι μὲν οὐδενός· ἑαυτον ἄρα ἐνέργημα αὐτός οὐκ ἄρα ὡς συμβέβηκέν ἔστιν, ἀλλ' ὡς ἐνεργεῖ αὐτός. ἔτι τοίνυν, εἰ ἔστι μάλιστα, ὅτι πρὸς αὐτὸν οἷον στηρίζει καὶ οἷον 20 πρὸς αὐτὸν βλέπει καὶ τὸ οἷον εἴναι τοῦτο αὐτῷ τὸ πρὸς τοῦτὸν βλέπειν, οἷον ποιοὶ ἄρα αὐτόν, οὐχ ᾧ ἔτυχεν ἄρα ἔστιν, ἀλλ' ὡς αὐτὸς θέλει, καὶ οὐδὲ ή θέλησις εἰκῇ οὐδὲ οὕτω συνέβη· τοῦ γάρ ἀρίστου ή θέλησις οὗσα οὐκ ἔστιν εἰκῇ. ὅτι δὲ ή τοιαύτη νεῦσις αιτοῦ πρὸς αὐτὸν οἷον 25 ἐνέργεια οὗσα αὐτοῦ καὶ μονή ἐν αὐτῷ τὸ εἶναι δὲ ἔστι

¹ The light in which the souls see the Forms in *Phaedrus* 250C4; for Plotinus this light is the Good (or comes from the Good). VI. 7. 21 22).

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16. But since we maintain, and it appears to be so, that this is everywhere and again is nowhere, we must ponder this and think out what we ought to posit about the subject of our enquiry when we look at it from this point of view. For if he is nowhere, he has not happened to be anywhere, and if he is everywhere, he is as much as he is everywhere; so that the "everywhere" and "in every way" are himself; he is not in that everywhere, but is thus himself and gives the others their being there with him in the everywhere. But he, since he has the highest place, or rather does not have it, but is himself the highest, has all things as slaves; he does not happen to them, but they to him, or rather they happen around him, he does not look to them, but they to him; but he is if we may say so, born to his own interior, as it were well pleased with himself, the 'pure radiance',¹ being himself this with which he is well pleased, but this means that he gives himself existence, supposing him to be an abiding active actuality and the most pleasing of things in a way rather like Intellect. But Intellect is an actualisation; so that he is an actualisation. But not of anything else; he is then an actualisation of himself. He is not therefore as he happens to be, but as he acts. And then, further, if he is supremely because he so to speak holds to himself and so to speak looks to himself, and this so-called being of his is his looking to himself, he as it were makes himself and is not as he chanced to be but as he wills, and his willing is not random nor as it happened, for since it is willing of the best it is not random. But that an inclination of this kind to himself, being in a kind of way his activity and abiding in himself, makes him be what

ποιεῖ, μαρτυρεῖ ὑποτεθὲν τοὺν πάντας ὅτι, εἰ πρὸς τὸ
ἔξω νούσειν αὐτοῦ, δπολεῖ τὸ εἶναι ὅπερ ἔστι· τὸ ἄρα
εἶναι ὅπερ ἔστιν η ἐνέργεια η πρὸς αὐτόν τοῦτο δὲ ἐν
καὶ αὐτός. αὐτὸς ἄρα ὑπέστησεν αὐτὸν συνεξινεχθεῖσης
30 τῆς ἐνέργειας μετ' αὐτοῦ. εἰ οὖν μὴ γέγονεν, ἀλλ' ἢ ἀσί¹
η ἐνέργεια αὐτοῦ καὶ οἷον ἐγρήγορης οὐκ ἀλλου ὅντος,
τοῦ ἐγρήγορότος, ἐγρήγορης καὶ ὑπεριόντος ἀεὶ οὖσα,
ἔστιν οὔτως, ὡς ἐγρήγορης. η δὲ ἐγρήγορος ἔστω
ἐπέκεινα οὐδέποτε καὶ τοῦ καὶ ζωῆς ἔμφρονος ταῦτα δὲ
35 αὐτὸς ἔστιν. αὐτὸς ἄρα ἐπτὸν ἐνέργεια ὑπὲρ νοῦν καὶ
φρόντιον καὶ ζωῆν· ἐξ αὐτοῦ δὲ ταῦτα καὶ οὐ παρ'
ἀλλου. παρ' αὐτοῦ ἄρα αὐτῷ καὶ ἐξ αὐτοῦ τὰ εἶναι οὐκ
ἄρα, ὡς συνέβη, οὔτως ἔστιν, ἀλλ' ὡς ἡθέλησεν αὐτὸς
ἔστιν.

17. Ἐπι δὲ καὶ ὁδε ἔκαστα φαμεν τὰ ἐν τῷ παντὶ²
καὶ τόδε τὸ πάν οὔτως ἔχειν ὡς ἂν ἔσχεν, ὡς η τοῦ
ποιῶντος προαιρεσις ἡθέλησε, καὶ οὔτως ἔχειν, ὡς ἂν
προιέμενος καὶ πρειβών ἐν λογισμοῖς κατὰ πρόγοιν
δ οὗτος' εἰργάσατο. ἀεὶ δὲ οὔτως ἔχόντων καὶ ἀεὶ οὔτως
γιγνομένων, οὔτω τοι καὶ ἀεὶ ἐν τοῖς συνοῦσι κείσθαι
τοὺς λογους ἐν μελέσοι εὐθυγρασύνῃ ἔστωτας· ὥστε
ἐπέκεινα προνόιας τάκει εἶναι καὶ ἐπέκεινα προ
αιρέσεως καὶ πάντα ἀεὶ νοερῶς ἔστηκότα εἶναι, ὅτα
10 ἐν τῷ ὄντι. ὥστε τὴν οὔτω διάθεσιν εἰ τις ὀνομάζει

¹ Theiler: οὔτως Enn.

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he is, is evident if one posits the opposite, because, if he inclined to what is outside him, he would put an end to his being what he is, so then his being what he is is his self-directed activity; but these are one thing and himself. He therefore brought himself into existence, since his activity was brought out into existence along with himself. If then he did not come into being, but his activity was always and a something like being awake, when the wakener was not someone else, a wakefulness and a thought transcending thought which exists always, then he is as he woke himself to be. But his waking transcends substance and intellect and intelligent life; but these are himself. He then is an active actuality above intellect and thought and life¹; but these are from him and not from another. His being then comes by and from himself. He is not therefore as he happened to be, but he is himself as he willed.

17. And further, [consider it] also like this: we affirm that each and every thing in the All, and this All here itself, is as it would have been if the free choice of its maker had willed it, and its state is as if this maker proceeding regularly in his calculations with foresight had made it according to his providence. But since things here are always like this and always come to be like this, so their rational principles also always rest among the things which exist all together, standing still in a better order, so that the things there transcend providence and transcend free choice, and all the things which are in real being stand in intellectual stillness. So that if someone calls this disposition of things providence,

² Again *Republic* VI 509B9.

πρόνοιαν, αὕτω νοείτω, δτι ἔστι πρὸ τοῦδε νόος τοῦ παντὸς ἑστώς, ἀφ' οὗ καὶ καθ' ὃν τὸ πάντα τάδε εἰ, λέν οὖν νοῦς πρὸ πάντων καὶ ἀρχῆς τὸ τούτους νόος, οὐκ ἀντίτινος
15 ὡς ἔτυχε, τολμὸς μὲν ἦν, συνῳδός δὲ αὐτῷ καὶ οἷον εἰς συντεταγμένος. οὐδὲν γάρ πολὺ καὶ πλήθος συντεταγμένοι καὶ λόγοι τάντες καὶ περιληφθέντες ἐν διὰ παντὸς ἡς ἔτυχε καὶ ὡς συνέβη, ἀλλὰ πόρρω φυσεως τῆς τοιαύτης καὶ ἐναντίου, ὅσον τύχη ἐν ἀλογίᾳ κειμένη λόγω. εἰ δὲ τὸ πρὸ τοῦ τοιούτου ἀρχή, δηλούτι
20 προσεχῆς τούτῳ τῷ οὐτα λελογωμένῳ, καὶ τὸ οὕτω λεγόμενον τοῦτο κατ' ἔκεινο καὶ μετέχον ἔκεινον καὶ οἷον θέλει ἔκεινο καὶ διπλαμις ἔκεινον ἀδιάστατος τοίνυν ἔκεινος, εἰς *(eis)*¹ πάντα λόγος, εἰς ἀρθμὸς καὶ εἰς μεῖζον τοὺς γεννημένους καὶ δυνατώτερος, καὶ οὐδὲν μεῖζον αὐτοῦ οὐδὲ κρείττον. οὐδὲ ἄρα ἐξ ἄλλου ἔχει οὔτε
25 τὸ εἶναι οὔτε τὸ ὄποιός ἔστι εἶναι. αὐτὸς ἄρα αὐτῷ δέ
ἔστι πρὶς αὐτὸν καὶ εἰς αὐτόν, ἵνα μηδὲ ταύτη πρὸς τὸ
ἔξω η̄ πρὸς ἄλλον, ἀλλὰ πρὸς αὐτὸν πᾶς

18. Καὶ σὺ ζητῶι μηδὲν ἔξω ζήτει αὐτοῦ, ἀλλ' εἴσω πάντα τὰ μετ' αὐτὸν αὐτὸν δὲ ξα. τὸ γάρ ἔξω αὐτὸς
ἔστι, περιληψις πάντων καὶ μέτρον. η̄ εἴσω ἐν βάθει, τὸ
δὲ ἔξω αὐτοῦ, οἷον κύκλῳ ἐφαπτόμενον αὐτοῦ καὶ
5 ἐκηργημένον πάντα ὁ λόγος καὶ νοῦς· μᾶλλον δὲ ἢν εἴη

¹ Cilento.

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he must understand it in this way, that Intellect is there standing still before this All, and this All here is from and according to Intellect. If then intellect was before all things and an intellect of this kind was the principle, it would not be just as it chanced to be, being many but in tune with itself and as it were brought together into a single order. For what is many and an ordered multiplicity, and all rational forms included in one which goes through all, none of this is as it chanced and as it happened to be, but it is far from a nature of this kind and opposed to it, as much as chance whose place is in contrast to rational principle. But if that before the Intellect of this kind is the principle, it is obviously close to this which is rationalised in this way and what we speak of in this way is according to that and participates in that and is as that wills and is the power of that. He is then without dimensions, one rational principle for all things, one number and one which is greater and more powerful than what has come into being, and there is nothing greater or better than him. He does not then have from another either his being or his being what he is. He himself therefore is by himself what he is, related and directed to himself that he may not in this way either be related to the outside or to something else, but altogether self related.

18 And you when you seek, seek nothing outside him, but seek within all things which come after him; but leave him himself alone. For he himself is the outside, the encompassment and measure of all things. Or within in depth, but what is outside him, touching him in a kind of circle and depending on him, is all which is rational principle and intellect;

νοῦς, καθὸς ἐφάπτεται καὶ δὲ ἔξηργγται¹ αὐτοῦ [καὶ δὲ ἔξηργγται],² ἀτε παρ' ἐκείνου ἔχων τὸ νοῦς εἶναι ὡσπερ ἀν οὖν κύκλος, *(ὅς)*³ ἐφάπτοιτο κέντρον κύκλῳ, ὁμολογούσθι ἀν τὴν δυναμιν παρα τοῦ κέντρου 10 ἔχειν καὶ οἰον κεντροειδῆς, *ἡ*⁴ γραμμαὶ ἐν κυκλῳ πρὸς κέντρον ἐν συνιούσαι τὸ πέρας αὐτῶν τὸ πρὸς τὸ κέντρον παιονός, τοιούτον εἶναι οἷον τὸ πρὸς ὃ ἥμερθησαν καὶ ἀφ' οὗ οἰον ἔξεφυσαν, μείζονος δύτος ἡ κατὰ ταύτας τὰς γραμμὰς καὶ τὰ πέρατα αὐτῶν τα 15 αὐτῶν σημεῖα τῶν γραμμῶν—καὶ ἔστι μὲν οἰον ἐκεῖνο, ἀμυδρὰ δὲ παὶ ἔχηντες τοῦ δὲ διωταῖ αὐτὰ καὶ τὰς γραμμὰς δυνάμενον, αἱ πανταχοῦ ἔχονται αὐτός καὶ ἐμφαίνεται διὰ τῶν γραμμῶν, οἷον ἔστιν ἐκεῖνο, οἰον ἔξελιχθὲν οὐκ ἔξελιχτιγμένον—οὔτω τοι καὶ τον νοῦν καὶ τὸ δὲ χρῆ λαρβάνειν, γνώμενοι ἔξικενται μὴ οἰον 20 ἔκχυθὲν καὶ ἔξελιχθὲν καὶ ἔξηργγμένον, ἐκ τῆς αὐτοῦ νοερᾶς φύσεως μαρτυρεῖν τοὺς οἰον ἐν ἐνὶ νοῦν οὐ νοῦν δύτα· ἐν γάρ, ὡσπερ οὐδὲ ἐκεὶ γραμμὰς οὐδὲ κύκλον τὸ κέντρον, κύκλου δὲ καὶ γραμμῶν πατέρα, ἔχην αὐτοὺς δύτα καὶ δυνάμει μενούσῃ γραμμὰς καὶ κύκλον οὐ 25 πάντη ἀπηργγένεα αὐτοῦ ῥώμῃ τινι γεγενηκότα αὐτῷ τοι κάκενο, τῆς νοερᾶς περιθεούσῃς δυνάμεως, τὸ οἰον ἴνδαλματος αὐτοῦ ἀρχέτυποι, ἐν ἐνὶ νοῦν, πολλοῖς καὶ εἰς πολλὰ οἰον νευκημένους καὶ νοῦ διὰ ταύτα γενομένου, ἐκείνου πρὸ νοῦ μεναντος *(ἐκ)*⁵ τῆς δυνάμεως αὐτοῦ νοῦς γεννήσαντος—τίς ἀν συντυχίᾳ (*ἢ* το αὐτόματον *ἢ* τὸ *'ως συνέβη εἶναι'*) τῆς τυπού;

¹ conieciimus ἐφάπτεται. Enn.

² deleimus

³ Thesler

⁴ F^{3mg} (= Ficinus); *ἡ* Enn.

⁵ A^{3mg} (= Ficinus), H. S¹; om. H-S²

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but, rather, it would be Intellect, in so far as it touches him and in the way that it depends on him, in that it has from him its being Intellect. Just as a circle, therefore, which touches the centre all round in a circle, would be agreed to have its power from the centre and to have in a way the centre's form, in that the radii in the circle coming together to one centre make their terminal point at the centre like that to which they are carried and from which they, so to speak, grow out, though the centre is greater than is proportionate to these lines and their terminal points, the points of the lines themselves and the terminal points are like that centre, but only a dim image of that which has power to produce them in having power also to produce the lines; and what that centre is like is revealed through the lines; it is as if it was spread out without having been spread out it is like this that we must apprehend that Intellect-Being, coming to be from that Good and as if poured out and spread out and hanging out from it, is, by its own intelligent nature, evidence of something like Intellect in the One which is not Intellect, for it is one. Just as in our example also the radii and the circle were not the centre, but it is the father of circle and radii giving traces of itself and with an abiding power generating radii and circle, not at all cut off from it, by a kind of strength; so also is that too, as the intellectual power runs round it, a kind of archetype of the image of itself, Intellect in one, an image, as it were, overcome by many and into many and so becoming Intellect, while that remains before Intellect and generates intellects from its power what chance happening (or accident or "as it happened to be") could come near a power like this

PLOTINUS ENNEAD VI 8

δυνάμεως τῆς νοοποιοῦ καὶ ὄντως ποιητικῆς πλησίου
ἡκοι; οἶον γαρ τὸ ἐν νῷ, πολλαχῆ μεῖζον ἡ τοιούτον τὸ
ἐν ἑνὶ ἐκείνῃ, ὥσπερ φωτὸς ἐπὶ πολὺ πιεδοπιθέντος ἔξ
35 ἐνός τυντος ἐν αὐτῷ ὄντος διαφωνούς εἴδωλον μεν τὸ
σκεδασθεν, τὸ δὲ ἀφ' οὗ τὸ ἀληθές· οὐ μὴν ἀλλοειδὲς τὸ
υπεριώσθει εἴδωλον ὁ τοῦ, οὐσὶ τύχῃ, ἀλλὰ καθέκαστοι
αὐτοῦ λόγος καὶ αἵτια, αἵτιον δὲ ἔκεινο τοῦ αἵτιου.
μειζόνως ἀρα οἷον αἵτιώτατον καὶ ἀληθέστερον αἵτια.
10 δρμοῦ πάσις ἔχων τὰς μελλούσας ἀπ' αὐτοῦ ἕστεθαι
νοερὰς αἵτιας καὶ γεννητικὸν τοῦ οὐχ ὡς ἔτιχεν, ἀλλ'
ώς ηθέλησεν αὐτός. ἡ δὲ θέλησις οὐκ ἄλογος ἢ οὐδὲ τοῦ
εἰκῇ οὐδὲ ὡς ἐπήλθει αὐτῷ, ἀλλ' ὡς ἔδει, ὡς οὐδενὸς
ὄντος ἔκει εἰκῇ ὅθεν καὶ δέον καὶ καιρὸν
15 ὃ Πλάτων ὡς οἶδόν τε ἦν σημῆναι ἔφιέμενος, ὅτι πόρρω
του ὡς ἔτιχεν, ἀλλ' ὅπερ ἔστι, τοῦτι δέον. εἰ δὲ οὐ δέον
τοῦτο, οὐδὲ ἀλογίως τοῦτο, καὶ εἰ καιρός, τὸ μάλιστα
κυριώτατον ἐν τοῖς μετ' αὐτῷ καὶ πρότερον αὐτῷ καὶ
οὐχ οἷον ἔτιχε τούτῳ ἔστιν, ἀλλὰ τοῦτό ἔστιν, διπερ οἷον
δι έβουληθη αὐτός, εἴπερ τὰ δέοντα βούλεται καὶ ἐν το
δέον καὶ ἡ τοῦ δέοντος ἐνέργεια καὶ ἔστι δέον οὐχ ὡς
ὑποκείμενον, αλλ' ὡς ἐνέργεια πρώτη τοῦτο ἐαυτῇ
ἐκφήγασα, διπερ ἔδει. οὕτω γὰρ δεῖ αὐτὸν λέγειν
ἀδυνατοῦντα λέγειν ὡς τις ἔθελει.

Taken from an entirely different context, Plato's discussion of the two kinds of measurement, *Statesman* 288

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which makes Intellect and is maker of reality? For something like what is in Intellect, in many ways greater, is in that One: it is like a light dispersed far and wide from some one thing translucent in itself what is dispersed is image, but that from which it comes is truth; though certainly the dispersed image, Intellect, is not of alien form, *i.e.* is not chance but each and every part of it is rational principle and cause, but that One is cause of the cause. He is then in a greater degree something like the most causative and truest of causes, possessing all together the intellectual causes which are going to be from him and generative of what is not as it chanced but as he himself willed. And his willing is not irrational, or of the random, or just as it happened to occur to him, but as it ought to be, since nothing there is random. For this reason Plato speaks of "due" and "right moment",¹ desiring to indicate as far as possible that it is far from "as it chanced" but what it is is what it ought to be. But if this is what ought to be, it is not so irrational, and if it is the right moment it has the most authentic mastery among the things which come after it, and has priority in its own right and is not what it in a way chanced to be, but what he in a way wished to be, since he wishes what ought to be and what ought to be and the active actuality of what ought to be *αὐτὸν*; and it is not what ought to be as a substrate, but as the first active actuality revealing itself as what it ought to be. For this is how one has to speak of him since one is unable to speak as one should

284D-E, from which Aristotle develops his doctrine of the Mean

19 Λαμβανέτω τις οὖν ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων ἀνακινηθεῖς πρὸς ἑκένο ἑκένο αὐτό, καὶ θεάσεται καὶ αὐτὸς οὐχ ὅσον θέλει εἰπεῖν δυνάμερος ἵδων δέ τοι τὸν ἑνὸν ἀντὸν πάντα λόγου ἀφεὶς θήσεται παρ’ αὐτοῦ ἑκένο
5 τοῦτο ὅν, ὡς, εἴπερ εἶχεν οὐσίαν, δούλην ἀν αὐτοῦ τὴν οὐσιὰν εἶναι καὶ οἷον παρ’ αὐτοῦ εἶναι οὐδὲν ἀν τολμήσει τις ἴδων ἔτι τὸ “ώς συνέβη” λέγειν, οὐδὲν δὲλως φθέγξασθαι δύναται. ἐκπλαγεί γαρ ἀν τολμῶν,
καὶ οὐδὲν ἀν ἔχοι ἀλίξας “ποὺ” εἰπεῖν περὶ αὐτοῦ πάντη
10 αὐτῷ ἑκείνον οἶοι πρὸ δύμάτων τῆς ψυχῆς προφαινομένου καὶ, ὅποι ἀν ατενίσῃ, ἑκείνον βλέποντος, εἰ μή που ἄλλῃ ἀφεὶς τὸν θεὸν ἀτενίσῃ μηδὲν ἔτι¹ περὶ αὐτοῦ διανοούμενος χρὴ δὲ ἵστην καὶ τὸ ἐπέκεινα
15 οὐ σίας καὶ ταύτη τοεῖσθαι τοῖς παλαιοῖς λεγόμενον δι’ αἰνίξεως, οὐ μόνον διτι γεννᾷ οὐσίαν, ἀλλ’ ὅτι οὐ δουλεύει οὐδὲ οὐσίᾳ οὐδὲ ἔαντῷ, οὐδὲ ἔστιν αὐτῷ ἀρχὴ
ἡ οὐσία αὐτοῦ, ἀλλ’ αὐτὸς ἀρχὴ τῆς οὐσίας ἀν οὐχ αὐτῷ ἐποιησε τὴν οὐσίαν, ἀλλὰ ποιήσας ταύτην ἔξω εἴσασεν
έαυτον, ἀτέ οὐδὲν τοῦ εἶναι δεόμενος, ὃς ἐποίησεν αὐτό.
20 οὐ τοίνυν οὐδὲ καθό ἔστι ποιεῖ τὸ ἔστι.

20. Τί οὖν; οὐ συμβαίνει, εἴποι τις ἀν, πρὸν ἥ γενεσθαι γεγονέναι, εἰ γάρ ποιεῖ ἔαντόν, τῷ μὲν “ἐπιτὸν” οὕτω ἔστι, τῷ δὲ αὐτῷ ποιεῖν ἔστιν ἥδη πρὸ ἔαυτοῦ τοῦ ποιουμένου ὅντος αὐτοῦ. πρὸς δὲ δὴ λεκτέον,

¹ A³ms (=Ficinus); εἰ τ. wBUCQ. ἦτοι κ.

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19. Raised up, then towards that by what has been said one should take hold of that itself, and he will see also himself and will not be able to say all that he wishes. But when he sees that in itself he will put away all reasoning and will set that by itself as being such that, if it had substance its substance would be its slave and as if derived from it. Nor would one who sees it still be rash enough to say as it happened to be"; nor is he able to utter a word about it, if he did he would be struck dumb in his rashness, and would not in his swift flight be able to say "where" about it; it appears everywhere to him as if before the eyes of his soul and, wherever he fixes his gaze, he is looking at him, unless he leaves the God and fixes his gaze elsewhere and thinks no more about him. And one ought perhaps to understand that it was in this sense that the ancients spoke of "beyond being" with a hidden meaning,¹ not only that he generates substance but that he is not a slave to substance or to himself, nor is his substance his principle, but he being principle of substance, did not make substance for himself but when he had made it left it outside himself, because he has no need of being, he who made it. He does not then even make being in accordance with his being.

20 "Well then," someone might say, "does he not happen to be already before he comes into being?" For if he makes himself, as regards himself he does not yet exist, but on the other hand as regards the making he exists already before himself, as he himself is what is made." To this we must reply that he is

The reference is of course again to Plato *Republic* VI 509B9

PLOTINUS: ENNEAD VI. 8.

ο ὁς δλως οὐ τακτέον κατὰ τὸν ποιούμενον, ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὸν ποιοῦντα, ἀπόλυτυν τὴν ποίησιν αὐτοῦ τιθεμένοις,
καὶ οὐχ ἵνα ἀλλο ἀποτελεσθῇ ἐξ αὐτοῦ τῆς ποιήσεως,
ἀλλου τῆς¹ ἐνέργειας αὐτὸν οὐκ ἀποτελεστικῆς, ἀλλ'
οὐδον τούτου διντον οὐ γάρ δύο, ἀλλ' ἕν. οὐδὲ γάρ
10 φιβητέον ἐνέργειαν τὴν πρώτην τίθεσθαι ἀνει οὐσίας,
ἀλλ' αὐτὸ τούτο τὴν οὖν υπόστασιν θετέον. εἰ δὲ
υπόστασιν ἄκεν ἐνέργειας τις θεῖτο, ἐλλιπής ἡ ἀρχή καὶ
ἀτελής ἡ τελειοτάτη πασῶν ἔσται. καὶ εἰ προσθείη
ενέργειαν, οὐχ ἐν τηρεῖ. εἰ οὖν τελειότερον ἡ ἐνέργεια
15 τῆς οὐσίας, τελειότατοι δὲ τὸ πρώτον, πρώτον ἀν
ἐνέργεια εἴη ἐνεργήσας οὖν ἥδη ἐστὶ τούτο, καὶ οὐκ
ἔστιν ὡς πρὶν γενένθιαι ἢ τότε² γάρ οὐκ ἦρ πρὸ³
γενέσθαι, ἀλλ' ἥδη πάσι ἦν. ἐνέργεια δὴ οὐδὲν δοιλεύσασα
οὐσίᾳ καθαρώς ἔστιν ἐλευθέρα, καὶ οὕτως³ αὐτὸς παρ'
20 αὐτοῦ αἰτίας καὶ γάρ εἰ μὲν ἐσφύζετο εἰς τὸ εἶναι ὑπὸ⁴
ἄλλου, οἱ πρώτοι αὐτὸς ἐξ αὐτοῦ· εἰ δὲ αὐτὸς αὐτὸν
ὁρθῶς λέγεται συνέχειν, αὐτὸς ἔστι. καὶ δὲ παράγων
ἔαυτον, εἴπερ, ὅπερ συνέχει κατὰ φύσιν, τοῦτο καὶ ἐξ
ἀρχῆς πεποιηκεν εἶναι. εἰ μὲν οὖν χρόνος ἦν, ὅθεν
ἥρξατο εἶναι, τὸ πεποιηκέναι κυριώτατον ἀν ἐλέχθη
25 νῦν δέ, εἰ καὶ πρὶν αἰώνα εἶναι. ὅπερ ἔστιν ἦν, τὸ
πεποιηκέναι ἔαυτον τυῆτον εὐείω τὸ σύνδρομον εἶναι τὸ
πεποιηκέναι καὶ αὐτό· ἐν γάρ τῇ ποίησι καὶ οἷον
γεννήσει ἀιδίῳ το εἶναι. διθεν καὶ τὸ "ἄρχων ἔαυτοῦ"

H S¹ ἀλλ' οὖσης Enn.

²Theiler δὲ Enn.

³Nicephorus Gregorus. αὐτὸς Enn

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not at all to be classed as made, but as maker; we must posit that his making is absolute, and not in order that something else should be brought to perfection by his making, since his activity is not directed to the perfection of something else, but is altogether this God; for there are not two, but one. Nor should we be afraid to assume that the first activity is without substance, but posit this very fact as his, so to speak, existence. But if one posited an existence without activity, the principle would be defective and the most perfect of all imperfect. And if one adds activity one does not keep the One. If then the activity is more perfect than the substance, and the first is most perfect, the first will be activity. In his activity, therefore, he is already this first, and it cannot be that he was before he came to be; for then he was not before coming to be, but already altogether was. Now certainly an activity not enslaved to substance is purely and simply free, and in this way he himself is himself from himself. For indeed, if he was kept in being by another, he would not be first self from himself, but if he *s.rightly* said to hold himself together he is both himself and the bringer of himself into being, granted that what he by his nature holds together is what from the beginning he has made to be. Now if there was a time from which he began to be, "he has made" would be used in the strict and proper sense; but now, if he was what he is before eternity existed, this "he has made" must be understood to mean that making and self are concurrent; for the being is one with the making and what we may call the eternal generation. From this too [it comes that we say] "ruing himself", and if there were two, this is properly said, but if there is

PLOTINUS ENNEAD VI. 8.

καὶ εἰ μὲν δύο, κυρίως, εἰ δὲ ἐν, τὸ ἄρχων¹ μόνον οὐ
γάρ ἔχει τὸ ἀρχόμενον. πῶς οὖν ἄρχον οὐκ ὅντος πρὸς ὅ.
η τὸ ἄρχον ἐνταῦθα πρὸς τὸ πρὸ αὐτοῦ, διὰ μηδὲν ήτι. εἰ
δέ μηδὲν ήν, πρῶτον τοῦτο δὲ οὐ τάξει, ἀλλὰ κυριότητι
καὶ δυνάμει αὐτέξουσιφ καθαρώς. εἰ δὲ καθαρώς, οὐκ
ἔστιν ἔκει λαβεῖν τὸ μὴ αὐτεξυνυῖν. ὅλον οὖν
οὐτέξουσίς ἐν αὐτῷ τί οὖν αὐτοῦ, δὲ μὴ αὐτός; τί οὖν,
δὲ μὴ ἐνεργεῖ, καὶ τί, δὲ μὴ ἔργον αὐτοῦ; εἰ γάρ τι εἴη μὴ
ἔργον αὐτοῦ ἐν αὐτῷ, ἀντὶ κινητῶς ἀντὶ οὐτε
αὐτεξουσίος οὗτε πάντα δυνάμενος ἔκεινον τε γάρ οὐ
κύριος πάντα τε οὐδὲ δυνάμενος. ἔκεινο γοῦν οὐ δύναται,
οὐ μὴ αὐτὸς κύριος εἰς τὸ ποιεῖν

21 Ἐδυνατο οὖν ἄλλο τι ποιεῖν ἑαυτὸν ηδὲ ἐποίησεν;
ηδὲ οὕπω¹ καὶ τὸ ἀγαθὸν ποιεῖν ἀναιρήσομεν, διὰ μὴ ἀν
κακὸν ποιοῦ οὐ γάρ οὕτω τὸ δύνασθαι ἔκει, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὰ
ἀντικείμενα, ἀλλὰ ὡς ἀστεμφεῖ καὶ ἀμετακινήτῳ
5 δινάμει, ηδὲ μάλιστα δύναμις ἔστιν, διταν μὴ ἔξιστηται
τοὺς εὐ καὶ γάρ τὸ τὰ ἀντικείμενα δύνασθαι ἀδυνατίας;
ἔστι τοῦ ἐπὶ τοῦ ἀρίστου μένεν. δέδε καὶ τὴν ποίησιν
αὐτοῦ, ηδὲ λέγομεν, καὶ ταῦτην ἀπαξ εἴναι· καλὴ γάρ.
καὶ τίς ἀντὶ παρατρέψεις βουλήσει γενομένην θεού καὶ
10 βιούλησιν οὖσαν; βουλήσει οὖν μήπω ὅντος; τί δέ
βιούλησιν ἔκεινον ἀβουλεύντος τῇ ὑποστάσει, πόθεν οὖν
αὐτῷ ἔσται ηδὲ βιούλησις ἀπὸ οὐσίας ἀνενεργήτου, ηδὲ

¹ The later: οὔτω Enn

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one, the "ruling" only; for he does not have what is ruled. How then can we say "ruling" when there is nothing to rule? Now "ruling" here refers to what was before him, because there was nothing before him. But if there was nothing, he is the first; but this means not in rank, but in authentic mastery and purely self-determined power. But if it is purely self-determined, it is not possible to accept absence of self determination there. He is therefore altogether at his own disposal in himself. What then is there of his which is not himself? What which is not his activity? And what which is not his work? For if there was anything in him which was not his work, he would not then be purely and simply at his own disposal and capable of all things for he would not be master of that and would not be capable of all things; at any rate he would not be capable of that of whose making he was not himself master.

21 Could he then make himself anything else than he did? Now we shall not yet do away with his making himself good because he could not make himself evil. For power to make there is not to be understood as power to make the opposite, but as making with power unshaken and not to be deflected, which is power in the highest degree when it does not go out of the One; for to be capable of the opposite belongs to incapacity to remain with the best. But his making which we speak of must be once for all; for it is beautiful. And who would alter it when it has come to be by the will of God and is his will? By the will, then, of a God who did not yet exist? And what could his will be when he is without will in his very existence? How will he come to have a will from his inactive substance? Now his will is in

βούλησις ἐν τῇ οἰσίᾳ οὐχ ἔτερον ἄρα τῆς οὐσίας οὐδέτ
ἢ τί ἡν, δι μὴ ἣν οἶον ἡ βούλησις; πάν ἄρα βούλησις ἢ
15 καὶ οὐκ ενι το μη βούλησιν οὐδὲν, δι πρὸ βούλησιν
ἄρα πρώτον ἄρα ἡ βούλησις αὐτός καὶ τὸ ὡς ἔβούλετο
ἄρα καὶ οἶον ἔβούλετο, καὶ τὸ τῇ βούλησι επόμενον, δὴ
τοιαντῇ βούλησις ἐγέννα ἐγέννα δὲ οὐδὲν ἔτι εν
αὐτῷ—τούτῳ γάρ ἥδη ἦν. τὸ δὲ συνέχειν έσιτον οὕτω
20 ληπτέον νοεῖν, εἴ τις ὁρθῶς αὐτὸ φθέγγοιτο, ὡς τὰ μὲν
ἄλλα παντα δσα ἔστι πηρά τούτου συνέχεται μετουσια
γάρ τινι αὐτοῦ ἔστι, καὶ τις τούτῳ ἡ ἀναγωγὴ πήντων
αὐτὸς¹ δὲ ἥδη παρ' αὐτοῦ οὗτε συνοχῆς οὗτε μετουσίας
δεόμενος, ἀλλὰ πάντα ἔσιτῷ, μᾶλλον δὲ οὐδὲν οὐδὲ
25 τῶν πάντων δεόμενος εἰς αὐτόν ἀλλ' ὅταν αὐτὸν εἴπῃς
ἢ ἐνοηθῆς, τὰ ἀλλὰ πάντα ἀφει. ἀφελῶν πάντα,
καταλιπῶν δὲ μόνον αὐτόν, μὴ τί προσθῆς ζήτει, ἀλλὰ
μὴ τί πω οὐκ ἀφύρηκας ἀπ' αὐτοῦ ἐν γνώμῃ τῇ σῇ. ἔστι
γάρ τινος ἀφίψισθαι καὶ σέ, περὶ οὐκέτι ἀλλο
30 ἐνδέχεται οὗτε λέγειν οὗτε λαβεῖν ἀλλ' ἵπεράκῳ
κείμενον μόνον τούτο ἀληθείᾳ ἐλεύθερον, ὅτι μηδὲ
δουλεύον ἔστι ἔσιτῷ, ἀλλὰ μόνον αὐτὸ καὶ ὄντας αὐτό.
εἴ γε τῶν ἀλλων ἔκαυτον πάντα καὶ ἀλλο

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his substance; so there is nothing different from his substance. Or what was there that he was not, will for instance? So he was all will, and there is nothing in him which is not that which wills—nothing, then, before willing. So he himself is primarily his will. So then he is also as he willed and of the kind he willed, and what follows upon his will, what this kind of will generated—but it generated nothing further in himself for he was this already. But his holding himself together must be understood, if one is to say it correctly, as meaning that all the other things that exist are held together by this, for they exist by some kind of participation in him, and it is to this that their origin is to be traced. But he himself has no longer any need from himself of holding together or participation, but is all things by and in himself but rather none of them, and he does not need all things to be himself; but when you speak or think of him, put away all the other things. When you have put away all things and left only himself, do not try to find what you can add, but if there is something you have not yet taken away from him in your mind. For even you can grasp something about which it is not possible any more to say or apprehend anything else; but it is something which has its place high above everything, this which alone is free in truth, because it is not enslaved to itself, but is only itself and really itself, while every other thing is itself and something else.

¹ A^{long} (= Ficinus: annois Enn., H S².

VI. 9 ON THE GOOD OR THE ONE

Introductory Note

THIS early treatise, number 9 in Porphyry's chronological order, is the first clear presentation by Plotinus of the One as the ultimate principle and of union with it as the goal of the philosophic or spiritual life. It is the first and one of the clearest and most powerful of his great ascents of the mind, in which he both uses philosophic reason as far as it will go to show the way and urges his readers to go on beyond any thinkable reality to the union which he does not presume to describe. Though the treatise was probably meant for a rather wider circle of readers than the more technical works like VI 1-3, the discussion of the Categories, or VI 6, on numbers, it would still be intended to be read only by a chosen few, those among his friends and hearers who were capable of making the tremendous moral and spiritual effort required to travel by this way and reach the goal, and who already fully accepted the fundamentals of Platonic philosophical religion and were trying to live the philosophical life. Beginning from some fairly commonplace observations on the scale of unity and the necessity of unity for the existence of anything, it leads the reader rapidly through the Platonic World of Forms which is also Divine Intellect (where many Platonists and later theists wished to stop) to its source, and concludes with a passage about (not a description of) the mystical union which has rightly become a classic, though it should not be read and thought about in isolation from the rest of the *Enneads*, the two great works which precede it in the

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Ennead order, though they were written some years later, VI 7 [38] and VI 8 [39], need particularly to be taken into consideration.

Synopsis

All beings are beings by the one; unity is the condition of their existence. Soul unifies all beings in this world, but is not itself the One, but one by something else (ch. 1). Nor is real being, either individual or universal, the One; the world of Forms, which is Being, and is alive, and is Intellect, is manifold, and neither as the totality of real beings nor as living and thinking can it be the One which gives it unity (ch. 2). Difficulty of thinking or speaking about the One because it is formless, we must first reach the level of Intellect and then go beyond it, the One is not one of things it generates, and all which is said of them must be denied of it (ch. 3). We are aware of the One by a presence above knowledge, teaching and reasoning can only help on the way to it (ch. 4). We must first come to an understanding of the soul and its derivation from Intellect, and go on from there; inadequacy of all names, including "One" for the source of Intellect (ch. 5). What we mean by using this inadequate term for it; the absolute self-sufficiency of the One, it is beyond the need for thinking (ch. 6). Need to turn inwards, away from all other things, and even oneself, to find the One (ch. 7). The image of the circles; how we must turn to the One, the centre, by putting away otherness (ch. 8). The One is always present, always giving its gifts, but we must put away all other things to possess him truly (ch. 9). The vision which is perfect union, with no consciousness of duality (ch. 10). The final mystery of that union; how we fall from it and rise to it again (ch. 11).

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VI. 9 (9) ΠΕΡΙ ΤΑΓΑΘΟΥ Η ΤΟΥ ΕΝΟΣ

1. Πάντα τα ὄντα τῷ ἐνὶ ἔστιν ὄντα, ὅσα τε πρώτως
ἔστιν ὄντα, καὶ ὅσα διπλωσοῦν λέγεται ἐν τοῖς οὖσιν εἶναι
τί γάρ ἀν καὶ εἴη, εἰ μὴ ἐν εἴη, ἐπείπερ ἀφαιρεθέντα τοῖς
ἐν δὲ λέγεται οὐκ ἔστιν ἔκεινα οὔτε γάρ στρατὸς ἔστιν,
5 εἰ μὴ ἐν ἔσται, οὔτε χορὸς οὔτε ἀγέλη μὴ ἐν ὄντα. ἀλλ’
οὐδὲ οἰκία η ναυς τὸ ἐν οὐκ ἔχοντα, ἐπείπερ η οἰκία εἶ
καὶ η ναύς, δεὶς ἀποβάλλοι, οὗτ’ ἀν η οἰκία ἔτι οἰκία οὔτε
η ναῦς. τὰ τούντιν συνεχῆ μεγέθη, εἰ μὴ τὸ ἐν αὐτοῖς
παρεῖη, οὐκ ἀ τομή τριητόντα γοῖν, καθόσον τὸ ἐν
10 ἀπόλλυσιν, ἀλλάσσει τὸ εἶναι, καὶ δῆ καὶ τὰ τῶν φυτῶν
καὶ ζῶντων σώματα ἐν ὄντα ἔκαστα εἰ φείγου τὸ ἐν εἰς
πλῆθος θριπτόμενο, τὴν οἰσταν αὐτῶν, ην εἶχεν,
ἀπώλεσεν οὐκέτι ὄντα ἀ ην, ἀλλα δὲ γενόμενα καὶ
ἔκεινα, ὅσα ἐν ἔστι καὶ η ὑγίεια δέ, ὅταν εἰς ἐν
15 συνταχθῆ τὸ σώμα, καὶ κάλλος, ὅταν η τοῦ ἐνὸς τὸ
μήριον κατάσχῃ φύσις καὶ ἀρετὴ δὲ ψυχῆς. ὅταν εἰς ἐν
καὶ εἰς μίαν ὁμολογίαν ἐνωθῇ. ἀρ’ οὖν, ἐπειδὴ ψυχὴ τὰ
πάντα εἰς ἐν ἀγει, δημιουργούσα καὶ πλέατουσα καὶ
μαρφούσα καὶ συντάττουσα, ἐπὶ ταύτην ἐλθόντας δεῖ

¹ The scale of different degrees of unity which Plotinus uses in this chapter and elsewhere is Stoic. Cp. SVF II 366-8 and 10.3

² On beauty and unity cp. I. 6. 2. 18-28

VI. 9. ON THE GOOD OR THE ONE

1. It is by the one that all beings are beings, both those which are primarily beings and those which are in any sense said to be among beings. For what could anything be if it was not one? For if things are deprived of the one which is predicated of them they are not those things. For an army does not exist if it is not one, nor a chorus or a flock if they are not one. But neither can a house or a ship exist if they do not have their one, since the house is one and so is the ship, and if they lose it the house is no longer a house nor the ship a ship. So then continuous magnitudes, if the one was not with them, would not exist; at any rate, if they are cut up they change their being in proportion as they lose their one. And again the bodies of plants and animals, each of which is one, if they escape their one by being broken up into a multiplicity, lose the substance which they had and are no longer what they were but have become other things, and are those other things in so far as each of them is one.¹ And there is health when the body is brought together into one order, and beauty when the nature of the one holds the parts together²; and the soul has virtue when it is unified into one thing and one agreement. Is it true then that, since the soul brings all things to their one by making and moulding and shaping and composing them, we should, when we have arrived at it, say that it is this

20 λέγειν, ὡς αὕτη τὸ ἐν χορηγεῖ καὶ αὕτη ἔστι τὸ ἐν, ἵ
ωσπερ τα ἄλλα χορηγοῦσα τοῖς σώμασιν οὐκ ἔστιν αὐτὴ
διδόσαιν, οίον μορφὴ καὶ εἶδος, ἀλλ ἔτερα αὐτῆς, οὕτα
χρή, εἰ καὶ ἐν διδόσαι, ἔτερον δὲ αὐτῆς νομίζειν αὐτὴν
διδόναι καὶ πρὸς τὸ ἐν βλέποισαν ἐν ἔκαστον ποιεῖν,
25 ωσπερ καὶ πρὸς ἄνθρωπον ἄνθρωπον, συλλαμβάνονται
μετὰ τοῦ ανθρώπου τὸ ἐν αὐτῷ ἐν τῶν γάρ εἰ
λεγομένων οὕτως ἔκαστον ἔστιν ἐν, ὡς ἔχει καὶ ὁ ἔστιν,
ωστε τὰ μὲν ἥττοι δύτα ἥττον ἔχειν τὸ ἐν, τὰ δὲ μᾶλλον
μᾶλλον, καὶ δη καὶ φυχὴ ἔτερον οὖσα τοῦ ενὸς <.ό>
μᾶλλον <ἐν>¹ ἔχει κατὰ λόγου τοῦ μᾶλλον καὶ δύτως
30 εἶναι. [τὸ μᾶλλον ἐν]¹ οὐ μην αὐτὸ τὸ ἐν φυχὴ γάρ μία
καὶ συμβεβηκός πως τὸ ἐν, καὶ δύο ταῦτα φυχὴ καὶ ἐν,
ωσπερ σῶμα καὶ ἐν, καὶ τὸ μὲν διεστηκός, ωσπερ
χορός, πορρωτάτω τοῦ εἰ τὸ δὲ συνεχὲς ἐγγυτέρω
φυχὴ δὲ εἴ τι μᾶλλον κυνηγοῦσα καὶ αὐτή. εἰ δὲ ὅτι ἀνεύ²
35 τοῖς ἐν εἶναι οὐδὲ ἐν φυχῇ εἴη, ταύτῃ εἰς ταῦτά τις ἄγει
φυχὴν καὶ τὸ ἐν, πρώτον μὲν καὶ τὰ ἄλλα <ά>² ἔστιν
ἔκαστα μετὰ τοῦ ἐν εἶναι ἔστιν ἀλλ ὅμως ἔτερον αὐτῶν
τὸ ἐν—οὐ γάρ ταῦτα σῶμα καὶ ἐν, ἀλλὰ τὸ σῶμα
μετέχει τοῦ ἐν—ἔπειτα δὲ πολλῷ ἡ φυχὴ καὶ ἡ μία καν
40 εἰ μὴ ἐκ τερπνῶν πλείσται γάρ διπλάσιος ἡ αὐτῇ.
λογίζεσθαι, δρέγεσθαι, ἀντιλαμβάνεσθαι, μὲν τῷ ἐν
ὅστερ δεσμῷ συνέχεται ἐπάγει μὲν δὴ φυχὴ τὸ ἐν ἐν

¹ transposuimus, ut correctionem.

² H. S.

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which provides the one and this which is the one?
Rather we should consider that, just as with the other things it provides for bodies, it is not itself what it gives, shape and soul for instance, but they are other than i., so, even if it gives the one, it gives it as something other than itself, and that it is by looking to the one that it makes each and every thing one, just as it is by looking to [the Form of] man that it makes something man, taking the one in it along with the man. For of the things which are said to be one each is one in the way in which it also has what it is, so that the things which are less beings have the one less, and those which are more beings, more. And the soul too, which is other than the one, has its being more one in proportion to its greater and real being. It is certainly not the one itself; for the soul is one and the one is somehow incidental to it, and these things, soul and one, are two, just like body and one. And what has separate parts, like a chorus, is furthest from the one, and what is a continuous body is nearer; and the soul is nearer still, but still participates in it. But if because without being one it would not be soul, for this reason someone makes soul and the one the same, first of all, all the other things are what they are along with their being one, but all the same the one is different from them for body and one are not the same thing, but the body participates in the one—and then the soul is many, even the soul which is one, even if it is not composed from parts; for there are very many powers in i., reasoning, desiring, apprehending, which are held together by the one as by a bond. So the soul brings the one to other things

οὐδα¹ καὶ αὐτὴ ἀλλωπάσχει δὲ τοῦτο καὶ αὐτὴ ὑπὸ²
ἄλλου

2. Ἐπόνται μὲν τῶν κατὰ μέρος ἐν τῷ ταῦτὸν
ἡ οὐσία αὐτοῦ καὶ τὸ ἐν, ὅλως δὲ τῷ ὄντι καὶ τῇ οὐσίᾳ
ταῦτὸν ἡ οὐσία καὶ τὸ ὄν καὶ τὸ ἐν, ὥστε τὸτε ἔξευρόντα
5 τὸ ὄν ἔξευρηκέναι καὶ τὸ ἐν, καὶ αὐτὴν τὴν οὐσίαν αὐτὸν
εἶναι τὸ ὄν οἵοι, εἰ νοῦς ἡ οὐσία, νοῦν καὶ τὸ ἐν εἶναι
πρώτως ὄντα ὃν καὶ πρώτως ἐν, μεταδόντα δὲ τοῖς
10 ἄλλοις τοῖς εἶναι οὐτῶς καὶ κατὰ τοσούτουν καὶ τοῦ ἐνός
τι γάρ ἄν τις καὶ παρ' αὐτά εἴη αὐτὸς φήσαι, η² γάρ
ταῦτὸν τῷ ὄντι—ἀνθρωπος γάρ καὶ εἰς
15 ἀνθρωπος ταῦτόν—η οἷον ἀριθμός τις ἐκάστου,
ώσηπε τὸ δύνον τινὰ ἐλεγεις, οὐτως ἐπι μόνον τινος τὸ εν.
εἰ μὲν οὖν ὁ ἀριθμὸς τῶν ὄντων, δῆλον ὅτι καὶ τὸ ἐν καὶ
ζητητέον τί ἐστιν. εἰ δὲ ψυχῆς ἐνέργημα τὸ ἀριθμὸν
ἐπεξιούσης, οὐδεὶς ἀντὶ τοῦς πράγματος τὸ ἐν ἀλλ'
20 Εἰ λέγεν ὁ λόγος, εἰ ἀπολεῖ ἐκαστον τὸ ἐν, μηδὲ ἐσεσθα τὸ
παράπαν, ὅραν οὖν δεῖ, εἰ ταῦτὸν τὸ ἐν ἐκαστον καὶ τὸ
ὄν, καὶ τὸ ὄλως ὃν καὶ τὸ ἐν ἀλλ' εἰ τὸ δὲ τὸ ἐκαστον
25 πλήθος ἐστι, τὸ δὲ ἐν ἀδύνατον πλήθος εἶναι, ἔτερον ἀν-

¹ ἐν οὐσίᾳ A³ (= Ficinus); ἐνοῦσα ExUCQ; ἐνεῦσα W
² Α² (= Ficinus, et Enn)

That Intellect-Real Being is the first principle was the view of most Platonists before Plotinus, including his fellow-pupil, of Ammonius, Origen the Platonist (to be distinguished from Origen the Christian). See Origen fr. 7 Weber (= Proclus *Platonic Theology* II 4, p. 31, 5-11 Saffrey-

being also itself one by something else, it too experiences this unity by the act of another.

2. Is it, then, true that for each of the things which are one as parts its substance and its one are not the same thing, but for being and substance as a whole substance and being and one are the same thing? So that anyone who has discovered being has discovered the one, and substance itself is the one itself. For example, if intellect is substance, intellect is also the one since it is primarily being and primarily one, and as it gives the other things a share in being, so in the same measure it also gives them a share in the one.¹ For what can anyone say that it is besides being and intellect? For it is either the same as being—for "man" and "one man" are the same thing—or it is like a kind of number of the individual; you say "one" of a thing alone just as you say "two things". Now if number belongs to the real beings, it is clear that so does the one; and we must investigate what it is. But if numbering is an activity of soul going through things one after another, the one would not be anything factual. But our argument said that if an individual thing loses its one it will not exist at all. We must therefore see if the individual one and individual being are the same thing, and universal being and the universal one. But if the being of the individual is a multiplicity, but it is impossible for the one to be a multiplicity, they will be different from each other. At any rate

Westcrank). H. R. Schwyzer has suggested that Ammonius himself may have held a view closer to that of Plotinus (*Ammonios Sakkas, der Lehrer Plotins*, Opladen 1983, 72-78).

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εῖη ἐκάτερον. ἄνθρωπος γοῦν καὶ ζῷον καὶ λογικὸν καὶ
 20 πολλὰ μέρη καὶ συνδεῖται ἐν τὰ πολλὰ ταῦτα· ἀλλο ἄρα
 ἄνθρωπος καὶ ἐν τῷ μὲν μεριστόνι, τῷ δὲ πλήρεσι καὶ
 δὴ καὶ τῷ ὅλον ὃν πάντα ἐν αὐτῷ ἔχον τὰ ὅντα πολλὰ
 μᾶλλον ἢν εἴη καὶ ἔτερον τοῦ ἐνός, μεταλήψει δὲ ἔχον
 καὶ μεθέξει τὸ ἐν τῷ ἔχει, δὲ καὶ ζῷην [καὶ νοῦν]¹ τὸ ὅν· οὐ
 25 γάρ δὴ νεκρόν πολλά ἄρα τὸ ὅν εἰ δὲ νοῦς τοῦτο εἶη,
 καὶ οὕτω πολλὰ ἀνάγκη εἶναι, καὶ ἔτι μᾶλλον, εἰ τὰ εἰδῆ
 περιέχοι οὐδὲ γάρ η ἰδέα ἐν, ἀλλ' ἀριθμὸς μᾶλλον καὶ
 ἐκάστη καὶ ἡ σύμπασσα, καὶ οὕτως ἐν, ὥσπερ ἢν εἴη² ὁ
 κόσμος ἐν. ὅλως δὲ το μὲν ἐν τῷ πρώτῳ, δὲ νοῦς καὶ
 30 ἡ εἶδος, καὶ τὸ ὅν οὐ πρώτα. εἰδός τε γάρ εκαστον εκ
 πολλῶν καὶ σύνθετον καὶ ὑστερον ἐξ ἓν γάρ ἐκαστόν
 εστι, πρότερα εκείνα. ὅτι δὲ οὐχ οἶλόν τε τὸν νοῦν τὸ
 πρώτον εἶναι καὶ ἐκ τωνδε δηλον ἐστα· τὸν νοῦν ἀνάγκη
 ἐν τῷ νοεῖν εἶναι καὶ τοι γε ἄριστον καὶ τὸν οὐ
 35 πρὸς τὸ ἔξω βλέποντα νοεῖν τὸ πρὸ αὐτοῦ εἰς αὐτὸν γὰρ
 επιστρέψων εἰς ἀρχὴν ἐπιστρέψει καὶ εἰ μὲν αὐτὸς τὸ
 νοοῦν καὶ τὸ νοούμενον, διπλοῦς ἐσται καὶ οὐχ ἀπλοῦς
 οὐδὲ το ἐν εἰ δὲ πρὸς ἔτερον βλέπει, πάντως πρὸς τὸ
 κρείττον καὶ πρὸ αὐτοῦ. εἰ δὲ καὶ πρὸς αὐτὸν καὶ πρὸς
 40 τὸ κρείττον, καὶ οὕτως δεύτερον, καὶ χρὴ τὸν νοῦν
 τοιούτον τίθεσθαι, οἷον παρεῖναι μὲν τῷ ἀγαθῷ καὶ τῷ

¹ del. Harder² Harder. εἰ δὲ wBCQ. εἰ δὲ U. εἰ καὶ x

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"man" and "living being" and "rational" are many parts and these many are bound together by the one. "Man" and "one" are therefore different, and one has parts and the other is partless. And, further, universal being, which has all the beings in it, will be still more many and different from the one, and will have the one by sharing and participation. But being also has life; for it is certainly not a corpse, being therefore is many things. But if it is intellect, in this way too it must be many, and still more if it includes the Forms. For the Idea is not one, but rather a number, both each individual one and the total Idea, and is one in the way in which the universe is one. But altogether the one is primary and the Forms and being are not primary. For each Form is of many parts and composite and posterior; for those elements from which an individual thing is composed are prior to it. And it is clear also from the following that intellect cannot be the first: it is necessary that intellect exists in its thinking, and that the best intellect, the one which does not look outside itself, thinks what is before it¹; for in turning to itself it turns to its principle. And if intellect itself is what thinks and what is thought, it will be double and not single and so not the one, but if it looks to another, it must certainly be to that which is better than it and before it. But if it looks both to itself and to what is better than it, in this way also it is second. And one must suppose that intellect is of such a kind that it is present to the good and the first

¹ Here Plotinus is developing and correcting Aristotle's account of the self thinking divine mind in *Metaphysics* A 9. 1074b15-1075a12.

PLOTINUS: ENNEAD VI. 9.

πρώτῳ καὶ βλέπειν εἰς ἐκεῖνον, συνεῖναι δὲ καὶ έμπτῳ
νοεῖν τε καὶ ἑαυτὸν καὶ νοεῖν ἑαυτὸν δύτα τὰ πάντα
πολλοὺς αρά δεῖ τὸ ἐν εἶναι ποικίλον δύτα. οὐ τοίνυν οὐδὲ
45 τὸ ἐν τὰ πάντα ἔσται, οὕτω γάρ οὐκέτι ἐν εἴη· οὐδὲ νοῦς
καὶ γάρ ἀν οὕτως εἴη τὰ πάντα τοῦ νοῦ τὰ πάντα δύτας
οὐδὲ τὸ οὖν τὸ γάρ δι τὰ πάντα.

3. Τί ἀν οὐν εἴη τὸ ἐν καὶ τίνα φύσιν ἔχον, τὸ οὐδὲτ
θαυμαστὸν μὴ ῥάδιον εἰπεῖν εἴναι, σπου μηδὲ τὸ ὄν
ῥάδιον μηδὲ τὸ εἶδος· ἀλλ’ ἔστιν ἡμῖν γνῶσις εἰδεσιν
ἐπερεδομένη. ὅσῳ δ’ ἀν εἰς ἀνεῖδεον ἡ ψυχὴ ἦρ.
ἢ ἔξαδυνατοῦσα περιλαβεῖν τῷ μὴ δρίζεσθαι καὶ οἷοι
τυποῖσθαι ὑπὸ ποικίλου τοῦ τυποῦντος ἔξολισθάνει καὶ
φοβεῖται, μὴ οὐδεν ἔχῃ. διὸ κάρμνει ἐν τοῖς τυωόντις
καὶ πτημένη κατηβιάσει πολλάκις πτοπίπτουσα ἀπὸ
πάντων, μέχρις ἀν εἰς αἰσθητὸν ἥκη ἐν στερεῷ ὕστερ
10 ἀναπανομένη· οἷοι καὶ ἡ ὄψις κάμνονσα ἐν τοῖς μικροῖς
τοῖς μεγάλοις ἀσμένως περιπίπτει. καθ’ ἑαυτὴν δὲ ἡ
ψυχὴ δταν ἰδεῖν ἐθέλῃ, μόνον δρῶσα τῷ συνεῖναι καὶ ἐν
οὗσα τῷ ἐν εἶναι μάτῳ οὐκ λεπτί πω ἔχειν δύνηται, ὅτι
τον νοούμενον μὴ ἐπερόν ἔστιν. δρως δὴ χρή οὕτως
ποιεῖν τον μέλλοντα περὶ τὸ ἐν φιλοσοφήσειν. ἐπεὶ
15 τούνν ἐν ἔστιν δύνηται, καὶ τὴν ἀρχὴν τῶν πάντων
ἐπισκοποῦμεν, ταγαθὸν καὶ τὸ πρῶτον, οὕτε πάρρω δεῖ

Plotinus may be thinking here of Numenius' comparison of the attempt to see the Good to someone straining his eyes to catch sight of a little boat far away among the waves (fr. 2 des Places, 11 Leemans)

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and looks to him, but is also present with itself and thinks itself, and thinks itself as being all things. It is far, then, from being the one since it is richly various. The one then cannot be all things, for so it would be no longer one, and it cannot be intellect, for in this way it would be all things since intellect is all things; and it cannot be being; for being is all things.

3. What then could the One be, and what nature could it have? There is nothing surprising in its being difficult to say, when it is not even easy to say what Being or Form is; but we do have a knowledge based upon the Forms. But in proportion as the soul goes towards the formless, since it is utterly unable to comprehend it because it is not delimited and, so to speak, stamped by a richly varied stamp, it slides away and is afraid that it may have nothing at all. Therefore it gets tired of this sort of thing, and often gladly comes down and falls away from all this, till it comes to the perceptible and rests there as if on solid ground; just as sight when it gets tired of small objects is glad to come upon big ones.¹ But when the soul wants to see by itself, seeing only by being with it and being one by being one with it, it does not think it yet has what it seeks, because it is not different from what is being thought. But all the same this is what one must do if one is going to philosophise about the One. Since, then, that which we seek is one and we are considering the principle of all things, the Good and the First, one must not go far away from the things around the primary by

straining his eyes to catch sight of a little boat far away among the waves (fr. 2 des Places, 11 Leemans)

PLOTINUS: ENNEAD VI. 9.

γενέσθαι τῶν περὶ τὰ πρώτα εἰς τὰ ἔσχατα τῶν πάντων πεσόντα, ἀλλ’ ἕμενοι εἰς τὰ πρώτα ἐπαναγαγεῖν ἑαυτὸν ἀπὸ τῶν αἰσθητῶν ἔσχάτων διτῶν, κακίας τε πάσης 20 ἀπηλλαγμένον εἶναι ἀτε πρὸς τὸ ἀγαθὸν σπεύδοντα γενέσθαι, ἐπὶ τὴν ἐν ἑαυτῷ ἀρχῇ ἀναβεβηκέναι καὶ ἐν ἐκ πολλῶν γενέσθαι ἀνυῖς καὶ ἐνὸς θεατὴν ἐσόμενον. νοῦν τούνυν χρὶ γενόμενον καὶ τὴν ψυχὴν τὴν αὐτοῦ νῷ πιστεύσαντα καὶ ὑφιδρύσαντα, ἵν’ ἂ¹ ὅρῃ ἔκεινος ἐγρηγορήνα δέχοιτο, τούτῳ θεάσθαι τὸ ἐν οἱ 25 προστιθέντα αἰσθητιν οὐδεμίαν οὐδὲ τι παρ’ αυτῆς εἰς ἔκεινον δεχόμενον, ἀλλὰ καθαρῷ τῷ νῷ τὸ καθαρωτατον θεάσθαι καὶ τοῦ νοῦ τῷ πρώτῳ δύτων τούνυν ὃ ἐπὶ τὴν θέσορ τοῦ τοιουτον ἐσταλμένος ἡ μέγεθος ἡ σχῆμα ἡ δύκον περὶ ταύτη τὴν φύσιν φαντασθῆ, οὐ νοῦς τούτῳ 30 ἡγεμὼν γίνεται τῆς θέας, ὅτι μὴ νοῦς τὰ τοιαῦτα πέφυκεν ὅράν, ἀλλ’ ἔστιν αἰσθήσεως καὶ δόξης ἐπομένης αἰσθήσει ἡ ἐνέργεια. ἀλλὰ δει λαβειν παρὰ του νοῦ τὴν ἐπαγγελίαν ὥν δύναται. δύναται δὲ ὅράν ὁ νοῦς [ἢ τὰ πρὸ αὐτοῦ]² ἡ τὰ αὐτοῦ ἡ τὰ πρὸ³ αὐτοῦ. καθαρὰ 35 δὲ καὶ τὰ ἐν αὐτῷ. ἔτι δὲ καθαράτερα καὶ ἀπλονυτερα τὰ πρὸ αὐτοῦ, μᾶλλον δὲ τὸ πρὸ αὐτοῦ. οὐδὲ νοῦς τούνυν, ἀλλὰ πρὸ νοοῦ τὶ γάρ τῶν δύτων ἔστιν ὁ νοῦς: ἔκεινο δὲ οὐ τι, ἀλλὰ πρὸ ἐκάστου, οὐδὲ διν καὶ γαρ τὸ διν μεν μορφὴν τὴν τοῦ δύτου ἔχει, μεμορφωθεὶς ἔκεινο 40 καὶ μορφῆς νοητῆς. γεινητικὴ γάρ ἡ τοῦ ἐνὸς φύσις οὐστα τῶν παντων οὐδὲν ἔστιν αὐτῶν. οὔτε οὖν τι οὐτε ποιὸν οὔτε ποσὸν οὔτε νοῦν οὔτε ψυχῆν οὐδὲ

A³ (Ficinus): ἡν Επν

‘del Igal.

¹Igal παρ Επν

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falling down to the last things of all, but as one goes to the primary one must lift oneself up from the things of sense which are the last and lowest, and become freed from all evil since one is hastening to the Good, and ascend to the principle in oneself and become one from many, when one is going to behold the Principle and the One. Therefore one must become Intellect and entrust one's soul to and set it firmly under Intellect, that it may be awake to receive what that sees, and may by this Intellect behold the One, without adding any sense-perception or receiving anything from sense perception into that Intellect, but beholding the most pure with the pure Intellect, and the primary part of Intellect. When therefore he who is embarked on the contemplation of this kind imagines size or shape or bulk about this nature, it is not Intellect which guides his contemplation because Intellect is not of a nature to see things of this kind, but the activity is one of sense-perception and opinion following sense-perception. But one must take one's information from Intellect where it is competent. And Intellect is competent to see its own things and the things before it. The things in it also are pure, but those before it are purer and simpler—or rather that which is before it. It is not therefore Intellect, but before Intellect. For Intellect is one of the beings, but that is not anything, but before each and every thing, and is not being; for being has a kind of shape of being, but that has no shape, not even intelligible shape. For since the nature of the One is generative of all things it is not any one of them. It is not therefore something or qualified or quantitative or intellect or soul, it is not in movement or at rest,

κινούμενον οὐδ' αῦτός ἐστώς, οὐκ ἐν τόπῳ, οὐκ εἰ χρόνῳ,
ἀλλ' αὐτὸν¹ καθ'² αὐτὸ μονοειδές, μᾶλλον δὲ
ἀνείδεον προ σῖδοις δὲ παιτος, πρὸ γε γάστρας πρὸ⁴⁵
στάσεως· ταῦτα γάρ περὶ τὸ ὄν, ἢ πολλὰ αὐτὸ ποιεῖ διὰ
τί οὖν, εἴ μη κινούμενον, οὐχ ἐστώς; οὗτοι μὲν τὸ ὄν
πούτινα πάτερον ἡ ὀμφότερο πάντηκη, τό τε ἐπὶ τὸ
στάσει ἐστώς καὶ οὐ ταύτην τῇ στάσει ἀστε συμ-
βήσεται αὐτῷ καὶ οὐκέτι ἀπλοῦν μενεῖ.³ ἐπεὶ καὶ τὸ
50 πάτιν λέγειν οὐ κατηγορεῖν ἐστι συμβεβηκός τι αὐτῷ.
ἀλλ' ήμῶν, ὅτι ἔχομέν τι παρ' αὐτοῦ ἐκείνου ὄντος ἐν
αὐτῷ· δεῖ δὲ μηδὲ τὸ "ἐκείνου" μηδὲ "ὄντος"³ λέγειν
ἀκριβών λέγοντα, ἀλλ' ήμάς οιον ἔξωθεν περιθέοντας
τὰ αὐτῶν ἐρμηνεύειν ἔθελεν πάθη ὅτε μὲν ἐγγύς, ὅτε δὲ
ἀποπίπτοντας τὰς περὶ αὐτὸ ἀπορίας.

4. Γίνεται δὲ ἡ ἀπορία μάλιστα, ὅτι μηδὲ κατ'⁴
επιστήμην ἡ σύνεσις ἐκείνοι μηδὲ κατὰ νόησιν, ὁπερ
τὰ ἀλλα νοητά, ἀλλὰ κατὰ παρουσίαν ἐπιστήμης
κρείτυνοι. πάσχει δὲ ἡ φυχὴ τούτη ἐν εἰναι τὴν ἀγόστασιν
δ καὶ οὐ πάντη ἐστὸν ἐν, δταν ἐπιστήμην του λαμβάνη
λόγος γάρ ἡ ἐπιστήμη, τολλὰ δὲ ὁ λόγος. παρέρχεται
οὖν τὸ ἐν εἰς ἀριθμὸν καὶ πληθὸς πεσούσα. ὑπὲρ
ἐπιστήμην τοίνυν δεῖ δραμειν καὶ μηδαμη εκβανειν του
ἐν εἰναι, ἀλλ' ἀποστῆναι δεῖ καὶ ἐπιστήμης καὶ
10 ἐπιστητῶν καὶ παντὸς ἀλλον καὶ καλοῦ θεάματος. πᾶν

¹ Heintz ἀλλα τὸ Enn.

² Dodds. μένει Enn.

³ Page ὄντος Enn.

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not in place, not in time,¹ but "itself by itself of single form",² or rather formless, being before all form, before movement and before rest; for these pertain to being and are what make it many. Why then, if it is not in movement is it not at rest? Because each or both of these must necessarily pertain to being, and what is at rest is so by rest and is not the same as rest, so rest will be incidental to it and it will not be the same as rest. For to say that it is the cause is not to predicate something incidental of it but of us, because we have something from it while that One is in itself, but one who speaks precisely should not say "that" or "is"; but we run round it outside, in a way, and want to explain our own experiences of it, sometimes near it and sometimes falling away in our perplexities about it.

4. The perplexity arises especially because our awareness of that One is not by way of reasoned knowledge or of intellectual perception, as with other intelligible things, but by way of a presence superior to knowledge. The soul experiences its falling away from being one and is not altogether one when it has reasoned knowledge of anything, for reasoned knowledge is a rational process, and a rational process is many. The soul therefore goes past the One and falls into number and multiplicity. One must therefore run up above knowledge and in no way depart from being one, but one must depart from knowledge and things known, and from every other, even beautiful, object of vision. For every

¹ This comes from an established Platonic-Pythagorean exegesis of the First Hypothesis of Plato's *Parmenides*.

² Plato *Symposium* 211B1

γάρ καλὸν ὑστεροὶ ἐκείνοι καὶ παρ' ἐκείνου, ὥσπερ πᾶν
φῶς μεθημερινὸν παρ' ἡλίου. διὸ οὐδὲ ἡ τὸν οὐδὲ
γραπτόν, φησίν, ἀλλὰ λέγομεν καὶ γροφομενούς πάμποτες
εἰς αὐτὸν καὶ ἀνεγέρστες ἐκ τῶν λόγων ἐπὶ τὴν θέαν
ώσπερ ὅδον δεικνύντες τῷ τι θεάσασθαι βουλομένῳ
15 μέχρι γάρ τῆς ὁδοῦ καὶ τῆς πορείας ηὔδησις, ηὔδησις
αὐτοῦ ἔργου ἡδη τοῦ ιδεῖν βεβουλημένου εἰ δὲ μὴ ηὔδησις
τις ἐπὶ τὸ θέαμα, μηδὲ σύνεσιν ἔσχει ηψυχὴ τῆς ἐκεί
ηγδαῖτο, οὐδὲ ἔπιπλε μηδὲ ἔσχειν ἐν ἑαυτῷ οἷον ἐρωτικὸν
πάθημα ἐκ τοῦ ιδεῖν ἔραστον ἐν φῶ ἐρῆ ἀναπαυσάμενον,
20 δεξαμενος¹ φῶς ἀληθινὸν καὶ πάσαν τὴν ψυχὴν
περιφωτίσαν² διὰ τὸ ἐγγυτερων γεγονέναι,
ἀναβεβηκέναι, δὲ ἐπὶ ὀπισθοβαρῆς ὑπάρχων, ἀ ἐμπόδιοι
ἢ τῇ θέᾳ, καὶ οὐ μόνος ἀναβεβηκώς, ἀλλ' ἔχω τὸ
διείργον ἀπ' αὐτοῦ, η μήπω εἰς ἐν συναχθείσ—οὐ γάρ
25 δὴ ἀπεστιν οὐδενὸς ἐκείνο καὶ πάντων δέ, ὥστε παρὼν
μὴ παρειναι ἀλλ' η τοῖς δέχεσθαι δυναμένοις καὶ
παρεσκευασμένοις, ὥστε ἐναρμόσαι καὶ οἷον ἐφάψασθαι
καὶ θιγεῖν ὄμοιότητι καὶ τῇ ἐν αὐτῷ δυνάμει συγγενεῖ
τῷ ἀπ' αὐτοῦ ὅταν οὕτω ἔχῃ, ὡς εἶχεν, δτε φίλθεν ἀπ'
30 αὐτοῦ, ἡδη δύναται ιδεῖν ἀσ πέφυκεν ἐκείνος θεατὸς
εἶναι εἰς οὖν μήπω ἐστὶν ἐκεῖ, ἀλλὰ διὰ ταῦτα ἐστιν
ἔξω, η δι' ἐνδειπνού τοῦ παιδαγωγοῦντος λόγου καὶ πίστιν
περι αὐτοῦ παρεχομένου, δι' ἐκείνα μὲν αὐτὸν ἐν πιτίᾳ

¹ Kirchhoff: δεξάμενος. Enn.² suspic. Harder: περιφωτίσας. Enn.

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beautiful thing is posterior to that One, and comes from it, as all the light of day comes from the sun. Therefore, Plato says, "it cannot be spoken or written",¹ but we speak and write impelling towards it and wakening from reasonings to the vision of it, as if showing the way to someone who wants to have a view of something. For teaching goes as far as the road and the travelling, but the vision is the task of someone who has already resolved to see. But if someone has not come to the vision, and his soul has no awareness of the glory there, and he has not experienced and does not have in himself in seeing a kind of passionate experience like that of a lover resting in the beloved, then, having received the true light and illumined his whole soul through drawing nearer but being still held back in the ascent by a burden which hinders the vision, and having ascended not alone but taking something with him which keeps him from the One, or being not yet brought together into unity—for that One is not absent from any, and absent from all, so that in its presence it is not present except to those who are able and prepared to receive it, so as to be in accord with it and as if grasp it and touch it in their likeness; and, by the power in oneself akin to that which comes from the One, when someone is as he was when he came from him, he is already able to see as it is the nature of that God to be seen—if then someone is not yet there but is outside because of these impediments, or through lack of a reasoning to guide him and give him assurance about the One let him blame himself for those hindrances and try to

¹ Plato Letter VII 341C5

τιθέσθω, καὶ πειράσθω ἀποστὰς πάντων μόνος εἶνα., ἀ
35 δὲ ἐν τοῖς λόγοις ἀπιστεῖ ἐλλείπων, ὅδε διανοεῖσθω

5. Όστιν οἰσται τὰ δυτικά τύχηι καὶ τῷ αὐτομάτῳ
διοικεῖσθαι καὶ σωματικαῖς συνέχεσθαι αἰτίαις, οὗτος
πόρρω ἀπελήλαται καὶ θεοῦ καὶ ἔνοιας ἐνός, καὶ ὁ
λόγος οὐ πρὸς τούτους, ἀλλὰ πρὸς τοὺς ἄλλην φύσιν
5 παρὰ τὰ σώματα τιθεμένους καὶ ἀνίστρας ἐπὶ ψιχῆν
καὶ δὴ δεῖ τούτους φίσιν ψυχῆς κατανενοηκέναι τά τε
ἄλλα καὶ ὡς παρὰ νοῦ ἔστι καὶ λόγου παρὰ τούτου
κοωνήσασα ἀρετὴν ἴσχει μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα νοῦν λαβεῖν
Ἔτερον τοῦ λογιζομένου καὶ λογιστικοῦ καλούμενον, καὶ
10 τοὺς λογισμοὺς ἥδη οἷοι ἐν διαστάσει καὶ κινήσει, καὶ
τὰς ἐπιστήμας λόγους ἐν ψυχῇ τὰς τοιαύτας ἐν φανερῷ
ἥδη γνωμονίας τῷ ἐν τῇ ψιχῇ γνωμένῳ τὸν νοῦν τὰν
ἐπιστημῶν αἴτιον. καὶ νοῦν ἰδόντα οἷον αἰσθητὸν τῷ
ἀντιληπτὸν εἶναι επαναβεβήκοτα τῇ ψιχῇ καὶ πατέρᾳ
15 αὐτῆς δύτα κόσμου νοητόν, νοῦν ήσυχον καὶ ἀτρεμῆ
κύνησιν φατέον πάντα ἔχοντα εν αὐτῷ καὶ πάντα ὄντα,
πλήθος ἀδιάκριτον καὶ αὐτὸν διακεκριμένον. οὔτε γάρ
διακέκριται ὡς οἱ λόγοι οἱ ἥδη καθ' ἐν νοούμενοι, οὔτε
συγκέχυται τὰ ἐν αὐτῷ πρόεισι γάρ ἔκαστον χωρὶς
οἷον καὶ ἐν ταῖς ἐπιστήμαις πάντων ἢν ἀμερεῖ δύτων
20 ὅμως ἔστιν ἔκαστον χωρὶς αὐτῶν. τοῦτο οὖν τὸ δμοῦ
πλήθος, ὁ κόσμος ὁ νοητός, ἔστι μὲν δὲ πρὸς τῷ πρώτῳ,

depart from all things and be alone, but as for what he disbelieves because he is deficient in his reasonings, let him consider the following

5. Whoever thinks that reality is governed by chance and accident and held together by bodily causes is far removed from God and from the idea of the One, and our discourse is not directed to these people but to those who posit another nature besides bodies and have gone up as far as soul. Now these must come to an understanding of the soul, in other ways and especially that it derives from Intellect, and that it is by sharing in the rational principle which comes from it that it possesses virtue; after this they must grasp that there is an Intellect other than that which is called reasoning and reckoning, and that reasonings are already in a kind of separation and motion, and that our bodies of knowledge are rational principles in the soul and of a kind which have already become manifest there because Intellect the cause of knowledges has become present in the soul. And when one has seen Intellect as something like an object of sense because it is apprehended as transcending the soul and being its father, an intelligible universe, one must say that Intellect is a quiet and undisturbed movement, having all things in itself and being all things, a multiplicity which is undivided and yet again divided. For it is not divided as are the rational principles which are already thought one by one, nor are its contents confused, for each one proceeds separately; it is as it is in our bodies of knowledge, where all the items are in a partless whole and yet each of them is separate. This multiplicity all together, then, the intelligible universe, is what is near to the First, and our

καὶ φησιν αὐτὸς ὁ λόγος ἔξανάγκης εἶναι, εἴπερ τις καὶ
ψυχὴν εἶναι, τοῦτο δὲ κιριώτερον ψυχῆς· οὐ μέντοι
πρῶτον, ὅτι μή ἡ μηδὲ ἀπλοῦν ἀπλοῦν δὲ τὸ ἐν καὶ ἡ
25 πάντων ἀρχὴ. τὸ δὴ πρὸ τοῦ ἐν τοῖς οὖσι τιμια τάτου,
εἴπερ δέ τι πρὸ νοῦ εἶναι ἐν μὲν εἶναι βουλομένου, οὐκ
οὗτος δὲ ἐν, ἐνυειδοῦς δέ, στι αὐτῷ μηδὲ ἐσκέδασται ὁ
νοῦς, ἀλλὰ σύνεστιν ἔαυτῷ ὄντως οὐ διαρτήσας ἔαυτὸν
τῷ πλησίον μετὰ τὸ ἐν εἶναι, ἀποστήματι δέ πως τοῦ ἐνδέ
30 τολμήσας—τὸ δὴ πρὸ τούτου θαῦμα τοῦ ἐν, ὃ μη ὅν
ἔστιν, ἵνα μὴ καὶ ἐνταυθα κατ' ἄλλου τὸ ἐν, φῶνομα μὲν
κατὰ ἀλήθειαν οὐδὲν προσῆκον, εἴπερ δὲ δεῖ ὁνομάσαι,
κοινῶς ἂν λεχθὲν προσηκόντως ἐν, οὐχ ὡς ἄλλο, εἴτα ἐν.
χαλεπὸν μὲν γνωσθῆναι διὰ τοῦτο, γιγνωσκόμενοι δέ
35 μᾶλλον τῷ ἀπ' αὐτοῦ γεννήματι, τῇ οὐσίᾳ· καὶ ἄγει εἰς
οὐσίαν νοῦς—καὶ αὐτοῦ ἡ φύσις τοιαύτη, ἡς πηγὴν τῶν
ἀριστων εἶναι καὶ δύναμιν γεννῶσαν τὰ ὄντα μένονταν
ἐν ἑαυτῇ καὶ οὐκ ἐλαττουμένην οὐδὲ ἐν τοῖς γινομένοις
ὑπὸ αὐτῆς οὖσαν. ὅ τι καὶ πρὸ τούτων, ὀνομάζομεν ἐν
40 ἔξανάγκης τῷ σημαίνειν ἀλλήλοις αὐτῇ τῷ οἰόματι εἰς
ἕποισαν ἀμείριστον ἄγοντες καὶ τῇ φυχὴν ἐνοῦς
θέλοντες, οὐχ οὕτως ἐν λέγοντες καὶ ἀμερές, ὡς σημεῖον

¹ Normally, in this treatise as elsewhere in the *Enneads* intellect does not "lead to" substance: the two are identical. Perhaps Plotinus means that it is intellect *in us* that leads us to substance, and inserts this parenthesis to

argument says that it must necessarily exist, if one says that the soul exists, and that it must be of higher authority than soul; it is not, however, the First, because it is not one nor simple; but the One is simple and the principle of all things. Now that which is prior to what is most honourable among real beings, given that there must be something before Intellect which wants to be one but is not one, but in unitary form, because Intellect is not dispersed in itself but is in reality all together with itself and its nearness after the One has kept it from dividing itself, though it did somehow dare to stand away from the One—that which is before this Intellect, this marvel of the One which is not existent, so that "one" may not here also have to be predicated of something else, which in truth has no fitting name, but if we must give it a name, "one" would be an appropriate ordinary way of speaking of it, not in the sense of something else and then one, this is difficult to know for this reason, but can be better known from its product, substance—and it is intellect which leads to substance¹ and its nature is of such a kind that it is the source of the best and the power which generates the real beings, abiding in itself and not being diminished and not being one of the things which it brought into being. Whatever is even before these, we give the name of "One" to by necessity, to indicate its nature to one another, bringing ourselves by the name to an indivisible idea and wanting to unify our souls; we do not when we

remind his readers, in the middle of his account of the supra-intellectual way to the One, that this can only begin when the intellectual way has reached its goal

PLOTINUS: ENNEAD VI. 9.

ἢ μονάδα λέγομεν.¹ τὸ γὰρ οὗτος ἐν ποσοῦ ἀρκαί, δούκε
αὐτὸν ὑπέστη μὴ προσουστῆς οὐσίας καὶ τοῦ πρὸ οὐσίας
οὔκουν δεῖ ἐνταῦθα βάλλειν τὴν διάνυσσαν ἀλλὰ ταῦτα
45 δύοις αἰεὶ ἔκεινοις ἐν ἀναλογίαις τῷ ἀπλῷ καὶ τῇ
φυγῇ τοῖς πλήθους καὶ τοῦ μερισμοῦ.

6 Πώς οὖν λέγομεν τοῦ, καὶ πῶς τῇ νοήσει
ἔφαρμοστέος; ἢ πλεόνως τ.θέμενον ἐν ἡ ἀς μονὰς καὶ
σημεῖον ἐνίζεται ἐνταῖθα μὲν γὰρ μέγεθος ἢ φυχὴ
ἀφελοῦσα καὶ ἀριθμοῦ πλήθος καταλήγει εἰς τὸ
5 σμ.κρότατον καὶ ἐπερείδεται τινὶ ἀμερεῖ μεν, ἀλλὰ ὁ ἦν
ἐν μεριστῷ οὕτε οὕτως ἀμερές, ὡς τὸ μικρότατον
μέγιστον γὰρ ἀπάντων οὐ μεγέθει, ἀλλὰ δυνάμει, ὥστε
καὶ τὸ ἀμέγεθες δυνάμει ἐπει ταὶ μετ' αὐτῷ δύτα
10 ταῖς δυνάμεσιν ἀμέρ.στα καὶ ἀμερῆ, οὐ τοῖς δύκοις
ληπτέον δέ καὶ ἀπειρον αυτον οὐ τῷ ἀδιεξ.τητῷ ἢ τοῦ
μεγέθους ἢ τοῦ ἀριθμοῦ, ἀλλὰ τῷ ἀπεριλήπτῳ τῆς
δυνάμεως ὅταν γὰρ αὐτὸν νοήσῃς οἷον ἢ νοὸν ἢ θεόν,
πλεον ἔστι· καὶ οὐδὲν γάρ αὐτὸν ἐνίσης τῇ διανοᾳ, καὶ
15 τὸ ἐνικώτερον τῆς σῆς νοήσεως εἶναι· ἐφ' ἐαντοῦ γάρ
ἔσται οὐδεινὸς αὐτῷ συμβεβηκότος. τῷ αὐτόρκει δὲ αὐ-

¹ Harder: λεγούτες Enn.

² Gollwitzer θεὸν Enn.

Thus is, perhaps, the clearest explanation in the *Enneads* of the way in which Plotinus intends his use of the terms "one" and "infinite" as applied to the First Principle
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call it one and indivisible mean it in the sense of a point or a unit for what are one in this way are principles of quantity, which could not have come to exist unless substance and that before substance had preceded it; so that is not where one should direct one's thought, but all the same these correspond to those higher things in their simplicity and avoidance of multiplicity and partition.

6 In what sense, then do we call it one, and how are we to fit it into our thought? "One" must be understood in a larger sense than that in which a unity and a point are united. For there the soul takes away size and multiplicity of number and comes to a stop at the smallest and rests its thought on something which is partless but was in something divisible and is in something else, but what is not in something else or in the divisible is not partless either in the same way as the smallest, for it is the greatest of all things, not in size but in power, so that its sizelessness also is a matter of power; since the things after it also are indivisible and undivided in their powers, not in their bulks. And it must be understood as infinite not because its size and number cannot be measured or counted but because its power cannot be comprehended.¹ For when you think of him as Intellect or God, he is more; and when you unify him in your thought, here also the degree of unity by which he transcends your thought is more than you imagined it to be; for he is by himself without any incidental attributes. But someone could also think of his oneness in terms of self-

to be taken they are to point beyond any comprehensible unit or unboundedness.

τις καὶ τὸ ἐν αὐτοῦ ἔνθυμητείη.¹ δεῖ μὲν γάρ
ἰκανώτατον <ὅν>² ἀπάντων καὶ αὐταρκέστατον, καὶ
ἀνενδεέστατον εἶναι πάντα δὲ πολὺ καὶ [μὴ ἐν]³ ἔνδεες μή
20 ἐν ἑκ πολλῶν γενόμενον δεῖται οὖν αὐτοῦ ἡ σύσια ἐν
εἶναι. τὸ δὲ οὐ δεῖται ἑαυτοῦ· αὐτό γάρ ἔστι· καὶ μή
πολλὰ ὅν τοσούτων δεῖται, ὅσα ἔστι, καὶ ἔκαστον τὸν ἐν
αὐτῷ μετὰ τῶν ἄλλων δὲν καὶ οὐκ ἐφ' ἑαυτοῦ, ἔνδεες τῶν
ἄλλων ὑπάρχον, καὶ καθ' ἐν καὶ κατὰ τὸ δλον τὸ
τοιοῦτον ἔνδεες παρέχεται εἰπερ οὖν δεῖ τι
25 αὐταρκεστατον εἶναι, το ἐν εἶναι δει τοιούτον δι μονον,
οἷον μήτε πρὸς αὐτὸ μήτε πρὸς ἄλλο ἔνδεες εἶναι οὐ γάρ
τι ζητεῖ, ἵνα γέ, οὐδὲ ἵνα εὐ γέ, οὐδὲ ἵνα ἐκεὶ ιδρυθή. τοις
μὲν γάρ ἄλλοις αἴτιον δὲν οὐ παρ' ἄλλων ἔχει δ ἔστι, οἱ
τε εὐ τί ἀν εἴη αὐτῷ ἔξω αὐτοῦ, ὥστε οὐ κατὰ
30 συμβεβηκός αὐτῷ το εὐ αὐτῷ γάρ ἔστι. τόπος τε οὐδεὶς
αἴτιος οὐ γάρ δεῖται ιδρύσεως μᾶστερ αἴτιο φέρει οὐ
δυνάμενον, τό τε ιδρυθησόμενον ἀψυχον καὶ σύγκος
πίπτων, ἐὰν μήπω ιδρυθῇ ιδρυται δὲ καὶ τὰ ἄλλα διὰ
τούτον, δι' δὲν ὑπέστη ἄμα καὶ ἔσχεν εἰς δὲν ἔτοχθῃ
τόπουν ἔνδεες δὲ καὶ τὸ τόπον ζητοῦν. ἀρχὴ δὲ οὐκ
35 ἔνδεες τῶν μετ' αὐτῷ ἡ δ' ἀπάντων ἀρχὴ ἀνενδεές
ἀπάντων. ὅ τι γάρ ἔνδεες, ἐφιέμενον ἀρχῆς ἔνδεες· εἰ δὲ
τὸ ἐν ἔνδεες του, ζητεῖ δηλονότι το μη είνα. εν' ὥστε
ἔνδεες ἔσται τοι φθερούντος· πάν δὲ δὲν λέγηται
40 ἔνδεες, τοῦ εὐ καὶ τοῦ σώζοντός ἔστω ἔνδεες ὥστε τῷ

¹ Gollwitzer. ἐν οὐ μὴ θεή Εαπ

² Harder

³ del. Puelma.

sufficiency For since he is the most sufficient and independent of all things, he must also be the most without need; but everything which is many is also in need unless it becomes one from many. Therefore its substance needs to be one. But the One does not need itself: for it is itself. Certainly anything which is many needs all the things which it is, and each of the things in it, since it is with the others and not by itself, and exists in need of the others, makes a thing like this needy both in each single part and as a whole. Given, then, that there must be something supremely self-sufficient, it must be the One, which is the only thing of such a kind as not to be in need either in relation to itself or to anything else. For it does not seek anything for its being or for its well-being, or its establishment in its place. For since it is the cause of the others it does not have from the others what it is, and what could its well-being be outside itself? So its well-being is not incidental to it, for it is itself. And it has no place for it needs no establishment as if unable to support itself; and that which has to be established is soulless and a mass which falls if it is not yet established. And the other things are established through him, through whom they at once exist and have the place to which they are assigned; but that which is looking for its place is in need. But a principle is not in need of the things which come after it, and the principle of all things needs none of them. For whatever is in need is in need as striving towards its principle; but if the One is in need of anything, it is obviously seeking not to be one, so it will be in need of its destroyer; but everything which is said to be in need is in need of its well-being and its preserver. So that there is nothing

40 ένι οὐδὲν ἀγαθόν ἔστιν· οὐδὲ βούλησις τούννυ οὐδενός
ἀλλ' ἔστιν ὑπεράγαθον καὶ αὐτό οὐχ ἔαυτῷ, τοῖς δὲ
ἄλλοις ἀγαθόν, εἰ τε αὐτοῦ δύναται μεταλαμβανειν οὐδὲ
νόησις, ἵνα μὴ ἐπερόγησι οὐδὲ κίνησις· πρὸ γὰρ
κινήσεων καὶ πρὸ νοήσεως. τί γαρ καὶ νοήσει; ἔαυτόν
45 πρὸ νοήσεως τούννυ ἀγνοῶν ἔσται, καὶ νοήσεως
δεήσεται, ἵνα γνῷ ἔαυτὸν ὁ αὐτάρκης ἔαυτῷ. οὐ τούννυ
ὅτι γιγνώσκει μηδὲ νοεῖ ἔαυτόν, ἀγνοια περὶ αὐτὸν
ἔσται ἡ γὰρ ἀγνοια ἐπέροιο δύντος γίγνεται, ὅταν
θάτερον ἀγνοῇ θάτερον τὸ δὲ μόνον οὐτε γιγνώσκει
οὐτε πεπλέξει, ἵνα δὲ ὃν συνὸν αὐτῷ οὐ δεῖται
50 νοήσεως ἔαυτοῦ. ἐπεὶ οὐδὲ τὸ συνεῖναι δεῖ προσάρτειν
ἢ τὸ γρῆς τὸ ἔν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ νοεῖν οὐ τὸ συνεῖναι¹
ἀφαιρεῖν καὶ ἔαυτοῦ νόησιν καὶ τῶν ὄλλων οὐ γὰρ κατὰ
τὸν νοοῦντα δεῖ τάπτειν αὐτόν, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον κατὰ τὴν
νόησιν. νόησις δὲ οὐ νοεῖ, ἀλλ' αἰτία τοῦ νοεῖν ἀλλω τὸ
55 δὲ αἴτιον οὐ ταῦτὸν τῷ αἰτιατῷ. τὸ δὲ πάντων αἴτιον
οὐδὲν ἔστιν ἐκείνων οὐ τούννυ οὐδὲ ἀγαθὸν λεκτέον
τοῦτο, διαπρέχει, ἀλλὰ ἄλλων τάγαθὸν ὑπὲρ τὰ ἄλλα
ἀγαθά.

7. Εἰ δ' ὅτι μηδὲν τούτων ἔστιν, ἀριστεῖς τῇ
γνώμῃ, στήσοι σαυτὸν εἰς ταῦτα καὶ ἀπὸ τούτων θεῶ
Θεῶ δὲ μὴ ἔξω βίηιων τὴν διάνοιαν. οὐ γὰρ καταταύπον
ἐργμῶσαν αὐτοῦ τὰ ἄλλα, αλλ' ἔστι τῷ δυναμένῳ θυγεῖν
6 δε.² παρόν, τῷ δὲ ἀδυνατῶντι οὐ πόρευστιν. ὥσπερ δὲ
ἐπὶ τῶν ὄλλων οὐκ ἔστι τι νοεῖν ἄλλο νοοῦντα καὶ πρὸ-

¹ Preller συνέναι: Enn

² suspic Harder, approb. Puelma: ἐκ' Enn

good for the One; so then it does not wish for anything; but it transcends good, and is good not for itself but for the others, if anything is able to participate in it. And it does not think, because there is no otherness and it does not move for it is before movement and before thought. For what will he be able to think? Himself? Then before his thinking he will be ignorant, and will need thinking in order to know himself, he who suffices for himself. There is, then, no ignorance about him because he does not know or think himself; for ignorance is of what is other, when one thing is ignorant of another; but the One alone does not know and has nothing of which it is ignorant, but being one and in union with itself does not need thought of itself. For in order to keep to the one you should not add the 'in union', but take away thinking and being in union and thought of itself and of the others, for we must not put him on the level of the thinker, but rather on that of the thought. But thought does not think, but is a cause of thought to another; and the cause is not the same as what is caused. But the cause of all things is none of them. So we must not even call this One good, the good which he gives, but the Good in another way beyond all goods.

7. But if because it is none of these things you become indefinite in your thought of it, stand fast on these and contemplate it from these. But contemplate it without casting your thought outwards. For it does not lie somewhere leaving the other things empty of it, but is always present to anyone who is able to touch it, but is not present to the one who is unable. But, just as with other things it is not possible to think anything when one is thinking

PLOTINUS: ENNEAD VI. 9

ἄλλως δύντα, ἀλλὰ δεῖ μηδὲν προσάπτειν τῷ νοοημένῳ,
ἢ γά τὸ νοούμενον, οὐτώ δεῖ καὶ ἐνταῦθα εἰδέναι.
ώς οὐκ ἔστω ἄλλου ἔχοντα ἐν τῇ φυχῇ τύπον ἑκείνῳ
10 νοήσαι ἐνεργαύντος τοῦ τύπου, οὐδὲ αὐτὸς ἄλλοις
κατειλημένην τὴν φυχὴν καὶ κατεχομένην τυπωθῆναι
τῷ τοῦ ἐναντίοις τύπῳ, ἀλλ' ὥσπερ περὶ τῆς ὕλης
λέγεται, ως ἄρα ἄποιος εἶναι διὰ πάντων, εἰ μέλλει
δέχεσθαι τοὺς πάντων τύπους, οὐτώ καὶ πολὺ μᾶλλον
15 ἀνείδεον τὴν φυχὴν γνεσθαι, εἰ μέλλει μηδὲν ἐμπόδιον
ἐγκαθήμενον ἔσεσθαι πρὸς πλήρωσιν καὶ ἔλλαρψιν αὐτῇ
τὴν φύσεως τῆς πρώτης εἰ δὲ τούτῳ, πανταὶ τῶν ἔξω
ἀφεμένῃ δὲ ἐπιστραφῆναι πρὸς τὸ εἶσαι πάντη, μὴ
πρὸς τὰ τῶν ἔξω κεκλισθαι, ἀλλὰ ἀγνοήσαντα τὰ πάντα
20 καὶ πρὸ τοῦ μὲν τῇ αἰσθήσει,¹ τότε δὲ καὶ τοῖς εἰδεσιν.
ἀγνοήσαντα δὲ καὶ αὐτὸν ἐν τῇ θέᾳ ἑκείνου γενέσθαι,
κάκείνων συγγενόμενον καὶ ἵκανώς οἷον ὁμιλήσαντα
ηὔκεν ἀγγέλλοντα, εἰ δύνατο, καὶ ἄλλως τὴν ἑκεί
συνυսυλλαγὴν ὑπερβαίνειν τὸν Μίνωαν ποιεῖν
25 δαριστῆς τοῦ Διός ἐφημίσθη εἶναι, ἡς
μεμνημένος εἴδωλα αὐτῆς τους νόμους ἐτίθει τῇ τοῦ
θείου ἐπαφῇ εἰς νόμων πληρούμενος θέσων. η καὶ τὰ
πολιτικὰ οὐκ ἄξια αὐτοῦ γομίσας ἀεὶ² ἐθέλει μένειν
ἄνω, διπερ καὶ τῷ πολὺ ἴδοντι γένοντο ἄν πάθημα.

¹ Page: διαβέσει. Epp.

² van Winden: νομίσαντα εἰς Επι.

¹ A summary paraphrase of Plato *Timaeus* 50D-E.

² Τις η ιστορία is from *Odyssey* 19. 178-9. But Plotinus may have taken it from the account of Minos in the pseudo-Platonic dialogue of that title (*Minos* 318E-320D) which he is using here

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something else and has one's mind on something else, but one must add nothing to what is being thought about, that it may really be it which is being thought about, so here one must know that it is not possible when one has the impression of something else in one's soul to think that One while the impression is acting, and that the soul when it is taken up with and possessed by other things cannot take the impression of the opposite; but just as it is said of matter that it must be free from all qualities if it is going to receive the impressions of all things,¹ so much more must the soul be without form if there is going to be no obstacle settled in it to its fulfilment and illumination by the first nature. But if this is so, the soul must let go of all outward things and turn altogether to what is within, and not be inclined to any outward thing, but ignoring all things (as it did formerly in sense-perception, but then in the realm of Forms), and even ignoring itself, come to be in contemplation of that One, and having been in its company and had, so to put it, sufficient converse with it, come and announce, if it could, to another that transcendent union. Perhaps also it was because Minos attained this kind of union that he was said in the story to be "the familiar friend of Zeus".² and it was in remembering this that he laid down laws in its image, being filled full of lawgiving by the divine touch. Or also he may think civic matters unworthy of him and want to remain always above, this is liable to happen to one who has seen much. Plato says the One is not outside anything,³

¹ Plato *Parmenides* 138E4

οὐδενός φησίν ἐστιν ἔξι, ἀλλὰ πᾶσι σύνεστιν
οὐκ εἰδόσι. φεύγουσι γάρ αὐτοὶ αἴτοῦ ἔξω, μᾶλλον δὲ
αὐτῶν ἔξω. οὐδὲν δύνανται οὖν ἐλεῖν ὃν πεφεύγασιν, οὐδὲ
αὐτοὺς ἀπολαθεκότες ἄλλον ζητεῖν, οὐδέ γε ταῖς αὐτοῦ
ἔξω ἐν μανίᾳ γεγενημένος εἰδήσει τον πατέρα· ὁ δὲ
μαθὼν ἑαυτὸν εἰδήσει καὶ ὅποθεν.

8. Εἴ τις οὖν φυχὴ οἴδεν ἑαυτὴν τὸν ἄλλον χρόνοι,
καὶ οἴδεν ὅτι ἡ κίνησις αὐτῆς οὐκ εὐθεία, ἀλλ᾽ ἡ ὅταν
κλάσιν λάβῃ, ἡ δὲ κατὰ φύσιν κίνησις οὐα ἡ ἐν κύκλῳ
περὶ τι οὐκ ἔξω, ἀλλὰ περὶ κέντρον, τὸ δὲ κέντρον ἀφ'
5 οὐδὲ ὁ κύκλος, κωήσεται περὶ τούτη, ἀφ' οὐδὲ ἐστι, καὶ
τούτου¹ ἀναρτήσεται συλφέρουσα ἑαυτὴν προς τὸ
αὐτό, πρὸς δὲ ἔχρημα μὲν πάσας, φέρονται δὲ αἱ θεῶν ἀεὶ
πρὸς δὲ φερόμεναι θεοί εἰσι θεὸς γάρ τὸ ἐκείνῳ
συνημένον, τὸ δὲ πύρων ἀφιεστάμενον ἄνθρωπος ὁ
.0 πολὺς καὶ θηρίον. τὸ οὖν τῆς φυχῆς οἷον κέντρον τούτο
ἐστι τὸ ζητούμενον; η ἀλλο τι δεῖ νομίσαι, εἰς δὲ πάντα
οἷον κέντρα συμπίπτει: καὶ ὅτι ἀναλογίᾳ τὸ κέντρον
τοῦδε τοῦ κύκλου; οὐδὲ γάρ οὕτω κίκλος ἡ φυχὴ ὡς τὸ
σχῆμα, ἀλλ᾽ ὅτ. ἐν αὐτῇ καὶ περὶ αὐτὴν ἡ ἀρχαίς

Kirchhoff τοῦτο Enn

The phrase "the ancient nature" of the soul occurs in Plato at *Symposium* 192E9 (Ἄριστος πάντες τοιγάν), *Republic* X 611D2 (the simile of the sea-god Glaucus) and *Timaeus* 90D5 (in the context of the education of the soul). In all these places it means the true original nature of soul

but is in company with all without their knowing. For they run away outside it, or rather outside themselves. They cannot then catch the one they have run away from nor seek for another when they have lost themselves. A child, certainly, who is outside himself in madness will not know his father but he who has learnt to know himself will know from whence he comes

8 If then a soul knows itself for the rest of the time, and knows that its movement is not in a straight line, except when there is a kind of break in it, but its natural movement is, as it were, in a circle around something, something not outside but a centre, and the centre is that from which the circle derives, then it will move around this from which it is and will depend on this, bringing itself into accord with that which all souls ought to, and the souls of the gods always do; and it is by bringing themselves into accord with it that they are gods. For a god is what is linked to that centre, but that which stands far from it is a multiple human being or a beast. Is then this, as it were, centre of the soul what we are looking for? Or should we think it is something else in which all such centres coincide? And that the centre of the circle here below is only like it anatomically? For the soul is not a circle in the same way as a geometrical figure, but because there is in it and around it the ancient nature,¹ and because it comes

Plotinus uses it again in this sense at VI. 5. 1. 16 and this must be its meaning here. Harder gives a different explanation of the passage based on the interpretation of "the ancient nature" as matter in I. 8. 7. 6. See his note *ad loc*

15 φύσις, καὶ ὅτι ἀπὸ τοιούτου, καὶ ἔτι μᾶλλον καὶ ὅτι χωρισθεῖσαι ὅλαι. νῦν δέ, ἐπεὶ μέρος ἡμῶν κατέχεται ὑπὸ τοῦ σώματος, οἷον εἴ τις τοὺς πόδας ἔχοι ἐν ὕδati, τῷ δὲ ὄλλῳ σώματι ὑπερέχοι, τῷ δὴ μὴ βαπτισθέντι τῷ σώματι ὑπεράραντες, τούτῳ ουνάπτομεν κατὰ τὸ 20 ἑαυτῶν κέντρον τῷ οὖν πάντων κέντρῳ, καθάπερ τῶν μεγίστων κύκλων τα κέντρα τῷ τῆς σφαίρας τῆς περιεχούσης κέντρῳ, ἀναπαυόμενοι. εἰ μὲν οὖν σωματικοὶ ἥσαν, οὐ φυχικοὶ κύκλοι, τοπικῶς ἀν τῷ κέντρῳ συνηγγόντον καὶ που κειμένοι τον κέντρον περὶ 25 αὐτὸν ἀν ἤσων ἐπεὶ δὲ αὐτά τε αἱ φυχαὶ νοηταί, ὑπὲρ νοῖν τε ἐκείνο, δυνάμεσιν ὅλαις, γε πέφυκε τὸ ρυσσὸν προς τὸν κατιανυσμένων εἰς οὐνάπτειν, οὐγένεον /ἢ συναφήν γίνεσθαι καὶ πλέοντας τὸ νοοῦν παρεῖναι ὁμοιότητι καὶ ταντότητι καὶ συνάπτειν τῷ συγγενεῖ οὐδενὸς 30 διεργοντος. σώμασι μὲν γαρ σώματα κωλύεται κοινωνεῖν ὄλληλοις, τὰ δὲ ἀσώματα σώμασιν οὐ διεργεται· οὐδὲ ἀφέστηκε τοίνυν ὄλληλων τόπῳ, ἐτερότητη. δὲ καὶ διαφορῇ σταν οὖν ἡ ἐτερότης μὴ παρῇ, ὄλληλοις τὰ μὴ ἔτερα πάρεστιν ἐκείνο μὲν οὖν μὴ ἔχον 35 ἐτερότητα ἀεὶ πάρεστιν, ημεῖς δὲ σταν μὴ ἔχωμεν κάκείνο μὲν ημῶν οὐκ ἐφίεται, ὥστε περὶ ημᾶς εἶναι, ημεῖς δὲ ἐκείνουν, ὥστε ημεῖς περὶ ἐκείνου. καὶ ἀεὶ μὲν περὶ αὐτοῦ, οὐδὲ ἀεὶ δὲ εἰς αὐτὸν βλέπομεν, ὄλλ' οἷον χορὸς ἔξης φόδων¹ καίπερ ἔχων περὶ τὸν κορυφαῖον τραπέζην ἀν 40 εἰς τὸ ἔξω τῆς θέσης, σταν δὲ ἐπιστρέψῃ ἃδει τε καλῶς ἔξης φόδων Puelma. ἔξης φόδων Enn.

from an origin of this kind, and because souls are wholly separated. But now, since a part of us is held by the body, as if someone had his feet in water, but the rest of his body was above it, we lift ourselves up by the part which is not submerged in the body and by this join ourselves at our own centres to something like the centre of all things, just as the centres of the greatest circles join the centre of the encompassing sphere, and we are at rest. If then our circles were bodily, not soul-circles, they would be in touch with the centre at a place; the centre would be in some place and they would be around it. but since the souls themselves belong to the realm of Intellect and that One transcends Intellect, we must suppose that the contact takes place by other powers, in the way in which the thinker is naturally united to the thought, and that the thinker is present more completely by sameness and otherness and joined to what is akin to it with nothing to keep them apart. For bodies are hindered from communion with each other by bodies, but incorporeal things are not kept apart by bodies; nor are they separated in place, but by otherness and difference; when therefore there is no otherness, the things which are not other are present to each other. That One, therefore, since it has no otherness is always present, and we are present to it when we have no otherness; and the One does not desire us, so as to be around us, but we desire it, so that we are around it. And we are always around it but do not always look to it; it is like a choral dance: in the order of its singing the choir keeps round its conductor but may sometimes turn away, so that he is out of their sight, but when it turns back to him it sings beautifully and is truly

καὶ ὅντως περὶ αὐτὸν ἔχει, οὕτω καὶ ἡμεῖς ἀεὶ μὲν περὶ αὐτόν—καὶ ὅταν μή¹ λύσις ημῶν παντελῆς ἔσται καὶ οἰκέτη εσόμεθα· οὐκ ἀεὶ δὲ εἰς αὐτὸν ἀλλ’ ὅταν εἰς αὐτὸν ἰδωμεν, ὥστε ἡμὲν τέλος καὶ ὑπάπουλος καὶ τὸ μὴ² ἀπάδει χορεύουσιν ὅντως περὶ αὐτὸν χορείαν ἔνθεον.

9. Ἐν δὲ ταύτῃ τῇ χορείᾳ καθορῇ πηγὴν μὲν ζωῆς,
πηγὴν δὲ νοῦ, ἀρχὴν ὄντος, ἀγαθοῦ αἰτίαν, ρίζαν ψυχῆς·
οὐκ ἐκχειμένων ἀπ’ αὐτούν, εἰτ’ ἔκεινον ἐλαττούντων
οὐ γάρ δύκος· η̄ φθαρτὰ ἓν ἦν τὰ γεννώμενα νῦν δὲ
5 ἔστιν ἀδια, ὅτι η̄ ἀρχὴ αυτῶν ὠσαντως μένει οὐ
μεμερισμένη εἰς αὐτά, ἀλλ’ δῆλη μόνουσα. διὸ πάσσινε
μένει οἶον εἰ μένοντος ἡλίου καὶ τὸ φῶς μένον οὐ γάρ
ἀποτετμήθα οὐδὲ χωρὶς ἐσμεν, εἰ καὶ παρεμπεσούσα
η̄ σύμπατος φύσις πρὸς αὐτὴν ἡμᾶς εἰλικρινεῖ, ἀλλ’
10 εμπνεούμεν³ καὶ σωζόμεθα οὐ δόντος, εἰτ’ ἀποστάντος
ἔκεινου, ἀλλ’ ἀεὶ χορηγούντος ἔως ἂν γάρ ὅπερ ἔστι
μᾶλλον μέντοι ἐσμὲν νεύσαντες πρὸς αὐτὸν καὶ τὸ εὖ
ἐνταῦθα. τὸ δὲ⁴ πέρρω εἴναι μόνον καὶ ἥπτον εἴναι
ἐνταῦθα καὶ ἀναπαύειν ψυχὴ καὶ κακῶν ἔξω εἰς τὸ
τῶν κακῶν καθαρὸν τόπον ἀναδραμοῦσα· καὶ νοεῖ
15 ἐνταῦθα, καὶ ἀπαθῆς ἐνταῦθα. καὶ τὸ ἀληθῶς ζῆν
ἐν οὐδεὶ τὸ γάρ οὐκ εἰς τὸ μέν θεοῦ ἔχνες ζωῆς ἔκειντη
μιμούμενον,⁴ τὸ δὲ ἔκει ζῆν ἐνέργεια μὲν νοῦ ἐνέργεια
δὲ καὶ γεννᾶ θεούς ἐν ἡσίχῳ τῇ πρὸς ἔκεινο ἐπαφῇ
γεννᾷ δέ κάλλος, γεννᾷ δικαιοσύνην, ἀρετὴν γεννᾷ.
20 ταῦτα γάρ κύει ψυχὴ πληρωθεῖσα θεοῦ, καὶ τοῦτο αὐτῇ
ἀρχὴ καὶ τέλος ἀρχὴ μέν, διτὶ ἔκειθεν, τέλος δέ, διτὶ τῷ

¹ Kirchhoff: ἀ Enn.

² Kirchhoff: εὐ πνέομεν Εnn.

³ Muller

⁴ A³ i Ficinus: μιμούμενος Enn.

with him; so we too are always around him: and if we were not, we should be totally dissolved and no longer exist—but not always turned to him, but when we do look to him, then we are at our goal and at rest and do not sing out of tune as we truly dance our god-inspired dance around him.

9. And in this dance the soul sees the spring of life, the spring of intellect, the principle of being, the cause of good, the root of the soul; these are not poured out from him with the result that they diminish him; for there is no bulk; otherwise the things generated from him would be perishable. But as it is they are eternal, because their principle remains the same, not divided up into them but abiding as a whole. So they also abide; just as the light abides if the sun abides. For we are not cut off from him or separate, even if the nature of body has intruded and drawn us to itself, but we breathe and are preserved because that Good has not given its gifts and then gone away but is always bestowing them as long as it is what it is. But we exist more when we turn to him and our well-being is there, but being far from him is nothing else but existing less. There the soul takes its rest and is outside evils because it has run up into the place which is clear of evils; and it thinks there and is not passive, and its true life is there; for our present life, the life without God, is a trace of life imitating that life. But life in that realm is the active actuality of Intellect, and the active actuality generates gods in quiet contact with that Good, and generates beauty, and generates righteousness, and generates virtue. It is these the soul conceives when filled with God, and this is its beginning and end, its beginning because it comes from thence, and its end

ἀγαθὸν ἔκει. καὶ ἔκει γενομένη γίγνεται αἰτή καὶ περ
 ἦν τὸ γάρ ἐνταῦθα καὶ ἐν τούτοις ἐκπτωσις καὶ φυγὴ
 καὶ πτερορρύγησις. δηλοῖ δέ ὅτι τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἔκει καὶ ὁ
 25 Ἔρως ὁ τῆς Ψυχῆς ὁ σύμφιτος, καθὸ καὶ συνέζευκται
 Ἐρως ταῖς Ψυχαῖς καὶ ἐν γραφαῖς καὶ ἐν μύθοις. ἐπεὶ
 γάρ ἔτερον θεοῦ ἔκεινη, ἐξ ἔκεινου δέ, ἐρᾶ αὐτοῦ
 ἔξανάγκης. καὶ οὐσα ἔκει τὸν οὐράνιον Ἐρωτα ἔχει,
 ἐνταῦθα δὲ πάνδημος γίγνεται· καὶ γάρ ἔστιν ἔκει
 30 Ἀφροδίτη οὐρανία, ἐνταῦθα δὲ γίγνεται πανδημος οὐν
 ἐταρισθεῖσα. καὶ ἔστι πάσα ψυχὴ Ἀφροδίτη· καὶ
 τοῦτο αἰνίττεται καὶ τὰ ἡς Ἀφροδίτης γενέθλια καὶ ὁ
 Ἔρως ὁ μετ' αὐτῆς γενόμενος. ἐρᾶ οὖν κατὰ φύσιν
 35 ἔχουσα ψυχὴ θεοῦ ἐνωθῆναι θελουσα, ὥσπερ παρθένος
 καλοῦ πατρὸς¹ καλὸν ἔρωτα δύναται δὲ εἰς γένεσιν
 ἐλθοῦσα οἷον μηστείαις ἀπατηθῆ. ἄλλον ἀλλαξαμένη
 θυητῷ ἔρωτα ἐρημά πατρὸς ἴβρίζεται· μισήσασα δὲ
 πάλιν τὰς ἐνταῦθα ὕβρεις ἀγνείσασα τῶν τῆδε πρὸς τὸν
 40 πατέρα αδησις στελλομένη εὐπαθεῖ. καὶ οὐδὲ μὲν
 ὅγκωστοί ἔστι τὸ πάθημα τούτο, ἐντεῦθεν ἐνθυμείσθω
 ἀπὸ τῶν ἐνταῦθα ἔρωτων, οὖν ἔστι τυχεῖν ὡν τις
 μάλιστα ἐρᾶ, καὶ ὅτι ταῦτα μὲν τὰ ἔρωμενα θυητὰ καὶ
 βλαφερὰ καὶ εἰδάλων ἔρωτες καὶ μεταπίπτει. ὅτι οὐκ
 45 ἦν τὸ ὄντως ἔρωμενον οὐδὲ τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἡμῶν οὐδὲ ὁ

¹ Kirchhoff πρὸς wRCQ om JU.

² From the *Phaedrus* myth, 248C8.

² For the distinction of the two Aphrodites (which seems to have been a sort of Athenian homosexual joke, without foundation in cult or popular belief) see Plato *Symposium* 180D. E It had, of course, a much more serious history from Plotinus onwards.

³ *Symposium* 203B. Plotinus' fullest interpretation of the myth is III 5.7-9.

because its good is there. And when it comes to be there it becomes itself and what it was; for what it is here and among the things of this world is a falling away and an exile and a 'shedding of wings'.¹ And the soul's innate love makes clear that the Good is there, and this is why Eros is coupled with the Psyches in pictures and stories. For since the soul is other than God but comes from him it is necessarily in love with him, and when it is there it has the heavenly love, but here love becomes vulgar; for the soul there is the heavenly Aphrodite, but here becomes the vulgar Aphrodite, a kind of whore.² And every soul is Aphrodite; and this is symbolised in the story of the birthday of Aphrodite and Eros who is born with her.³ The soul then in her natural state is in love with God and wants to be united with him, it is like the noble love of a girl for her noble father. But when the soul has come into the world of becoming and is deceived, so to say, by the blandishments of her suitors, she changes, bereft of her father, to a mortal love and is shamed; but again she comes to hate her shames here below, and purifies herself of the things of this world and sets herself on the way to her father and fares well.⁴ And if anyone does not know this experience, let him think of it in terms of our loves here below, and what it is like to attain what one is most in love with, and that these earthly loves are mortal and harmful and loves only of images, and that they change because it was not what is really and truly loved nor our good nor what

¹ Plotinus uses this comparison again at V. 5. 12. 37. But there it is not the beauty of the world of sense which draws the daughter away from the father, but the beauty of the intelligible; on this see my note *ad loc.*

ζητοῦμεν. ἐκεῖ δὲ τὸ ἀληθινὸν ἔρώμενον, φῶς εὗτι καὶ
 45 συνεῖναι μεταλαβόντα αὐτοῦ καὶ ὄντως ἔχοντα, οὐ
 περιποιημένον σαρξὶν ἔξεσθαι. ὅστις δὲ εἰδεῖ,
 οἱ δὲ εἰν δὲ λέγω, ὡς ή ψυχὴ ζωὴν ἀλλὰ τόχει τότε
 καὶ προσιουσα¹ καὶ τῇδη προσελθούσα καὶ μετασχούσα
 αὐτοῦ, ὥστε γνῶναι διατεθείσαν, διτι πάρεστιν δὲ
 50 χορηγὸς ἀληθινῆς ζωῆς, καὶ δεῖ οὐδενὸς ἔτι. τούναντίον
 δὲ ἀποθέοσθαι τὰ ἄλλα δεῖ, καὶ ἐν μόνῳ στήναι τούτῳ,
 καὶ τοῦτο γενέσθαι μόνον περικόφαντα τὰ λοιπὰ δοσα
 περικόμισθα· ὥστε ἔξελθειν σπεύδειν ἐντεθεῖν καὶ
 ἀγανακτεῖν ἐπὶ θάτερα δεδεμένους, ἵνα τῷ δὲ πάθει αὐτῶν
 55 περιπτυξάμεθα καὶ μηδέν μέρος ἔχοιμεν. φῶς μὴ
 ἐφαπτόμεθα θεοῦ. ὁρᾶν δὲ ἔστιν ἐνταῦθα κάκεντον καὶ
 ἑαυτὸν ὡς ὁρᾶν θεμιτός ἑαυτὸν μὲν ἡγλαίσμενον, φωτὸς
 πλήρης νοητοῦ, μάλλον δὲ φῶς αὐτὸς καθαρόν, ἀβαρῆ,
 κούφον, θεόν γενόμενον, μάλλον δὲ ὄντα, ἀναφθέντα μὲν
 60 τότε, εἴ δὲ πάλιν βιαρόντα, ὥσπερ μαριώμενον.

10. Πῶς οὖν οὐ μένει ἐκεῖ; ηδὲ διτι μῆτων ἔξεληλυθει
 δόλος. ἔσται δὲ διτε καὶ τὸ συνεχὲς ἔσται τῆς θέας οὐκέτι
 ἐνοχλουμένω οὐδεμίαν ἐνόχλησιν τοῦ σώματος. ἔστι δὲ
 τὸ ἑωρακός οὐ τὸ ἐνοχλούμενον, ἀλλὰ τὸ ἄλλο, διτε
 5 τὸ ἑωρακός ἀργεῖ τὴν θέαν οὐκ ἀργοῦν τὴν ἐπιστήμην
 τὴν ἐν ἀποδείξει καὶ πίστει καὶ τῷ τῆς ψυχῆς
 διαιλογιούμενός το δὲ ιδεῖν καὶ τὸ ἑωρακός ἔστω οὐκέτι
 λόγος, ἀλλὰ μεῖζον λόγου καὶ πρὸ λόγου καὶ ἐπὶ τῷ

¹ Kirchhoff: προϊόντα Enn.

¹ The phrase seems to have been a fairly commonplace one, used by a mystery-initiate when addressing others to avoid divulging secrets. See Pausanias I 37. 4-5 (where it is

we seek. But there is our true love, with whom also we can be united, having a part in him and truly possessing him, not embracing him in the flesh from outside. But "whoever has seen, knows what I am saying",¹ that the soul then has another life and draws near, and has already come near and has a part in him, and so is in a state to know that the giver of true life is present and we need nothing more. But quite otherwise, we must put away other things and take our stand only in this, and become this alone, cutting away all the other things in which we are encased; so we must be eager to go out from here and be impatient at being bound to the other things, that we may embrace him with the whole of ourselves and have no part with which we do not touch God. There one can see both him and oneself as it is right to see: the self glorified, full of intelligible light—but rather itself pure light—weightless, floating free, having become—but rather, being a god; set on fire then, but the fire seems to go out if one is weighed down again.

10. How is it, then, that one does not remain there? It is because one has not yet totally come out of this world. But there will be a time when the vision will be continuous, since there will no longer be any hindrance by the body. But it is not that which has seen which is hindered, but the other part which, when that which has seen rests from vision, does not rest from the knowledge which lies in demonstrations and evidence and the discourse of the soul; but seeing and that which has seen are not reason, but greater than reason and before reason used in the very down-to-earth and unspiritual context of beans). Plotinus also uses it at I. 6. 7. 2.

λόγῳ, ὥσπερ καὶ τὸ ὄρώμενον. ἔαυτὸν μὲν οὖν ὕπὸ¹⁰
τότε, ὅτε ὄρᾳ, τοιοῦτον ὄφεται, μᾶλλον δὲ αὐτῷ
τοιούτῳ συνέσται καὶ τοιοῦτον αἰσθῆσται ἀπλοῦν
γενόμενον. τάχα δὲ οὐδὲ “ὄφεται” λεκτέον, τὸ δὲ
“ὄφθεῖν”, εἰπερ δεῖ δύο τοῦτα λέγειν, τό τε ὄρῶν καὶ
ὄρώμενον, ἀλλὰ μὴ ἐν ἀμφῷ τολμηρὸς μὲν ὁ λόγος.
τότε μὲν οὖν υἱτε ὄρᾳ οὐδὲ διακρίνει ὁ ὄρῶν οὐδὲ¹⁵
φαντάζεται δύο, ἀλλ’ οἷον ἄλλος γενόμενος καὶ οὐκ
αὐτὸς οὐδ’ αὐτοῦ συντελεῖ ἔκει, κάκείνου γενόμενος ἐν
ἐστιν ὥσπερ κέντρῳ κέντρον συνάφασ. καὶ γάρ ἐνταῦθα
συνελθόντα ἐν ἐστι, τό τε δύο, ὅταν χωρίς. οὕτω καὶ
ἡμεῖς νῦν λέγομεν ἔτερον. διὸ καὶ δύπτφραστον τὸ θέαμα²⁰
πῶς γάρ ἀν ἀπαγγελεῖ τις ὡς ἔτερον οὐκ ἴδων ἔκει ὅτε
ἔθεπτο ἔτερον, ἀλλὰ ἐν πρὸς ἔαυτόνι;

11. Τοῦτο δὴ ἔθέλον δηλοῦν τὸ τῶν μυστηρίων
τῶνδε ἐπίταγμα, τὸ μὴ ἐκφέρειν εἰς μὴ μεμυημένους,
ὡς οὐκ ἐκφορού ἔκεινο δι, ἀπείπε δηλοῦν πρὸς ἄλλον τὸ
θεῖνον, ἀτρ μὴ καὶ αὐτῷ ἴδεν εὐτύχηται. ἐπεὶ τούτην δύο⁵
οὐκ τὴν, ἀλλ’ ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ ὁ ἴδων πρὸς τὸ ἔωραμένου, ἐν
ἀν μὴ ἔωραμένου, ἀλλ’ τὴνωράνον, δι ἐγένετο δι τὸ ἔκεινο
ἐμύγνυτο εἰ μεμώτο, ἔχοι ἀν παρ’ ἔαυτῷ ἔκείνου
εἰκόνα. τὴν δὲ ἐν καὶ αὐτὸς διαφορὰν ἐν αὐτῷ οὐδεμίαν
πρὸς ἔαυτὸν ἔχων οὕτε κατὰ ἄλλου—οὐ γάρ το ἔκινετο¹⁰
παρ’ αὐτῷ, οὐ θυμός, οὐκ ἐπιθυμία ἄλλου παρῆν αὐτῷ
ἀταβεβηκότι—ἀλλ’ οὐδὲ λόγος οὐδέ τις νόησις οὐδ’

and above reason, as is that which is seen. When therefore the seer sees himself, then when he sees, he will see himself as like this, or rather he will be in union with himself as like this and will be aware of himself as like this since he has become single and simple. But perhaps one should not say "will see", but "was seen", if one must speak of these as two, the seer and the seen, and not both as one—a bold statement. So then the seer does not see and does not distinguish and does not imagine two, but it is as if he had become someone else and he is not himself and does not count as his own there, but has come to belong to that and so is one, having joined, as it were, centre to centre. For here too when the centres have come together they are one, but there is duality when they are separate. This also is how we now speak of "another". For this reason the vision is hard to put into words. For how could one announce that as another when he did not see, there when he had the vision, another, but one with himself?

11. This is the intention of the command given in the mysteries here below not to disclose to the uninitiated; since that Good is not disclosable, it prohibits the declaration of the divine to another who has not also himself had the good fortune to see. Since, then, there were not two, but the seer himself was one with the seen (for it was not really seen, but united to him), if he remembers who he became when he was united with that, he will have an image of that in himself. He was one himself, with no distinction in himself either in relation to himself or to other things—for there was no movement in him and he had no emotion, no desire for anything else when he had made the ascent—but there was not even any

ὅλως αὐτός, εἰ δεῖ καὶ τοῦτο λέγειν. ἀλλ' ὥσπερ
ἀρπασθεὶς ή ἐνθουσιάσας ἡσυχῇ ἐν ἔρήμῳ καὶ
κεταστάσει γενένηται ἀτρεμεῖ. τῇ αὐτοῦ οὐδίᾳ οὐδαμῇ
15 ἀποκλίνων οὐδὲ περὶ αὐτὸν στρεφόμενος, ἐστὼς πάντῃ
καὶ οἷον στάσις γενόμενος. οὐδὲ τῶν καλῶν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ
καλὸν ἥδη ὑπερβάν, ὑπερβάς ἥδη καὶ τὸν τῶν ἀρετῶν
χυρόν, ὥσπερ τις εἰς τὸ εὖω τούτου ἀδύτου εἰσόδου εἰς
τούτους καταλιπὼν τὰ ἐν τῷ νεῷ ἀγάλματα, ἢ
20 ἔξελθόντι τοῦ ἀδύτου πάλιν γίνεται πρώτα μετὰ τὸ
ἔνδον θέαμα καὶ τὴν ἐκεῖ συνουσίαν πρὸς οὐκ ἄγαλμα
οὐδὲ εἰκόνα, ἀλλὰ αὐτό· ἃ δὴ γίγνεται δεύτερα θεάματα.
τὸ δὲ τοσαὶ ἦν οὐ θέαμα, ἀλλὰ ἄλλος τρόπος τοῦ ίδειν,
ἔκοτισις καὶ ἀπλωσις καὶ ἐπίδοσις αὐτοῦ καὶ ἔφεσις
πρὸς ἀφῆρησιν καὶ στάσις καὶ περιπόησις πρὸς
25 ἐφαρμογήν, εἴπερ τις τὸ ἐν τῷ ἀδύτῳ θεάσεται. εἰ δὲ
ἄλλως βλέποι, οὐδὲν αὐτῷ πάρεστι. ταῦτα μὲν οὖν
μιμήματα· καὶ τοῖς οὖν σοφοῖς τῶν προφητῶν
αἰνίττεται, ὅπως θεός ἐκεώς ὄραται· σοφὸς δὲ ιερεὺς
τὸ αἰνεῦμα συνιεὶς ἀληθινὴν ἄν ποιοῖτο ἐκεῖ γενόμενος
30 τοῦ ἀδύτου τὴν θέαν. καὶ μὴ γενόμενος δὲ τὸ ἀδύτοις
τοῦτο ἀόρατόν τι χρῆμα νομίσας καὶ πρηγήν καὶ ὁρχήν.
εἰδῆσει ὡς ἀρχῇ ἀρχῆν ὄρατος καὶ συγγίνεται [καὶ]¹ τῷ
ἀμοιῷ τὸ ὅμοιον. *(καὶ)*¹ οὐδὲν παραλιπὼν τῶν θειῶν

¹ transposuimus.

¹ This is the only passage in the *Enneads* where *ἐκστασις* (usually rather inadequately and misleadingly translated "ecstasy") is used in any context relevant to the mystical union, if with Theiler and H-S we read *ἐκτάσις* in VI. 7. 17. 40. Theiler would prefer, for this and other reasons, to read [*ἐκ*]στάσις here and delete καὶ στάσις in the next line: see *Plotins Schriften VI (Indices)* p. 174. But even if the reading of the MSS is kept here, there is no good reason for

reason or thought, and he himself was not there, if we must even say this; but he was as if carried away or possessed by a god, in a quiet solitude and a state of calm, not turning away anywhere in his being and not busy about himself, altogether at rest and having become a kind of rest. He had no thought of beauties, but had already run up beyond beauty and gone beyond the choir of virtues, like a man who enters into the sanctuary and leaves behind the statues in the outer shrine; these become again the first things he looks at when he comes out of the sanctuary, after his contemplation within and intercourse there, not with a statue or image but with the Divine itself; they are secondary objects of contemplation. But that other, perhaps, was not a contemplation but another kind of seeing, a being out of oneself¹ and simplifying and giving oneself over and pressing towards contact and rest and a sustained thought leading to adaptation, if one is going to contemplate what is in the sanctuary. But if one looks in another way, one finds nothing. These are images; and this, therefore, is how the wise among the expositors of holy things express in riddles how that god is seen; and a wise priest who understands the riddle may make the contemplation real by entering the sanctuary; and even if he has not been there, and thinks that this sanctuary is something invisible, and the source and the principle, he will know that he sees principle by principle and that like is united with like. And he will neglect none of the divine properties which the soul can have even describing the mystical union according to Plotinus as an "ecstasy". It gives a very misleading impression of this austere and quiet mysticism.

ὅσα δύναται ψυχὴ ἔχειν καὶ πρὸ τῆς θέας, τὸ λοιπὸν ἐκ
 35 τῆς θέας ἀπαιτεῖ τὸ δὲ λοιπὸν τῷ ὑπερβάντι πάντα τὸ ὅ
 ἔστι πρὸ πάντων. οὐ γάρ δὴ εἰς τὸ πάντη μὴ ὅν ηὔει ἡ
 ψυχῆς φύσις, ἀλλὰ κάτω μὲν βᾶσα εἰς κακὸν ηὔει, καὶ
 οὕτως εἰς μὴ ὅν, οὐκ εἰς τὸ παντελὲς μὴ ὅν. τὴν ἐναντίαν
 40 δὲ δραμοῦσα ηὔει οὐκ εἰς ἄλλο, ἀλλ' εἰς αὐτήν, καὶ
 οὗτος οὐκ ἐν πᾶλιν οὐσίᾳ *(οὐκεὶ)*¹ ἐν οὐδενὶ ἔστιν, ἀλλ' ἐν
 αὐτῇ· τὸ δὲ ἐν αὐτῇ μόνη καὶ οὐκ ἐν τῷ οὐτι οὐκ ἐκείνῳ
 γίνεται γάρ καὶ αὐτός τις οὐσίᾳ, ἀλλ' ἐπέκεινα
 οὐ στατική, ἢ προσομοιεῖ. εἴ τις οὖν τοῦτο αὐτὸν
 γενόμενον θῶι, ἔχει δρούσιμα ἐκείνους αὐτὸν, καὶ εἰ ἀφί-
 45 αὐτοῦ μεταβαθεῖν ὡς εἰκὼν πρὸς ἀρχέτυπον, τέλος ἀλλά
 ἔχει τῆς πορείας. ἐκπίπτων δὲ τῆς θέας πάλιν
 ἐγέρεται ἀρετὴν τὴν ἐν αὐτῷ καὶ κατανοήσας ἐντὸν
 ταύταις κεκοσμημένον πάλιν κουφισθήσεται διὰ ἀρετῆς
 ἐπὶ νοῦν ἵνα καὶ σοφίαν καὶ διὰ σοφίας ἐπὶ αὐτόν, καὶ
 οὗτος θεῶν καὶ ἀνθρώπων θείων καὶ εὐδαιμόνων βίος,
 50 ἀπαλλαγὴ τῶν ἀλλων τῶν τῆς, βίος ἀνήδονος τῶν
 τῆς, φυγὴ μόνου πρὸς μόνον.

¹ Thedinga.

¹ "Beyond substance" is the often quoted foundation-text from Plato *Republic* VI 509B9; "the end of the journey" from *Republic* VII 532E3, again in the context of the ascent to the Good.

² These last words, in the common translation "flight of the alone to the Alone", are the only words of Plotinus at all generally known and remembered. He uses the "alone to the alone" formula elsewhere in the *Enneads* when speaking of our encounter with the Good (I. 6. 7. 8; VI. 7. 24. 7). It is in fact a fairly commonplace Greek phrase, generally, but not always, in a religious context. The closest parallel to Plotinus' use of it is in Numenius fr. 2 des

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before the vision, and will seek the rest from the vision; and the rest, for him who has gone beyond all, is that which is before all. For the nature of the soul will certainly not arrive at absolute non-existence, but when it goes down it will arrive at evil and in this way at non-existence, not at absolute non-existence. But if it runs the opposite way, it will arrive, not at something else but at itself, and in this way since it is not in something else it will not be in nothing, but in itself; but when it is in itself alone and not in being, it is in that; for one becomes, not substance, but "beyond substance" by this converse. If then one sees that oneself has become this, one has oneself as a likeness of that, and if one goes on from oneself, as image to original, one has reached "the end of the journey".¹ And when one falls from the vision, he wakes again the virtue in himself, and considering himself set in order and beautiful by these virtues he will again be lightened and come through virtue to Intellect and wisdom and through wisdom to that Good. This is the life of gods and of godlike and blessed men, deliverance from the things of this world, a life which takes no delight in the things of this world, escape in solitude to the solitary.²

Places (11 Leemans) 11–12 ὁμιλήσαι τῷ ἀγαθῷ μόνῳ μόνον. See E. R. Dodds "Numenius and Ammonius" in *Les Sources de Plotin (Entretiens Hardt V)*, Vandoeuvres-Genève 1957, 16–17. It does tell us something important about the mysticism of Plotinus, but can be misleading if considered in isolation from the rest of his writing about the spiritual life and Porphyry's account of Plotinus as he knew him. See my "The Apprehension of Divinity in the Self and Cosmos in Plotinus" (*Plotinian & Christian Studies XVIII*).